Ethics in Seventeenth Century English Puritanism

A Study of the Protestant Contribution to the Formation of Modern Democracy

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Preface

This study was initiated originally not by antiquarian virtuosity as a student of Church History, though it engaged itself deeply with Church-historical study, but rather by theological existential interest as a student of systematic theology and Christian ethics whose concern is always with his own church and nation in a particular place and time. This work was done in hope that through interpreting Puritanism with its character and significance we might be able to have insight in the destiny in which we live and to make clear our own responsibility for our nation. The choice of Puritanism was made in view of the fact that both Protestant Churches and democratic ideas in Japan were introduced from the United States and had their origins in Puritanism. Scientifically speaking, I became interested in Puritanism through my reading of the works of Troeltsch and Max Weber. Union Seminary in New York City is one of the best places of the world for the study of Puritanism, as it has a marvelous collection of 17th century materials which is widely known the McAlpin Collection of British Theology.

In dealing with Puritanism as a historical phenomenon, my theologico-ethical concern was combined with historical study in terms of history of Christian ethics. Methodologically speaking, I am fully aware of the problems pertinent to this sort of study as they have been already stated by Troeltsch. In this present work I have not discussed those problems, but I am convinced that the methodological problems

Troeltsch raised my be solved along the lines of the "method of dialogue" which may be applied not only to an interpretation of text (Bultmann) but also to an interpretation of historical phenomena. I have applied this method consistently in this study. This method is able to combine theological concern and objective historical study. This study is 'theological' in the manner in which it faces Puritanism, and it is 'historical' in its attempt to hear what Puritanism speaks from the past.

It is my pleasure to acknowledge my many obligations. I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Emil Brunner who first led me from systematic theology to the interest in Christian social ethics when I was his student and assistant in Tokyo. Here in New York I was raised in the honorable school of Christian ethics of Profs. Reinhold Niebuhr and John C. Bennett, to both of whom I owe very much. Prof. Pauck was an understanding teacher of his student who was struggling to relate theology and history. My special appreciation goes to Prof. Handy. He took pain in reading my first draft carefully with many valuable suggestions for the betterment of this thesis both in style and content. I thank two of my American friends, Mr. K. F. Thompson, tutor in Philosophy of Religion, and Mr. F. Snell, tutor in Church History, who helped "Englishing" my Japanese English. Finally, I want to express my gratitude to the libranians, Mr. Beach and Mrs. Foster, who allowed me to use the precious materials in the McAlpin Collection freely.

On the day of our Lord's Passion
at Union Seminary in N. Y.

Hideo Oki

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Summary

How did the change take place from the Lutheran idea of religious "personality" to the modern democratic man's self-consciousness in terms of "Human Right"? How did the change occur from "Status Society" to "contract Society"? How did a religous deepning of self in Protestantism become relevant to the modern society? Above all how did the shift take place from the mediaeval cosmo-ontological idea of Natural Law to the modern individual-personal idea of Natural Right? Fundamentally, what is the ethical meaning of Protestantism in relation to the formation of the modern world? These questions, stated in the Introduction, are answered by clarifying the ethics in 17th Century English Puritanism. This is a study done from the stand-point of the history of Christian ethics.

Chapter I deals with the question of the theological background of Puritan ethics, that is, Puritan Covenant Theology. The Puritan theology of Covenant is grasped as a commingling between the Reformed type of covenant interpretation, whose characteristics are historical, objective, and in a sense, sacramental(insofar as it defends the doctrine of Infant Baptism), and the Anabaptist type whose emphasis was laid more on ethical responsibility, contractual relationship, and is thus more subjective, or existential. The productive nature of Puritan Covenant Theology is in this combination, viz. combination of the historical and the existential (or the ethical). This commingling was not motivated by a mere theological inter-

est in synthesis, but had to be made because of the "destiny" in which the Puritan movement had to live. The Puritan theology became "ethical" theology (viz. "Divinity" in Ames' terminology). This theology was able to establish an ethical subject in the Protestant religious self-consciousness. The commingling did not reach any final theological synthesis, but on the contrary it created tension in the religious self-consciousness of Puritanism, and it led to the future denominational division of churches and groups.

Puritan casuistry, which is treated in the second chapter, is grounded, theoretically speaking, on the contractual emphasis in the interpretation of covenant. This is an ethics of "application." Puritanism was originally a political reform movement despite its religious appearance, but was obliged to transform itself into a preaching movement. It endeavored to to awaken man's spirit to serious religious self-consciousness and sought to direct the religiously awakened spirit towards ethical self-reformation. By this casuistry man was "concretely" changed. The focus of reformation was turned from the national church to an individual person. Here is given an analysis of Puritan casuistry represented by William Perkins and William Ames.

The third chapter deals with Puritan revolutionary ethics during the Civil War. The confrontation takes place at the level of "principle", but not on the level of "application". It is a battle between Weltanschauungen. The mode of combination between history and ethics in this revolutionary ethics is different from that in the casuistic ethics. Not by way of "application", but by way of "interpretation" ethics and history are combined. Various views of history , such as the Anglican view, the Presbyterian view, and the Independent view of history are examined in reference to their ethical implications. The Weltanschauung of Puritanism combined the biblical-universal history and the English-national history, and interpreted Natural Law as a revolutionary principle through this scheme. The modern idea of Human Right emerged from this struggle of Weltanschauungen. In this relation the significance of the Leveller movement is specially emphasized.

The questions which we stated in the Introduction are answered through this clarification of Puritan ethics. This is an attempt to give a historical introduction to a Protestant social ethics of a church which takes its spiritual rootage in Puritan Protestantism.

POINT OF VIEW: This is a study in the history of Christian Ethics. There are few studies of Puritan ethics done from this standpoint, even though some studies have dealt in part with the "ethics" of Puritanism. The nineteenth century Whig historian Gardiner has done a most remarkable work in restoring the significance of Puritanism from long neglect and distortion. It is due to him that the "Great Rebellion" was turned to the "Puritan Revolution."[1] From the viewpoint of the history of ideas, the famous historian Gooch brought Puritanism into new light and gave it due place in the development of the democratic idea in England. This work appeared at the turn of the century.[2] But it was from the Continent, some years later, that Puritanism was viewed from a wider concern with its world-historical significance. Three Germans may be mentioned: Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch, and Georg Jerineck. Weber's celebrated essay, Die protestantische Ethik and der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus, appeared in 1904, and Jerineck's Die Erklärung der Menschen and Bürgerrechte - Ein Beitrag zur modernen Verfassungsgeschichte, in 1895. Troeltsch, who was one of the first to interpret Puritanism from the viewpoint of the history of Christian Ethics, dealt with this movement in his famous Soziallehren, which first appeared in 1908, and more concisely in essay, Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt, in 1909. All these works pointed to a unique nature of Puritanism and its contribution to the formation of the modern world.

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[1] Gardiner's works are still interesting to read, although he has been criticized for being influenced by his contemporary "Hero-worship." Those German historians, Troeltsch, Weber, and Jerineck, were indebted to Gardiner's works. See the Bibliography for a list of his important works on this field. A good summary of the studies of this area since Gardiner is found in Christopher Hill's article, "Recent Interpretations of the Civil War", first appearing in History, No. 141-3, 1956, and compiled in Puritanism and Revolution, Studies in Interpretation of the English Revolution of the 17th Century, (London, 1958).

[2] Gooch, G.P., English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century, 1898, second edition with supplementary notes and appendices by Harold J. Laski in 1927, and recently in a paper-back edition published in 1959.

Weber's work, by virtue of the response from the English historian, Tawney, initiated a great and successful study in the field of Economic History. The leadership in the study of Puritanism has been taken in England largely by historians of Economic History. We owe much to their effort in advancing the understanding of Puritanism. Another element must not be neglected in this relation, the work of Marxist historians. A re-discovery of Puritanism was made by the German Revisionist, Bernstein. His work is known under the title, "Cromwell and Communism" which was published in 1930.[3] Following Bernstein, Marxist historians produced good study, though tainted by their ideology. Christopher Hill is a vital leader of this group, a good historian and productive writer.

If we turn our eyes to America, we note a remarkable difference in approach to Puritanism. This is due to the fact that the modern scientific study of Puritanism had been initiated by two famous professors who taught in the field of History of Literature. Both Perry Miller and William Haller are schooled in English Literature. They depended upon the methodology of literary criticism and interpretation. Both depicted Puritanism according to their own reading of texts, sociological study, if they had any, was secondary. What the English economic historians view from the conditions of the environment, American literary historians interpret from the characteristic mode of life which is expressed in texts.[4]

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[3] The original title is Sozialismus and Demokratie in der grossen englischen Revolution, first published in 1922, translated into English by H. J. Stenning.

Recently, however, the study of Puritanism in the field of Economic History has begun, again, to take the problem of religion more seriously, for it has come to realize the impossibility of sweeping away this movement merely by pointing out some economic conditions. Again, the interaction between religious elements and sociological and economical elements is recognized as the hinge of the correct understanding of this movement. American study had been open to the religious elements, for the picture of Puritanism as shown in the texts is religious, too religious. For example, Miller, who himself is no theologian, contributed an important interpretation of Puritan theology, which threw light on the Church-Historical studies of Puritanism.

Puritanism is as its name itself shows, a religious movement which was carried in a particular state of mind. Thus, this movement cannot be interpreted apart from religious concern. Sabine, a historian of political thought, rightly judged: "It is hopelessly unhistorical to take the seventeenth-century radical out of the religious and theological context in which, as a matter of fact, he did his thinking and his acting."[5] To be sure, the Puritan study by Church-historians is showing a rapid development in America, in conscious reference to the task of the self-understanding of Anglo-American type of Protestant Christianity. When both economic history and literary history came to have concern for the problem of religion, their need could be fulfilled only by better and more up-to-date clarification by Church History. As Economic History progresses, so must Chunch History. Often Marxist historians project into Puritanism their own version of religion which they learned not from Puritanism but from Marx and Engels. The same is true of liberal historians in their own way. But Church History must widen its own perspective; if it remains, as defined generally, as a historical study of the institutional side of church, it may not be able to grasp the real dynamic element of Puritanism. There are some important elements of Puritanism which break through the framework of the institutional church. Puritanism, viewed from its own nature, is not an "Institution" as such, but stands in confrontation to a sort of institutional church. Likewise, another legitimate theological study, History of Christian Dogma, may fail to deal adequately with this movement, if it is defined in an ordinary sense.

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[4] Not only Perry Miller and William Haller are the scholars in English literature, but other leading scholars of Puritanism, such as Don Wolfe, Woodhouse, and so forth, are men in the same field. Haller and Wolfe studied Puritanism in their purpose to clarify the spiritual background of Milton. Both are originally Milton scholars.

It is History of Christian Ethics, we are sure, that is able to grapple with Puritanism squarely and to locate and evaluate it rightly as it stands. Certainly History of Christian Ethics is the most underdeveloped area in the world of theological discipline. There are various reasons for this, but one reason is that this study is situated between various departments of study, between Church History, History of Dogma, and History of Political Thought, History of Law and Economic History. But these specialized ways of study are only the product of the modern university education. Puritanism lies as a complex object beyond these artificial specializations. Puritanism as it stands in history is a religious movement which bears with itself a particular religio-cultural idea, which can be grasped only partially by these areas of specialization. History of Christian Ethics, as situated between these specializations is very appropriate for this particular study.

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[5] George H. Sabine, The Works of Gerrard Winstanley, Introduction, p. 3.

Above all, we must note in this age, History of Christian Ethics had the last and most meaningful contact with History of Law in the West. We must mention, in this relation, a study of Puritanism which has been made by the historians of Law and Government. It has been inaugurated by Figgis in the latter half of the nineteenth century in England,[6] but in the United States this interest in Puritanism arose under the McIlwain. In the Puritan Revolution, the legal problem went beyond statute laws; the problem was not the exposition of the laws, but the philosophy of law, the problem of the ultimate of all law. In other words, it is the problem of the ground where both ethics and law take root, the problem of 'philosophy' of constitution. Therefore, Puritanism must be clarified from the depth where ethics and law meet one another.[7]

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[6] A modern study of Puritanism in the field of political science is deeply indebted to Figgis' works such as, The Divine Right of Kings (1896), From Gerson to Grotius 1414-1625 (1907).

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[7] McIlwain seems to be inflexible in holding fast his scheme "gubernaculum vs. jurisdictio" taken from Bracton, although this scheme as such is an efficacious tool for interpreting the development of the western sense of law. Applying this scheme to the interpretation of Puritanism he was led to misunderstanding of the meaning of Puritanism. He concluded his survey of political though since the ancient age in his book, the Growth of Political Thought, (N. Y., 1932, p. 387), with this remarks on the English Civil War in the 17th Century: "The English Civil Wars of the seventeenth century roughly threw English political thought permanently out of orbit and substituted a theory of might for a theory of law; and the English theory of sovereignty, as well as the Americal theory derived from it, has been eccentric ever since in its adherence one great colonial empire. . . . This fatal identification of sovereignty with might is the damnosa hereditas of the English Civil Wars, but the beginnings of the departure from medieval thought which led to it go back much further, and before the Long Parliament the more extreme of the Parliamentary party were placing a one-sided emphasis upon the the fixity of the costume in the medieval precedents and thus developing Coke's doctrine of the supremacy of the common law to the exclusion of the precedents for the King's administrative supremacy; whilst their opponents insome cases were asserting with the same lack of discrimination a complete royal supremacy over every part of the common law itself. Later, under the stress of war, there opposing and one-sided but notyet wholly immoderate claims gave way to extremer views; on the one side, to a radical republicanism which had no precedent whatever in medieval England, and on the other, to the advocacy of a 'despotic' monarchy like that of Filmer's Patriarcha, which the political thought of the middle ages recognized only to repudiate." According to this medievalist's view the modern Age has nothing but a negative meaning destroying the good heritage of the Middle Ages. Puritanism is nothing but a fore-runner of Hobbes or Austin.

This general view was brought to a rather unfortunate direction by his disciple, George L. Mosse, in his essay, The struggle for Sovereignty in England, 1950. He seems to have articulated his teacher's misjudgment with more one-sided documentation. Out of same academic stock, however, Margaret Judson, by more objective and impartial reading of sources, was able to grasp the real problem of this day. Cf. The Crisis of the Constitution, Rutgers University Press, 1949

Thus envisaged, concluding this brief survey of the history of the Puritan studies, Puritanism appears as a typical object of study by the method of History of Christian Ethics. So this mustbbe our view-point in this present study. To be sure, this kind of study was started by Troeltsch. We have not had any comparable study to Troeltsch's until today. Troeltsch's work, however, reveals, in view of the recent development in the more objective studies in Puritanism, some defects both materially and methodologically. Materially a defect is that his treatment was not endorced with satisfactory documentation by original texts. Although in line with Troeltsch's work, we shall attempt independently to read the orginal materials and seek to understand a meaning of Puritanism.

POSITION OF PURITANISM IN HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS:

Troeltsch viewed history of Christian ethics, in his Soziallehren, with the penetrating insight into the idea of Natural Law. For this idea constitutes something fundamental for Christian social teaching throughout the centuries of Church history. The position of Puritanism in history of Christian ethics may be viewed in reference to this idea.

Now, Troeltsch's interpretation of the establishment of the modern world is characterized, above all, by this judgment, that it did not begin with, to use his terminology, the "old Prtestantism," meaning the Protestantism of Luther and Calvin. He distinguished the old and the new Protestantism by an opposition of the idea of "Church-ruled-culture" and the idea of "Church-free-culture," that is to say, secularized culture, and also other oppositions based on or related to this opposition. The shift from the old to the new Protestantism took place in the seventeenth century, and the most important occasion was the Puritan Revolution. He writes:

> Der Staat Cromwells, der eben damit gerade ein christlicher sein wollte, hat diese Idee [viz. the idea of the free Christian State] auf kurze Zeit verwirklicht, und, so kurze Zeit dieses grandiose Gebilde dauerte, seine weltgeschichtlichen Wirkungen sind ausserordentlich. Denn aus dieser gewaltigen Episode verblieben die grossen Ideen der Trennung von Kirche and Staat, der Duldung verschiedener Kirchenegemeinschaften nebeneinander, des Freiwilligkeits-prinzips in der Bildung der Kirchenkörper, der (zunächst freilich relativen) Ueberzeugungs - und Meinungsfreiheit in allen Dingen der Weltanschauung and der Religion.[8]

He observed here "the end of the medieval cultural idea."[9] This means that the Middle Ages, together with Luther's Reformation, and even Calvin's, which were merely continuations of the Middle Ages in respect to the religious relation to culture, has been finally overcome. This is a judgment of keen insight, yet we cannot accept it without some discriminations. There is an opposition between "die staatlich-kirchlishe Zwangskultur" of the medieval and old Protestant time, and"die moderne freie individuelle Kultur", but the more important thing is to note the fact that, in spite of freeing culture from the rule of church, 17th Century Protestantism did not let culture simply become secularized; on the contrary it gained a totally different and more dynamic relation to modern culture. Without taking account of this, the contemporary religious situation of America cannot be interpreted with justice. The effect of Troeltsch's distinction is defective in that it fails to illumine some positive elements of the new Protestant culture idea. The defect will be discovered in the following judgment which he mentioned as one of the basic differences of the new Protestantism from the old, with which we must contend:

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[8] Ernst Troeltsch, Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt, (München & Berlin, 1906) S. 40f.

[9] op. cit. s. 41.

> Er [der Neuprotestantismus] hat ferner gründsatzlich neben sich ein vollig emazipiertes weltliches Leben anerkannt, das er weder direkt noch indirect durch Vermittelung des Staates mehr beherrschen will, und hat seine alte Lehre von der diese Beherrschung ermöglichenden und fördernden Identitat der Lex Dei and Lex naturae bis zum volligen Unverständnis vergessen.[10]

This is at once right and wrong; we do not need to speak about our agreement, but this is wrong if he lets this judgment simply stand without discrimination. It must be modified with regard to Puritanism. We must clearly say against Troeltsch that Puritanism must be seen not only in respect to the difference but also as the process between the old and the new Protestantism! Puritanism had maintained the identity of Lex Dei and Lex naturae consistently, and never given up this doctrine; this is true not only to the Presbyterians but also the sectarians. Certainly the Puritans did not, nor could not use it as a means of ruling the culture in the sense of the old time. But they had translated the identity of Lex Dei and Lex Naturae into a different context. This translation took place within the process of change from the old to the new Protestantism. This is, with regard to the content, the translation of it from the cosmic order to personality. In other words the seat of natural law is not in cosmos but in the person. Natural law as divine law no longer rules the realm of culture as in the Middle Ages; this is true, as Troeltsch had judged. But it does regulate culture in some way. In this translation the old cosmic natural law had changed to be a modern personal Natural Right! This change is meaningful to the formation of the modern world. But to grasp Natural Law in personal subject is to leave another element in the medieval Natural Law, viz. as the law of the outward realm of nature, out of relation to the realm of humanity. The modern personal idea of natural law became the principle of human society, but another aspect of the traditional Natural Law made the principle of nature.[11]

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[10] op. cit., s. 15.

Viewed broadly, the new interpretation of natural law in Puritanism has a very grave significance as event in the history of Christian West. The combination of Lex Dei and Lex Naturae began already in Paul, and the identification of historical Jesus and the cosmological Logos in John. This combination and identification, however, was given a philosophical treatment in the Apologists, and since then has been developed variously, finally reaching a consummation in Thomas Aquinas. Whether we take this development negatively as Harnack did, or positively as Gilson did, this achievement was a historical fact, and was of tremendous significance. The Truth of the Christian Gospel was revealed in a historical form, to say, it is a historical truth. Throughout its development this truth had been combined with a heterogeneous type of truth, truth which demands itself by necessity, that is to say, a natural truth. The seat of the former truth is primarily in personality, while the latter is in cosmological structure. The combination between the truth in history and the truth of nature. Certainly, we admit, this combination made the vitality of the Western civilization, but it is also fraught with many problems. This combination came to express itself in such a way as to universalize the historical truth by means of the cosmological principle of Logos. Thus, the cultural synthesis in the Middle Ages took such a form as a universalized history, or a historical universality whose concrete expression was "Christendom." The highly personal community, Christian Church, was turned to be an institution of cosmic latitude. The identification between historical Christ and the cosmological Logos was an ontological basis for Christendom, and the combination between Lex Dei and Lex naturae its ethical ground.

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[11] This split becomes decisive in the later 17th Century, the one as the principle of society being developed by Locke, and the other as the principle of nature by Newton. Hobbes in the mid-17th century is rather mediating this split, by employing a new idea of "fictious personality." Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan. This phase of development was clarified by Borkenau. cf. Franz Borkenau, Der Uebergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild, Paris, 1934.

Luther, however, broke through this cultural synthesis of the medieval Church by restoring Christian religion on the basis of personality. In this sense he recovered the original quality of Christian truth. For the truth of Christianity is, as Christ himself is a historical person, a historical truth, this truth sould live in personality, should be understood in personal encounter. He revived this truth, but as we shall see this revival was not extended to a re-formation of the medieval cultural heritages around his newly discovered truth of the Gospel. This situation seems to be analogous to his attitude on doctrinal matters as typically exemplified in the "Schmalkaldische Artikel," distinguishing what he could share with Rome and what he had to defend to his death.

Luther was, it is true, to give the last death-blow on the Thomistic form of cultural synthesis as the Supernatural overarching Nature, and translated the relation of the Supernatural and Nature into a different scheme, that is, from the ontological-hierarchical to the spiritual-paradoxical scheme. The Supernatural is now not on high above Nature, but is identified with a certain attitude of personality. On the other hand, the Natural in the medieval culture which had been already Christianized passed without essential change, for instance, into Luther's political theories. This Troeltsch particularly had pointed out. Luther only recast the Supernatural-Nature scheme into a new, that is, paradoxical relationship, taking from an old, hierarchical order. But in the realm of politics, the logic of paradox has no such effect as in religion. To this fact we must open our eyes. The most important effect of Luther's reinterpretation of that relation is only this, that it gave religious sanction to the rising absolutist conception of state. The elevation of the kingly power also had a medieval basis, but the difference is this: the medieval church elevated it as much as it could and still deal with it, but Luther elevated it without such as prospect for religious control.[12] Luther simply emancipated state from any restriction, and only gave some spiritual direction to state regarding its ideal form. It is only because he was surrounded by the contingent coincidence of many fortunate political conditions that the danger and problem implicit in his theory had not fallen upon Luther himself. But it is wrong for Luther to interprete this fortune as provided by God simply for the sake of the truth of God's Word. The irony is that a confession of faith can be valid even in the mistake in its application to particular political problems. This problem may , or may not, appear, and in Luther's case fortunately it did not. But this problem did appear in Tyndale's case in England, Tyndale who had almost the same theological and political position as Luther. He even carried Luther's political theory so far as to say "King is without law!"[13] He did so in prospect of reformation by means of the King's power. His words uttered at the stake disclose the depth of the problem: "Lord, open the King of England's eyes!"[15] Tyndale must have expected Henry VIII to become an Elector Frederick for England; Frederick had "open eyes," but Henry not. Thus, he had to be burned in his "Obedience of a Christian Man."

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[12] Cf. Fritz Kern, Gottesgnadentum und Widerstandsrecht im Früheren Mittelalter, (1914). Even for the medieval church it was not without hazardous result to elevate kingship, but the medieval church utilized natural law theory most effectively to control it.

[13] William Tyndale, The Obedience of a Christen man, and how Chriten rulers ought to governe, wherein also (if thou marke diligently) thou shalt find eyes to perceaue the craftie conueyance of all iugglers, (1528), Doctrinal Treatises and Introductions to Different Portions of the Holy Scriptures (Parker Society) (Cambridge, 1848), p. 178. "Hereby seest thou that the king is, in this world, without law; and may at his lust do right or wrong, and shall give accounts but to God only."

[14] R. Demaus, William Tyndale, A Biography (1886), p. 442

To be sure, it was in England that the problem implicite in Luther's political idea was disclosed, and thus was needed to be overcome. Tyndale's position, if not directly Luther's, of "passive obedience" was finaly overcome in 1640s. It is due to Puritanism that developed the Protestant religious principle to a high social relevance. This is our contention on the historical significance of Puritanism in history of Christian Ethics. To this fact we direct our study. This judgment, we know, may not be warrantable from the standpoint of biographical history. As Karl Holl judged, there is no passway from Luther, or even from Calvin, to the political ethics of Puritanism,[15] and it may be true. We hold this judgment only by possiblity of history of Christian ethics. The standpoint of history of Christian ethics takes this view: the Puritans knew Luther's doctrine of "freedom of Christian man," and gave it a special implication of social relevance. To repeat, this is our point: through the Puritan movement as a whole the transformation of the medieval cultural synthesis was achieved upon the basis of Luther's principle of personality; in Puritanism Protestantism found the cultural form most suitable to its own spiritual character. That is to say, through the Puritan movement the historical universality which was achieved by the medieval cultural synthesis had been shifted from the cosmological order to the inner personality. Concretely speaking, there was a transition from the cosmic Natural Law to the personal Natural Right. In this shift the idea of historical universality is to be held within personality, but not outwardly in the cosmic latitude. So to speak, the idea of Natural Right as Human Right is a Protestant version of historical universality.

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[15] Cf. Karl Holl, The Cultural Significance of the Reformation, p.72

The contribution of Protestantism on the formation of modern culture (here we are most concerned with the ethico-political aspect of the modern world) was made by Puritanism as its most positive form, in rendering a new historical universality as the basis of the coming new age. Protestantism has no other cultural form than this modern civilization with which it can feel a solidarity and with which it can deal responsibly. Our ethics must be built in the context of this cultural form. In such a prospect the study of Puritanism becomes more important. We pay attention to the shift from Natural Law to Natural Right, on the one hand, and to the development from "Personality" to Human Right, on the other. The former is a change from the objective-cosmic to the subjective-personal; and the latter an unfolding of the personal to the social. The former, speaking historically, is to deal with a change from Thomas Aquinas to Puritanism, and the latter with a change from Luther to Puritanism. It is the "historical" Weltanschuung in Puritanism that led the Thomistic cosmic idea transmuted into a subjective-personal idea. And on the other hand, it is through establishing ethical subjectivity that Lutheran religious personality was developed into social relevance. To make clear these changes is the purpose of our study.

To study Puritanism from the ethical point of view, therefore, is to make clear some fundamental elements in the interaction between Protestantism and modern civilization at the beginning. We admit, on the other hand, that the vital mutual influence between Protestantism and the modern civilization has been lost. The nineteenth century attempt for cultural synthesis by German Protestant theology ended in despair. The first half of twentieth century of theology put too much emphasis on eschatology, so that theological recapitulation of culture became more and more difficult. This situation makes it again necessary to look back to the original interaction of Protestantism and modern civilization. A theology which makes for cultural responsibility must have a correct understanding of this basis. For this reason we must go back to the seventeenth century Puritanism.

There are two things which we must heed in our present study: first, we must not allow Thomistic idea and Puritan idea of Natural Law and Natural Right to be confused. For example, Maritain, without this discrimination, thought to be able to ground Democracy upon a new interpretation of Thomistic idea of Natural Law.[16] Next, we think it better to distinguigh between the Puritan idea of Natural Right and that of the French Revolution. The French Revolution's interpretation, which was basically secular and rationalistic, caused misunderstanding and reaction of this idea, especially there was an unfortunate element when Romantic German theologians established their unique position against rationalism of Enlightenment and of French Revolution.[17]

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[16] Cf. J. Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, (New York, 1943)

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Now we shall state the problems with which we are going to deal in this thesis, in three headings though pointing to one subject, viz. a clarification of ethics in Puritanism with particular reference to the problem of the formation of the modern democratic world.

PROBLEM OF MAN: When the problem of the periodization of history is to be dealt with from the point of view of History of Christian Ethics, what matters is the change in the conception of man. This change may or may not go hand by hand with the changes in the outer conditions. In the midst of new political forms in the new economical structure of society, man can yet live old life. A Russian communist philosopher has become aware of this backwardness in the way of life in the midst of such a new socialist society. This fact can be a sign that there is another law besides the law of economics, which governs the moral life of man. Communism becomes dangerous in imaging and practising that this law of the moral life of man can be subject to the laws of economics and politics. The rise of a modern man took place by overcoming the old morals. As far as this old morality was based on a type of religion, it demanded a religious battle.

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[17] For example, Schleiermacher: it is characteristic for him to parallel Natural Law and natural religion. He writes in Christian Faith, postscript, p. 48: "For the former of the two terms (positive, revealed religion) we are given a good lead by the use made of it in the theory of Law, where positive rights [positive laws may be better translation for 'das positive Recht'] are contrasted with natural right [natural law, to be exact]. If we compare the two, one finds that natural right never appears in the same sense as positive, namely, as the basis of a civic community. Even the simplest and most original relationships, such as paternal authority or the marriage union, are in each society defined in a distinctive manner - in the developed State by express legislation of all societies. . . . Now it is the same with Natural Religion." The tradition of German Romantic theology placed emphasis on "positive religion" "positive laws" over against "natural religion" "natural law." It is interesting to note that Karl Holl in his interpretation of Luther's Reformation(in his above quoted book, p. 65) emphasized on "Luther's position" that "only historical law, not natural law is relevant."

As has been suggested, within Luther there co-existed the very new and the old, reconciled in paradoxical or dialectical way. His idea of freedom, "Freiheit des Christen Menschen," is a freedom of the Christian who is freed by the power of the Evangel. In this sense it is the "evangelical freedom." No doubt here was couched a great revolutionary meaning in this idea. Nevertheless, Luther was not such a modern man as Maritain thinks (although we do not take the same elements negatively as he does).[19] If we interpret a modern man as a man suitable to democratic society, a true modern man must be sought among the Puritans. The rise of a modern man begins when Luther's truth of personality was extended to a social significance. Luther's establishment of personality took place with his discovery in the realm of soteriology. The establishment of personality occurs at the occasion of "passive justification."

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[19] Cf. J. Maritain, Three Reformers, Luther - Descartes - Rousseau, (New York, 1929)

In this passivity, paradoxically enough, there is a positive basis of personality. At the self-negation, at the self-denial, man's self receives such a religious personality. This religious truth co-exists in his mind with such a political doctrine as "Passive Obedience." But, once he comes to this point, he should have realized the fact that there is no validity of religious dialectics here, for under the doctrine of "Passive Obedience" man can only have an occasion to loose his personality. In the religious dimension, passivity and negativity can be a "Moment" (in Hegel's terminology)to make for dialectics. The political passivity tends to destroy personality, although we admit that there can be a religious use of such a political passivity. Inview of this fact, the shift from Lutheran "evangelical freedom" to Puritanic civil liberty in relation to the conception of man becomes an important question.

This shift, which is from evangelical freedom to civil liberty, was achieved by the Puritans at the cost of Civil War and of ecclesiastical unity. It did not come from Luther himself, nor directly from Calvin either. They had to overcome first of all, the Lutheran doctrine of "Passive Obedience" in order to achieve this shift. This Lutheran doctrine entered deeply, most likely through Tyndale, into the heart of Anglicanism.[20]

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[20] Cf. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, pp. 80-106. With reference to the relation between the doctrine of "non-resistance" and the theory of "Divine Right of Kings", see pp. 219ff. Figgis gave a survey of a seried of books written on the ethic of obedience in the Tudor era: Tyndale's, The Obedience of a Christen Man, appeared in 1528, Robert Barnes in his Supplication to the most gracious prince Henry VIII and Men's Constitutions bind not the Conscience, declared most emphatically in favour of Passive Obedience. Another work of 1534, Opus eximium de

As Anglicanism utilized Lutheran political principles deeply, the principle of the Royal Supremacy was basic to Anglicanism. Founded on that principle, the policy of Absolutism had not a secular but a profoundly religious ground. When we consider the change in the conception of man, we must look at man in this age as living within that religio-political structure of society. The most typical view of life in Anglicanism had been expressed by such a typical Anglican theologian as Richard Hooker. He wrote these words in his dedicatory epistle to Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, prefixed to the Fifth Book of the *Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie*:

> ...that as, by the sword of God and Gedeon, was sometime the cry of the people Israel, so it might deseruedly be at this day the joyfull song of innumerable multitudes, yea the embleme of some Estates and Dominions in the world, And (which must bee eternally confest euen with teares of thankefulnesse) the true inscription, stile or title of all Churches as yet standing within this Realme, *By the goodnesse of Almightie God and his seruant Elizabeth we are*. (underlines are mine) [21]

(cont.) *vera Differentia Regiae Potestatis et Ecclesiasticae* expounded regal authority as against Papal, and claims God's ordinance on behalf of kings. In 1535 Bishop Gardiner 's work *On True Obedience* developed the notions of absolute subjection to the sovereign, of the King's power being God's ordinance, and of the sinfulness of resistance; *The Necessary Erudition of a Christian Man* by the same author written in 1543 argued: "Scripture taketh princes to be as it were fathers or nurses to their subjects." By this commandment the Fifth Commandment also subjects be bound not to withdraw their said fealty, truth, love, and obedience towards their princes, for any cause whatsoever it be, ne for any cause they may conspire against his person, ne do anything towards the hindrance or hurt thereof." And also remarkably, "And furthermore by this commandment they be bound to obey also, all the laws, proclamations, precepts and commandments made by their princes and governors except they be against the commandment of God." In the same spirit Latimer's Sermons, "An Exhortation Concerning Order and Obedience" and "Against Wilful Rebellion" gave a religious basis to the idea of non-resistance. Bilson, in 1585, wrote an essay, *The True Difference between Christian Subjection and un-Christian Rebellion*, which is important in this relation. This line of thought was to be carried on further by Jacobites in the 17th Century. The quotations above cited are taken from Figgis, *op. cit.* pp. 93 ff.

[21] Richard Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (1616 edition).

We must accept these words as they are meant and expressed by Hooker. He could speak like that, and it is important for us to adjust our mind to his mode of thought. He viewed the ground of life in the mutual overlapping of two realities: God and the Crown. The depth of meaning in this idea may be unintelligible to contemporary democratic Americans. But Hooker lived in different way as his expression shows.

The serious problem of man lies right here. Why did Hooker as a gentlemen view life in that way? In so questioning, we come to ask further about the ethic of a type of people who are now generally termed as "Gentry", Hooker being one among them.

The Gentry was a newly rising class in the 16th-17th Centuries. The alteration of the ruling classes had been taking place during those two centuries. After the most powerful elements of the Old Nobility had died out in the Wars of Roses, the leadership of the English society was taken over by the new Gentry. Of course, this change had not been accomplished without the struggle between the Old and the New people. Here is an interesting episode to illustrate the competitive relation between the Nobility and the Gentry, written by Henry Peacham in his The Compleat Gentleman,[22] published in 1634, which will do a great service to illuminate the ethical nature and ideal of the new Gentry:

> ...most pitifull is the pride of many, who when they are nobly borne, not onely staine their stocke with vice, and all base behaviour, relying and vaunting of their long pedigrees, and exploits of their Fathers, but (themselves living in sloath and idlenes) disparage and disgrace those, who by their vertuous endeauours are rising. To these and

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[22] Henry Peacham, The Compleat Gentleman (1634), p. 16.

> such, I oppose Marios, and that stout reply of his in Salust: They contemne mee as an upstart, I scorne their sloath and basenesse. Againe, What they idlely heare and reade at home, my selfe hath neither acted or seene; if they scorne mee, let them scorne their Ancestors, who came by their Nobilitie (meaning an eminence in act and deed--by the present writer) as I have done: If they enuy mine Honour, let them also anuy my labours, mine innocence, my perils, et. Now see how equally they deale: that which they arrogate to themselves from the vertue of others, that they deny me for mine owne, because I have no Images, and my Nobilitie is new, &c. Shortly after: I cannot, to proove my discent, bring forth the Images of my ancestors, their Triumphs, their Consulships; but if need be, I can shew Launces, my Ensigne, Caparisons, and other such warlike implements, beside a number of scarres upon my breast: these are my Images, my Nobilitie, not left me by descent and inheritance, &c. And as resolute of late yeeres, was the answers of Verduge a Spaniard, Commander in Friseland, to certaine of the Spanish Nobilitie, who murmured at a great feast, that the sonne of a Hang-man should take place above them, (for so he was, and his name importeth:) Gentlemen (quoth he) question not my birth, or who my Father was, I am the sonne of mine owne desert and Fortune; if any man dares as much as I have done, let him come and take the Tables end with all my heart.[23]

Here is revealed a fundamental ethical antithesis between the old Nobility and the new Gentry. The content of this antithesis is the opposition between the way of life of status by birth and that of eminence of deed. The latter position emphasizes the highly ethical qualities of man, labor and virtue. By serious effort man achieves the height of moral nobility. And this emphasis on studious labor was the keynote of Peacham's teaching. Peacham encouraged sons of the new Gentry to win this moral battle by urging them to arm themselves with high human qualities, in learning to begin with, and even in sports. A complete Gentleman must be able to "swim!" Finally the new Gentry won the competition for the social leadership, but the real problem of man still remains unsolved. The problem is revealed in the relation of the new Gentry to the Crown.

It was an important political task for a king of this age to keep balance of power between the old Nobility and new Gentry. But the position of the king was quite different than before. When Henry VII came to the throne, picking up the Crown in the field, he found himself more powerful with no serious competing power. Now the Crown was raised high as a sole possessor of power and prestige, and this became a summit which all the ways of human striving must aim at. In the lower ranks of society, since the leadership had changed, new people were thronging to rise. These people were very vital and ambitious; a man of mean birth could rise to an important position near to the king; Wolsey, Thomas Cromwell, and Cranmer were typical of this type of person. They rose by their own ability and fortune. But these people revealed their ethical weakness in their relation with the King. Anglicanism was carried on by these people. If there had been a strong Catholic nobility compatible with king in power and prestige, Henry VIII's political maneuver at the Reformation Parliament could hardly have taken that shape. The new Gentry had a power by their own effort and ability, and also by fortune; but the meaning of their power in society had to be recognized with respect to prestige. They were used by a King who is the source of prestige, because they were seeking prestige to give power social recognition and honor. Peacham was certainly right to reduce social prestige into the high quality of man as man. Nobility was, according to him, no longer a social status but a human quality. He opened up the way for the new Gentry to rise higher than the old Nobility.[23] But such a teaching could mean something only at a time when the old Nobility was declining. Both power and prestige were more centralized in the Crown overarching the subjects. The new Gentry in this situation had to seek in the seat of the King the goal of their efforts. For it is only by the grace (of God - granted in this age and) of the King that they could find the meaning of life. Thus, the new Gentry threw themselves under the centralized source of prestige; thus, viewed ethically, the problem of the spirit of the new Gentry was worse than in the old Nobility. This formed the ethical basis of Tudor Absolutism. Tudor monarchs did not need to express the theory of Absolutism as James did later, for there was a factual basis of this Absolutism. But this basis changed during the reign of Stuart kings.

The ethical character of the new Gentry appears in various occasions as strong in power, fervent in strife, but rest-less in spirit, and quite subservient and weak in respect of prestige. Thomas Cromwell is one of the best examples of such a man. He was quite effective as an instrument of the King, but when he lost the favor of the King, he cried out miserably for the "mercy of the King." But our question is, what change took place from Thomas Cromwell to Oliver Cromwell? from Hooker to Locke?

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[23] Peacham re-interpreted the meaning of Nobility: "Nobility then is nothing else then a certaine eminency, or notice taken of some one above the rest, for some notable act performed... and in that sense are Nobilis and Ignobilis usually among the Latine Peoets taken. More particularly, and in the genuine sense, Nobility is the Honour of blood in a Race or Linage, conferred formerly upon some one or more of that Family, either by the Prince, the Lawes, customes of that Land or Place, whereby either out of knowledge, culture of the mind, or by some glorious Action performed, they have been usefull and beneficiall to the Common-wealth and places where they live." (p.2) "Neither must we honor or esteem those ennobled, or made Gentle in blood, who by Mechanicke and base meanes, have raked up a masse of wealth, or because they follow some great man, whare the Cloath of a Noble Personage, or have purchased an ill Coat as a good rate; not more than a Player upon the Stage, for wearing a Lords cast suit: Since Nobility hangeth not upon the ayery esteeme of vulger opinion, but is indded of it selfe essentiall and absolute." (p.3).

This question may not be solved by applying the Marxist theory of class-struggle. Recent objective historical studies arrived at a conclusion that the English Civil War was not a class struggle but a struggle within one class in particular, the Gentry.[24] What matters here is that there are in an ethical sense two types of Gentry: one type built life and its meaning on the ground of Monarchy; the other, could stand by itself. There are still attempts in Economic History to interpret this difference as grounded in the different social statuses, Trevor-Roper distinguished "Court Gentry" and "Lerrer Gentry". Yule, rightly questioned Trevor-Roper's theme: Why "the declining recusant gentry" could be such ardent "Royalists"? But how can we deny this: that one who believed in the doctrine of "Passive Obedience" could not stand in the camp of the Parliamentary Army! The validity of ethical viewpoint lies particulary here in the interpretation of Puritanism.

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[24] The study of the Gentry is a most important and interesting one in the field of Puritan studies. The studies done by Tawney and Trevor-Roper were important ones. Here we mention an extremely interesting study done by an Australian historian, George Yule, whose work recently published, The Independents in the English Civil War, which is of great service to widen the view-point towards more closer interaction between sociological study and religious elements which are made clear by recent historical study of this area. Yle concluded thus, "I have found a clear-cut class struggle on Marxist lines does not emerge in a study of the main protagonists of the Civil War, although a class division is apparent between the Levellers and Independent Grandees. The Civil War was primarily a war among the gentry, . . . The Marxist division between old feudal classes and the bourgeoisie is false, . . ." (p. 81)

The Civil War had an ethical depth, and we must try to view it in this depth. A democratic man came out of the profound struggle in the deeper level of life overcoming of the Lutheran doctrine of "Passive Obedience" was a decisive occasion in the process of the changing of men. Puritanism made part of Gentry ethically strong and independent, for the Puritan Gentry could live without a King and, in its extreme case, even by killing the King. Luther could not produce this sort of man. Our study in History of Christian Ethics must show how this change took place.

PROBLEM OF SOCIETY: The change of man, above outlined, was related to the change in the conception of society. This change can be described generally as a shift from "Status Society" to "Contract Society." Here is a decisive overcoming of the old age. Contract Society is not identical with the Burgeois society, if by the latter the society of the Gentry is generally circumscribed. There are two forms of the burgeois society, Absolutist and Democratic. This difference, again, cannot be interpreted from the fact of the natural vitality of the Gentry, but appears only in the different ways of orientation of the vitality of the Gentry. The orientation as such is a matter of religion and ethics. Peacham, who was simply a moralistic educator, could not orient the Gentry's vitality but was merely interested in raising the Gentry, his own class. He could not go beyond the worldly teaching in his class-interest, and the defect is seen in his teaching on companionship:

> For the companions of your recreation, consort your selfe with Gentlemen of your owne ranke and quality; for that friendship is best contenting and lasting. To be over free and familiar with inferiors, argues a basenesse of Spirit, and begetteth contempt: for as one shall here at the first prize himselfe, so let him looke at the same rate for ever after to be valveed of others.[25]

His interest lies in the Gentry as a status, therefore it cannot overcome the status society. Thus it is not an intrinsic quality of the Gentry which caused the change in the conception of society, but a particular type of religious idea which gave a particular quality of the Gentry's moral acts.

Status society had a religious basis in so far as it is grounded in the order of Natural Law. Natural Law had justified the given social status as grounded in nature which is at once the order of creation. Man's existence is determined by the objective rule and law which has rootage beyond the possibility of man's responsibility and this ethical reaction. Man's ethics is nothing but duty as legality, that is, obedience to the given laws by which his being is basically determined. This was a medieval thought, and it appeared in Hooker, too. Hooker tried to fix the dynamic Gentry into a status society which should be built on both God and the Crown. Legality of human action breeds good: "Good doth follow unto all things by observing the course of their nature, and on the contrary side of evil by not observing it." Even Nature, he thinks, conforms to divine order of Nature, why not the "noblest creature" in the world?[26]

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[25] Peacham, op. cit., p. 40.

Over against this status society based upon the ontological Natural Law, contract society takes as its ground the individualized Natural Right. Reviving the medieval idea of Natural Law, Hooker attempted to bring a shaky society to a new settlement in a form of status society. Hooker himself is one of the new risen Gentleman; Whitgift is one too. We may use Trevor-Roper's term "court gentry" for describing these men. They attempted to stop and settle the dynamic rising power of the Gentry at the state that they had achieved. But this settlement would have been worse than that of the Middle Ages. There was an exit from the bondage of status in the medieval society. That was the monastery. But in the Anglican settlement this system of society was simply a weighty burden to the spirit. The idea of contract society broke down the artificial frame to curb the dynamism of the Gentry, and let it flow into another channel. Society is not based on nature but on volition. The principle of this contract society is not such an ontological Natural Law but, an individualistic Natural Right. Certainly this does not determine the order of society should/serve. Therefore, a social order as such is no longer deified and absolutized, but regarded as the means.

Status society is, so to speak, natural, but contract society is ethical. In the former the individual man is not the end but a part of the social whole. The higher quality of contract society is that it has another dimension which is lacking in status society. It is a dimension of teleology which is ethically articulated. Of course in the status society there is a teleology, but it is a teleology in the structure of society. Contract society has a teleology to the ideal structure of society. Therefore society's value should not be judged according to an existing social structure, but in reference to the standard which judges the society.

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[26] Cf. Hooker, op. cit., Book I, VIII, expecially section 8.

The shift from status society to contract society must be accompanied, or undergirded, by the change in theology which interprets society. In other words, fundamentally, there must be a change in theological conception of Natural Law. During the Middle Ages the idea of Natural Law had overcome the ancient theory of contract, not only of Germanic theory but also of Israelite theory. If a society's order is grounded in Nature, and in the order of Creation as the consequence of the identification of Natural Law and Christianity, then a constructual formation of society has no serious meaning. (In the Middle Ages the element of contract between the king and the people became merely a ceremonial process.) The ontological interpretation of Natural Law makes the theory of contract nonsense. If a political society is so natural as the relation between father and son, no contract is needed. Then, in order to make the theory of contract the idea of Natural Law must be re-interpreted anew. It means that the idea must be viewed not as a law of being, but a law of person. A law of person in Christian theology is viewed in relation of man

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with God, that is to say, in both Creation and Fall. Natural Law is now conceived not in an ontological but in a dialectic historical manner.[27]

If man is a being as created by God, he can hold that society is natural as created by God. No contract is needed, nor possible. Contract presupposes that the formation of a society is not primarily natural. It aims at the preservation of what is natural. But the aim of preservation, in turn, presupposes the hold of something natural. This dialectics makes the ground of social contract.

During the Middle Ages there was no use of this theological dialectics for the explanation of the formation of society. In Augustine two elements are co-existent with no synthesis: he admitted on the one hand the natural instinct for the basis of society, and on the other, asserted that the political society was formed as the result of sin. Thomas grounded the political society upon his natural theology. Puritanism took that dialectics as the logic of history of the beginning of the world. By means of this dialectic logic of history (of Creation and Fall) the Puritans overcame the medieval conception of society based upon natural theology.

It is by this dialectics of history that the Puritans grounded the theory of social contract. It is by this theology of history that the Puritans overcame the cosmological conception of Natural Law, and guided the change from Natural

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[27] The difference between ontology and dialectically conceived history here mentioned will be made clear to the degree how seriously and existentially Fall and Sin be taken. Luther and Kierkegaard are referred in this relation.

Law to Natural Right.

PROBLEM OF RELIGION: Our discussion above has been pointing to the problem of religion. The decisive matter in respect to those problems is the problem of religion. The change both in the conception of man and in the theory of society can hardly be interpreted deeply and justly without understanding the underlying problem of religion. The content of the change in the conception of man is the development from Lutheran evangelical personality to Puritan Human Right; and that of the change in the theory of society is the change from Thomistic Natural Law to Puritan Natural Right. How is religion related with these changes? Why did Puritanism connect itself with the rise of the idea of Human Right and of the theory of social contract? These questions make up the fundamental problem with which this thesis is going to grapple.

We must observe the character of Puritan religion. For our study the character, rather than genesis, of Puritanism is more important. The most characteristic character of Puritansim was revealed in its confrontation with Anglicanism. The opposition between Anglicanism and Puritanism has a different aspect and depth than such a contradiction between Calvinism and Arminianism, where the doctrinal concern stands on the foreground. This opposition is more involved, that is to say, it is a conflict in the religious Weltanschauung. To draw the character of Puritanism by the example of Tyndale, regarding his as the "first Puritan", is dangerous, for there is no immediate connection, but tather a serious contradiction, between Tyndate and the later Puritan movement. There is still a value in the traditional view; that is to say, Puritanism came to exist when the Marian exiles returned to England at the enthronement of Elizabeth. This Puritanism began to show its own nature at the occasion of Vertarian Controversy of 1566, and at the so-called Admonition Controversy of 1572 to 1577. Here Puritanism appeared more clearly within its own character in contrast to Anglicanism. This opposition there revealed, was to render a fundamental shape to the coming of the long struggle between Anglicanism and Puritanism throughout the 17th Century, although there were some occasions for both sides to modify their positions and fronts against one another. It was through the struggle with Anglicanism that Puritanism became a force which did much towards the formation of the modern world positively, relating itself to the rise of the idea of civil liberty and Democracy. We must emphasize that it is through this struggle, with Anglicanism, rather than from the intrinsic nature of Puritan Calvinism, that Puritanism could become meaningful in the formation of the modern world. In other words it is from the "destiny", but not from the "essense", of Puritanism. It is to this "destiny" of Puritanism that we must pay particular attention.

Anglicanism as well as Puritanism was a new religious "cultural idea" (in Troeltsch's terminology). But the difference between them is great and essential. Anglicanism is an ideology which arose from the English soil taking consciously and seriously the position as an English nation. But, Puritanism was rooted in alien soil. This general outward difference must be taken seriously. This difference was not only true to the contemporary witnesses,[28] but also to the modern historians, for example, such as Frere. It may be worthwhile to quote at length from Frere's judgment of Puritanism:

> The Puritan mind was the result of a transplantation, not a purely native growth, and though some of its characteristics were already latent in the English character, others were new and are more French or German than English. The Marian persecution drove the advanced wing of reformers into exile; and they found themselves at Basle, Zurich, Geneva, Strassburg, or Frankfort in circumstances which were to a certain degree congenial, but to a very considerable extent unlike what they had left behind. They found themselves among reformers who had entirely broken with the ancient continuity of church organization, and who were in a state of violent reaction against all externals. Both these features were no doubt to a certain degree attractive to the reforming temper of the exiles: they had seen the hollowness of the outward husk when it had lost the kernal, and they had already been forced in some degree to equally regard the ancient church organization, which was in possession under Edward and under Mary, as essentially hostile to their own plans of reform. But on the other had, the orderly and constitutional English mind shrank from the light-hearted levelling of the foreing revolutionist; it was not attracted nearly so powerfully as the French mind by the clear-cut system and ingenious machinery of the Calvinistic church polity; it had not enough of the German love for the interior idea to be able to afford to despise the exterior embodiment of it; it had a traditional love for objectivity and ceremonial, which had shown itself up to the last in the Englishman's unique ciligence in attending daily mass and in his unrivalled love for external pomp and ceremony both ecclesiastical and civil. The exiles were no doubt drawn from that section of English life which had most in common with the foreign views; but even among the, and even during the brief era of exile itself, there arose differences. Under transplantation some absorbed more and some less of the foreign characteristics.[29]

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[28] Cf. Hooker, op. cit., A Preface.

[29] Frere, W., and Douglas, C.E., Puritan Manifestoxes, A Study of the Origin of the Puritan Revolt, 1907, Introduction vii. Cf. Harkness, R., "The Development of Democracy in the English Reformation," Church History, Vol. VIII. "But Puritanism failed in England not alone because Elizabeth thus outwitted it in diplomacy, but because in its original, Presbyterian, form it was essentially foreign and out of accord with the historic development of Democracy in the English society." This judgment is based on his peculiar idea of the development of Democracy, but his judgment on Puritanism as a foreign ideology has some validity.

If we heed his High-Church Anglicanism, this judgment hits the point. For it took into view the aspect of Puritanism which came to conflict with Anglicanism.

The conflict between Anglicanism and Puritanism was not only a conflict between different types of theology (to be sure, this sort of conflict was to be drawn when Hooker was able to build successfully the Anglican theology on the different basis than Calvinism), nor a conflict merely on practical matters (though it appeared so), but a conflict of different religious ideas of culture. Anglicanism as a "cultural idea" was of the alien nature. Here is made a deliberate distinction between Puritanism and the Puritans, although this distinction whould not be taken to be separation. We cannot separate Puritanism as a "cultural idea" from the living Puritans, yet both can be distinguished in view of the fact that the name "Puritan" was applied not merely to a certain theological and religious character but to a religious state of mind which took a particular view of life, society, the church as an institution, the state, which was apparently different from Anglicanism. It is in opposition to Anglicanism which formed its own cultural idea being deeply steeped in the English history and also supported by the political advantage, that the Puritan cultural idea shows its "alien" character. The Puritans themselves were no less "English" than the Anglicans, yet their cultural idea was not always so. Take for example the Japanese Christians. They are Japanese, yet a Christian cultural idea which is contained in a certain type of Christianity which they accepted cannot be simply regarded as "Japanese" as well. This distinction must be envisaged in order to take up the problem correctly. As, despite the fact that there are the "Japanese" Christians, the "indigenization" is yet needed to us, so the English Puritans had to bear with them the problem of their "alien" cultural idea.

We must observe the difference between the native Anglicanism and the alien Puritanism in depth as well as in latitude. The first point is this, that Anglicanism took root in nationality, Puritanism, so to speak, in universality. Puritanism is one branch of the international Calvinistic movement. An alien ideology must take seriously its universal validity in order to assert itself into a national community. Then what is the ground of Puritan universalism? From this question we must proceed to the Second point: Puritanism had a different type of universality, from that of Roman Catholicism. Its universalism is one which is rooted in God's government of history. We cannot, however, neglect that Anglicanism also had a unique view of history. But yet there is a difference between the Puritan view of history and the Anglican view. History for the Puritans, primarily, is a history in God's view; while for the Anglicans it is a history in man's life. Anglicanism was based on the historical life of the nation. At the beginning there was a historical "view" for Puritanism, but not a historical "life". Thirdly, for the Puritanism, this historical view is not merely God's "contemplation" of the world history but rather God's "programme" for world history. Not only does God look at history, God wills history! This will of God is revealed in the

Scriptures. Puritan Biblicism is not the static principle often imagined. It is the intelligible part of God's counsel beyond human accessibility. They can read God's will in the Scriptures. The strength (and also the problem) of Puritanism is that the Puritans viewed in the Church of Geneva the realization of God's willed church pattern. Hooker wrote: "this church is found unconformable to the platform of Geneva."[30] ~~(p. 93, *Everyman*)~~ Here the conflict becomes clearest and sharpest. Anglicanism was opposed by such a vital force that shaped itself theologically from the mysterious root of God's counsel to the most articulate political fromt. The Puritans had a concrete example of God's realized will, the Genevan pattern of a reformed church. But it was merely a pinnacle of the vast theological edifice.

Fourthly, if a reformation such as the Puritans advocated in Admonition, should be erected in England, it must have now something more than merely personalconversion. The original advocates of Puritan reformation thought not of personal conversion, but rather of the transformation of national life as a whole. Here appears another deeper aspect of the conflict: Puritanism could not enter England without remolding the national life which Anglicanism took as its basis. Puritanism had the "Word", but not "life". A modern Anglican pastor said, "The Church must first imbody the truth in its own life."[31]

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[30] Hooker, *op. cit.*, A Preface, II, 10.

[31] *The Church of England, Its Nature and Its Future*, (London, 1919), p. 145.

The Anglican church took "life" more seriously than "Word"; the proclamation in life is primary, while the proclamation in word is secondary, and rests largely upon the proclamation in life."[32] This character is continuous with the beginning of Anglicanism. With this theology of "life", the Puritan theology of the "Word" (for God) conflicts. Puritanism must create new life out of the "Word" in order to get itself indigenous in England. Fifthly, however, this national life had an outword form, that is, laws of society. Therefore, the changing of the national life had political implications. Anglicanism which accepted the existant order of national life was not merely a religious organization, but had a political commitment. Hooker typically expressed this character in grasping the ground in terms of "received order" or"established order". He does not deal with the ideal order of life as such, but with historically established order. But this historically established order is God's order. This becomes the theme of his apologetics. "Surely the present form of church-government which the laws of this land have established is such, as no law of God nor reason of man hath hitherto been alleged of force sufficient to prove they do ill, who to the uttermost of their power withstand the alteration thereof."[33] In the contrast to this Anglican consciousness, Puritanism was detected with its seditious tendency. It is interesting that the Puritans were not fully conscious of this tendency, but from the view-point of Anglicanism it is undeniably clear that there is hidden in the Puritan deman "the pretended end of civil reformation."[34]

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[32] op. cit., p. 129.

[33] Hooker, op. cit., A Preface, I, 2.

These differences lay beneath the conflict between Anglicanism and Puritanism as first disclosed in the Admonition controversy. The fundamental pattern of theological difference which was made clear by Hooker's establishment of a unique theology was the opposition between Puritanic historical theology and Anglican metaphysical theology. This opposition, however, is not as clear as the terminology as such would imply. For, Hooker's ontology was based upon a certain interpretation of history, that is to say, upon his acceptance of the 'historical' reality of Elizabethan Settlement. At the time of this Settlement, "under the happy reign of her Majesty", the historical development which aimed at the reformation came to an end, and thereupon he justified it in the realm of metaphysical thinking. Upon this general difference, another more material difference becomes clear, the difference between Puritan biblical theology and Anglican natural theology. The introduction of natural theology to Anglicanism has a different meaning that in Thomas or Luther. Thomas is hierarchical in dealing with natural theology, while Hooker is rather modalistic; Luther is dialectic, while Hooker inclines towards the philosophy of identity. Thus, the opposition between Anglicanism and Puritanism was from the beginning fundamental, deeply dividing their states of mind. Rupp, using Toynbee's terminology, has interpreted Puritanism as a "response" to Anglicanism which became too humanistic, and I think this is right, for Hooker grounded his metaphysical theology upon the so-called English Renaissance, upon the movement of Elizabethan humanism.[35] Puritan historical theology, on the other hand, took its root deeply in the tradition of historical theology of the Reformed Church on the Continent.

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[34] *op. cit.*, A Preface, VIII, 8.

This laid the basic theological difference, but it is not quite true to say that this difference continued throughout as the struggle between two religious forces. On the contrary, Hooker's metaphysical theology was not taken over by the next generation. That is to say, the cosmological "harmony" which Hooker had described the truth and goodness of the world, was no longer acceptable to man in that society. At the turn of the century, men such as John Donne and Henry

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[35] To view Hooker in relation to Elizabethan Renaissance, see, for example, E. M. W. Tillyard, *The Elizabethan World Picture* (N. Y., 1944). A more recent and interesting study was done by Paul N. Siegel, "English Humanism and the New Tudor Aristocracy", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, (XIII, 1952). The latter is a study of the new Gentry, which may give a clarification of the background of Hooker's life and thought. Arthur B. Ferguson's article "Renaissance Realism in the 'Commonwealth' Literature of Early Tudor England" in the same magazine XVI, 1955, also helps our understanding of the background. The relation between Hooker and the English Humanist tradition may be taken more positively if we turn to an interesting biography written by Sisson, *The Judicious Marriage of Mr. Hooker and the Birth of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, published in 1940. According to his opinion, his wife's family ,the Churchmans, was the place for him to develop the thought to be expressed in his great work through his collaboration with Sir Edwin Sandy, George Cranmer, and Dr. Spenser, who were a typically new gentry of Humanistic learning. (Cf. Sisson's book, p. 33 and p. 47).

Burton had todecide between skepticism and fideism. Both skepticism and fideism were nothing but the signs of the destruction of Hookerian humanistic synthesis. On the other hand, Puritanism as such had to modity its front considerably, though comparatively in less degree than Anglicanism. In the seventeenth Century the Anglican theological situation became miserably confused. Rationalism was to contract itself with Arminianism, Chillingworth and Laud being representative; the historical tendency was to ally with the theory of Divine Right, not only in politics but also in religion, for example, Hall's teaching of divine right of episcopacy.

In our present concern, the development of Puritanism must be dealt with more attentively. Puritanism, which disclosed itself at the occasion of the Admonition Controversy was soon oppressed, and had been driven underground since the 1580s. Haller described this fact as meaning that the Puritan movement became a preaching movement. We accept this judgment as true. The Puritan movement since 1880 is no longer the same, at least in appearance, as the Puritanism of the Admonition Controversy. For it was a political movement prompted by a unique Calvinistic theology such as we have described above. The Puritans were Calvinistic not only in the determination of what lay behind their activity but also in guiding their political activity itself. When they presented Admonition to the Parliament, it was because Calvin taught that the lesser magistrate should take up its responsibility of doing God's will for reformation, when the king was not capable for this work. The Puritans did not think that God's will should be responded to only by an individual man, but by man in collective solidarity. Reformation should be a national engagement to the will of God. But it is clear that no relation may come out of this kind of Puritanism tothe formation of the modern world. This Puritanism as it was had almost nothing to do with the rise of the idea of human right and of the modern theory of social contract. But, on the other hand, it is true that there was such a relation in the course of development of Puritanism. We shall discuss this later in our main part of this thesis. Here this much should be anticipated: the development of Puritanism may be viewed as a process of rendering itself indigenous to the English soil. The original Puritan movement of the Admonition had failed, but, being driven into the Preaching movement, it took this failure an occasion to assert itself in society by a very new method. Thus started a new way of the indigenization of Puritanism in English society. In this process of indigenization Puritanism did much towards the formation of the modern world. In so doing, Puritanism successfully overcame its original alien character. Through this process the Puritans allowed more room for the idea of natural law in their rigid biblicism, for Calvin had degraded the position of Natural Law under his biblical principle. Nevertheless, the Puritans accepted the idea of Natural Law within the biblical-historical scheme of theology, in a way greatly different from the Hookerian treatment of the Bible and Natural Law. Hooker absorbed the Scriptures within the system of natural law; for the later Puritans the order is reversed.

But we must admit that the process of indigenization was also the process of disintegration of Puritanism. All the differences among Puritanism came out of Puritanism as the preaching movement. When the long hoped change was finally granted to Puritanism in 1641, it already lost the power to recover its original character in 1560s-1570s. The Puritan had to move in an unprecedented way toward a solution: Reformation as Toleration!

Through this process, the change from Natural Law to Natural Right and the development from personality to Human Right, come to be interwoven with more the broader problem of Puritan ethics. But the Puritan ethics must be grasped as a very complicated movement of history. Puritan ethics has hardly turned out to be a system; it is better interpreted as development. Puritanism was turned from a political reform movement to a preaching movement, from the political reformation of society to the ethical reformation of man. Through this change, Puritanism created life, a new life, out of the "Word". But this life was of a different quality, different than ever understood within the thought realm of Anglicanism. Weber is quite right in saying that the difference between the Cavaliers and the Round-Heads was based not on mere differences of policy but in concepts of"man".[35] Puritanism created a new man, a new Gentleman, who was able to live without a king. This type of man was the subject of revolution in the 1640s. The most representative figures are Lilburne, Milton, and the like. In these people Lutheran evangelical freedom was decisely turned to civil liberty. A society in the mind of these people was no longer an old society. The modern world begins thus.

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[35] Cf. Max Weber, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus (Tübingen, 1934 edition) S. 81, "Kavaliere und Rundköpfe empfanden sich nicht einfach als zwei Parteien, sondern als radikal verschiedene Menschengattungen, . . ."(underline is mine).

Chapter I

Theological Background of Puritan Ethics

-Covenant Theology*

Puritanism, as we have described in the Introduction, has a particular relation to the formation of the modern world, insofar as it contributed to the change of the basic ideas of man and society. In the personal dimension, the change occurred from "religious personality" (in Luther) to social Human Rights, from "evangelical freedom" to social liberty, that is to say, from Luther to the Puritans. In the social dimension, the change was from status society to contract society, from cosmo-ontological Natural Law to socio-personal Natural Right, and from Thomas Aquinas and Richard Hooker to the Puritans. Underlying these changes is a deep and important problem of ethics, so that a simple, superficial observation of these changes, all too familiar in the history of thought, does not deal with the real problem satifactority. We must penetrate to the deepest level on which these changes took place.

There is a very complex development, viewed from the theological point of view, underlying the change from Lutheran personality to Puritan human right, or from Lutheran evangelical freedom to Puritan civil liberty, for Lutheran personality has a soteriological root, andit requires for its proper understanding a category of "corum Deo." It must be understood in the sight of God, but how is it possible to interpret it in the sight of society as well? One may object that Lutheran personality is a constitutive principle of community. It is true, but the question is this, that there is still a differ nce between Lutheran idea of religious personality and the Puritan idea of the more civil personality. Is it not true, that in the Lutheran thought-realm personality, which was established corum Deo, at the soteriological occasion of self-denial, is absorbed into a community as a merely serving member? The relation between personality and community in the case of Luther is, again, in tension and paradox. Because of this paradox, which takes a deep root in religious logic of existence, Luther's personality is not self-asserting but self-denying even in the sight of society. What matters here is that in Luther's religious logic an ethical subjectivity cannot be established in a positive sense. The most serious question is, therefore, how is it possible to establish the ethical subject in relation to Luther's personality? If it is possible, the line from Luther to the Puritans is to be drawn as a legitimate development.

On the other hand, the transition from Thomistic-Hookerian idea of Natural Law whose characteristic is cosmo-ontological, to the Puritan idea of Natural Right demands that we deal with another difficult problem, a problem of Weltanschauung. Without a change in the view of the world, the other change would have been impossible. Here again, the problem of history versus ontology comes to the fore. This change was carried out by a a historical Weltanschauung. In other words, it is through the medium of a historical Weltanschauung that cosmo-ontological Natural Law was transmuted to appear in human subjectivity.

These questions must be treated in clarifying the Puritan theology. The Puritans were, as is generally recognized, ethical; but this should not mean that they were un-theological. On the contrary, here is a unique theology, which may become, more meaningful to be sure, after the Reformation theology either of Luther or Calvin has been quite thoroughly drawn up. The Puritan ethics cannot be understood without knowing this theological background. It is now generally recognized as "Covenant Theology." But the interpretation of this theology is not easy, in the historical point of view, despite the fact that a correct understanding of the Puritan ethics depends upon the correct interpretation of this theology. We must proceed avoiding every error which may block the way.

I. Two Types of Covenant Theology

Modern rediscovery of the great importance of covenant theology in Puritanism was made by Perry Miller.[36] He showed that the Puritans had a different type of theology from a pure Calvinsim. This hypothesis was taken over by a church historian, L. J. Trinterud, in his essay "The Origins of Puritanism." He makes two important points: one is to relate Puritanism with the theology of "Rhinelander Reformers, such as Zwingli, Jud, Bullinger, Oecolampadius, Capito, Bucer, Martyr." The other is to displace Calvin from generally accepted high position in relation to the English Puritans. "The Genevan Influences came late, after the essential patterns of Puritanism had been established."[37] There are many notable contentions and illuminating citations in this article, so that it may be duly recognized as a milestone in the history of Puritan studies. Above all, it is significant that this is one of the first serious studies of Puritanism to be done from a modern point of view by a church historian.

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[36] Two important documents may be mentioned: The New England Mind, N. Y. 1936 & 1954, and one article "The Marrow of Puritan Divinity", Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, XXXVII, (1936).

Let us proceed by raising some questions. The old theory, generally accepted, was that the Puritan movement had begun when the Marian exiles who were impressed at the Genevan reformation returned in England to promote a further reformation of Anglican Reformation. Is Dr. Trinterud's thesis to displace wholly this old theory? Here occurs a problem of the formation of the historical concept, which has been discussed by the NeO-Kantian philosophers.[38] The term "Puritanism" as a historical concept is a very complex one. But how much further historical concept is to be extended in its connotation, this is the question. Is Tyndale the "first Puritan"? Should this be said in a "Historical" sense? He seems to apply the term"Puritan" even to some Anglicans, but in this case the terminological question affects the interpretation of Puritanism as a whole. Isn't it true that Puritanism appeared on the surface of history in its characteristic opposition to Anglicanism during the reign of Elizabeth? Puritanism, insofar as it reveals its character at the Admonition Controversy, does show elements fore favourable to the old theory. "His [Calvin's] books are almost the very canon to judge both doctrine and disciple by."[39] Such was a Hooker's judgment. Hooker's apologetic effort was to defend Anglicanism over against such a Calvinistic Puritanism. Calvinism in this case was not merely a theology but also a religious cultural idea. We have taken "Puritanism" in this sense.[40] If Puritanism may be interpreted so, isn't it still appropriate to see the origin after the return of the Marian exiles?

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[37] In Church History XX, (1951), 37

[38] One of the main causes of difficulty and confusion in the Puritan studies is ambiguity of the concept "Puritanism". In order to be fruitful in this area of study, it may be worthwhile to re-examine our historical conception, for which purpose Heinlich Ricker's famous essay, Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, Eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften, (Tübingen, 1902) may be helpful.

What supports his thesis seems rather theological than historical, although his method is genetic-historical. He connected the Puritans with the Phineland theologians because of an observed theological similarity between them; and he almost dissociated Calvin from the essential Puritan theology because the Puritan theology of covenant is different from Calvin's theology. This assertion was made by assuming the existence of difference between the Rhineland Reformers and Calvin in the conception of covenant:

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[39] Hooker, op. cit., A Preface I, 8.

[40] At least a contemporary view of Puritanism in contrast to the Anglican Royalism was in this line. For Example, William Dugdale in his A Short View of the Late Troubles in England (1681), took the view which supports our definition. Cf. expecially chapter Two of the above book.

> For Calvin, and so in the Geneva Bible, the covenant of God is God's promise to man, which obligates God to fulfill. Moreover, in the incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ God did actually fulfill that promise to which his covenant bound him. Therefore, the sacraments are witnesses, attestations, or seals to the effect that God has long since fulfilled his covenant, his promise. Therefore, covenant and testament are identical. In the covenant theory of the Rhineland and of the English reformers the covenant is a conditional promise on God's part, which has the creating a mutual pact of treaty. The burden of fulfillment rests upon man, for he must first obey in order to bring God's reciprocal obligation into force.[41]

His whole thesis, it may easily discovered, is based upon this theological discrimination. He introduced an opposition between Calvinistic objective type and the Rhinelander-Puritanic reciprocal and contractual type of the understanding of covenant. The question is whether this distinction can stand as it is here asserted? The newness in this hypothesis, viewed in the broader perspective, lies in his challenge to the accepted theory that Calvin followed the tradition of the Reformed theology in his conception and use of the idea of covenant. Ever since Schrenk studied the tradition of federal theology in Reformed churches, the interpretation of Calvin's thought of covenant as standing in the line of Zwingli and Bullinger has been widely recognized on the continent.[42] Dr. Trinterud, however, did not confront squarely Schrenk's interpretation of federal theology, except by giving a few words of comment: "While this monograph /Schrenk's "Gottesreich und Bund im alter Protestantismus"7 is the most thorough history of the covenant, theology yet written, it covers the period of origins much too hastily, and generalizes much too broadly. The Puritan phase is hardly noticed."[43] It appears to us, however, that in order to contribute towards a better interpretation of covenant theology Dr. Trinterud should have dealt with this Schrenk's theory seriously, for Schrenk did not see such a distinction between Zwingli-Bullinger's interpretation of covenant and Calvin's. Schrenk drew out the line of the Heisgeschichte school from the Reformed covenant theology, while Dr. Trinterud attempted to clarify the contractual-ethical tendency in the same stock of covenant theology. This symbolizes a theological difference between America to Europe.

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[41] "The Origins of Puritanism", Church History, XX (1951), 45

[42] Schrenk, Gottlob, Gottesreich and Bund im älteren Protestantismus, vornehmlich bei Johannes Coccejus. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Pietismus und der heilsgeschichtlichen Theologie. (Gutersloh, 1923)

There are several points which need more discrimination:

1. One may not immediately identify covenant and contract;
2. Natural law has such manifold meanings that it should be used with very careful discrimination. Natural law-contract can hardly explain generally in view of the historical facts.
3. The church-covenant idea is more specific than Dr. Trinterud assumed here. 4. The historical conception of covenant may not be neglected.

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[43] Trinterud, op. cit., 56

1. Despite a "tendency" to interpret covenant in terms of "contract", contract and covenant can not be absolutely identified. Contract was a sociological term. There was a tendency to apply the meaning of contract to the biblical term covenant. But contract is an idea which presupposes a full ethical responsibility, and this did not immediately suit the biblical term "covenant." For example, Ames used both contract and covenant and distinguished them:

> Quest: What law is there of the efficient causes of contracts? Answer: 1. To a lawfull contract, first are required Persons fit to a Contract, they which have the administration of their goods, or power to oblige themselves in such things. 2. Hence Infants, mad-men, and prodigals are not fit to make a Contract. . . .[44]

He excluded infants from possible partnership of contract. Nevertheless, it must be noted, he admitted infants of the believers in religious covenant. If the term contract is applied to covenant, covenant will be highly "ethicized." Anybody who is ethically irresponsible cannot be in covenant, so that the infants must be excluded out of covenant. It is in a strict case, as we see in the Anabaptist interpretation of covenant. An objective element in covenant is purged out. So we must take heed in what sense contract is assimilated into religious covenant, when contract is applied to covenant. We should say that a contractual interpretation would intensify an ethical tendency in covenent, so that mutuality is emphasized and one is led to the subjectivistic-individualistic interpretation. We admit that there was such a tendency present in

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[44] Ames, _Of Conscience_, lib.V, 42.

Puritanism, but it was there only as a tendency.

2. The next question is his coupling of natural law and social contract. More discrimination is needed before the connection is applied to historical interpretation. For the combination between natural law and social contract should not be taken for granted. In a sense then ideas stand as mutually exclusive, and actually in history, as Fritz Kern described with the early medieval development of political theory, the social contract theory of old German tribes had been overcome by natural law theory of the Chruch. Dr. Trinterud writes: "Politically the natural law-social contract theory had had some vogue in medieval English thought, but it came into open allience with religious reform first in John Ponet, John Knox, and Christopher Goodman during the Marian Exile."[45] On the contrary, did those Scottish Reformers' theory of contract not derive from Calvin? Was it from the English common law tradition? The law system in Scotland was not the doctrine of the common law, but Roman law; how does he combine English common law with Scottish Reformers? On the other side, he completely overlooked the plain fact that the very idea of natural law was also utilized by Royalist leaders of 1640s as well as James I and his brain trust. They all emphasized that the relation between king and his subject is "natural" but not "contractual."

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[46] Trinterud, op. cit., 39

3. Dr. Trinterud writes: "The very necessities within which the Marian Exiles found themselves required that they organize themselves into congregations or churches while away from England. Here the medieval notion that all bodies politic come first into being by a contract provided pattern enough for them."[47] And then in the footnote he explains: "The attempt totrace the origins of the church covenant idea in English Puritanism to an Anabaptist source, as in C. Burrage, The Church Covenant Idea, 1904, fails to take account of the indisput able, widespread interest in both the Rhineland and England, in the social contract theory of the state, and in the covenant theology, prior to any possible influence from Anabaptist sources."[48] This assertion, however, leads to a confusion: for if he admits the church covenant idea generally to Puritanism as a whole, how he can come to terms with later events, such as the disputes between John Ball and Richard Bernard, and the New England leaders, above all, Richard Mather concerning the church covenant, and also later between Edmund Calamy and his close Presbyterians, and the New Englanders, this time represented by Thomas Hooker.[49]

All the questions about Dr. Trinterud's thesis finally point to his definition of the idea of covenant. If he took the idea of covenant too narrowly, he did so because he willfully rejected another interpretation of covenant as held by Calvin.

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[47] op. cit. , 45

[48] Trinterud, op. cit., p. 56.

[49] Cf. Chapter III of this Thesis, pp. 300ff, especially pp. 312-313.

4. Lastly, his narrow definition of the idea of covenant makes it difficult to treat the"historical" aspect in covenant theology. He seems to have been engulfed onesidedly in Perry Miller's definition of the Puritan covenant theology. There is, however, a slight difference: Perry Miller said the Puritan theology was different from a pure Calvinism, while Trinterud declared it was different *from the beginning*. Certainly, we must not underestimate the strength of this view. There are some elements which can be explained in the line of Miller-Trinterud interpretation, but also there is another no less important aspect of covenant theology which slips out of their hands. This element is what Schrenk had traced, a historicalelement which points towards *Heilsgeschichte*. In Puritanism this historical element is so evident that no one should overlook it. But, due to their too narrow definition of the term, Miller and Trinterud failed to account for this obvious truth.

Dr. Trinterud's method is a genetic method, but he inserted a typological method rather inconsistently: he viewed a typological difference of covenant theology between Calvin and the Rhinelanders. He should have done to justice to the Calvinistic pattern of covenant theology with his same genetic method by showing how this type arose and was developed. He did not trace with the same strictness of genetic method this line of the Calvinistic concept of covenant. But our question is whether there really is such a typological difference between Geneva and the Rhineland. Approaching the problem from a different side, we may ask whether there was a more important and clearer typological difference incovenant theology than in between Geneva and the Rhineland. Yes, there was. The more important contrast in covenant theology took place between the Anabaptist of Rhineland the Reformed of the same area! This difference,we must note, was unmistakably a vital issue of that day, and both sides, especially, the reformed theologians, were involved deeply in this debate. In comparison to this conflict, which was fought upon the basis of different interpretations of covenant, the typological difference between Geneva and the Rhineland cities, seems to have not then been recognized as important. The battle line was drawn not between Geneva and the Rhineland (those in Strassburg and the so-called Swiss Brethren) and the Reformed of the same area. The debate had a central issue: viz. the doctrine of Infant Baptism. It was around this doctrine that interpretations of covenant theology divided between the Reformed and the Anabaptist.

In order to make clear this conflict we must first turn to the Anabaptist conception of covenant. Our study is not interested in genesis but in character; our method, therefore, if morphological than genetic. We are now in a better position to know the Anabaptist, objectively, than ever before. We are greatly indebted in the effort of the Mennonite theologians and historians in this respect. From their works we know now that there was a unique theological basis for the Anabaptist movement.[50] This theology underlies not only the rejection of the doctrine of Infant Baptism but also their peculiar conceptions of church, of Christian life, etc. The most articulate theological thought of the Anabaptist, especially of the Brethren in South Germany and Switzerland, was Covenant theology! It is this covenant theology underlying the Anabaptist doctrines that challenged and deserved such a serious theological rebuttal from the side of the Reformed theologians.

We shall focus our attention on Pilgram Marpeck (1495?-1556), re-discovered recently in his importance as the most prominent theologian and spokes man of the Brethren of the Rhineland.[51]

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[50] A best and most recent bibliographical survey of the recent study of Anabaptism is made by Robert Friedmannin his two articles "Recent Interpretations of Anabaptism", *Church History*, XXIV, (1955), 132-151, and "Progress in Anabaptist Studies: A Comprehensive Review 1955-1957", *Church History*, XXVII (1957), 72-76. Harold S. Bender, the leader of the Anabaptist study in America, wrote a good summary "Recent Progress in Research in Anabaptist History," *Mennonite Quarterly Review*, VIII, (January, 1934), 3-17. Dr. Wilhelm Pauch's article "The Historiography of the German Reformation During the Past Twenty Years; IV. Reserach in the History of the Anabaptists," *Church History*, IX, (December, 1940), also dealt with this area. Bender's article "The Anabaptist Vision", *Church History*, XIII, (1944), gives a revised picture of Anabaptism.

[51] Pilgram Marpeck, or Marbeck, was the most prominent minister of a group of evangelical "Anabaptist" churches located at Strasburg in Alsace, Augsburg in Swabia, and other places, as a Mennonite historian judges, which in doctrine and practice were almost identical to the Swiss Brethren. Cf. John Horsch's article "The Faith of the Swiss Brethren", *The Mennonite Quarterly Review*, 1931. A new complete re-statement of his life and work was done by John C. Wenger in his excellent aricles on life and theology of Marpeck: "The Life and Work of Pilgram Marpeck", and "The Theology of Pilgram Marpeck", and a trans-

He was one who by his theological genius was able to articulate the theological position of the Anabaptists. His theology was consistently a covenant theology. Marpeck applied the idea of covenant to the interpretation of the scriptures. The Bible was viewed as developmental history of covenant: the Lord made a covenant with Noah promising never again to blot out mankind with a flood. Again He made a covenant with Abraham, promising his and his seed a national home in Canaan and giving circumcision as the seal of the covenant; then it was renewed with Isaac, with Jacob and with the children of Israel. And the law of Adam and of Moses was also called a covenant; the latter called a covenant of life. This developmental historical interpretation of covenant comes to an end at the covenant in Jesus Christ, the New Covenant. The evolutionary development of history of covenant has come to an end in Christ, the new covenant. This end made everything new and different. The Anabaptists emphasize this end characteristically. For this end is the dividing line between Old and New Testament. The Old testament is "Yesterday", but the New Testament, "Today."

> Therefore the Scripture holds all the forgiveness of yesterday (the time of the Old Covenant) for no (real) forgiveness to eternal salvation, becuase it left all men, believing and unbelieving, under the law, the curse,

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scription of "Pilgram Marpeck's Confession of Faith, 1531", which appeared in *The Mennonite Quarterly Review*, XII (July-October 1938). On the continent, Johann Loserth has been rendering a great service by publishing one source: *Pilgram Marbecks Antwort auf Kaspar Schwenckfelds Beurteiling des zur Geschichte der oberdeutschen Taufgesinnten imm 16. Jahrhundet*, Wein und Leipzig, 1929. Roth, F., *Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte*, vol. III, München, 1907, contributed the date of Marpeck's death, 1556. (The latter two books are mentioned by Horsch in his above quoted article.)

> sin and death untill (the time of Christ... (Gal. 4, Gal. 3, Rome 5). Today for the first time is there real forgiveness, taking away, cancelling and forsaking of sin.[52]

There is a similarity between the Reformed and the Anabaptist views of history of covenant, but the difference appears in the degree and mode of emphasis on this difference between "Yesterday" and "Today." The Anabaptist's view is, to translate into a contemporary terminology, that taking the fulfillment in "Today" of the New Covenant seriously, historical view of covenant was ended and turned to the existential "now" of decision.

In order to understand the Anabaptist covenant theology, this emphasis upon "Today" of the fulfillment of the history of salvation is of utmost importance. The Anabaptist interpretation is, therefore, inclined towards the distinction of Old and New covenant. Against this tendency, as we shall see later, the Reformed interpretation emphasized consistently the unity of both covenants. A sharp dividing line was drawn by the Anabaptist between old and new covenant; here is the ground of their sharp Christo-centricism and New Testamentism.[53] The emphasis on the existential "now" diminishes the sense of history, history which is lineal in its temporal aspect. For the Anabaptist, therefore, the history of covenant does not have real importance, for at the new covenant the religious relation between God and man is the event of "Today." Some contemporary theological contentions may come to mind at this point, the difference between Bultmann's existentialism and Cullmann's Heilsgeschichte. But the Anabaptist differs from Bultmann insofar as he interpreted this existential "now" in terms of ethics!

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[52] Quoted from Wenger, "The Theology of Pilgram Marpack," "The Mennonite Quarterly Review, XII, 207; Wenger quoted this from Marpeck's Testamenterlaüterung, 5A.

[53] Cf. John Horsch's article "The Faith of the Swiss Brethren", The Mennonite Quarterly Review, V, (1931), 22. He quoted from Hnas Pfistermeyer, a minister of the Swiss Brethren: "I make a greate difference between the Old and New Testament and believe that the New Covenant, which was made with us, is much more perfect than the Old that was made with the Jews." This is found originally in Ein Christen lich Gesprach gehalten zu Bern Zwuschen den Predicanten und Hansen Pfyster Meyer von Aarow, den Widertouff, Eyd, Oberkeyt und andere Widertoufferischen Artikel betreffende, 1531.

Thus, the covenant of "Today" in Christ is expressed in "discipleship" to Christ; in their own terminology, "Nachfolge Christi." The moment of "now" is not a mystical moment in which the personality is absorbed into a higher reality, but this moment is grasped in highly conscious, ethical responsibility. In this respect, the Anabaptist religion is primarily an ethical religion, rather than mystical as Rufus Jones thought.[54] In the distinction between old and new covenant their position seems to be closer to the Lutheran antithesis of Law and Gospel, but this does not allow such an inference, for the Anabaptists viewed the new law for Christian life in the teachings of Jesus Christ. "What ever is found in Christ's Doctrine and life (the New Testament Scriptures) I shall recognize as binding for the Christian, and whatever is found otherwise I shall not so recognize. For I believe that Jesus Christ is the Word of the Heavenly Father and has sufficiently taught and declared the will of the Father."[55] So said Hans Pfistermeyer; upon this view the Anabaptist ethicism is grounded: "We would sincerely admonish every Christian," said Marpeck, "to be on the alert and personally study the Scriptures, and have a care lest he permit himself to be easily moved and led away from Scripture and apostolic doctrine by strange teaching and understanding; but let every one, according toScripture and apostolic teaching, strive with great diligence to do God's will, seeing that the word of truth could not fail us nore mislead us."[56] Christian men's "Nachfolge" is guided by the Christ's law found in New Covenant, which is the sole norm for new-born Christians' life.

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[54] As to Rufus Jones's mystical interpretation, cf. Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries, (1914 first ed., 1959 in paperback edition).

An ethical subject who exercizes "Nachfolge" is the subject as a partner of the New Covenant. The partner must be a responsible subject, who makes up his mind to be a follower of Christ. At this very point the Anabaptist comes into conflict with such a doctrine as Infant Baptism. Thsi rejection is a plain outcome of their theological logic which read the Bible uniquely. Baptism is a seal of the New Covenant, as circumcision of the old covenant. We must be reminded of the distinction the Anabaptist maintained strictly between Old and New Covenant. This strict distinction rejected such an interpretation of Infant Baptism by analogy of circumcision.

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[55] Horsch, op. cit., 22.

[56] Horsch, op. cit., 18, originally from Marpeck's Gedenkschrift, p. 197.

This was based on their particular view of the Scriptures. But at the same time, their ethical tendency as well as their theology did not permit an acceptance of this doctrine. In "this" day of the New Covenant, one enters the covenant not by virtue of race as in the Old Covenant, but by virtue of the new birth; so Marpeck writes:

> Their [the believers'] young children do not inherit faith from them as flesh and blood; and since they can neither speak nor understand, they cannot be considered as belonging tothe spiritual seed, as formerly the young children in Israel (according to the flesh) were.[57]

They admitted that the old covenant was a national one, but rejected saying analogously, "therefore the New Covenant is also national in a new sense." The shift was made also on the side of human partnership. Man as a covenant partner is not a nation but an individual; entering the covenant in the time of New Covenant is no longer a national engagement but an individual personal commitment. The New Birth is not symbolic but real, that is to say, existential. Baptism must be accompanied by a real change of life. Baptism must be the pledge of a complete commitment to obey Christ, and not primarily the symbol of a past experience. Those who are really and truly baptized in Christ are baptized with Christ, through patience, as fellow companions of the tribulation of Christ, to suffer with Christ until death. A partner of the New Covenant who now submits himself to the sacrament of Baptism is such a highly ethical, responsible subject. An infant because he could not take the requesite responsiblity of the covenant in the sacrament of Baptism, could not be accepted into this covenant. This was the theological reason for their rejection of Infant Baptism.

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[57] Wenger, op. cit., 227, originally in Testamenterlauterung, 222 B.

Briefly we may mention the Anabaptist conception of church which becomes clear in this context. The church for them is a "body of committed and practicing Christians pledged to the highest standard of New Testament living."[58] The joining to the church must be based upon true conversion and a commitment to holy living and discipleship. Under the old covenant, all Israel, according to the flesh, without distinction, was called God' people. But, as Marpeck put it, "Today (in the New Covenant) for the first ime is there a real spiritual church." It is "Today" that the real church of Christ, distinguished from that of Old Covenant, "is called the people of God, not as they should be... but as they are; namely, all one believing people in one faith and spirit, one body, one soul, and heart, one faith, one baptism, through which they are all baptized into one body... They are therefore called God's people, because of the unity of their faith and wills, and not because of certain believing ones who are supposed to be among the."[59] Their church is in a strict sense a "communion of saints." This conception of church contradicts the reformed ideal on reformation of church and state, according to which the idea of church was "Volkskirch," including all the citizens who belong to the church through Infant Baptism. The circle of the Anabaptist communion is made narrower insofar as the strict self-commitment was required. The church is a company of believers, but not an institution.

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[58] Harold S. Bender, "The Anabaptist Vision", Church History, 1944, XIII, p. 18.

[59] Wenger, op. cit., pp. 242-243.

Throughout those discussions it became plain that there was a characteristic understanding of the idea of covenant underlying the differences between the Reformed and the Anabaptist. The first point is the sharp distinction between old and new covenant; secondly, by virtue of this distinction, the new covenant freed itself from the past history of covenant, and tended to turn itself toward a different dimension, that is to say, from history to existence. In this sense the God-man relationship in the new covenant is spiritual, subjective and existential. Thirdly, this existential relation to God is interpreted in terms of "discipleship", that is, in terms of ethics. But this ethicism breeds an individualistic tendency. Out of this ethical and individualistic tendency, fourthly, the conception of the church as a highly ethical community, a contractual company of saints is established. Generally speaking, the Anabaptist religion comes furthest from the Grace-objectivism, from the position of Grace _ex opere operato_. In this sense their religion is subjectivistic. The emphasis on "Today" led to a modification of eschatology. It is interesting that, in Marpeck for example, eschatology is not of a milenarian type. There is not speculation nor contemplation of the coming age. Marpeck did not expect a final completion of salvation in the future, for salvation is perfect "Today", in the new covenant! Only Marpeck emphasized that Christian should be prepared for the day of Last Judgment by fulfilling his responsibility in this new covenant: for "Present faith, that is the New Covenant in Jesus Christ, is the faith which will stand the test on the Judgment Day."[60] If anything will happen more, it is glorification of the body. This eschatology is more ethical than millenarian. In this sense the most influencial millenarianism was not from the Anabaptist stock, but on the contrary it was out of the Reformed root.[61] We must distinguish the Anabaptist represented by a theologian such as Marpeck from the Schwärmer represented by Müntzer. The Swiss Brethren were more ethical and less speculative.

Now, we must look at the other side, that is, the Reformed covenant theology. It is not always right to call the Reformed theology a covenant theology as Marpeck's (and the Rhineland Anabaptists') theology is called a covenant theology. Bullinger's theology was, once judged by van't Hooft as the first Reformed covenant theology; but this has not been fully accepted by scholarship. The Zwingli-Bullinger line of theological thought still favors such an interpretation, the leitmotif of their theology being the idea of God's sovereignty and providence. Nevertheless, there was a notable development of covenant theology, occasioned by their controversy with the Anabaptist.

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[60] Cf. Wenger, op. cit, pp. 253-256.

[61] Most significant and persisting millenarianism was originated from the Reformed theology. The last flower of theological millenarianism was that of Johann Albrecht Bengel (1687-1752). But Bengel's millenarianism is not accepted to be out of the Reformed origin through Cocceius.

It is Zwingli who first developed a counter-interpretation of covenant against the Anabaptists. Zwingli took up the same idea of covenant, but applied it differently for the defense of the doctrine of Infant Baptism. For this purpose he invented an analogy between Old Testament's circumsision as a seal of the Old Covenant and Infant Baptism in the New Testament. This analogy was rooted deeply in his conviction of the unity of both Old and New Covenant. In a sharp contrast to the Anabaptists, he emphasized the unity rather than distinction between covenants.

In this respect, too, Zwingli had "der andere Geist" than Luther. Luther is more Pauline. Paul had placed more emphasis on the distinction between Old and New Testament, bringing in an antithesis such as Law vs. Gospel. Zwingli, however, did not take the sharp Pauline distinction as real and substantial. The distinction of both covenants is mere as "per ethologiam aut mimesin." If we look at the basis, he believes, we can find the unity and continuity of one Covenant, one salvation by Christ. By the same Christ, not only we but also they (old Israel) were saved. He was then hidden but now revealed, yet He is the one and same saviour forever!

It is upon this basis of unity of covenant, that Zwingli developed his counterinterpretation of covenant. Zwingli's interpretation of covenant is characteristically undergirded by his theocentricism which expressed God's act in history in terms of Providence and election. He conceived God as "the Architect of the universe", whose primary attributes are at once merciful and just. The history of covenant, therefore, is a series of events of God's intervention in human history by his providential act grounded in his mercy and justice.[62] The history of man under God's providence moves between man's disillusion and God's salvation by covenant. After the fall, Adam had a son (Cain) in the hope based upon the covenant, "Adam believed that the son born to him was he of whom God had said not long before that he should bruise the head of the devil." This Cain became a murderer! "So all fell out that everything depended upon one." To man's despair, which comes out of paradox of human nature in fall, God directs Himself with renewed covenants. Covenant is, in its essential nature, God's promise, upon which man trusts his hope of salvation. God renewed His covenant with Noah, then with Abraham. Zwingli's mode of thought must be noted here that the partner of covenant was always to be the collective person, either a nation or humanity.[63] Thus election in the movement of covenantal history does not point to particularism, but to a procuration which allows a universalism. He interpreted priesthood in that way. His peculiar thought will be seen clearly here:

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[62] God's paradoxical relation to human history in his In Catabaptistarum Strophas (1527), (Selected Works of Huldreich Zwingli, ed. by S. M. Jackson, pp. 219-220), is expressed thus: "God was too merciful to visit the betrayer (viz. Adam) according to the magnitude of his fault, and at the same time too just to pass so daring a deed unpunished....When he drove him from Paradise he did not forbid him to become a father, but simply that he should not be the father of so noble a race as would have been if he had not betrayed his trust." This historical perspective is quite similar with that in Milton's Paradise Lost.

[63] He wrote "The covenant was renewed with him (Noah), in whom the whole human race was renewed and spreading to all parts of the earth in order to its cultivation. Meanwhile God was

> Although Judah the son of Israel was designated as he from from whom the Saviour should be born, yet the rest of the tribes which came of Abraham were not excluded from the covenant or from his friendship that he had given to their father Abraham...all were regarded as under the coveant who had descended form Abraham.[64]

He turned tothe Anabaptist from this perspective. He writes, "Here then the Catabaptists have a medicine or plaster for their whole error, if they would suffer it to be applied." Zwingli revealed his method of interpretation as the method of "synecdoche" which grasp the whole in the particular and vice versa. This method served rather his collective thinking:

> If ye will hear my voice and keep my covenant, he says. Here is God speaking synecdochiacally! For when he addresses the whole people: If ye hear my voice and keep my covenant, etc., which can be referred to those alone who hear and can have desire to keep the covenant, yet he no more excludes infants because they do not hear or understand what is to be kept than they who were bound in sleep or mentally.[65]

This is the very heart of Zwingli's logic of refutation of Anabaptism. "For they who are of one body are considered together. But since infants are of the people of God, they

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not unmindful of his counsel, and so passing by all the rest, even the best of men, he embraced Abraham and selected him out of all for this purpose, that from him might come the posterity that would save not only the Jews, but the whole human race." (op. cit., p. 221)

[64] Zwingli, op. cit., p.222.

[65] op. cit., p. 222.

are not excluded because they cannot hear or understand. For that they are members of oneand the same body of God's people is clear from this, that circumcision, the sign of the covenant, is given them."[66] Thus he summarized his position against the Anabaptist Covenant theology:

> In short (for why should we use much testimony in so clear a matter?), I mean this: The Israelites were God's people with whom he entered intocovenant, whom he made especially his own, to whom also he gave a sign of his covenant from the least to the greatest, because high and low were in covenant with him, were his people and were his church. And when, in giving command or prohibition, he addresses that whole people, the infants are not excluded because they understand nothing of what is said or commanded, but he speaks synecdochically, so that so far from excluding that part which could receive nothing that came because of the ties or its age he even includes it, just as when a person acts with a man he also acts with all the family and his posterity. So that he often addresses the whole people as one man: Hear, O Israel, and : Say tothe house of Jacob, etc. Therefore the same covenant which he entered into with Israel he has in these latter days entered intowith us, that we may be one people with them, one church, and may have also one covenant.[67]

Nothing more may be needed to elaborate the contradiction between the Reformed and the Anabaptist in the interpretation of covenant: "Ut unus essemus cum eis populus: una ecclesia et unum foedus quoq; haberemus."[68] Here is the most precise expression of the Reformed interpretation of covenant.[69]

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[66] Zwingli, op. cit., p. 222.

[67] Zwingli, op. cit., p. 227. [68] In Latin text, p. 147.

[69] Dr. Trinterud's thesis is in this connection cloaked with ambiguity. The Zwinglian concept of covenant was regarded there as contractual and reciprocal. But this is wrong, or ar least needed much discrimination. For Zwingli's mutuality in covenant relation with God is not individualistic but collective. It is a whole nation which makes a covenant with God. Here arose the idea of national covenant among the Reformed churches. And this national covenant was one which criticized by the Puritans outside the Presbyterians. Zwingli's thought cannot be separated from the later development in Calvin. In this respect Dr. Trinterud was mistaken.

Behind the battle with the Anabaptist this kind of theological thinking was moving. It is a version of the idea of covenant, diametrically opposite to that of the Anabaptists. We must note that in this covenant thought, there is a unique combination of the most characteristic elements of the Reformed theology: theory of the Scriptures as basically interpreted in terms of unity of the covenants, the *Heilsgeschichtliche* view of history and world, the idea of national church and national covenant. These elements undergird the practical confrontation with the Anabaptists on the issue of Infant Baptism.

The basic Reformed position having been thus formulated, the followers of Zwingli, such as Bullinger and Calvin, employed the same tactics as well as position in their battle with the Anabaptists. Bullinger's book entitled *De testamento seu foedere Dei unico et aeterno*, which has been regarded as the first systematic treatment of the Reformed covenant theology, was, in truth, nothing else but a succession and development of Zwingli's theme.[70]

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[70] Antonius Johannis van't Hooft, *De Theologie van Heinrich Bullinger in betrekking tot de Nederlansche Reformatie*, 1888, Amsterdam. "Wij heben nu gezien dat het foedus Dei di kern uitmaakt van Bullinger's theologie." S. 44; This author's interest as the title shows, is to trace the tradiction of "Feoderaaltheologie" which flowered in Holland in 17th Century, represented Coccejus. "...maak ik geen bezwaar om Bullinger's theologie Foederaaltheologie to nomen. Ja, ik zou zelss durven beweren dat zij op dien naam nog meer recht heeft dan die van Coccejus." Ibid. He regards the above mentioned book as a Summa of Christian theology which was built upon the systematic principle of covenant. Against this interpretation, see Schrenk, S. 40; and also Peter Walser, *Die Prädestination bei Heinrich* Bullinger im Zusammenhang mit siener Gotteslehre. (Zurich, 1956). Bullinger's sources for the idea of covenant are: *de testamento*, 1534; *Der alt gloub*, 1537-39; *Die 26. Predigt der Dekaden*, 1550;

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He elaborated what had been implicit in Zwingli; for example, the identification of covenant and testament was found in Zwingli, but he treated it in a more scholarly way.

> Vocula ergo ברית quam LXX. constanter uerterunt Διαθήκη Latini uero Testamentum, aliquoties ipsam significat haereditatem quae testamento obuenit. Nam διατίθεμαι testari est, et τὰς διαθήκας ποιῶ testamento aliquid haeredibus mando. Et Latinis Testamentum condere, est supremam uoluntatem testari. Testamentum enim dictum uolunt quasi uoluntatis nostrae testimonium. Vlpianus iureconsultus uistam uoluntatis nostrae stntentiam dixit, quam quis post mortem suam fieri uelit....Atque hac significatione usus est hac voce Christus apud Matthaeum in 26. cap. et Paulus in epist. ad. Galatas 3. cap. et ad Hebraeos 9... Rursus διατίθημαι ... est paciscor et stipulo: unde διαθήκη numero singulari pactum et conuentum et pollicitationem, hoc est ἐπαγγελία significat. Et apud Latinos a teste fit uerbum testor, quod proprie est testimonium dico et iureiurando affirmo: unde Testamentum in sacris libris aliquoties ponitur pro promissione, nec quauis, sed iureiurando firmata: sic Zacharias apud Lucam, Vt memor esset, inquit, testamenti sui sancti, Iusiurandum quod iurauit patribus daturum se hobis. Et Petrus in Actis, Vos estis filij prophetarum ac testamenti, quod testatus est deus erga patres nostros. Item διαθήκη uel διαθῆκαι numero plurali pactum quoque ac foedus significat, cui maxime respondet Hebraeorum ברית quod à ברת hoc est pepigit aut foedus inijt deriuatur: qua significatione usurpauit Moses in cap. 15. et 17. Sic et nos usurpabimus in expositione praesenti.[71]

This will exemplify what direction the Reformed thought of the covenant was taking, despite the assertion of Trinterud that the main line is drawn differently, pointing to Calvin. It is plain that there is an objectivistic tendency in the covenant thinking. The history of covenant was also elaborated more than in the case of Zwingli, but the basic tendency did not deviate anywhere.[72] Thus, covenant for him is not contract but rather promise, not subjective mutuality but rather objective gift. The most important motive of the Reformed covenant thought is found in the second Helvetida, chapter 17.

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[71] I owe this quotation to van't Hooft, *op*. *cit*., p. 45-46.

[72] Cf. *Haussbuch*, S. 3b, 150a, b. and *Compendium* *relig*.*christ*. p. 26. and also *Summa*, S. 2b, 31. References in Schrenk, S. 41.

. If we, then, show that Calvin exactly stood in line with Zwingli and Bullinger in his conception of covenant, Trinterud's presupposition will be rejected with just reason. Calvin dealt with the idea of covenant in vorious places in his works. In his Institutes Book II, chapters IX, X, XI, he discussed the subjects of Law and Gospel, and the Scriptures. What we find here is nothing but an articulation of the Reformed position inaugurated by Zwingli and Bullinger. The leitmotif is the fundamental unity of both the covenants. In a sense he attempted a reconciliation between the Lutheran theme of Law and Gospel, and the Reformed theme of the unity of both the covenants. But he stood, it is remarkable, on the side of the Reformed in his dealing with this problem. He reiterated the same discussion in Book III, chapter XVII. In Book IV, chapters XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, he defended the Reformed position abainst the Anabaptist mainly on the subject of Infant Baptism. Here we find Calvin fighting with the same response as Zwingli and Bullinger had used in their battle with the Anabaptist: i.e. the analogy between circumcision as the sign of the old covenant and Infant baptism as the sign of the new covenant. He is line with Zwingli and Bullinger in the specific interpretation of covenant with its history, as well as in his mode of thought: the "heilsgeschichteliche" view, the collective mode of thought, the national engagement to the covenant with God. Schrenk rightly remarked:

> So hat Calvin mit Zwingli and Bullinger der sakramentalen Verwertung der Bundesidee in der reformierten Kirche den Weg gewiesen. Ueberal steht die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Täufertum in Hintergrund. Das Volkskirchliche Interesse fördert hier die heisgeschichtliche Betrachtung.[73]

This has been a necessary discussion for us toget rid of Trinterud's hypothesis, for his hypothesis leads us to a confusion of the theological backgroundof Puritan ethics. We may roughly repeat the characteristic difference between the Anabaptist and the Reformed conception of covenant; the Anabaptist interpretation was existential, subjective, and ethical; while the Reformed one, historical, objective, and sacramental. One of the main purposes of the Reformed covenant theology was the defence of the doctrine of Infant Baptism; thus too, its sacramental interest. Not only Calvin, but Bullinger and even Zwingli identified covenant with testament and promise, and this means an objective tendency. This difference leads toward a different conception of the church. The Reformed theologians tried to defend the national church by an objective view of covenant. The idea of covenant concerns a nation as a whole, not an individual person. Infant Baptism was the seal of this objective covenant. On the other hand, for the Anabaptist the covenant-taking is highly subjective-

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[73] G. Schrenk, op. cit., S. 48.

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personal matter, which leads to a different conception of church. For personal covenant-taking is the constituting principle of church. The reformed theologians did not think the idea of covenant as the constitutive principle in this sense. Rather their constitutive principle is an objectivistic doctrine of Election and Predestination. Its historical realization is a national engagement of God's dispensation. The later Calvinists developed the idea of national covenant from this element, and this national covenant was the one which conflicted with the Independent idea of church covenant, for the idea of church covenant was of deeply Anabaptistic inclination.[74]

We must envisage this fundamental difference and should read the later development from this depth. Dr. Trinterud's hypothesis may be capable of explaining the side of Puritan covenant theology, but its serious defect is that it hardly comes to terms with the historical element in Puritan covenant theology which is of quite an orthodox Reformed interpretation. Puritan covenant theology, as we shall see, had two elements historical and ethical in interaction though not in combination. We cannot say that the Puritans achieved the synthesis of the two types of covenant theology; on the contrary the interaction of these two types caused a variety of denominational churches and Christian groups. It is because of this interaction that there appeared an "Inclination" in religious thought from the Presbyterian through the Independent to the Baptist, and still further to the Quaker. It is terms of this "Inclination," not upon any self-made flat hypothesis, that the Puritan covenant theology is better understood.[75]

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[74] There are numerous examples for this conflict between the idea of national covenant and church covenant. The Independent is, as we shall see later, placed in between the Reformed type and the Ahabaptist type of covenant thought. For it admitted church covenant idea, yet did not reject Infant Baptism though limited sense. Here is an interesting example taken from the age of Civil War: Cawdrey, a Presbyterian, could detect the Anabaptistic inclination in the Independent's idea of church covenant. "The Anabaptists say, no children are to be baptized, becuase they are not confederate, not capable of the covenant of the Gospel: The independents say, no children but of members confederate in the church-covenant with a particular church; The difference is not great.... So it is the very next door to Anabaptism." Daniel Cawdrey: The Inconsistence of the Independent Way, p. 186, 1651.

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[75] 

II Two Types of Covenant Theology Commingled

This inclination within Puritanism had been caused by the failure of the Presbyterian plan of reformation in the time of Elizabeth's reign, a failure to maintain the church background in which their theology could be affirmed with validity. Without the church background any theology falls into abstraction. But this was especially true to Calvinistic Puritanism. For its theology was bound essentially with its ideal of reformation of a national church. There was a national church but it was not of a sort in which its theology could live. Theology could be easily transplanted, yet this theology was originally bound with a reformed national church. The idea of Reformed national church in the Presbyterian mind had toconflict with the idea of a national church existing in that society! It is characteristic that the Presbyterians went to the Parliament with their admonition of further reformation. This tactic was not only of Calvinistic origin, but also based on Calvinistic theological thought: the reformation must be done as a national engagement through the legislative power. Failure would cause the Presbyterian theology to become abstract unless it could adjust to meet a new situation. The confusion of the Presbyterians was exemplified in their leader, Cartwright. He could hardly discriminate correctly his own position. He believed their demand for further reformation was no seditious, nor political reformation; he took several times his oath of allegiance to Queen Elizabeth. But he could hardly see rightly what was really happening about himself and his party.[76]

It is at this failure of Presbyterianism that another ideal of reformation comes to be significant and more relevant, an ideal brought from an unexpected source in Puritanism itself, from Robert Browne! A _Treatise of reformation without tarying for enie, and of the wickednesse of of those Preachers which will not reforme till the Magistrate commaunde or compell them_ was it. Why "without tarying"? It is because this reformation can go regardless of magistrate's power. Why are the Presbyterian brethren tarrying? It is because they are mistaken by engaging themselves in political reformation by virtue of legislative change. According to Browne, reformation of the church does not need to have any recourse to the civil power, because the true church is nothing to do with the sort of power and its assistance. The church is the Christ's Kingdom. The reformation can be, so should be realized without the magistrate's power which has actually no power for reformation. That is to say: Browne's reformation is a matter of ethics while Cartwright's is a matter of politics.

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[76] So he had to be "psychoanalyzed" in order to depict the real picture of Tudor Puritanism. Cf. Scott-Pearson, _Church and State_, preface, "We have sought to reveal the fact that their leader, Thomas Cartwright, was more politically minded than he himself realized. Indeed, we have psycho-analysed a Puritan and found a politician."

Reformation is possible for it is an event which takes place with respect to individual persons!

We must note here that, on the one hand, the two patterns of covenant thought are discovered in Cartwright and Browne, and, on the other, the Reformed type of covenant thought represented by Cartwright had lost its church background. We are not concerned here whence Browne took his idea of covenant, but we shall find that there is an unmistakable similitude between the Anabaptist type of covenant interpretation and Browne's own. Browne's conception of covenant is subjectivistic and voluntaristic. The covenant should not be made by super-personal subject, as he writes, "For covenaunte was first made, as it is written, they made a couenant to seeke the Lord God of their fathers, with all their harte, and with all their soule." "The Lords people is of the willing sorte. They shall come vnto Zion and inquire the way to Ierusalem, not by force nor compulsion, but with their faces thitherward: ...For it is the conscience and not the power of man that will driue vs to seeke the Lordes kingdome." The Anabaptist inclination will become clearer when it is applied to the conception of church:

> The Church planted or gathered, is a companie or number of Christians or beleeuers, which by a willing couenant made with their God, are under the gouernment of god and Christ, and kepe his lawes in one holie communion: becuase Christ hath redeemed them vnto holines & happines for euer, from which they

> were fallen by the sinne of Adam.[77]

For him the church is no longer a national church, but a "companie" of believers who joined together by taking covenant in promising of excercising holy life. Here is the possiblity of the reformation of the church "without tarying." It is most interesting in this relation that he built another mark of the true church beside Calvinistic two marks, viz. Preadhing and sacraments:

> And therefore when Christ appointeth the Apostles to plant churches throughout the world, he appointeth them not, to talke of an professe the word in their mouthes onely, but he giueth in charge these three things, as being the chiefe marks of a planted Church: namely preaching the word, ministration of the sacraments, & reformation of life, which is the chiefest thing of all to set forth his Church & Kingdom: for he commandeth to preach and baptize, & because preaching & baptizing is nothing without amendment of life, he addeth these words, teaching the to observe and do all things, whatsoeuer I haue commanded you.[78]

Reformation of life! This new mark makes every difference between Cartwritian orthodox Calvinism and Anabaptistic Brownism. By this mark the church attains a subjectivistic integration. The church which is constituted by covenant-taking, must lead to this reformation of life, to the exercise of godly life. "Our profession and submission to his lawes and couernement, is the keeping of our couenant, by leading a godly and Christian life."[79] Thus, where there is no reformation of life, no excercise of godly life, there is no church. The Church of England has no exercise of godly life, therefore it is no church of Christ. There appears an undeniable difference in judgment on the churchliness of the Church of England between Cartwright and Browne. Cartwright was affirmative, for "They haue the couenaunts of the churches of god, namely the spirit and the worde of god put in their mouthes, therefore they are the Churches of god." Browne's rebuttal is this: "The worde is not the couenant to establish a Church except it reigne andrule in the Church, to subdue it in obedience to the Lorde: for the Lorde maketh no couenant, but with those that turne from iniquitie in Iacob." Here is envisaged an appearence of that difference which we have made clear in the previous section.[80]

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[77] Robert Browne, "ABooke which sheweth the life and manners...", The Writings of Robert Harrison and Robert Browne, ed. by A. Peel & L. H. Carlson, (London, 1953), p.253.

[78] Browne, op. cit., pp. 440-441. (underline is mine)

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[79] Browne, op. cit., p. 257.

[80] The difference between the Presbyterian and the Brownist conceptionof church persisted long and re-appeared in the 1640s. Here is an example which displays clearly this persisting difference: W. Rathband, A Most Grave, and Modes Confutation of the Errors of the Sect, commonly called Brownists... 1644, "The description of a church, which they give ..., viz. That it is a company of faithfull people that truly worship Christ, and readily obey him; is utterly untrue, if it be understood (as needs it must) of the visible church; for if every one that the Church may account a visible member, be truly faithfull, how is our Savious to bee understood, when he compareth the Church of Ministery to a draw-net, which being cast into the Sea, gathereth as well [the faithful as the wicked...]. Ruthband views the (cont.)

To be sure, there was a contrast between the two types of covenant thought in England, yet these two types were to be commingled under a particular ciucumstance in which the Puritans found themselves. The Presbyterians had no ecclesiastical ground based on which their theology would become meaningful. Their defence of the national church against separation was not consistent. In fact they themselves were driven to an underground movement. Their political reform-movement was turned to the preaching movement! Their zeal of reformation was poured out to the personal reformation than to political reformation. What is the difference between the Presbyterian and the Brownist? It was merely this, from a political point of view: the latter became separatist, but the former non-conformist. But both were practically running in the same direction. It was in this condition, we must emphasize, that the both types of covenant thought came to to be commingled.

We shall make clear this commingling from both objective and subjective side.

(cont.) ground of church not in covenant but in God's objective plan of salvation. "Against the Brownist assertion that (if the Church of England be called to be a true church) at the beginning of her Majesties Reigne, the people should have beene required with solemne oath and covenant to renounce Idolatry, and to professe faith, and true obedience to the Gospell, after the example of Asas reformation; Wee answer ...it was Gods true church before the time of that oath and dovenant made by Asa, wee reade it was made and taken in the 15. yeere of his Reigne, when yet his subjects were the true Church long before..."

First, from the objective side this commingling began to produce a semi-Brownistic covenantal community, although there was an emphasis on the difference of it from Brownistic conventicle. In Rogers' Seven Treatises, Fifth Treatise, chapter 13, there is a record of the covenantal group of Christians; it says:

> In the yeare 1588, there met in a Christian mans house certaine well minded persons, which dwelt in one towne together, with whome also the Preacher of the place did meete at the same time. Their meeting was for the continuance of loue, and for the edifying one of another, after some bodily repast & refreshing. And yet know, that they were no Brownists: for they were diligent and ordinarie frequenters of bulicke assemblies with the people of God. Neither were their meetings couenticles, for the disturbing of the state of the Church and peace ther of; as many imagine that there can be no priuate fellowship among Christians, but it is to such ends: the contrary may be seen by their conference. These with one consent, fell into communication how the case stood betwixt God and themselues.[81]

This account is extraordinaryily interesting and important, since this sort of meeting deserved such a careful explanation: it was not only a new type of meeting but also a subtly different from the Brownist meeting. Here it is clear that there is no separation from the establishment, the members being "diligent and ordinarie frequenters of publicke assemblies." Nevertheless, to widen our perspective, a question will be raised immediately: why they had to make up this sort of meeting, for if the Presbyterians had succeeded in their reformation, how did this kind of meeting become needed? "The Preacher" was also positively involved in this meeting. Hadn't this preacher sought to give vent in this meeting to his zeal of reformation? Wasn't this a sort of "ecclesiola" in ecclesia anglicana? Above all, this group was formed in a way resembling the Brownist method, despite the author's wilfull attempt to distinguish this type of meeting from the Brownist. In view of the fact that the main purpose of this meeting was the exercise of godly life, it comes much closer to ethicism of the Anabaptistic sect. Rogers continues giving account of this meeting:

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[81] Rogers, Seven Treatises, Fifth Treatise, p. 477.

> Some accusing and complaining of themselues, that they had not vsed their long continued peace and libertie of the Gospell to the end for which God did send both: but that they had bene dimme lights. The rest consenting, by occasion offered among them all (well nigh twentie persons) sundry reasons and proffes were set downe, to make their complaints more weighty; and also that euill fruite they did see to proceed from such a dead and vnprofitable course of liuing: and yet the persons spoken of, did as farre exceed the common professors do exceed them in religion, which know not the Gospell. When they had proceeded thus farre, it was demaunded, whether there were no way to come out of this werisome and unprofitable life, not beseeming such as imbraced the Gospell. If there were any: what might be the fittest and best remedies to come out of such bondage (for they counted it no better;) and betwixt them they agreed upon certaine, with such good liking, after they heard and conceiued them, that it might apparently be seene, that their heauy hearts were much eased, when they did but see a way to be deliuered from that yoke of bondage; whiles their plentifull teares were turned into chearfull countenance. The conclusion was this, they did couenant faithfully and seriously, to set vpon these remedies forthwith and speedily; thinking that such a weightly matter had need of no delay; and thereupon, desired the Preacher to set downe the summe of their conference and communication together, for the better putting of them in rememberance of it to practise it; as also that they might see way the summe of their conference was: which, seeing they agreed vnto, they call
> call a couenant.[82]

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[82] Rogers, Ibid.

In all those things, it is at least clear that this sort of application of the idea "Covenant" is totally unknown to the orthodox Reformed thinking. This is sociological implication was more Brownistic. This covenantal group of people was highly ethical, aiming at the exercising of godly life, endeavouring to be a perfect Christian. It is this that we must note here: in such groups of people Puritanism began to adapt itself in order to survive. It was no longer in a national community but in a small group or corporationof Christians that Puritanism found its own place of theological thinking. To use a terminology of Formgeschichte, *Sitz im Leben* grew different for Puritanism following that failure. Puritanism now had to live with its adherents, so its Progress was possible only by increasing their number.[83]

Secondly, viewed from the subjective side, the commingling of the two types of covenant thought was effectuated by virtue of the intrinsic logic of the preaching movement. The Puritans' express aim was no longer a political reformation, but their zeal was turned to a different object, not the government of society but the life of man! A tendency towards spiritualization and internalization of religion starts here. By the logic of evangelical preaching the religious character was brought closer to the type of the Anabaptist. Logic of evangelical preaching could hold both the objective and the subjective in religion in vital relationship. The objective emphasis of the Reformed theology was, thus, reconciled with the subjective element of the Anabaptist type of religion.[84] Evangelical preaching in its exhortation towards decision has a tendency to elevate an element of human responsibility in accepting grace. Moreover, evangelical preaching aims not at a corporation as a whole but a person as an individual.

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[83] "Profesying" meeting was also of this nature. "Lecturership" had a same effect. Sir William Dugdale looking back at the past time of trouble remarked rightly, "As also by planting Schismatical Lectures in most corporate towns and populous places throughout the Realm; so to poison the people with antimonarchical principles." Lecturership required the vital tie between the preacher and the people not only by religious need but also by economic reason. Cf. William Dugdale, *A Short View of the Late Troubles in England*, (1681).

The Logic of evangelical preaching in the realm of Puritan Covenant Theology was typically examplified by Robert Harris among others. In his book entitled A Treatise of the Covenant of Grace, published in 1632, Harris espressed clearly an evangelical pattern of early 17. Century Puritanism.

He began by exposing relentlessly man's total depravity, according to the text found in Ezechiel chapter II, verse 19. He used "the anatomizing knife of the Word" to penetrate into the interior of man's heart, where he laid the basis of his Puritan religion. Here is exemplified an internalization of Puritan religion.

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[84] The most characteristic objectivism of the Reformed theology is expressed in the doctrine of Predestination. This doctrine was certainly modified by logic of evangelical preaching during this period of development. See paragraph V, p.127ff of this thesis dealing with Justification and Sanctification in Covenant theology.

> For our selues first, labour to get a better heart, a better inside. Most people are all for the outside... but let vs learne to beginne at the right end, to get the heart made good, this is the source and spring of all our actions, therefore make that cleane first...
>
> The heart is the chiefe part of a man, it is Gods roome wher he abides, his bed-chamber where hee lodges... therefore giue all diligence to get a new heart, a cleane heart.[85]

It is characteristic of Puritanism that this internalization was brought by way of a sharp self-examination, a fight with self-deception. The Puritans envisaged the "mystery" of self-deception.[86] It was by this sharpness of self-examination that Puritanism could overcome skepticism which had been corrupting the people during the English Renaissance in the early seventeenth century.

Of course, in this turning to individual personal direction, the Puritan may not be judged simply to have abandoned his political intent; on the contrary, being suited to the new situation, he seems to have indirectly hoped for total renewal by way of personal reformation:

> Leuell at the heart of the hearers, like as when a man would strike his enemy dead, he aymes not at his legges or feet, but bendeth the stroke at his heart... but the main businesse (of preaching) lyes

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[85] Harris, A Treatise of the Covenant of Grace, (1632), pp. 17-18.

[86] Cf. Daniel Dyke, The Mystery of Selfe-Decieuing, (1630). The severe criticism on self-deception continued vital throughout the Puritan movement.

> about the heart, with it must we be dealing, if we mean to doe good, for there is the fountaine of all sinners.[87]

Yet, the means is the preaching but not the political appeal which their fathers had tried and which had failed. They very likely hoped that if the man's heart was reformed internally then the outer society would be changed consequently.

Along with this personalization and internalization of Puritan religion, the logic of evangelical preaching, taking up the contractual element in the idea of covenant, applied personal partnership to the contractual relation with God. Harris defined the idea of covenant thus:

> A couenant is nothing else but a solemne contract passing betweene some parties, (two at the least) whereby they binde themselues each to other in certaine articules to both their contents, for their mutuall peace and comfort.[88]

This sort of the identification between covenant and contract is found among the Reformed theologians on the Continent, too,[89] although the meaning of this identification must be carefully discriminated. But we must note that in Harris this identification had a special meaning and importance. For this contractual covenant theology was taken as a special service of evangelical preaching. Conversely, we may say, the logic of evangelical preaching was to find a better expression in contractually conceived covenant theology. Thus contractual covenant theology became the theology of Puritan preaching movement.

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[87] Dyke, op. cit. pp. 21-22.

[88] Harris, op. cit., the Second Sermon, p. 166.

[89] For example, Ursinus already defined the idea of covenant in this line: "A Covenant in generall signifieth a mutuall contract or agreement of two parties joyned in the Covenant, whereby is made a bond or obligation or certaine conditions for the performance of giving or taking something, with addition or outward signes and takens, for solemn testimony and confirmation, that the compact and promise shall be kept inviolable. Hence we easily collect the definition and nature of Gods Covenant: For it is a mutual promise and agreement between God and man, whereby God giveth men assurance, that he will be gracious and favourable to them, remit their sins, bestow new righteousnesse, his

(cont.)

He divided first the "ciuill" covenant and the "sacred" covenant. The sacred covenant is again divided between the covenant of works and that of grace. The emphasis weighed slightly on the side of distinction rather then unity, though not going to the extremeof the Anabaptist type. He thinks that both "are now incompatible." "If a man will be saued by the couenant of grace, hee must let goe workes, I meane, in point of Iustification, and an opinion to be saued by them: But if any will needs be saued by workes, hee is falne from grace, as Paul tells the Galations: For if salvation be of workes, it is no

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(cont.) holy Spirit, and life eternall for and by his Son our Mediatour: And on the other side, men bind themselves to faith and repentance; that is, to receive this so great a benefit with true faith, and to yeeld true obedience unto God." But the difference must be noted: from this starting point, Ursinus moves towards a Christological interpretation of covenant which is identical with testament, then the unity of both covenants. Ursinus did not deviate from the main line of the Reformed covenant thought even in his defence of Infant Baptism. While, Harris utilized contractual interpretation for his evangelical preaching. Rather the anthropoligical interest surpasses the Christological interest. Man is urged to take or renew covenant by Harris. (See following pages.)

more of grace, else works should be no workes..."[90] The emphasis on grace, however, does not fall into the error of Antinomianism, but in relating the human subject to grace it moves through the narrow passage way between the orthodox Reformed and the Anabaptist, insofar as such correlation was not fully ethically interpreted. His conditional interpretation of covenant discussed: "Is there nothing then to be done on our behalfe?" "Yes, it is required of vs, that wee vse Gods means, that wee goe on in his wayes, according to that, Yet I will be sought vnto for these things by the house of Israel, Ezech. 36. When he acts vs, wee must moue; when he opens our eyes, we must see; in fine, coucurre as subjects, to be wrought vpon in his meanes and times, and then we are surely, in Couenant with God, and so in happy estate..."[91] That is to say, salvation which is solely brought to man by the initiative of God does require man's "concurrence" (but not "co-operation") in responsibility.

This contractual-conditional interpretation was, however remarkably expressed in his evangelical appeal:

> So say I to euery one that heares mee this day: make your choyce, and resolue whom you will cleaue vnto, and which way you will take for your owne safety: But if it be so, that there be no such God asthe Lord, no such sauiour as Christ, no such couenant as the couenant of grace, no such performance as Gods, no such worke, no such wages, no

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[90] Harris, op. cit., the Second Sermon, p. 166.

[91] op. cit., p. 48.

> such plaine-dealing in all the world as with him, be you entreated to bestow your selues vpon him, let him haue your hearts; we beg it of you, we beseech you in Christs stead be reconciled vnto God, let him haue loue for loue: He hath made you, he hath bred you, he hath fed you, he hath taught you, he hath doone all for you; therefore, let him haue all, yea, bestow your selues also vpon him; Nay, this you haue done already, the couenant is not now to make, it was made long since euen in your Baptisme: The tender of our selues in that Sacrament was a reall passing ouer of our selues to God; Baptisme was the seale of the Couenant giuen on Gods part, and taken on your part: and euery time you come to the Lords Table, you renue this Couenant, &c. Now therefore, see that ye be men of your words, and keepe the couenant you haue made with God.[92]

Here we have the most typical evangelical application of the idea of covenant. By virtue of the evangelical logic personalism, which tends toward individualism becuase of its emphasis on decision, is effectively related with conditional-contractual relation in covenant with God; moreover, the objectivism of the Reformed type is reconciled beautifully. A combination of the sacramental objectivism and the existential personalism is achieved.[93]

The Puritan synthesis, if we can call it "synthesis", is a dynamic mediation by the logic of evangelism, so it could move through the narrow passage way between the Reformed and the Anabaptist. But it was never a systematic synthesis of the two types, so that if the need of systematic relation arose, this synthesis would have been broken in pieces. And this was precisely the situation in the 1640s. There are two notable systematic treatments of Puritan covenant theology, before the Civil War, namely Ames's Medulla Theologiae and Ball's Treatise of Covenant of Grace. Ames systematized covenant theology as the process of commingling, while Ball did it by maintaining the orthodox Reformed ttradition of covenant thought.

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[92] Harris, _op_. _cit_., p. 171.

[93] This logic of evangelical preaching here we noted in Harris had been working ever since Perkins, whose thought had been carried on by Sibbes, Preston, Ames, etc.

III Two Types Commingled (2)

-Theology of William Ames-

Ames came out of the Puritan preaching movement, but lived outside England in his later life, and at that time Developed the religion which he and his friends lived, into a system. It is important to note that his systematic thinking was quite likely conditioned by that commingling process which was going on. Preaching in its interaction with an ethical community of Christians produced in England a unique theological tendency, which John Downame describes as follows.

> I could finde no one part of Diuinity more profitable, in these time, for me to spend my strength vpon, then that which consisteth more in experience and parctise, then in theory and speculation; and more principally tendeth to the sanctification of the heart, then the informing of the iudgement and the increasing of knowledge; and to the stirring up of all to the practise of that they know in the duties of a godly life, and bringing forth the fruits of faith in new obedience; then to fit them for discourse.[94]

Ames's systematic theology agrees with this tendency. Ames, however, surpassed his fellow Puritans in systematic ability; therefore, he was capable of building a new systematic theology in keeping with this tendency. It is a "systematic" ethical theology. He used the term Divinity rather than theology intentionally to clarify his position; he defined thus, "Divinity is the doctrine of living to God."[95]

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[94] J. Downame, Gvide to Godlinesse or a Treatise of A Christian Life, (1622), The Epistle Dedicatorie.

[95] W. Ames, The Marrow of Sacred Divinity, Book I, chapter 1.

"Seeing that," he explained, "that life of the Creature is most perfect, which comes neerest to the living, and life-giving God, therefore the nature of Divinity-life is to live to God."[96] Again, "Men live to God when they live, according to the will of God, to the glory of God, God inwardly working in them..."[97] "Therefore Divinity is better defined by that good life whereby we live to God, they by a blessed life whereby we live to our selves..."[98] As to the difference of Divinity from theology: "Divinity is practicall, and not a speculative discipline."[99] That is to say, it is concerned with "Will", but not with "Reason." But in this way Ames attempted to open up a new theological perspective concerning man, the relationship of man to God, etc. For to observe man at the point of "Will" means to be able to grasp the whole man. "Moreover seeing this life is as spirituall act of the whole man, whereby he is acried on to enjoy God, and to doe according to his will, and it is manifest that those things are proper to the will, it followes that the prime and proper subject of Divinity is the will."[100]

This conception of man, and of Divinity, were nothing else than a unique product of Puritan covenant thought. Man in covenant-relation with God is the whole man who acts. Here is a combination of anthropology and ethics in a covenant scheme. Ames overcame the dichotomy of systematic theology and ethics towards divinity, an ethical theology; this solution is different than what Barth did in recent times. He overcame the dichotomy by means of a whole inclusive Dogmatics. Divinity is concerned with this concrete man, and with this man's relation with God. The view-point of the whole man is superior to the view-point of one faculty in man even thought it is such and the highest faculty as reason. He no longer took the antithesis of reason and faith as the methodological starting point of theology. Divinity in its superior method of dealing with man and God is the supreme art of man:

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[96] _op. cit._, I, i, 5.

[97] _op. cit._, I, i, 6.

[98] _op. cit._, I, i, 8.

[99] Ames, _op. cit._, I, i, 10.

[100] _op. cit._, I, i, 9.

> Divinity therefore is of all Arts, the supreame, most noble and the masterpeece, proceeding in a speciall manner from God, treating which of God, and divine matters, and tending and leading man to God, in which respect it may be not unfitly called θεωζία, or θεεργία as well as θεολογία, that is living to God, or a working toGod, as well as a speaking of God.[101]

His system of Divinity was ingenious. His thought proceeded not according to any traditional way of systematization but in a totally new way, according to intrinsic logical structure of Puritan religion. Divinity is subdivided into two heads: 1. Faith in God; and 2. Observance. The former division deals with the objective side in religion, i. e., God. But this objective side is grasped fundamentally in faith; his genius must be observed here:

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[101] op. cit., I, i, 13.

the objective side in faith is greated consistently through the eyes of faith. In other words, he discussed God as He is to us, but not as He is in Himself. Of course, he did not separate God as He is to us and as He in Himself, but he admitted that He should be regarded as in Himself. God's attribute as in Himself is Sufficiency both in His Essence and His Substance, and Ames admitted the need of discussion of this aspect. But his uniqueness is found in his way of developing the discussion: unfolding the relational aspect in the definition of God and His attributes, that is, God in His relation to the world in creation and providence. Creation is theobjective side that relation. And providence the subjective side, and this relational par excellence. Thus, from the subjective-relational side again there are the unfolded comman and special providence. From the special providence particularly God's relation with human destiny is unfolded. His thought moves according to a development which appears like a parabola. The essential agency of this parabola-like development is the attraction of faith which not only reaches God on high but also unfolds the relational aspect of God down to reality of faith in us. This is the higher structure of Divinity which he discussed in the First Book. There is the lower structure of Divinity which deals with the human side in correspondence to this higher structure. The same method of development is drawn out of Observance.

His whole system is, therefore, cicumscribed by two parabolae, each being unfolded in correspondence with the double theme: Faith and observance (or obedience). This theme, learned form Calvin, is unique to Puritanism. Calving, however, did not use it as a systematic theme; the scheme of the Institutes was suggested by the Apostlic Creed. This Puritan theme of faith and obedience had been living in the covenant scheme of thought. It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that Ames used Puritan covenant thought methodologically in his system. But materially he dealt with the idea of covenant in two different ways: one is covenant as "application" of the objective in God, whether providence or grace, to the subjective in man; the other is covenant in history. The element of application is what has been emphasized in the Puritan preaching. But on the other hand there is a peculiar "historical" account of covenant, which, interestingly enough, aimed at the defence of the congregational conception of church. Here we note a strange commingling of those two types of covenant thought. For this system stands between the orthodox Reformed and the typical Anabaptist in conception of covenant.

By virtue of "application", the objective elements on the side of God are effectively related with man, the subjective side. For example, Ames applied the method of application to the doctrine of Providence.He accepted the Calvinistic distinction between general and special Providence.

"General gubernation" is God's rule of unintelligent creatures. "Speciall Gubernation is that whereby God doth governe reasonable Creatures in a speciall manner." With this doctrine Ames combined the idea of covenant. The idea of covenant is the application of God's gubernation to man, and the man's obedience to this God. The Calvinistic covenant is viewed from God's initiative, while Ames allowed more transaction between God and man.

> From this speciall and proper way of governing reasonable creatures, there ariseth that covenant, which is between God and them. For this covenant is as it were a certaine transaction of God with the Creature, whereby God commandeth, promiseth, threatneth, fulfilleth, and the Creature doth tie it selfe in obedience to God thus covenanting.[102]

Both Calvin and Ames shared the same conviction of God's government of the whole man's life. Ames, however, moved slightly towards an emphasis on the human subject insofar as his view of God's "gubernation" is realized in man's responding obedience. The very fact that God's government is realized by covenant, allows morality in man.

> Now becuase this way of entering into covenant is not between Lord and servant. Therefore it pertaines to government, whence also it is most properly called not the covenant of man, but of God, who is the author, and chiefe Executor of it. Deut. 8, 17. That he may performe his covenant. By vertue of this covenant the morall workes of the intelligent Creature, whilst he is in the way, have always a respect, either to happinesse as a reward, or to unhappinesse as a punishment: but in the last there is meriting but in the other not.[103]

The doctrine of Providence is essentially that of a

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[102] Ames, op. cit., I, x, 9.

[103] op. cit., I x, 10.

"heilsgeschichtliche" character. Ames combined the ethical element of Covenant idea with this historical concept of Providence. This combination of the ethical and the historical affects his conception of church.

He is generally regarded one of the forefathers of Independency. The Independency was nothing but a product of the commingling process of the Reformed and the Anabaptist types which was being accelerated by the logic of evangelical preaching and by the politico-social situation in which they were obliged to live. The semi-Brownistic tendency is revealed in his definition of a visible church:

> The church as it lives upon Earth, although it be not wholly visible together, yet it is visible in its parts, both dividedly in the severall member, and joyntly in companies or Congregations. The former visiblity is by mens personall profession which doth not make a Church simply visible, but in certaine members, or visible members of the Chruch, although the Church in it selfe or in its integrall state is not visible in the same place. Acts. 19.1. ... That visibility, which is in distinct companies or congregations, doth not only make a visible Church, but touching the outward forme doth make so many visible Churches as there are distinct congregations. Revel. 1. 4., 2 Cor. 8. 1. 19.[104]

Above all, the way of establishing this visible community comes closer to the Brownist way:

> Such a congregation or particular Church is a society of believers joyned together by a speciall band among themselves, for the constant exercise of the communion of Saints among themselves. ...This bond is a covenant, either expresse or implicite, where by

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[104] Ames, op. cit., I, xxxii, 1.

> believers doe particularly bind themselves, to performe all those duties, both toward God and one toward another, which pertaine to the respect and edification of the Church.[105]

This covenant is the "Church covenant" is a strict sense. The visibility of a church finds its ground here in the church covenant unlike the orthodox Reformed, especially in Calvin, which grounded the visibility in the Word of God either in preaching or in sacraments. The visibility here emerges through more subjective channel, rather than as an objective mechanism.

The relation between invisible and visible church becomes modified uniquely; if we first look at the basic subjective logic underlying it, this relation is discovered as a function of a pair of mutually related concepts: faith and profession. By profession of faith a church becomes visible; and by faith in profession an invisible Church exists: "It is a society of believers: because that same thing in profession doth make a church visible, which by its inward and reall nature doth make a mysticall Church, that is, Faith."[106] This is no belief in a universal visible church as a materialization of an invisible church. An invisible church is universal, yet a visible church is always an individual congregation; thus he writes:

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[105] Ames, op. cit., I, xxxii, 6.

[106] op. cit., I, xxxii, 7.

> Neither is this Church that is instituted by God properly nationall, provinciall, or Diocesan, which formes were brought in men from the paterne of civill government, especially the Romane: but is Parochiall, or of one congregation, the members whereby are combined among themselves, and doe ordinarily meete into one place to the publick exercise of religion.[107] p. 178

In two respects, however, Ames decisively differs from the Anabaptist type: 1. in admitting the children of the members of a visible church into a church covenant; and 2. in grounding this congregationalism in the history of covenant.

As to the first point:

> Among believers there are to be accounted as members of the Church the children of those believers who are in the Church: 1Cor. 7. 14. Your children are holy. For they are partakers of the same covenant, and the same profession with their parents. Yet infants are not so perfect members of the Church, as that they can exercise acts of communion, or be admitted to partake of all the privileges thereof, unlesse there doe first appeare an increase of Faith: but they are not to be excluded from those privileges which pertaine to the beginning of Faith and entrance into the Church.[108]

This admittance of infants pertains to an objectivistic tendency remaining in Ames' dealing with the covenant. He did not fall into extreme subjectivism. In the chapters XXXVIII and XXXIX, he displayed his historical view of covenant. The fundamental logic in his view of history of covenant is expressed thus:

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[107] *op. cit.*, I, XXXIX, 22.

[108] Ames, *op. cit.*, I, xxxii, 12.

> Although the free, and saving Covenant of God hath beene onely one from the beginning, yet the manner of the application of Christ or of administring this new Covenant, hath not always been one and the same, but divers, according to the ages in which the Church hath been gathered. In this variety here hath been alwayes a progresse from the more imperfect, to the more perfect.[109]

This logic, that is, progress from the more imperfect to the more perfect, is most important for understanding of Ames' view of *Heilsgeschichte*. Ames admitted the difference between the covenant of law and works, and the covenant of grace; and in viewing the covenant of grace from the beginning of history, he differed from the Anabaptist, and more nearly resembled the Reformed. But this history of covenant through both Testaments does not emphasize unity, but development, even of a unique type. For this development isone which points towards specialization: "First therefore the mystery of the Gospel was manifested generally and more darkly, and then more specially and more clearly."[110] What does thismean in reference to the conception of church? It means that the whole history of the covenant, that is *Heilsgeschichte*, moves from a more general type of church such as "national church" to a more specific type and more truthful type of church such as "congregational church!"

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[109] op. cit., I xxxvii, 1.

[110] *op. cit.*, I, xxxviii, 30.

> Therefore the Church instituted since Christ exhibited, is not one catholic Church, so as all the faithful throughout the world should be joyned together in one and the same outward band among themselves, and should depend upon one and the same visible pastor, or company of pastors, but there are so many Churches as there are companies, or particular congregations, of those that professe the Faith, who are joyned together by a speciall band for the constand exercise of the communion....Hence divers fixed Congregations, of the same contrey, and Province are alwayes called Churches in the plurall number not one Church, ...Neither is there any thing read in all the New Testament of the institution of any larger Church upon which lesser congregations should depend, neither is there any worship of holy ordinance prescribed which is not to be observed in every Congregation, neither is there any ordinary Minister made, who is not given to some one such company.[111]

He viewed the developmental process from the Jewish national church of the old covenant of grace to the Independent particular churches of the new covenant. It is interesting to note the difference between thought under the Platonic influence and this historical thought. For the former, the universal is clearer than the particular, while for the latter the particular is clearer than the universal in respect to the quality of truth. Therefore in every Church of the New Testament the whole solemne and ordinary worship of God and all his holy ordinances may and ought to be observed, so that all the members of that Church may ordinarily exercise communion together in them. For is it not now as it was ordained of God in the Church of the Iewes that some more solemne parts of Divine worship may be exercised in one place, & other in other places, but one particular Church is ordained, in which al holy offices are to be performed."[112]

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[111] op. cit., I xxxviii, 20.

Here we have a typical systematic expression of theology of the Independency, in which both the ethical and the historical elements are mutually related. The idea of covenant which was interpreted in terms of "application" pointed to an ethical implication, while there is a combination ob ecclesiology and Heilsgeschichte which pertains to the tradition of the Reformed theology. The subject in covenant-taking is not an individual person as in the Anabaptist type, but a congregation, though an individual's covenant-taking is naturally involved. This moderate collectivism made room for children to be accepted within acongregational covenant.

In this way the Independency proved itself to be a third type between the Reformed and the Anabaptist. In this sense it is a legitimate child of the Puritan preaching movement; it was born in that commingling process. But it more advanced than Roger's position in its covenantal group positively as a true church. The Independents now discovered the way to live with self-conviction. Rogers held a semi-Brownist meeting carefully discriminating and guarding from sectarianism. As a result it had a mild and restricted meaning as a meeting within the

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[112] Op. cit., I, xxxviii, 15.

Establishment. But independency grounded its own semi-Brownist meeting as a true church. With this difference in the degree of emphasis the rift between the Presbyterians and the Independents was deepened. From the early 17th century, Independency began to assert its adaptability to English society by making a church a corporation within the state and allowing the magistrates' position in the present state which greatly was able to meet the Erastian tendency. This was typically exemplified by William Bradshaw's pamphlet *English Pvritanisme*, published in 1605. As shown in this pamphlet, the separation between state and church,[113] the congregational

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[113] As to the civil magistrate: "They hould that the civill Magistrate as he is a Civill Magistrate hath and ought to haue Supreame power over all the Churches within his Dominions, in all causes whatsoever, And yet they hould that as he is a Christian he is a Member of some one particular Congregation, and ought to be as subject to the Spirituall Regiment thereof prescribed by Christ in his word, as the meanest subject in the Kingdome,...p. 32-33. ,.ecclsiastical power has no jurisdiction* (quote); so that the censures by the church is of spiritual sort, by convincing an offender his sin. "And if he be a King and Supreame Ruler, they are to kneele downe before him, and in the humblest manner to Censure his faultes, So that he may see apparently that they are not cariedwith the lest spirit of mallice against his Person, but onely with zeale of the health & Salvation of his soule." (p. 27) This attitude must be compared with the Presbyterian attitude. As to the church's relation to the civil magistrate: "They are then to craue the assistance and by helpe of the Civill Magistrate, who alone hath power, and who ought by his Civill sword, and authoritie, procure to all Members of the Church, whether Couerners of others, freedome from all manifest iniuries and wrongs." (p.8) The Church exists within the greater circle of civil state as smaller circles, as a corporation, of a voluntary sort. "Christ Iesus hath not

(cont.)

system of church government[114] and the acceptance of political principles implied in English Royal supremacy, were the ways in which Puritanism could live after the Presbyterian plan of political reformation had failed.

(cont.) subiected any Church of Congregation of his, to any other superior Ecclesiasticall Iurisdiction, then vnto that which is within it self so that if a wholl churche or Congregation shall erre, in any matters of faith or religion noe other Churches or Spirituall Church officers haue (by any warrant from the word of God) power to censure, punish, or controule the same: but are onely to counsell and aduise the same, and so to leaue their Soules to the immediate Iudgment of Christ, and their bodies to the sword and power of the Ciuill Magistrat, who alone vpon the Earth hath power to punish a wholl Church or Congregation. (p. 6) These quotationsshow how the Independency strived to live modifying the political position.

* "No Pastor ought to exercise or accept of any Civill publique Iurisdictio & authoritie, but ought to be wholly imployed in spirituall Offices & duties to that Congregation over which he is set." (p. 17)

[114] Cf. pp. 5, 8, 9, 11, 13. In page 13, he wrote, "They hould, that there are not by any divine Institutions in the world, any ordinarie Nationall Provintiall, nor Diocesan Pastors or Ministers vnder which the Pastors of Particular Congregation are to be subiect, as Inferior officers."

IV. Establishment of Ethical Subject

We have seen above a tendency in the logic of evangelical preaching to elevate human subjectivity by emphasizing the subjective decision to take covenantl Thus, the Puritan ethical tendency had been accelerated through the Puritan preaching movement. It was, however, accelerated not only by the intrinsic logic of evangelical preaching, but also by the interaction between the evangelical preaching and the need of forming the Puritan community. The contractual character of covenant was emphasized, and this contractual covenant was easily combined with this ethical tendency. It is by virtue of this contractual character of covenant that human ethical subjectivity was to be established in Puritanism. Here we must see how ethical subjectivity came to be established by this contradtual covenant. This question becomes serious if we consider the fact that in both Luther and Calvin thisestablishment had not been assured.

First, we know that the Puritans accepted a scheme of "the covenant of law - the covenant of grace." This scheme had had a variation, "thecovenant of works - the covenant of faith", "the covenant of nature - the covenant of grace", or sometime later, "the covenant of the law of works - the ocvenant of the law of faith." But the dichotomy points generally to asimilar content. The most important occasion in the development of this scheme, as Schrenk pointed out,[115] the assimilation of Melanchthonian natural theology into this scheme. In so doing, the covenant of works (or of law, of nature) assumed a positive meaning. By this assimilation the idea of Natural Law was to be re-interpreted by the covenantal scheme of thought. The latter is a historical mode of thought, and thus it permitted a new possibility of relation between historical thinking and the idea of Natural Law. We shall deal with this aspect later. Here we must concentrate our attention on the contractual aspect of covenant.

The covenant of law is described by Ames as follows:

> The law and covenant of God with man in the Creation was, Doe this, and thou shal live: If thou doe it not, thou shalt dye the death.[116]

This determines the original relation between God and man in creation. This covenant was first made with Adam after his creation, but this should not be interpreted in terms of the "order of creation" if the term taken in Lutheran sense. For this original relation is not a relation as "order" but a relation in the "imperative."[117] The former is based upon ontological gradation of being, the latter upon personal encounter: consequently in the latter case the matter is the relation between God and Adam as man, but not the relation between God and the creature in general. Covenant is a matter between personal beings, but no person can take covenant with impersonal things. This idea of the covenant of law or works in the creation was generally held by the Puritans in the 17th century,[118] but it is important that the Puritans conceived the origin of the history of humanity in this term, covenant.

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[115] Cf. Schrenk, op. cit., S. 48ff; Schrenk gave a clear survey of the development of this scheme within the Reformed churches.

[116] Ames, op. cit., I, x, 32.

[117] Here again Dr. Trinterud's judgment must be taken critically. He says: "Covenant and contract were indeed of the very essence of God's created order." op. cit., p. 53. God's created order must subsume the creature as a whole, but covenant is specially concerned with man as a person, subject to history, but not with man as a part of nature.

It is a hard and subtle question whether the Puritans believed the so-called "Ur-Geschichte", the most original event before the beginning of history of humanity; that is, the event of the eternal birth and crucifixion of Christ. Certainly Calvin had this in mind, and grasped the whole history in the light of this eternal event, which was the foundation of the unified conception of the double covenant. For the Puritan mind, a more specific analysis will be needed; but it is certainly too hasty a conclusion to say that the puritans placed the covenant of works as the more fundamental basis of the covenant of grace. In the history of the covenant, which develops as God's grace was applied by way of covenants, the covent of law came first. The covenant of grace followed the fall of the original man. But the so-called Proto-Evangelion (the first covenant of grace) is, as Ames said, an "application" of God's grace, not grace itself. At any rate, the history of humanity was grounded on the covenant between God and man from the beginning.

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[118] Cf. Preston, The Nevv Covenant, p. 315, "What this Covenant is. You must know that there is a double Covenant, there is a Covenant of workes, and a Covenant of Grace: The Covenant of workes runs in these termes Doe this and thou shalt live, and I will be thy God. This is the Covenant that was made with Adam; and the Covenant that is expressed by Moses in the Morall Law, Doe this and live. The second is the Covenant of Grace, and that runs in these terms, Thou shalt beleeve, thou shalt take my Sonne for thy Lord, and thy Saviour, and thou shalt likewise receive the gift of righteousnesse, which was wrought by him, for an absolution for thy sinnes, for a reconciliation with mee, and thereupon thou shalt grow up in love and obedience towards mee and then I will be thy God, and thou shalt bee my people."

What is the ethical implication of the covenant of law in the Creation? By defining the relation between God and man by means of covenant, the original form of ethics is drawn clearly: Natural Law is regarded asthe content of Divine imperative, but God commands man according to the law of human nature written in Adam's bosom. Theonomy is God's imperative is nothing but the Autonomy of man, but the fact that Theonomy is spoken of in the form of the imperative means that the Autonomy of man is only a possibility, something to be ethically realized. Otherwise, Theonomy is nothing but Heteronomy, Autonomy is nothing but "Anomy". The idea of covenant applied to the original relation of God and man had an ethical significance. It is interesting to note that the Puritan viewed sin as "disobedience" to God's commandments (Theonomy), a "covenant-breaking" whereby man became "Anomy."[119]

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[119] By this dynamic understanding of God-man relationship, Ames could escape from determinism: "For he had received that righteousnesse, and grace by which he might have persisted in obedience if he would. That rightousnesse and grace was not taken from him before he had sinned, although (cont.)

After Adam's fall by sinning, by covenant-breaking, the proto-type of covenant-relationship meant something different. Theonomy was turned into Heteronomy; thus the human subject was bound with the result of broken covenant. The law implanted in man's heart only helps remind him of the covenant relation to be.

The establishment of the ethical subject becomes a question under that condition; and its solution will be brought about by the covenant of grace.

> So you see now what this Covenant of Grace is, and how it differes from the Covenant of workes, it is that ministration not of the Letter, but of the Spirit, because it doth not onely present the outward letter of the Commandement, but there is a Law written within, that is done by vertue of the Spirit. So that the order is this: first it reveales righteousnesse, secondly, it softens the heart; it is a ministration of freedome, and not of bondage and enmitie: for when the Law is thus written, a man is not haled to it, hee comes not to it, as a bondslave to doe his worke, *but hee comes willingly, he finds he hath some ability to doe it, hee finds a delight in it*, as Paul saith, I delight in the law of God according to the inward man.[120]

It is under this new covenant of grace that man is restored as a freely responsible subject in covenant with God; man now delights in the law of God (Theonomy) to the inward man (Autonomy). "Willingness" and "ability" to do the law

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(cont) that strengthning and confirming grace by which the acts of sinning should have been actually hindered, and the contrary act of obedience brought forth was not granted unto him, and that by the certaine, wise, and just counsell of God. God therefore was no wise the cause of his Fall: neither did he lay upon man a necessity offalling, but man of his own accord, did freely Fall from God." (*Marrow of Divinity*, p. 50)

[120] Preston, *The Nevv Covenant* (1639 edition), p. 321.

of God is restored to him. Preston describes the process of this restoration of ethical subject with his religio-psychological touch; let it speak according to its own eloquence:

> But on the other side, when a man lookes upon the promises, then hee beginnes to see the covenant that his sinnes shall be put away, hee beginnes to see the goodnesse, and the mercy, and the tender compassion of God towards him, he begins to see a possibility of fulfilling the Law, in such a manner as God now requires, Then his heart melteth, hee becometh not only applicable to the Commandement, But is ready to delight in it; this a man gets by applying his heart to the Covenant of Grace, or by applying the Covenant of Grace to himselfe: That very applying of the promises of forgivenesse, I say, it begets a new disposition in the heart, which the Scriptures call a new life: that even as you see the Sunne, when it applies its beames to a fitly disposed matter, and stayes upon it, when it pitcheth its beames upon it with any continuance, it begins to beget life and motion in it, and makes it a living creature: so doth the Covenant of Grace, when it is applyed to the heart of a man, it begins to beget life in him, and to make him a new creature, it makes him another man, there is that power in the Covenant of Grace, in the promises of the pardon and forgiveness of sinnes, that it begets another life in a man, it makes him a new creature, it makes him a living creature to God, which before he was not.[121]

In this way, no further explanation is needed. The ethical subject as a partner of covenant is re-established.

This establishment of the ethical subject is important insofar as it is an attempt within the limit of "evangelical"Protestant circle. It is an attempt not against "Evangelical" principle, but in accordance with it. Here we must deal with one of the two important questions we have presented in our Introduction: the shift from Lutheran religious personality to Puritan human right. As we have suggested, this shift must be mediated by the establishment of an ethical subject who bears a positive core not to be destroyed by religious dialectics.

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[121] Preston, op. cit., p. 338.

Luther's idea of personality cannot be rightly understood apart from his idea of faith. For his personality is a personality in faith. Faith is nothing else than to have God, and thus personality must be conceived in the logic of having God. "Having God," he wrote in the Larger Catechism, "is nothing else than heartily to believe and trust in him; ...this trusting and believing makes both, God and idol; for these two belong together, faith and God."[122] What matters in this relation is the nature of God, who is at once Deus revelatus and Deus absconditus. Man must have this God; faith as trust teaches, therefore, a paradoxical nature of religious personality: simul iustus ac peccator! Trust in God is to stand in tension with repentance of selfishness. If we can use the term "existential" in the original sense of the word, viz. in Latin, ex-sistere: to stand-out, to go-out, his idea of personality is characterized by an existential nature. Personality in "trust" is dynamism as such which establishes itself by standing outside itself, by denying itself. He placed the ground of personality outside of the self. Here is Luther's overcoming of egocentricism, in which he saw the root of sin. But this overcoming should not be grasped simply in static manner; if this were possible, Luther could easily establish an ethical subject upon this religious personality. He envisaged egoism even in the religious act itself. Thus, the overcoming of sin takes place not as a process but as a tension with ever-recurring egocentricism. Thus, all the outer concern of life is again and again absorbed within the fundamental religious question, which is a question of "being just" prior to the question of acting justly. A vent to ethics is, therefore, opened indirectly, analogous to good fruits coming forth from a good tree.

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[122] WA 30, I: 28 (I owe this quotation to Dr. Pauck's The Heritage of the Reformation, 1950, p. 18)

Calvin somehow implied positive ethical meaning by the term "obedience." His faith is a faith as "obedience." Personality in relation to God is also duly stated as personality in obedience. But this obedience as such was not always able to establish an ethical subject. In addition, two factors must be mentioned in this relation: first, to Calvin, human attitude towards God's activity in history can be characterized in terms of "contemplation" as it is implied in his idea "meditatio futurae vitae." Man's attitude appears more "contemplative" than ethical. Secondly, his collective mode of thought make individual ethical subjectivity rather obscure, and conceived ethic in terms of churchly discipline. This leads to legalism. These two facotrs work rather negatively to the purpose of establishing ethical subjectivity.

The Puritan idea of "new obedience " is of Calvinistic origin and much closer to Calvin. But we mustmake clear the meaning of a development from Luther's personality in "trust", as well as Calvin's personality in "obedience" in the Puritan personality in "new obedience." The fundamental difference is this: that is Puritanism the human subject is grasped in the covenant scheme. By virtue of this scheme the Puritans could develop an ethical subject without conflicting with Luther's Evangelical principle, without falling into Calvin's legalism.

In a developed form of Puritan covenant scheme there are two facets: one is "orderly" aspect, and the other "correlative" aspect. In the quotation cited above, Ames said, "Now because this way of entring into covenant is not between those that are equall, but between Lord and servant, Therefore it pertaines to government, whence it is most properly called not the covenant of man, but of God, who is the author, and chiefe Executor of it."[123]

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[123] John Ball's emphasis on this orderly aspect came from his legitimate Reformed thinking: "The Author of the Covenant is God, not God and man, For God doth enter into Covenant with man, not as his equall, but as his Soveraigne, and man is bound to accept of the conditions offered by the Lord. There can be no such equality of power and authority betwixt God and the creature, as that he should indent with the most High, but must accept what the Lord is well pleased to offere and command." Ball, Treatise of the Covenant of Grace, (1645), p. 7.

This spirit was generally shared with Puritan covenant thinkers. On the other hand, as to the "correlative" aspect, Preston writes:

> he the Creator, and we but Creatures and yet hee is willing to enter into Covenant, which implies a kind of equalitie between us; as when Ionathan and David made a Covenant though there was a difference, the one was a Kings Sonne, yet notwithstanding, when the Covenant of friendship was made, there did rise a kind of equalitie between them; so it is betweene the Lord and us. ...I shuld enter into Covenant with the great God, that he should come to a Compact and agreement with me that hee should tye himselfe, and bind himselfe to become a debtor to mee...[124]

This latter element must be judged as a unique product of the Puritan preaching movement. The former "orderly" aspect was legitimately belonged to the reformed tradition. But the orthodox Reformed did not apply the term "covenant" in the latter way. Now, the "orderly" aspect of covenant renders a right position to the human subject in relation to God, while the latter correlative aspect of covenant raises the human subject up to ethical responsibility. The establishment of the ethical subject in Puritanism must be viewed in this dialectic. By virtue of the "orderly" element the error of Arminianism was avoided and by virtue of the "correlative" element ethical subject was raised within the Evangelical principle. The covenant scheme hardly allows a mystical sublimation of man's subject in God. For it does not think of religion in terms of substantial identity of God and man, but always maintain the orderly "relation" between God and man. Man is placed on the one pole of the relation, and at that position he must struggle with God. Religious deepening in that position cannot tend towards any sort of ecstasy, but remains in personal self-consciousness. Thus, a deeply religious Puritan remained sober in his way of life. Of course, there was a degeneration of covenant theology in the course of Puritan movement, and when the Principle of Spirit took the place of thecovenant, enthusiasm broke out, as in the time of the Civil War. But unless the covenant scheme was utterly rejected, even mysticism in Puritanism had a different character than the other kinds of mysticism, for example, the mysticism of the _Theologia_ _Germanica_. The difference is found in the connection between mysticism and ethics in Puritanism. In Luther there was no such scheme as covenant which holds the position of man in anorderly relation with God, so that a religious deepening is not always redirected to ethics; religion rather lies beyond good and evil. Luther can not be blamed however, because his acute religious deepening absorbed ethics. Rather, should he be blamed because he did not maintain his religious dynamism in religious personality, as _simul_ _iustus_ _ac_ _peccator_, but turned either to "unio mystica" on the subjective side or to "Est" principle of the theory of Sacrament (and Sacramental Christology) on the objective side. This turning means a compromise, or mitigation, if not abandoning, of that religious dynamics. In this way personality in "trust" disintegrated, either to mysticism or to sacramentalism. The advantage of the covenant scheme lay in the fact that it clearly circumscribed the place of man. By this scheme that Puritan could combine religion and ethics as one in one personality.

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[124] Preston, op. cit., p. 327.

On the other hand, the correlative aspect of covenant, in tension with the orderly aspect, draws ethical responsibility out of the human subject. The Orderly element permits such attitudes as "Trust" and "Obedience", but the correlative element, which holds God and man in "a kind of equalitie", established a positive core as an ethically responsible subject in the midst of the passive "Trust" and "Obedience." Therefore, for Puritanism, which means self-denial, and active and positive responsiblity arises in the midst of a religious trust which means self-denial. Thus, self-denial in this covenant scheme does not point to religious sublimation, but toethical asceticism, Weber's so-called "Innerweltliche Askese."

In the tension between the orderly element and the correlative element in the covenant scheme, an ethical subject which is established by the correlative element breeds a feeling of thanks; for man's ethical subject here established is naturally his own. This establishment of the ethical subject, therefore, must be distinguished from the Arminian doctrine of"salvability." It is also distinguished from the Erasmian "liberum arbitrium." "Within the new Couenant, God vndertakes to make vs able to performe the conditions that hee requires. Hee undertaketh both for himselfe and vs too. Hee commands vs to haue a new soft, one hart, and he maketh it so." So Harris answered to the question of the conditions man must take.[125] This emphasis is in line with the Evangelical Protestant teaching. But this does not allow a confusion with belief in "Alleinwirksamkeit Gottes" in Holl's terminology. In Luther this belief concluded in "servum arbitrium."[126] But in Puritanism, God's act elicits free but thankful responsibility; by the grace of God, as Preston said in the above quoted place, "hee comes willingly, he finds he hath some ability to doe it!" Here we must note a crucial difference: the Puritans do not simply trust in the grace of God, but respond to it, making use of the grace! This sense is deeply supported by the correlative element of covenant: "When there is a Covenant betweene us; then his (Christ's) strength is our strength, and his armies are our armies, we have interest in all: there is an offensive and defensive League: and when wee seeke to him, and put him in mind of it he cannot deny us."[127]

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[125] Harris, A Treatise of the Nevv Couenant, (1632) p. 48.

[126] Cf. Holl, G. A. I, Luther, S. 44ff. "Ohne Schwanken ziehot er deshalb aus Gottes Allmacht für den Menschen die Folgerung des "Unfreien Willens". (S. 46).

[127] Preston, op. cit., p. 328.

There are other interesting remarks on grace, which come from the period of the Civil War; Edmund Calamy wrote:

> Let us not be like that woman, that when her husband sent her a jewell as token of his love, to put in minde of him, fell in love with the jewell and forgot her husband. Let us not make these mercies our God, but bridges to lead us over unto God.[128]

The Puritan thought of God's grace and man's responsibility is here articulated again. Luther had known that faith as trust makes "both God and idol." But he did not overcome the idolatrous possibility in this "trust", though he himself rightly directed his trust to a true God. But the Puritan took grace as a "bridge" (or, means), without losing a right relationship with God. The difference between Luther and the Puritan is a very subtle one: Luther seemed to have in mind the German paternalistic family relation when he thought of personal relations, while the Puritan had more in mind contractual relations between persons. Both conceived God's grace in personal terms. But for the Puritan God's grace was not merely His merciful "attitude," but an event between God and man.

Taking grace in this way, the Puritnn avoided the idolatry of grace which would destroy man's ethical responsibility in his covenantal relationship. Certainly the Puritanism was based on "sola Gratia" but this motto is characteristically interpreted by ethical action. The covenant scheme could only hold such tension as activity (ethics) in the midst of passivity (religion). This tension was expressed characteristically in this way: "true Faiths apprehension of Christ, is mutuall. . . . So that true Faith, kissing Christ, is Kissed of him, embracing Christ is re-embraced of him, and it so apprehends Christ, that at the same time the beleeuer is apprehended of Christ, as Paul sheweth in his owne example."[129] It is interesting to read that "Faith hath two hands. One receiuing Christ from God: the other giuing the beleeuer ot God." This paradoxical nature of faith was expressed in one word, "Instrument". Faith is "Instrument."

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[128] Calamy, God's Free Mercy to England, (1641) p. 15.

> Wee are iustified by faith alone: whereby we are not to vnderstand that faith by its owne vertue, or as it is a faculty, habit, worke or action in vs, doth iustifie vs, but as it is the alone instrument, whereby we do apprehend and applie vnto vs Christ Iesus, his righteousnes and obedience, by which only righteousnes, which is out of our selues, in Christ, as the proper subject we are iustified in Gods sight...[130]

We can now make clear the development from Luther to the Puritan: it is the development from personality of faith as "trust" in Luther, through personality of faith as "obedience" in Calvin, to personality of faith as "instrument".

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[129] D. Dyke, The Mystery of Self-Deceiving, (1630), p. 17.

[130] Downame, Christian Warfare, (1612), Lib. 2, chap.LII, P. 668.

Thus, the establishment of ethical subjectivity in Puritanism, owing to the covenant scheme, marks an important event in the course of the theological development of Protestantism. If we today try to assume the same position as Luther, every ethical question must be first reduced to the question of religion. This position was taken by Barth, though with some Kantian emphasis in the Lutheran attitude. Ethics is absorbed in Dogmatics in him. On the other hand, we must say that when Dr. Niebuhr spoke the following, the covenant scheme served as a theological basis: "The dimension of depth in the consciousness of religion creates the tension...(which) bends the bow from which every arrow of moral action flies." "The 'pull' or 'drive' of moral life is a part of the religious tension of life."[131] Undergirded by the covenant scheme, this dynamic combination of religion and ethics is to be theologically explained. The Puritan covenant theology was creative at least in the task, of establishing ethical subjectivity within the Evangelical Protestant platform. The danger that the Evangelical religious truth would commit the error of eroding the ethical subject of responsibility, was thus overcome.

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[131] Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, pp. 8-9.

V. Justification and Sanctification in Covenant Theology

We have shown in the previous section that the establishment of ethical subjectivity did not add something alien to the Evangelical Protestant position of "Justification by faith alone" but contributed something ethically positive within, or in accordance with that position. The Puritans avoided falling into the error of Arminianism, and rather attempted to turn the element of "pro me" in Luther's soteriological thinking toward a more positive ethical implication. The establishing of ethical subjectivity took place as the contractual element in covenant theology. It was more and more emphasized during the time from the failure in political reformation under the reign of Elizabeth to the beginning of the Revolution. During this time, the Puritan movement had been creating an "Inclination" in its own theology, which both served to establish ethical subjectivity and allowed, if it did not admit, a tendency to draw nearer to Arminianism. Thus, about the time of the Revolution the Puritan effort to establish ethical subjectivity in keeping with the Lutheran soteriological principle found itself entangled with many confusing problems. This condition was the outcome of the prevailing contractual interpretation of covenant theology. Along with this line of development, the re-statement of the doctrine of Justification and also the reaction against such an attempt became serious. The problem of Justification, therefore, should be viewed first in this relation.

But it is not enough to take up the problem from that side only, for the Puritan doctrine of Justification has another aspect which may not be fully appreciated from the contractual point of view of covenant theology. We must again consider the two elements in the Puritan covenant theology which were being commingled. The historical element of covenant gave a peculiar character to the doctrine of Justification and Sanctification. In order to appreciate this aspect, we must first consider a complicated area where the historical covenant theology projects itsown characteristic into the human subjective horizon. The historical element in covenant theology is, by its nature, an objective view of God's dispensation in history of covenant, or of *Heilsgeschichte*. But this element was characteristically projected on the human subjective level. The historicall view on the objective side was correspondingly related to the subjective side. The Puritans expressed this by the term "historical faith." On this point the Puritan differs from Luther, the latter emphatically distinguishing saving faith and historical faith.[132]

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[132] Calvin also followed to Luther in this distinction; he rejected historical faith simply because it is "a common assent to the evangelical history." Cf. *Institutes* III, ii, 1. Luther's contradistinction was, in the modern time, repeated by Kierkegaard with more one-sided emphasis though not deviating from Luther, Cf. *Einübung in Christentum*. This line was taken by the contemporary "dialectic theologians."

The Puritan viewed the historical activity not only as God's government of the world, but also in man's faith. The subjective qualification of *fides historica* is "assent." Ames distinguished "general assent" and "speciall assent." As to general assent, he explains, "that generall assent, which which the Baptists make to be Faith, is not Faith, because by their own confession, it may be without any life." But on the other hand, he defended the "speciall assent" saying "But that solid assent yeelded to the promises of the Gospel is called Faith; and confidence, partly because it begetteth Faith as it is a generall assent: partly because it flowes from that confidence as it is a speciall and solid assent apprehending the actuall possession of grace already obtained."[133] The Puritans did not simply assert or contemplate the historical activity of God in *Heilsgeschichte*. They *lived* by historical faith through a firm assent which copied in human subjectivity what God did objectively. Thus, *Heilsgeschichte* is to be reproduced in the subjective human life-course. The doctrines of Justification and Sanctification in Puritanism were, for the Puritans, conceived as aspects of this life-course. Therefore, a conception of soteriology was developed. It is from this side that we must view the Puritan soteriology.

Those two elements, historical or contractual, are brought into interaction in the Puritan covenant theology on the human subjective side, too. As on the objective side of the course of events there was a process of commingling, so on the subjective side of man's life, both historical and saving faith were interrelated:

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[133] Cf. Ames, *Medulla*, lib. 4, c. 2

> Faith signifying beliefe is vsed to note, here historical faith being concerned and ordinary knowledge and bare assent to the historical truth of Scripture, grounded vpon the authority and truth of the Speaker, though sometimes holpen by experiments, and other inducements, and probablilites of the things; and this is called faith Historicall, that is, a nacked, imperfect, dead assent, without trust or confidence in the mercies of God, or adherence to the Commandements. Howbeit we must not imagine, that faith is reputed vnsound, or not saluificall, because historicall (rather it is oftentimes vnsufficient to saue, because it is not so fully historicall as it might be) but the name of historical faith arose hence, that some are said to belieue, who did neuer embrace Christ as their only Sauiour with all their hearts, nor confidently relie vpon the promises of mercie: otherwise faith iustifying doth more certainly belieue trugh of the history of Gospel, and so is more historicall than the faith called historicall.[134]

This is really a significant text which proves how the Puritan mind conceived faith and history in relation. Although conscious of the error of the Catholic interpretation of historical faith, the Puritan attempted to synthesize both saving and historical faith. A true faith has a historical element! It is such a remarkable statement that he wrote, "faith iustifying doth more certainly belieue truth of the history of Gospel, and so is more historicall than the faith called historicall." Here is, to speak in modern terminology, a combination between the existentialism in saving faith and the historicism in historical faith. This may throw light on the contemporary issue of contradiction between existentialism (represented by Bultmann) and Heilsgeschichte (represented by Cullmann), if the position here asserted by Ball may be treated by modern conception.

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[134] John Ball, A Treatise of the Covenant of Grace, p. 350.

Let us, now, begin by considering the fundamental question which was produced by the continuing emphasis on the contractual element in relation tothe Protestant doctrine of soteriology. There occurred a fundamental question whether the contractual element in Covenant theology would conflict with Luther's position on Justification. If an ethical condition were intensified, would it not fall into the Catholic error of Justification by Works? If an element of natural liberty were emphasized, if might fall into Arminian error of "Salvability." Luther was not unknown to the Puritans of this age; on the contrary, the so-called Reformation literatures such as "Freiheit des Christen Menschen", and the Commentary on Galatians were translated anew in 1635 and 1636. The Puritans could have read the essentials of Luther's teaching afresh. If the Lutheran element was known, the tendency of the Puritans may easily have been held in check by the suspicion of "Synergism." Luther stood on the position of "unconditional" Justification. This position, which denied the human condition for Justification, was accepted by Calvin, in whom this position was stressed as

Presdestination in line with the Zwinglian concept of God. The Doctrine of Predestination is therefore nothing but a form of the idea of unconditional Justification, which was conceived according to the Reformed doctrine of God. The Puritans strictly favored the doctrine of Predestination which was firmly established at the Dort Conference, and rejected Arminianism. Nevertheless! Yes, nevertheless, the logic of evangelical preaching in which the Puritans engaged themselves, necessarily gave rise to the tendency of maximizing human ethical responsibility.

Take Perkins for example:

> Some think, that men may be brought within the Covenant, by the doctrine of Vniversall grace and redemption. But this way of perswading a man that he hath title in the Covenant of grace, is both false and unfit. False it is, because all the promises of the Gospel, are limited within the condition of Faith, and Repentance; not being universall to all, but made onely tosuch persons, as repent and believe: therefore they are indefinite, in regard of whole mankind, and to beleevers only they are universall.[135]

When he said thus, he did not seem to fully realize the coming complication. Perkins emphasized the condition of faith and repentance (viz. the human subjective side in the covenant with God), and thus avoided the danger of "Universalism" in Soteriology. But he admitted, on the other hand, according to the logic of evangelical preaching, that whosoever believes in the "promises of the Gospel" will be saved universally. In order to avoid Universalism, or in other words, in order to maintain the truth of Predestination, he related faith as a condition of grace. But does not this lead to an important change of Calvin's dodtrine of Predestination? In so doing, he had to admit that God's Predestination may be determined, or at least, realized by man's faith. Therefore, it may lead to the conclusion that man's salvation is dependent, at least in part, on man's decision, though fundamentally dependent on God's decision. This must cause a serious modification in the doctrine of Predestination. It is noteworthy that already in Perkins there was a strong Johannine tendency which emphasized the necessity of faith: "To this purpose saith S. Ihon 3. 36. "He that beleeveth in the Sonne, hath everlasting life.' And 5. 24. 'He that beleeves in him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation, but hath passed from death to life.'" and he said, "This is the Ground." "Whosoever is by faith united unto Christ, the same is elected, called, justified, and sanctified."[136] This nothing else but one expression of the logic of the evangelical preaching. Man can take covenant by his believing decision, and he who is in covenant is predestined.

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[135] Perkins, The Whole Treatise, 1636 edition, p. 55.

We must not overlook, however, the fact that this Johannine emphasis on faith did proceed one step further towards the ethical cognition of Predestination. If to be in Covenant takes human decision as condition, and if the covenant has an ethical demand as well as belief, the "cognizability" of Predestination has an ethical expression.

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[136] Perkins, The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience, (1636), p. 44.

This problem is related to the question of the certainty of salvation. To fulfill the ethical conditions is to give the certainty of slavation to the believers. Faith in the covenant turns itself towards ethics, so that if faith is a "true living faith" in covenant with God, the ethical acts and qualities as the necessary condition of covenantal faith become the witness of this certainty. Harris said in answer to the question: "how shall I know that I am within the couenant?"

> For this, thou must looke to two things. First, see what God hath done for thee. Secondly, what thou has done for him againe: For, something there is to be done on both sides, you know, in euery couenant. For the first, looke whether God hath giuen thee this one heart here promised, this new spirit, this heart of flesh insteed of thin old heart, thy heart of stone? See what affections he hath renewed in thee? hath he put his loues, his fear into thy inward parts? hath he written his lawes in thy heart? hath he giuen thee a new nature? art thou become another man then thouwast, cast into a new mould? hast thou new thoughts, new desires, new designes to set up God alone in the making of thine own saluation, &c? Then thou art of those with whom God is in couenant. Againe, secondly, see what thou dost for God,for thou must be working, all that are in couenant with him, . . . Search then what thou hast done in Gods worke, doest thou warre against the flesh? Subject thy wit to Gods wisdome, thy will to Gods will, &c. Hauing such promises as these dost thou (as the Apostle exhorteth) Cleanse thy selfe from all filthinesse of flesh and spirit, parfecting holinesse in the fear of God? then it is sure that God hath smitten a couenant with thee, and it shall be performed vnto thee.[137]

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[137] Harris, A Treatise of the Nevv Covenant, (1632), pp. 46-47. Max Weber is right to point out this character in proving the certainty of salvation, but his discussion is defective in that he is not informed about covenant theology. He attempted to interpret this character in exclusive reference tothe doctrine of Predestination.

A theologically complicated situation concerning Soteriology arose after the 1640s as this tendency came to full expression. Two things should be mentioned: the first is the reaction against this tendency, and the other is the clarification of what was implied in it. In doing justice to the real theological situation, an attempt to reduce the following theological conflict to any simple scheme, for example, Calvinism versus Arminianism, should be avoided. For it is a disintegration within the Reformed theology.

First the reaction came from so-called Antinomianism, although this very term is one of the most unsuitable labels that could be applied. This Antinomianism must be distinguished from that which arose in the circle of Lutheranism on the continent. The Puritan Antinomianism was found in Tobias Crisp (1600-1643), the author of an influential book entitled Christ alone exalted, first published in 1643, and after several editions, the occasion of re-publishing of his work in 1690 was to cause the so-called Crispian controversy in the 1690s. The point of this controversy was taken up clearly by an anonymous author, as the title of his pamphlet shows: "The Covenant of Grace, not Absolute, but Conditional", published in 1692. Whether the covenant of grace is "absolute" or "conditional": this statement of problem can be applied to the whole course of the theological conflict between Antinomianism and the main current of Puritanism. The central idea of Antinomianism has been stated as the doctrine of "Free Grace." But it may be less suitable to the real theological situation, to oppose this doctrine of "Free Grace" to the Puritan doctrine of "federal Covenant theology" as Leo F. Solt has done recently.[138] For the Antinomians did not reject the idea of covenant, on the contrary, they used the idea of covenant though in a different meaning. According to Baxter the Antinomians are ones "who deny the covenant of Grace to any proper Conditions, but a priority and posteriority of Duties."[139] What the Antinomians denied is the "conditional" interpretation of the covenant of Grace. Moreover, in view of the fact that such a typical Presbyterian as Edmund Calamy preached before the Parliament in 1641, under the subject "Gods Free Mercy to England" the dichotomy "Free Grace" versus "Covenant" does not seem to clarify the real meaning of confrontation between Antinomianism and the main current of Puritanism. We prefer, therefore, to the dichotomy which is not only theologically clear but also historically true, "the absolute versus the conditional covenant."

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[138] Mr. Solt's book entitled Saints in Arms, Puritanism and Democracy in Cromwell's Army, (Stanford Univ. Press, 1959) may be valuable in calling attention to the importance of Antinomianism. His failure seems to be due to an inadequate theological knowledge, which limited his view unfortunately. Moreover, we must note here again, Trinterud's thesis which he accepted without criticism gave him a theological prejudice. This caused him to fail in locating Antinomianism in theological and historical context of 17th Century Puritan movement. In this case the Church-historian may be more guilty of this mistake. Mr. Solt's criticism of Woodhouse might be more fruitful if his position was delineated theologically more clearly.

[139] Baxter, Of Justification, (1658), p. 37.

The Antinomian response was taken against the increasing emphasis on the "contractual" interpretation of the covenant of the main current of Puritanism. This would undermine the religious ground of Protestantism. Saltmarsh envisaged rightly this danger. He attempted, with theologically healthy reason, to avoid the tendency of contractual covenant towards legalism and the doctrine of "Justification by works" andthus to recapture covenantal religion into Christocentricism. His emphasis was that "The new Covenant, no Covenant, properly with us, but with Christ for us."[140] He wrote as follows:

> God makes no Covenant properly under the Gospel as he did at first: But his Covenant now is rather all of it a Promise. Man is not restored in such a way of Covenant and Condition as he was lost, but more freely, and more by Grace and Mercy; and yet God Covenants too; but it is not with Man only, but with him that was God and Man, even Jesus Christ; he is both the Covenant, and Messenger or Mediator of the Covenant. God agreed to save Man, but this agreement was with Christ, and all the Conditions were on his part; he stood for us, and articled with God forus, and performed the Conditions for Life and Glory: And yet because we are so concerned in it, it is called, a Covenant made with us, I will make a new Covenant with them: And yet that it may not be thought a Covenant only with us as the first was, it is called a new Covenant, anda better Covenant; and Christ is called the Mediator of it... So as in this new Covenant God is our God of Free Grace and Righteousnesse on his part, not for any conditional Righteousnesse on his part, not for any conditional Righteousnesse on ours.[141]

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[140] Saltmarsh, Free-Grace: Or, the Flowings of Christ's Blood freely to Sinners. (1645-1646) p. 101.

[141] op. cit., pp. 101-102. Also see p. 120f. "The Covenant that is called the new Covenant that God makes with his now under the Gospel, is all on his own part, without anything on Man's; he makes himself ours, and makes us his; (cont.)

In sofaras theological intention is concerned, there is a surprising similarity to what Karl Barth is emphasizing today, here. Even the idea of covenant here described appears much closer to one that Barth uses in his Dogmatik; although, needless to say, the similarity should not be extended tothe other aspects. Covenant was objectively conceived, here. One may be able to interpret this situation by means of Toynbee's terminology: Antinomianism is a reactionary response to the challenge of the contractual interpretation of covenant. In this sense the Antinomian reaction contained many healthy elements. For it could mean a revival of some elements of the genuine Reformed objective interpretation of covenant. The covenant of grace is "Gods Covenant"; and God's covenant is His "Promise." Against the Puritan emphasis on the side of "mutuality", here is a counter-emphasis on the objective side of God's grace, which is based solely upon God's sovereign will.

(cont.) all is of his own doing: Tho' a Covenant in the strict legal common Sense, is upon certain Articles of Agreement and Conditions on both sides to be performed: Thus stood the old Covenant, there was Life promised on Condition of Obedience, and so in Covenants and Contracts beteixt Man and Man; but now there is a Covenant, there was Life promised on Condition, or rather Promise in Jesus Christ, who is called the Mediator or Manager of the Covenant, in which God gives himself freely in Christ, to be the God of a poor Sinner, Christ undertaking all, both with the Father and the Soul. Such a kind of Covenant was established with Noah, Gen. 9.11. Behold I establish my Covenand, &c. nothing required on Man's part: This is called a New Covenant, for it is clear against the strain of theOld, wherein Man was to have his Life upon Condition: Yet it were Good, that we did not rest too much in the Notion of a Covenent: nor is it the way of a Covenant that the Gospel uses, but rather the Promise, or Grace, or Salvation."

> God takes us intoCovenant, not upon any Condition in us before; he brings with him Christ, and in him all the Conditions, and makes us as he would have us; not for the Covenant, but in it, or under it; we are not his People before he be our God First.[142]

Let us give our attention to the emphasis on the "before", which describes the time-aspect of theological objectivism. Saltmarsh said that we are not his People before he be our God first. This "before" implies a special meaning in view of the Puritan tendency which expressed the mutuality in the covenant relation between God and man in terms of "Concurrence," in order to avoid the suspicion of synergistic "Co-operation."[143] The careful Puritans never used the term "co-operate." But, instead of that, the correlation was expressed as "Concurrence." So the conflict is drawn between the "before" and the "concurrence." Does not this remind us of a contemporary theological conflict between Barthian objectivism and Brunnerian theology of encounter?

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[142] Saltmarsh, op. cit., p. 102.

[143] Harris wrote of the two parties between whom the covenant is smitten: "The party vndertaking is God, who is heere brought in by the Prophet Ezekiel, as one entring into couenant that he will giue them all spiritaull and sauing grace. The parties with whome he couenants, and these are his Israel, whom he had chosen out of all Nations to be a people to himselfe, as before he tells them. These be the parties that concurre in this couenant. (underline is mine.) Harris, op. cit. p. . The use of "concurrence" can be found in many places of the Puritan documents! Let us give another example: Baxter made use of this terminology more intentionally. "With this covenant concures a mutual delivery; Christ delieverth himself in all comfortable relations to the sinner, and the sinner delivereth up himself to be saved and ruled by Christ...." Saints Eternal Rest, Part I, chap viii, p. 6.

The emphasis upon the "before" leads to theological objectivism, while the stress on the "concurrence" points to the correlational aspect of God-man encounter. The Antinomians' objectivistic tendency is, however, distinguished from "Universalistic" objectivism, in sofar as it retained the idea of Predestination. But we must admit that Antinomianism stood on the rather fluid basis between Universalism and Predestination.

We cannot neglect the important and healthy aspects of this Antinomian reaction; for the Antinomians did know the problematic character of the Puritan contractual interpretation of covenant. If the Puritans dare to view the certainty of salvation in ethical achievement, then doesthe failure in ethics mean a fall from salvation? Against this danger, Saltmarsh contended:

> We are naturally apt to take Measure of our Graces and God's Love to us, first, by the Mortification of sin in us, and dying to former Lusts: and if we find that otherwise than we would, we presently let go our hold upon the Promises, and slacken our believing, and perswade our selves, that because it is thus and thus with us, and Corruption quickening aagain, we were deceived in our selves, and that sure the Spirit was never in us.[144]

Saltmarsh, therefore, laid the foundation of the certainty of salvation on the transcendental side of God's grace, in which man can believe "in Hope against Hope, Rom. 4."

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[144] Saltmarsh, op. cit., p. 48.

In spite of the outer miserable conditions which rob us of every confidence of being a Christian, we are secure by laying ourselves outside ourselves! This is a healthy element in the Antinomian reaction. But the matter remains more complex: How does the human subject have a relation to the objective certainty? Dealing with this question we may be able to solve the question why the objectivistic inclined Antinomians show spiritualistic enthusiasm. It is this: Saltmarsh related the Absolute Covenant of Free Grace not with the human ethical subject, but with the "Soul." He wrote:

> A Soul is then properly, actually, or expressly in Covenant with God, when God hath come to it in the Promise; and then when it feels it self under the Power of the Promise, it begins only to know it is in Covenant; and yet to yield and obey, as if it were but to enter into that Covenant which God hath made with it in Christ, before it could do any thing; so as they that believe, do rather feel themselves in that Covenant which God hath made with them, without any thing in themselves, either Faith or Repentance, &c.[145]

The human partner of thecovenant is not an ethical "I" but a psychological "I", for a soul feels itself in covenant with God before the ethical engagement occurs. In this way, by the covenant withaa soul, the doctrine of "Free Grace" is connected with the tendency of enthusiasm. The "feeling" becomes therefore the witness of being in covenant. This should be contrasted with the orthodox

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[145] Saltmarsh, op. cit., p. 103. (underline is mine)

Puritan interpretation of seeing witness in ethical acts.

It is in view of this Antinomian reaction that a theological clarification of the Puritan Soteriology becomes necessary in the contractual interpretation of covenant. It is to thissituation that Perry Miller's thesis fits exactly. His thesis is that the Puritan Covenant theology is the middle way between Antinomianism and Arminianism.[146] Soteriology in the Puritan Covenant theology had to assert its own validity in the narrow between Antinomianism and Arminianism. It lies between "Free Grace" and Salvability." The former places too much emphasis on the objective side in the covenant, the latter on the subjective side. It is true that the logic of evangelical preaching did elevate human possibility in taking covenant, but the most difficult question in this connection is where the human subject should be located in relation to God. Thus, the "Inclination" within the Puritan theology may be constructed to prevent falling in Arminianism. The most unique work in meeting this problem is the work of John Goodwin entitled Imputatio Fidei. This work represents a type of clarifying effort of the theological "Inclination." How is the establishment of ethical subjectivity able to come to terms with the Lutheran doctrine of Justification? Goodwin boldly grappled with this difficult problem, and thus attempted to interpret the Protestant doctrine of Justification in the light of covenant theology. The theme of this book isthis, as Haller puts it, "The technical point. . . was that the atonement did not impute or transfer to sinners the righteousness of Christ but only the power to believe that by that righteousness they might be justified and saved if they would."[147] To elaborate a little further, "imputatio Fidei" is not deliberately distinguished from "imputatio iustitiae." In the case of Luther this sort of distinction was never thought. Rather was he more interested in the distinction between "imputatio" and "infusio," which emancipated soteriology from the yoke of the medieval scholastic ontological-substantial conception. Soteriology was now transferred to the personalistic thought realm. But in spite of this change, Luther's personalistic thinking fell short of establishing an ethical subjectivity. There was a two-fold aspect in Luther's soteriological thought, as Holl described, either as God's work or as human experience. [148] From the side of God it is the imputation of righteousness; but if rightousness is thus imputed, the human ethical subject has not only nothing to do with it, but is also excluded from the event of Justification. From the side of man, Luther's emphasis on the element of "pro me" does not seem to have been conceived "ethically", but rather "existentially" with mystico-psychological tendency. Thus conceived, man's attitude is soteriological concern, if it faces the problem of the certainty of salvation, may incline towards a solution in terms of "unio mystica." This makes it impossible to establish the ethical subject.

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[146] Miller, The Puritan Mind, The Seventeenth Century, p. 367. "As controversy spread from the church to doctrine, Puritans had to defend their position not only against Anglicans but against two revolts within their own camp, against what was known at that time as 'Arminianism' and against what for the sake of convenience we may call 'Antinomianism.' Both these errors sprang from orthodox Calvinism's defieiencies. The group of Puritans who made up the federal school endeavored to forestall Arminians and Antinomians by their doctrine of the Covenant of Grace..." His citation of Willard may be one of the clearest texts which proves hisinterpretation: "Willard entertained the same conception of the situation: 'the way lyes very narrow between Antinomian and Arminian errours, and therefore needs the greater exactness in cutting the thread true.' It was necessary, he said in a compleat Body, to 'fortify our selves against the Pelagian and Polish Errors on the one hand, which some Protestants have too deeply imbibed, and the Antinomian and Libertine Frenzies on the other, which too sadly prevail in this Licentious Age.'" (p. 372)

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[147] Haller, Rise of Puritanism, p. 200.

From Goodwin's point of view, such may be a consequence of not making the distinction between *imputatio fidei* and imputation of righteousness. For Luther the imputation of righteousness should concur with being given faith. Faith, therefore, is like a vessel in which righteousness is received. Although Goodwin is in agreement with the traditional idea of Protestantism regarding faith as given, or imputed, he maintained that this faith is something by means of which righteousness is to be imputed and at the same time to be secured; in other words, by this faith both the objective gift and subject acquirement are held at once. Karl Barth once attempted to relate ethical responsibility with Lutheran Evangelical position by virtue of the logic "Gabe - Aufgabe", but this is nothing else than a matter of words, for there is nothing structural which clarifies the transmutation from the "Gabe" to the "Aufgabe". Goodwin attempted to solve this problem by holding together both the Puritan notion of faith as "Instrument" and his idea of "imputatio fidei." In so doing the Puritan ethical tendency was reconciled with the Protestant platform of soteriology.

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[148] Holl, *Die Rechtfertingungslehre im Licht der Geschichte des Protestantismus*, (Sammlung Gemelnuerstandlicher Vorträge und Schriften aus dem Gebiet der Theologid und Religions geshcichte, 1609) "Luther betrachtet den Vorgang das einemal von oben her als Akt Gottes, das andereman von unten her als Erlebnis des Menschen. Beides tritt bedeutungsvoll auseinander." (s.8)

This has been done by Goodwin's very keen and subtle reasoning. Certainly the label of Protestant scholasticism is deserved here, since the reconciliation was undergirded by the theory of causality. This is an Aristotelian heritage, which was refined through medieval scholasticism. Faith is defined here as the "instrumental-efficient cause." This definition as such is not his invention but rather, we must assume, prevailed among the Puritans. For example, John Downame used the same definition in his famous "christian Warfare."[149] The uniqueness of Goodwin may be found in his effort to reconcile the Lutheran Soteriology and the Puritan Covenant theology. The theme is that faith can participate in the event of Justification actively and efficiently. But this efficiency is not principal but "instrumental." The connotation of "Instrument" is different from that of "vessel", for the instrument is not simply "passive" as the vessel, but suggests activity. This activity, however, is never simply "positive"; on the contrary, it means that when it is most active, then it is moved and used by something other and higher than itself. Thus, in the midst of activity there is passivity, and in the midst of passivity it could be most efficient in activity. It is God Himself who moves it, and He is the "principal efficient cause." In this definition the Calvinistic doctrine of the sovereignty of God is preserved. Calvin did not reject the secondary causes, while Goodwin made clear the relation between the primary and the secondary causes. Christ's righteousness concerns the event of Justification indispensably as the "meritorious efficient cause, " and faith as the "instrumental efficient cause" is related thus:

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[149] Cf. Downame, Christian Warfare, (1612 edition), p. 654. "There is a two fold instrumental cause: one on God's part is the Word and the Sacrament, and the other on our part, a true and lively faith."

> True it is, Faith is not an impulsive or moving cause in Iustification of the same kinde, nor after the same manner that Christ and his sufferings are: these are impulsive and moving in a superior way, by way of merit, and consequently of Iustification simply, and therefore are at no hand to be reckoned amongst the instrumentall causes thereof, whereas Faith moveth only in an inferior and under way, and by such a motion, wherewith causes properly instrumentall someimes move (as hath bin said) and therefore mooveth, not properly to Iustification, or to Iustification of such and such men, viz. that doe beleeve.[150]

It may be interesting, by the way, to take a look at other causes of Justification. He takes the formal cause to be the "Rightiousness of Christ" which was above regarded as the "meritorious efficent cause". Christ's righteousness is at once the meritorious efficent cause and the formal cause. This means that the form as such is something dynamic, and not a static holy quality which may be transferred to man.[151] The material cause was identified with human personality.[152]

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[150] Goodwin, *op. cit.*, Second Part, p. 83.

[151] Downame named thus: "The formall cause of our iustification is a reciprocall imputation or transmutation of the sinnes of the beleeuer vnto Christ, and of his righteousnesse vnto the beleeuer. . ." *Ibid*.

[152] It is noted that Goodwin consciously rejected the commonplace which was believed and accepted since the day of Downame, that "The materiall cause of our iustification is the actiue and passiue righteousnesse and obedience of Iesus Christ, his inherent holinesse, his fulfilling of the law, his death, sacrifice and full satisfaction. . ." *Ibid*. Rejecting this position, Goodwin said, "it can be none other, but either the subject, or the object of Iustification, that is either God himselfe, or the person that is to be iustified." p. 89.

As the final cause of Justification, he writes:

> the Glory of God which is the generall, great, and sovereigne end of all things whatsoever. . . The great subordinate end, and which lies fairest and fullest in view to the sight of all men, is the advancement of the creature, or persons iustifyed, to that exceeding height of glory, and endlesse happinesse, in the entire and satisfying injoyment of God, which himselfe was graciously pleased to ordeyne them unto from the beginning and to prepare and make them meet for, in time.[153]

It is interesting that there are two aspects in this final cause: the Calvinistic "Gloria Dei" and the ethical accomplishment of salvation.

It must be noted, that by virtue of making faith the instrumental efficient cause, the Puritan not only could succeed in establishing the ethical subject but also could come to terms with a developmental conception of soteriology. Christ's righteousness is not mystically acquired, but rather ethically acquired by and through faith. But this is possible insofar as the believers are entitled to Christ's righteousness. Goodwin rather preferred the image of marital relationship, than that of organic relation of head and body. The mystical union in organic interpretation is avoided. Christ's righteousness is the believers' as right, but they *must* not think of themselves immediately as holy, as harmless, as for separated *from* sinners as Christ himself is.[154]

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[153] Goodwin, *op*. *cit*., p. 84.

[154] *op*. *cit*., p. 116.

> So the righteousnesse of Christ becomes ours by right of our spirituall mariage with him: but not to be righteous withall (formally) for this is still his personall propriety, notwithstanding the giving of himself in mariage to us: but to have the benefit and blessing of it communicated unto us, and derived upon us, both in our justification, adoption, and salvation.[155]

Man, thus, proceeds from faith to faith, and Christ's righteousness as the meritorious efficient cause as well as the formal cause permits a teleological process in soteriology. Self-understanding as "instrument" does not allow simply a con-substantial "unio mystica." Thus, the whole Puritan religious character can make room for thought of a developmental process in soteriology.

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[155] Goodwin, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

It is interesting to note that Goodwin rejected the unity of both covenants, but placed more emphasis on the difference between the covenant of works and the covenant of grace. On this point, certainly, he comes closer to the Anabaptist type. Heis typically an Independent. But this emphasis is also closely knit with his interest in the establishing of the ethical subject. "If imputation of righteousness of Christ were the condition, then the whole Covenant should lye upon God, and nothing should be required on the creatures part: . . ." p. 157. And he criticized this kind of interpretation because it is based on the confounding the two covenants. For if as the old covenant required the righteousness of works, so the new does the same, the man who cannot achieve his righteousness must expect in Christ to be imputed with righteousness. But in the new covenant faith is the condition. Faith, imputed to man, establishes man's partnership with God in covenant. In this covenant relationship, righteousness is something which the believers should realize themselves, and through this realization the righteousness of Christ has for us the meritorious efficacy for salvation.

Self-understanding of the believer in terms of the instrumental efficiency of faith was generally accepted by the Puritan in the main stream. For example, Richard Baxter wholeheartedly accepted the idea of "the Instrumental efficiency of Faith to our Justification," to use his terminology. (Preface of his disputation "Of Justification."

The second aspect that we have mentioned at the beginning of this section should be treated in this connection. This second aspect is that there is in Puritanism as understanding of salvation as the developmental process which is presumably a transcription of "Heilsgeschichte" onto human subjectivity in faith. As salvation from the objective God's view-point developed Heilsgeschichte, so salvation in the subjective human side takes a course of development. The characteristic of Puritan soteriology lies precisely here in this scheme of developmental process. For example, Ames typically showed: calling - Justification - Adoption - Sanctification - Glorification. This scheme had been accepted by the Reformed churches in general, and the Westminster Confession also has a same soteriological scheme. We cannot say that this developmental scheme of soteriology is solely the work of the Puritans; nevertheless, it is true that the Puritans took this scheme seriously and grounded in on a firm theological basis. When Goodwin criticized the position of imputation of Christ's righteousness, he had in mind that this would attribute too much to Justification and would thus destroy the process of soteriology. For if the righteousness of Christ be imputed immediately once for all, this event will cut the developmental line of soteriology. To interpret the believing subject as "Instrument" is not only to be able to establish the ethical core of responsibility but also to come to terms with this developmental soteriology. Here the contractual element and the element of process is combined.

We cannot say that there was no possibility of development in Luther's soteriology. As Holl made clear, there is a developmental process from "rechtfertigung" to "Gerechtmachung", that is to say, from Justification to Sanctification. But this process is not what the Puritan means. Holl admitted that this process is not a process for man to trace, but is God's work in process.[156] In reference to man, there hardly occur the category of process within the thought-realm of Luther. In other words, for Luther it is God's teleology, in sofar as God anticipates the goal of salvation in His "Rechtfertigungsurteil."[157]

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[156] Holl, *op. cit.*, s. 123-124. "Wenn Gott shon bie der "Rechfertigung" das Ziel verfolgt, den Menschen zu erneuern, so heisst das bie Luther aduh so view, dass die Erneuerung des Menschen für Gott im Augenblick der Rechtfertigung bereits vollendet ist. Denn Luther denkt über das Verhältnis des göttlichen Willens zu Zeit ganz im Sinn der Erwählungslehre. Was Gott beabsichtigt, steht schon fertig vor ihm da, sobald er es will. Das am Ende zutage Tretende ist für ihm, den Zeitlosen and Allmächtigen, im Angang, d. h. dann, wenn er "das Urteil spricht", bereits Gegenwart."

[157] Holl, K. "*Die Rechtfertigungslehre im Licht der Geschichte des Protestantismus*", (1906), s. 9. "Gott nimmt den Menschen, den er in das Verhältnis zu sich hereinzieht, nicht an, um ihn zu lassen, wie er ist, sondern um ihn umzuschaffen zu einem wirklich Gerechten. Durch Christus und den heiligen Geist vollzieht er dieses Werk. Und als der Allmächtige dommt Gott sicher zum Ziel. Insofern kann man sagen: wenn Gott den Sünder in dem Moment, in den er nur Sünder ist, für gerecht erklärt, so antizipiert er das Resultat, zu dem er selbst den Menschen führen wird. Sein Rechtfertigungsurteil ist analytisch." Cf. G. A. S. 124. Holl could endorse his judgment by discovering this text: "egrotus in rei veritate, sed sanus ex certa promissione

(cont.)

This should not be confounded with the teleology in soteriological thought of the Puritans. For the Puritans it is an ethical process, in other words, a teleology which should be traced ethically.

This process-soteriology is first of all, characterized by the idea of "effectual" calling. "God doth effectually invite and draw men to Christ." Note the difference between Luther and the Puritan: God, in the thought of Luther, "judges" man as righteous in "anticipation" that God Himself will make man sanctified at the end; for the Puritans, on the other hand, God moves man "effectually" to attain at the goal of salvation. To God's calling man takes both a passive and an active attitude. Insofar as man is called, the will of man is nothing else than "obedientiall subjection"; but in being called "effectually" man meets this calling by "active receiving," or by "an act of faith" which is essentially "Actus elicitus."[158] Again we must remind ourselves that in the paradoxical combination of this passivity and activity here seen in Ames was later articulated in terms of "Instrumental Efficiency."

(cont.)
medici cui credit, qui eum iam velut sanum reputat, quia certus quod sanabit eium, quia incepit eim sanare nec imputavit ei egritudinem ad mortim. Eodem modo Samaritanua noster Christus hominem semivivum egrotum suum curandum susceptit in stabulum et incepit sanare promissa perfectissima sanitate invitam eternam et non imputans peccatum i. e. concupiscentias ad mortem." (Gesammelte Aussatze I, S. 124)

[158] Ames, Marrow of Divinity, lib. I, chap. xxvi, 26

Luther is engrossed in the doctrine of Justification, but the Puritans who regarded it as one of the states in the "process" of salvation, turn their attention especially to the doctrine of Sanctification. Downame has said that Sanctification "which is the last effect of Gods election wrought in vs in this life," "is the true touchstone of all the rest: whereby we may certainly know whether we be effectually called, . . . whether we be truely iustified, . . ."[159] For the process of salvation culminates finally at this point. Ames shares this thought, and because of his intellectual tendency he gave an interesting explaination for the process from Justification to Sanctification. He thinks in terms of the quality of change in human state: this change of state is two fold, relative, and sbsolute or real. He writes:

> A relative change of state is that which consists in Gods reputation. Rom. 4. 5. And he that worketh not, but believeth in him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is imputed to him for righteousnesse, I Cor. 5. 19.[160]

This is the state of change in Justification, in which the change is not real but in God's reputation. Then, as to Sanctification, he writes:

> the reall change followes whereby that former is manifested, and as touching the effects, as it were

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[159] J. Downame, Christian Warfare, p. 278

[160] Ames, op. cit. chap. xxvii, 4

> committed to execution. . . . The reall change of state is an alteration of qualities made in man himselfe.
>
> But because it doth not consist in relation and respect, but in reall effecting; therefore it admits divers degrees, of beginning, progreesse, and perfection.[161]

It is even more interesting to see that Ames rejected a commingling of both Justification and Sanctification in order to keep the process-soteriology. In Luther there is an intrinsic possibility of such a commingling from his theology. For there is no positive process from Justification to Sanctification; on the contrary, man himself stands as "iustus ac peccator simul." From the human side, Sanctification is always within Justification. Against this position Ames distinguished the term Sanctification:

> It is called a reall change, that it may be distinguished not only from Justification, but also from that Sanctification which is by Justification, as is the Sanctification of the seventh day: or also that which is by relation of a signe, as is the Sanctification of the elements in the Sacraments, or lastly, that which is by manifestation, in which manner God himselfe is said to bee sanctified by men.[162]

Thus, the doctrine of Sanctification becomes the crown of the Puritan soteriology. The developmental process in soteriology starts with calling and proceeds to Sanctification by realizing the righteousness of Christ for the human subject by means of the "instrumentally efficient" faith, by making a change in man's subjective, moral quality.

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[1] Ames, op. cit. chap. xxix, 1 & 2.

[2] Op. cit., chap. xxix, 9.

Through this change man achieves what God has done and is doing. The Puritans could only avoid being accused of "synergism" by interpreting the believing subject in terms of "Instrument."

In the later years, during the 1650s, the discussion on soteriology became a complicated one because of the disintegration of Puritanism. The most important occasion at which the question of soteriology was raised was the controversy among Thomas Blake, Richard Baxter, and John Tombes. But the disputation between Baxter and Tombes is more important in the sharpness of the statement of the problem. Tombes' position on Justification is to view it as "declarative", but not "constitutive." Accordingly he denies an interpretation of Justification as "continued act." In this sense Tombes stands closer to Luther, although only in this particular aspect. Baxter took a different position, viz. the position of "constitutive Justification" and viewed it as "continued act."[163] Combatting the Tombes' position, Baxter comes closer to what we have see in John Goodwin. There is a conservative inclination in Baxter, and he accepted the history of covenant according to the more orthodox Reformed way. Therefore, he did not distinguish between the two covenants as sharply as Goodwin did. He grounded process-soteriology upon the presupposition ofthe identity of covenant-promise-testament. Testament as covenant is "to give Right to the thing." Being entitled to the righteousness and grace of Christ, man in faith is the "Instrumental efficiency", and can realize what has been given to his own personality.

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[163] Baxter, Of Justification (1658), p. 335. "You say, 'This is but Virtual Justification' which is in Law Title. Answ. 1. It is Actual Consitutive Justification, and not Virtual only. 2. But it is indeed but Virtuall sentential justificationl. But yet it is of the highest kind of Virtuality. It is that which makes us rectos in curia, (which I take to be the nature of our Justification in this life.) And taken divisim, it seemeth more excellent in some respect, then the sentence or declaration it self;. . ."

Again let us emphasize that it is the most unique contribution of the Puritan soteriology to interpret human subjectivity in terms of a faith which is "the instrumental efficiency", in order to render the proper position in the Protestant doctrine of Justification to the human ethical subject. Moreover, by virtue of this self-interpretation, the Puritans achieved a reconciliation between the contractual element and the historical element on the side of human subjectivity.

VI. The Norm of Christian Life: Law and History in the Covenant Theology

We are now going to conclude our long discussion of the first chapter, but let us add one more observation to the study of the theological background of Puritan ethics. It is the question of the norm of Christian life. In the relation to this question, we again have to envisage a complex phase of the Puritan covenant thought. For if we take the view-point of Dr. Trinterud, it is clear that we can hardly do justice to the thought we want to examine here. How did the Puritans conceive law in their covenant thought? Despite the Antinomian reaction, the Puritans generally accepted the Calvinistic interpretation, which is now regarded as the "third use of law." The most typical treatment of law, however, is done within a peculiar thought pattern. We must note, that this is a "historical" scheme of thought. Therefore, if one neglects the "historical" aspect of the Puritan covenant theology, this question can hardly be treated. This historical scheme of covenant thought derives from the orthodox Reformed heritage. The Puritans had never deserted this heritage despite their theology. We have seen in Ames's case that he preserved a historical interpretation along with his tendency towards contractual interpretation. Over against the on-going contractual emphasis, it must be noted the historical interpretation was keeping its position clear.

We are going to deal with John Ball's A Treatise of *the Covenant of Grace: Wherein the gradual breakings out of Gospel-grace from Adam to Christ are clearly discovered, the differences betwixt the old and new Testament are laid open, divers errours of Arminians and others are confuted; the nature of Uprightnesse, and the way of Christ in bringing the soul into Communion with himself*: . . . published posthumously in 1645. This was brought to the public with the recomendation of the most articulate Presbyterian leaders of the Westminster Assembly, such as Edward Reynolds, Daniel Cawdrey, Edmond Calamy, Thomas Hill and Anthony Burgess. This book rendered the theological basis for these men, expecially over against the Independent challenge. This would undergird the English Presbyterian alliance with the Scottish Presbyterians. Every important aspect of the orthodox Reformed interpretation of covenant were preserved and revived in this book.

Here we are only concerned with Ball's interpretation of law within the historical scheme of covenant theology.

There are two or three important pointswhich need clarification: one is the question of the relation between the covenant of works with Adam and that with Moses and the other is whether the covenant with Moses is a covenant of works or of grace. In this connection one more important question arises: what is the relation between the old covenant of grace and the new covenant of grace?

Those questions constitute the main problem of the character of Heilsgeschichte. The discussion on those questions take a historical and not an ethical form, a speculative and not an experiential or existential form. When we deal with this problem, we enter into the inmost knot of the historical covenant theology. Ball himself confessed, "Here at the first we meet with a great difficulty, How and whether at all the Covenant of Grace was manifested by Moses?" Most of the Puritans knew the distinction between the covenant of works and of grace, but they were not always sure about the connection between them. "Most Divines hold the old and new Covenant to be one in substance and kind, to differ only in degrees: but in setting down the differences they speake so obscurely, that it is hard to find how they concent with themselves."[164] It is due to Ball's genius that what had been vaguely in the Puritan mind was made clear and articulated in such a broad range of historical speculation on the covenant. Especially noteworthy is it that both the Heilsgeschichtliche view and the natural-theological view of covenant were brought into firm combination in the thought of Ball. Of course, there had been a development under way since the Reformed historical covenant theology had assimilated Melanchthoniam natural theology. But to John Ball must be reserved the honor of being named the architect of the edifice of historical covenant theology in which natural theology was assimilated.

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[164] John Ball, A Treatise of Covenant Grace, p. 95.

The covenant of works with Adam was made by the ingrafting of law in his heart, so that this law is identified with natural law. Because of this character, it was otherwise called a "covenant of Nature."[165] But what matters here is how this Natural Law in the first covenant of works will be related with Mosaic law in the second covenant of works on Mt. Sinai? To this question Ball answers:

> In the long course of time betwixt Adam and Moses, men had forgotten what was sinne, and had oblieterated the very Law of nature. Therefore God sets out the lively Image of it by Moses in this draught and abstract, to which end, all the commands saving two are propounded in the negative, that so men by the Church might know the nature of sinne againe, Rom.3.19.[166]

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[165] Cf. Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 8 and p. 94, etc. The dichotomy between the covenant of nature and the covenant of grace first appeared in the work of Ursinus: *Summa theol*. p. 14, "Lex continet foedus naturale, increatione a Deo cum hominibus initum, hoc est, natura hominibus nota est, et requirit a nobis perfectam obedientiam erga Deum, et prastantibus eam promittit vitam aeternam, non praestantibus minatur aeternam poenas: Euangelium vero continet foedus gratiae, hos est, minime natura notum existens: ostendit nobis eius iustitiae, quam lex requirit, impletionen in Christo, et restitutionem in nobis per Christi spiritum; et promittet vitam aeternam gratis propter Christum, his qui in eum credunt." quoted in Schrenk, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59, Schrenk comments, "Der Zusammenhang dieses Aspektes mit der lex naturae bei Melanchthon ist ebense augenscheinlich, wie die Beziehung des foedus gnerale bei Musculus zu Melanchthons Gedanken wahrscheinlich ist." S. 59.

[166] Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

Ball has repeatedly said that Mosaic Moral Law is "draught of nature." This expression as such is nothing new, for we find many predecents in the history of Christian thought. Luther and Calvin had in mind the same interpretation, although Luther did not interpret Mosaic law as a copy of natural law. It is a famous judgment of Luther that he regarded Mosaic law as a Jewish Sachsenspiegel.[167] On the other hand Calvin took a more positive attitude to Mosaic law, and he wrote: "Now, as it is certain that the law of God, which we call the moral law, is no other than a declaration of natural law, and of that conscience which has been engraven by God on the minds of men, the whole rule of this equity, of which we now speak, is prescribed in it."[168]

Then, what is the new in Ball's thought? It is, we think, that the relation was interpreted within the scheme of historical interpretation of the covenant. Mosaic law is the renewal of the covenant of works with Adam, and the only difference lies in that "The Covenant of Nature leanes upon the Creation and generall conservation; the old Covenant upon the Election of Israel, his deliverance out of Egypt, and conservation in the Land of Canaan."[169] In this way the line of development was drawn from Adamic covenant to Mosaic covenant of works.

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[167] Cf. Arnold, Franz Xaver. *Zur Frage des Naturrechts bei Martin Luther*, *Ein Beitrag zum Problem der natürlichen Theologie auf reformatorishcer Grundlage*, München, 1937 S. 47ff. John T. McNiell discovered Luther's negative attitude towards Mosaic law in one of an interesting text: "he set forth the Ten Commandments for them in spokenand written form, as something superfluous (zum Ueberfuluss), for the reason that He would change mankind by means of the Jews. Yet we heathen, towhom God gave no written law, ought not on that account to honor, praise and thank Him the less." EA 36, 4. l. quoted in the essay "Natural Law in the Thought of Luther", *Church History*, X, (1941), 22.

[168] Calvin, *Institutes* IV, xx, 16.

The more serious question, however, is how this line is connected with the other line of Covenant of grace. Ball dealt with this question in the following way: the covenant of grace is divided into the old andthe new. We must not confound the covenant of works withthe covenant of grace which is old. It is assumed that there is a double character in the Old Testament, which includes both the covenant of works and the covenant of grace. The most difficult point in the historical view of covenant lies right here. Moreover this point concerns the historical event of the covenant on Mr. Sinai. The Mosaic covenant is, on the one hand, the covenant of works, and on the other hand, the "old" covenant of grace. It is a skillful solution that Ball here displays. The double nature of Mosaic covenant will be explained by Moses' twofold manner and his presentation of law to the people. Twice Moses went up to the mountain, as the Bible wrote, one is stated in Exod., chapt. 19, and the other in chapt. 34. The law given at this first going to Mr. Sinai, is "a perfect and exact draught of the prime nature," which

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[169] Ball, op. cit., p 94.

"breaths nothing but wrath to fallen nature, for that hath no grace and mercy."[170] But the second is differently described according to the Scriptures: the covenant given at the second assention is "a perswasion and incouragement to corrupt nature to stirre up the relicks of power and the Image of God upon hope of future good." "The first and rigid proposition is of the Morall Law alone, and as it was contained in the first writing, Exod. 20." While "The second is laid downe in Moses whole frame and economy to that people." And thus, "the first stands in full opposition to the Covenant of Grace, containing a perfect covenant of Workes: but the second is and may be subordinate to the Covenant of Grace."[171]

On this second occasion, however, Moses had received the same law written by God, which means that "God could not, nor would not alter the Law, which was a perfect draught of the first Law imprinted in Adam."[172] The most important difference, therefore, was not found in the Law itself, but in the manner of presentation and preservation of the law.

The difference in the manner of presentation was explained thus: Moses had to provide an Arke to cover the Table of the law, so Ball interprets, "which was not only for the safe keeping of the Tables, but to cover the wrath and curse, that the people should not see it, which was the first veile."[173] In such a manner the covenant of grace was brought to the people. Another veiling of wrath is seen, in the veiling of Moses' shining face. Ball writes in the same vein:

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[170] Ball, op. cit., p. 96.

[171] op. cit., p. 96f.

[172] op. cit., p. 98.

> When Moses came downe this appearance of God had changed the skin of his face that he was glad to put a vaile upon him, for otherwise the people could not, nay durst not behold him, but ranne from him, as at the first from God when he delivered the Law upon Mount Sinai, which God would have for the very same end, Moses his shining face signifying the curse and wrath of God in the Law, as a meere draught of the Covenant of workes, which the people could not behold, his vaile signifying the covering of this curse from the eyes of Israel.[174]

In such a manner are the covenant of works and the covenant of grace mutually related in the covenant of Moses. "And now he had in his hand both the Covenant of works and of Grace, the one hid in the Arke, the other open in his hand: the same Commandements, but the one with wrath, the other lenified by God."[175] This combination is nothing else than a full expression of the idea generally held by the Puritans, such as "the old Testament, even the Law, as it was given upon Mount Sinai, is the Covenant of Grace for substance, though propounded in a manner fitting to the state of that people, time and condition of the Church."[176] The Calvinistic third use of law is thus endorsed and undergirded by a historical interpretation of covenant:

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[173] op. cit., p. 98.

[174] op. cit.,pp. 98-99.

[175] op. cit., p. 98.

> It was so delievered as it might serve to discover sin, drive the Jews to deny themselves and flie to the mercy of God revealed in Jesus: but it was given to be a rule of life to a people in Covenant, directing them how to walk before God in holinesse and righteousnesse, that they might inherit the promises of grace and mercy.[177]

When the curse is covered, curse being the result of man's fall, the covenant of law of Moses is found with its character as the Covenant of Grace. In this manner, the severe contradiction between Law and Gospel was overcome. Law is fundamentally of Grace. Law has received its positive meaning. Let us look at one of the typical expressions of the Puritan conception of law:

> The Law hath a double respect: one as the unchangeable rule of Life and manners, according to which persons in Covenant ought to walke before and with the Lord, and in this sense it belongs to the Covenant of Grace. The other, as it is propounded in forme of a Covenant, as if he must necessarily perish, who doth neglect or breake it in the least jot or tittle, and in this sense the Covenant of grace and workes are opposite. The matter of Evangelicall precepts and of the Morall Law is the same, but the forme of promulgation is not the same: the rule is one, but the Covenants differ. Materialy the Law, that is, the matter and argument of the law, as a rule, stands in force: but if formally it did continue as a Covenant, there could be no place for repentance, nor for the promise of forgivenesse, or mercy reaching to the pardon of sinne, or the quickning of them that be dead in treaspasses.[178]

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[176] op. cit., p. 102.

[177] Ibid.

[178] Ball, op. cit., p. 15.

The Puritanism represented by Ball shows a preservation of the orthodox Reformed position and with regard to the antithesis of Law and Gospel, Ball comes closer to Zwingli than to Luther:

> The Apostle doth not perpetually and absolutely oppose the Law, and the Covenant of Grace: for he teacheth expressly, that faith establisheth the Law to consist in faith: but because the Jews addicted to the letter of the Law, did prepermit the force and life of it, Paul proves the Law so taken and separated from faith, to be the cause, not of life, but of death: as that which did not only want Christ, who is the soul of the Law, but is oppositeto him.[179]

But the double nature of Law will be explained most clearly insofar as it is viewed in the light of Jesus Christ. Christ is "the soule of the Law." The double nature of Law is determined by double relation of Law to Christ. "The Law considered without Christ woundeth, killeth and reviveth sinne by reason of our Corruption: But meaning the Law considered in Christ, and as it pointeth unto him , killeth corruption, and converteth the soule."[180] Thus, a two fold meaning of Law is re-affirmed in this way: "One as it is a rigid exacttor of intire obedience, and hand-writing against us for sinne, andthus of it selfe barely considered, it woundeth, but healeth not, it reviveth sinne, but mortifieth it not. The other, as it pointeth to Christ in whom Salvation is to be found and directeth how to walke in all well-pleasing before the Lord: and thus it is an easy yoke."[181]

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[179] *op. cit.*, p. 115.

[180] *op. cit.*, p. 120f.

This is, to be sure, a tremendous achievement as a theological treatment of the very difficult problem with which Protestantism had been confronted. In Ball's mind the Heilsgeschichtliche interpretation of covenant is "Christologically" recaptured. The whole development of Heilsgeschichte is ultimately grasped by what perpetually underlies the Heilsgeschichtliche development. Christ was since before the beginning of the world! Christ is slain before the beginning of the world! Christ is existing throughout the history of the covenant in aform either emplicit, hidden, or explicit, revealed. This conviction is genuinely of the Reformed tradition. When the Reformed theologians say that"the covenant of God is but one in substance and matter," they are thinking of Jesus Christ behind the history of Covenant.[182] The Heilsgeschichtliche development is counterbalanced by the "Christological" recapitulation. This is a stimulating factor to our contemporary theological thinking. For, as an attempt at a theology of history we must consider seriously in our speculation the character of the Urgeschichte. Theology of history must view Christ not only "in"history but "under" history, or "before" history. The concept of Urgeschichte may make it possible to overcome or to bring into reconciliation the antithesis between history and ontology.

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[181] op. cit., p. 120.

[182] Historically viewed Moses was the mediator of the old Covenant, yet essentially understood Christ was there as the real mediator, Moses being only a shadow of Christ. For example, Ursinus has written: "But some man will say, Moses was the Mediatour of the old Covenant. Answer, True, as in a type, adjoyned to the Mediatour which was signified, who then also was Mediatour, but now is sole Mediatour without that typicall Mediatour." The summe of Chris. Rel. p. 126.

In this relation, we think it rather questionable to say that the Puritans made the covenant of works more basic in the history of the covenant, and, as a result, are basically legalistic. In the sequence of history, it is true, the covenant of works has priority. This priority is, however, a historical prioirity. Christ who is slain before the beginning of the world has essential priority. Ursinus has said that by Christ "even Adam attained salvation."[183] Such was the Reformed heilsgeschichtliche position.

In order to sum up our preceeding discussion, we shall reiterate the Lutheran view of Law and Gospel remarkably revised in terms of this heilsgeschichtliche view of the unity and continuity of the history of the covenant.

> The Law doth not so directly and expressely teach faith in Christ, but require obedience, yet doth it leade us to Christ, and more obscurely command faith in him. The Gospell doth more fully reveqle Christ,

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[183] Cf. Ursinus, The Summe of Christian Religion.

> and the grace of God in him, commanding faith by
> name: but it doth also urge, presse, and exact
> obedience. Thus sweetly doe the Law and Gospell
> consent together.[184]

Law was accepted anew as the norm for Christian life: "The Law animated by Christ is pleasant and delightfull." Law in Christ, this is to guide a Christian to attain to the final salvation. The Puritan developmental soteriology is founded on this idea of law lest a Christian be lost in his pilgrimmage to the final salvation.

We must add, moreover, some considerations in relation to the whole perspective of this thesis.

The theological importance of Puritanism is that despite the ethical-contractual tendency in covenant theology, they maintained this historical perspective. This makes Puritanism extraordinarily significant for contemporary re-evaluation. Itmmay mean something in view of the contemporary A Anglo-American type of Christianity which is less interested in history and more interested in ethics, that the forefathers, viz. the Puritans, had maintained both the ethical tendency and the historical perspective at once. It is rather unfortunate that the heilsgeschichtliche type of covenant theology was, through the channel of William Ames, and English Puritan, developed only on the continent by Cocceius, Ames' disciple, while on the side of Anglo-America this tendency, the sense of history, as it being transmuted towards empiricism, was to loose its cultural significance. It survives rather in an insignificant form of millenarianism among extreme sects. On the continent the heilsgeschichtliche school has had a persisting influence not only upon theology but also upon philosophy. It is Bengel, above all, who, taking over the idea of Heilsgeschichte from the tradition of Cocceius' "Foederaltheologie," translated it among the circle of Schwäben Pietism. According to Benz, Marburg Professor of Church History, out of this theological stock Schelling's, and Hegel's historical speculation grew up. Historical speculation in German Idealism is, therefore, a step-child of theological Heilsgeschichte school. Insofar as Marx took the historical scheme from Hegel, his historical materialism may be judged with respect to this general scheme as a secularized Heilsgeschichte. On the other hand, the American theological mind has been more and more interested in contractual aspect of covenant. In the field of philosophy Pragmatism is a step-child of contractual covenant theology. If the conflicts between Marxism and Pragmatism, the ideology of the Soviet Union and the ideology of the United States should be brought to some reconciliation, where else shall we refer back to their original unity than in the 17th Century Puritanism?

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[184] Ball, op. cit., p. 113

Next, in a broader perspective, we should mention the significance of the combination between the heilsgeschichtliche view of covenant and natural theology. The medieval cultural synthesis was the product of synthesis between

Logos and history which began with the Apologists. The pattern of synthesis which was stated by the Apologists was, generally speaking, to interpret history by the principle of Logos. The element of history, which is the form of biblical Truth, was often endangered, yet in so doing they translated the historical form of biblical Truth into universal validity. This made the foundation not only for the medieval philosophical theology but also for the medieval cultural synthesis. But this cultural synthesis had broken down. It is in view of this fact that the Puritan historical covenant theology appears in the foreground. It achieved a new type of cultural synthesis, whose form is opposite to that of the Apologists. The Puritan historical covenant theology grasped the principle of Logos conversely in the historical scheme! This is made clear in their treatment of the natural law. Natural law is a kind of Logos type principle. As we have seen above, Ball located natural law within the historical scheme. Natural law is now conceived within history. This makes possible a new cultural synthesis.

During the 17th Century there appeared another attempt of cultural synthesis, that of Deism. Deism was a revival of the Apologist type of cultural synthesis, though with more embarrassment to the historical form of religion. The principle of nature, and of reason, was again pushed forward. The cultural synthesis in the Puritan theology of history must be distinguished from this Deistic attempt.

It is in America that the contractual covenant thinking was married to Deistic rationalism. During the 19th Century the element of history which came from the tradition of Heilsgeschichte came to contradict Deistic Rationalism, which is generally known as the antithesis between Romanticism and Enlightenment. When the historical element was brought to scientific refinement, this opposition appeared as Historism versus Rationalism.

Chapter II

Puritan Casuistry, Or Puritan Ethics Before the Revolution

We have discussed how the ethical-personal element has been increasingly emphasized in the Puritan Covenant Theology, which was due to the intrinsic demand of the logic of evangelical preaching. Such a tendency appeared as an emphasis on self-commitment to the rule of God's law, on the effort of renewal of daily life, and on striving to attain the final salvation. This ethical tendency appeared much closer to the Anabaptist type of religion as discussed in the previous chapter, than to the genuine Reformed type. Yet, the Puritans were never obsorbed fully into this tendency, and the lements of the Reformed type of covenant thought was kept alive throughout the developing movement of Puritanism. There was a closer interaction between the two types, but, to be sure, this interaction was inclined towards the Anabaptist type.

Here we are going to deal with a type of Puritan ethics characteristic of the decades of the Puritan "underground" movement. The Puritan ethics of this period may be duly characterized as ethics as "Christian Directory," or in a more systematized form, as "Casuistry." This form of ethics was closely bound with that theological tendency, viz. an increasing emphasis on "contractual" or "conditional" aspect of covenant, or else an inclination towards the Anabaptist type. Again, it must be repeated, this did not mean that they had given up their own heritage of the Reformed theology.

We cannot relate Puritan casuistry to a single source. To be sure, Calvinistic theology, especially its view of law, may have influenced on this development.[1] But the situation seems to be more complicated if we see that the Puritan movement in its original character was hardly casuistic but rather ecclesio-political. We shall have to take sociological element for account in order to describe this situation. The Puritans appear to have become more and more casuistic, and less and less political after their failure in a political reformation of the church and state. Numerous works on Christian directory or casuistry were produced in this particular span of time. This tendency was developed along with their preaching movement. The "kerygma" and "didache" were deeply combined in their movement. The rise of Puritan casuistic ethics was conditioned and destined by such various elements.

What matters here is the meaning of the combination of the "kerygma" and "didache," the preaching and teaching, in Puritanism. It may not be an exaggeration to say that this combination gave the uniqueness to Puritanism in contrast to Luther or Lutheranism and Calvin or the orthodox Reformed.

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[1] Karl Barth views that Calvin objected to casuistic ethics because of voluntaristic conception of God: "Von hier aus hat Calvin die kasuistische Ethik beanstandet: Gott ist der unicus legislator und darf seines Rechtes als solcher nicht beraubt werden (Instit. IV, 10, 1). Er will auch für den unicus vitae magister ac director gehalten sein (10, 7). Sein Wille ist die vollkommene und genügende Regel aller gerechtigkeit und Heiligkeit und ihn erkennen ist die vollkommene und genügende Wissenschaft von einem guten Leben. Er allein will über unsere Seelen herrschen, so dass uns nur übrig bleibt, ihm zu gehorchen, das heisst uns von seinem Wink völlig abhängig zu machen (10, 8). Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik, III/4, S. 9

Its meaning should be sought not merely in theological level but also in social and cultural level. This we must explaine before entering into our material study of the Puritan casuistry. The comparison may be drawn by looking at Luther's idea of reformation. Luther explained what he believed concerning the present event of reformation in this way: "All I have done is to further, preach, and teach God's word; otherwise I have done nothing. So it happened that while I slept or while I had a glass of beer with my friend Philip (Melanchthon) and with Amsdorf, the papacy was so weakened as it never was before by the action of any prince or emperor. I have done nothing; the word has done and accomplished everything. . . . I let the word do its work."[2] If we compare the Puritan preaching movement with Luther at this point, we find a difference clearly insofar as the Puritans could no longer remain in Luther's position. Despite some differences in understanding of the Word of God, both Luther and the Puritans are believed to have shared the similar conviction in the power of the Word, yet the Puritans could not interprete their political situation as Luther did. In spite of the Word of God the Reformation did not come. It is in such a situation that the preaching and the casuistry were combined in Puritanism. Not by the Word "miraculously" and "automatically," but consciously and intentionally in terms of ethics, the reformation had now to be exercised.

The situation where such a combination of the preaching and casuistry may be viewed in a broader perspective. After the principle of "cuius regio, eius religio" of the Peace of Augsburg (1555) began to be generally accepted, the map of Christendom was to be drawn with a new religious boaderline. Lutheranism in Germany and the Scandinavian countries; the Reformed churches in the Rhineland and Geneva area, Netherlands, Scotland, Bohemia, and Hungary; Roman Catholicism in Spain, France, Italy, Ireland, and Poland; Anglicanism in England; such was the religious situation of the 16th and 17th Centuries. The doctrinal matter was combined with the ecclesiastical background devided into territorial churches. That is to say, the validity of a doctrine was no longer supported by a universal Christian mind, but was more or less to depend upon ecclesiastical "geography." The age of dogmatics was raptidly approaching to the end. To the eyes of Cudworth, the most famous Cambridge Platonist, dogmatics was nothing more than "Opinion."[3] It was as early as 1624 that the first monumental book of Deism, Herbert of Cherbury's De Veritate appeared. The course of history witnessed the replacing of dogmatics by rationalism in the 18th Century.

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[2] I owe this quotation to Dr. Pauck. Cf. The Heritage of the Reformation, (1950), p.23

The combination of preaching and casuistry took place in such a transitional age, viz. from the age of dogmatics to the age of rationalism. In a sense casuistry was a substitutive way for verification of doctrinal truth when dogmatics was losing its validity. Dogmatics was an objective and demonstrative way of verification, but now it was to be replaced by a subjective and experiential way of verification: either mystical, or ethical experience. Mysticism and ethics, both became, thus, the characteristic forms of self-expression for Puritan religion. Puritan casuistry belongs to this ethical tendency. That is to say, casuistry became an important way to verify what they believed. "If any man will do his will, he shall know whether the doctrine be of God or no." This was a text which was used with historical significance. The truth and validity of a doctrine had to be proved by its ethical efficacy. The church and the dogmatics of the church had to be built upon a certain universality which was endorced by "ethic."

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[3] Cf. Ralph Cudworth, A Sermon preached before the Honourable House of Commons, March 31, 1647, (Cambridge, 1647)

English experience of this casuistic age is judged as very important in view of a future development of English thought. In view of the arriving end of the age of dogmatics, rationalism and Deism attempted to ground truth upon a rational universality, whereas casuistic ethics attempted to verify truth by virtue of common ethos. In effect, with respect to the latter, the question of validity of a doctrine could be carried towards the principle of majority. In other words, a validity of a doctrine depends on the number of men who have a common ethos. The category of "universality" was thus to be replaced by a new category of "majority." It may not be an exaggeration to say that casuistry prepared the rise of Utilitarianism and Pragmatism in English realm of thought.

Lutheranism could develop its religion into "pure doctrines" under the auspices of the state church as well as the dogmatic tendency of Lutheran religion. But in England the Puritans had to confront more complicated problems, which were not known in the lands of Lutheranism. Puritanism had to depend on the adherents to the Puritan preaching, and it had to make itself established only by re-moulding the life of its adherents. Such was the situation until the new opportunity for a "political" reformation returned to them in 1640s. The Puritan casuistry may be viewed better in such a context.[4]

I. Rise of Puritan Casuistic Ethics

The 17th Century of England appears to us in the history of Protestantism as the age of ethics after the age of dogmatics of the Reformation Century. According to the ordinary interpretation of the history of Protestantism, the 17th Century was regarded as the age of Protestant scholasticism. This may be right with respect to the continental Protestantism, but it hardly fits to the English 17th Century. The fact that the English 17th Century turned to ethics was of great significance, for it was to create some most important characteristics of Anglo-American Protestantism in contrast with the continental Protestantism, above all, different from Lutheranism. In the course of development of Protestantism the 17th Century English Puritanism occupies a unique position. Taking seriously the significance of Puritanism we can discover a deeper cultural meaning of Protestanism in the modern world.

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[4] The study of casuistry of this period is few, but these works may be noted: H. R. McAdoo, The Structure of Caroline Moral Theology, (London, N.Y., Toronto, 1949); Thomas Wood's English Casuistical Divinity during the Seventeenth Century, (London, 1952); George L. Mosse, The Holy Pretence, a Study in Christianity and reason of state from William Perkins to John Winthrop, (Oxford, 1957)

The age of ethics began surrounded by unique political conditions of England under Anglican Reformation. England enjoyed a curious toleration in the matter of doctrine. The serious question was rather "sedition" than "heresy." In such a time as the 16th and 17th Centuries, needless to say, doctrinal heresy was till an important question to the church, yet it is true that under Elizabeth there was a semi-toleration unless there was "sedition." But this sort of practical toleration was of grave effect upon dogmatic thinking: Anglicanism, Puritanism, and Roman Catholicism standing in an internecine relationship. The dogmatic way of verification was losing its credit here in England than anywhere else. It was a matter of course that there arose a tendency to scepticism on the one hand, and a tendency to fanaticism on the other.

If a doctrinal truth was so uncertain, how the people could find the way of spiritual security? Roman Catholicism had a Pope, Puritanism the Scriptures, and Anglicanism the established church. Anglicanism was, in this situation, in the best advantage, but a sort of doubt in which later John Henry Newman was caught was not fully cleared even in this age. Here was a situation that a doctrinal truth had to depend upon its ethical effect: whether it could really meet the need of the people in uneasiness of spirit, whether it was able to cure the "wounded soul." The Protestant position that if the Word of God be preached rightly the Word itself would do everything was also becoming untenable as it was in the 16th Century. The truth of a preached "Word" had to be proved by its ethical effect. In view of this condition, the field of practical theology arose to be more important. The distinction between theoretical and practical theology began to be taken seriously:

> Ther being two parts of Christian diuinitie, the one Theorike or speculatiue, belonging principally to knowledge, discourse, and beleefe; the second called practique or actiue, appertaining cheefly to action and execution: the first is more easy and common, then the second, bicause then to worke; to beleeue as we ought, then to liue we should: and the things that a man hath to beleeue, are fewer then the things he hath to doe; learned in shorter time and with lesse difficultie, thẽ the other are executed. Euen as we see by experience, that a breefe Cathechisme instructeth a man sufficiently in his faith; but al the bookes and sermons that we can read and heare, can not persuade the least part of men to performe so much in life, as by their vocation is required.[5]

These words were spoken by a Jesuit scholar, Robert Parsons, who had been a Confessor to the Spanish King, testifying the contemporary theological mood. A truth in doctrinal level was anew to be brought back to a relation with practise on the ethical level. Luther by his doctrine of "Justification by faith alone," did overcome the division of speculative and practical theology, but the circumstance of late 16th and 17th Centuries demanded that practical theology might be distinguished from, and related anew with, theoretical theology. And thus the field of practical theology became a new arena where the truth of doctrine was to be contested.

It is believed that this Robert Parsons was the first conspicuous figure in England to turn to this field to re-assert the doctrinal truth he represented in terms of ethics. He wrote an influential book, a portion of which was already quoted above, entitled "A Christian Directorie Gviding Men to Their Salvation" which ran into several editions. His special concern with the problem of ethics was manifested as he said:

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[5] Parsons, A Christian Directorie Gviding Men to Their Salvation, (1585), Preface.

> All standeth then in this one poinct, for direction of our selues in this lyfe, and for reaping benefit by the mysteries of our faithe and religion; that we allot our selues tyme to meditate, ponder, and consider what thes thinges doe teache vs. For as the sycke man, that had most excellent remedies and precious potions set before hym, could expect no profit or ease therby, if he onlie dyd locke vpon them, or smeld them, or toke them into his mouthe alone, or should cast them foorthe of his stomache agayne, before they were setled or had tyme to worke there operatiō: euen so is it in this case of ours.[6]

He never deserted the position of Thomism, but the difference cannot be overlooked: for Thomas Aquinas ethics is "motus" of rational being towards the Supernatural, which is an ascendance and culmination; while Parsons is more concerned with "application" of doctrine to daily life, which takes a descending direction. Parsons tries to draw ethic out of knowledge, while for Thomas ethics is more closely bound with knowledge, so for him Socratic dictum "virtue is knowledge" is true, too. Parsons deals with the doctrine of God in the second chapter; the doctrine of man in the third; the teaching of man's service to God in the fourth; the true Catholic Church in the fifth; etc. But he dealt with those doctrines by the practical concern. He was more interested, as he stated in the beginning of chapter V, in "how a man may attaine the fruite of this doctrine: that is to saye: how he may come to be a good Christian." The importance of ethics now arose as high as dogmatics, as he pointed out:

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[6] Parsons, op. cit. pp. 20-21

> First, whether he beleeue vnfainedly the total summe of documẽts & mysteries, left by Iesus & his disciples in the Catholique Church; and secondlie, whether he performe in sinceritie the rules and preceptes of life, prescribed vnto Christians for direction of their actions.[7]

Parsons took as his aim the guidance of people to their "obedience to the Catholic Church." The ideal type of man as a true Catholic is, he described, a man who "holdeth hymselfe within the obedience of this general and vniuersal Church, which hath descended by succession from Christ and his Apostles;" a man who "abhorre all sectes and names of particular men as Marcionites, Montanistes, Valentinians and the like /alluding Lutherans and Calvinists/;" a man who "doth confesse sincerlie . . . that one priest for the time, is to be obeyed by gods ordinance, as judge in Christes roome, by the vniuersal brotherhode of al Christianitie;" a man who "is modest, quiete, sober, voide of contẽtion, & obedient;" and a man who "is humble ĩ his owne cocept. . . firme in faith, & not variable, nor delighted with nevv doctrines," and "can captiuate his vnderstandinge to the obedience of Christ, which is to beleeue humblie such thinges, as Christ by his church proposeth vnto him, albeit his reason or sense should stande against the same;" and finally a man who "can be content at Christes commandement, to heare the Church in al thinges, without doubt or exception, and obey the Gouernours therof, . . . and consequentelie, can say truelie, & sincerlie, with the whole College of Christes Apostles together, Credo sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam, I doe belieue the holie Catholique & vniversal Church, and what soeuer that Church doth set forth, teach, holde, or beleeue. . ."[8]

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[7] op. cit. p. 310

Bearing such a clear image of a Catholic Christian in his mind, he endeavoured to recover a "lost province" in Catholic Christendom. But remarkably the method for this recovery was casuistic ethics, not the first part of Christian doctrine, but "the second part of Christian profession." The second part of Christian profession, that is, concerning life and manners, he says, "is a matter of so much more difficultie then the former, by how many more wayes a man may be lead from vertuous life, then from sincere faith." He sought eagerly to rebuild a life of a Catholic in accordance with the doctrines of Catholic Church. For, whether a doctrine be true or not, could not be decided on the level of faith and doctrines. Against Luther's doctrine of Justification, he says, "It is not enoughe to beleeue in Iesus, and to make professio of his name and doctrine; except we conforme our lyues and actions accordinge to the prescript of his commaundmentes."[9] No doubt he admitted that "faith be the first and principal foundation, whervpon all the rest is to be stayed and grounded," and he continues to say," yet as in other material buildinges, after the foundation is layed, ther remaineth the greates labour, time, cost, cunning layed once the foundation and grounde of true beliefe, the rest of al our life, time labour, and studies, is to be employed in the perfection of our life, and actions. . . . Without the which, our faith is to no more purpose or profite, then is a foundation without a building vpon it, or a stocke or tree that beareth no fruite."[10]

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[8] op. cit., p. 310

[9] op. cit., p. 315

[10] Ibid.

Endorcing this position he quoted from James, chapter 2, and took the thought of James to counterbalance the Pauline teaching on Justification.

> S. James of al other, is most vehement against al such, as think that faith can suffice to saluation without good works in so much, as he cõpareth them to the deuils theselues, saying Doest thou belieue that there is one God? thou doest vvel: the deuils also doe belieue the same and tremble.[11]

With this emphasis on good works, he guides man to build up himself as true Catholic. He gives two principal ways through which man may appertain to a Christian life: "to resist all synne" and "to excercise all kynde of vertue vvith the meanes and methode hovv to perfourme them both," in which, he says, the whole duty of a good Christian is summarized. Besides we cannot overlook the militant spirit of a Jesuit in his moral guidance:

> In respect of the first wherof, our life is called, in holie scripture a warfare vpon earth; and vertuous mẽ are termed souldiours; for that, as good souldiours doe lye in continual wayte to resist their ennemies; so vigilant Christians doe carefully stand vpon their watche, for resisting the suggestions and temptations of sinne.

And also:

> We are commaunded by Godes holy worde, to doe it manfully, vigilantly, and constantly. And S. Paul addeth moreouer; that in this resistance, we ought to striue euen vnto death, and to the shedding of our last blood, if occasion doe require. The same are we taught by diuers other Apostles and Saintes in Christes Church, exhorting and instructing vs to this fight and cõbat with the flesh, world, & deuil, that entice vs to sinne. For proofe wherof, it shal suffice in this place, to alleage thos last wordes of Iob, which doe conclude his large discourse of the most dreadful power and crueltie of Leuiathã; *Memento belli*; by not vnmindful of the warre, which thou wagest with this enemy.[12]

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[11] *op. cit.* p. 317

[12] *op. cit.* p. 326

In such a shape and spirit casuistic ethics was thrust to the theological foreground in the late 16th Century England. Roman Catholicism was driven out a second time at the accession of Elizabeth, and so it had lost an official institutional way to approach England, and had left only an individual personal way. Parsons' Christian Directorie was nothing else but a means of re-establishing a bridgehead in the lost province of England. The Jesuits had sought to hold their religion with their adherents, giving them clear consciousness and morals to be a Catholic.

Puritan casuistry arose in the similar destiny as well as in response to Jesuit casuistry. It was Parsons' Christian Directorie that gave occasion for the rise of the casuistic ethics in Puritanism. The first of the Puritan casuistic works came out of the hands of the famous Richard Rogers(1550?-1618) who was an associate to Cartwright. Cartwright, the leader of Elizabethan Puritanism, was more politically inclined, though he did not realize that he was, while Rogers moved from the political foreground to the matters of Christian life. His Seven Treatises had left out politics and turned to casuistry. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the history of Puritan casuistry began with Rogers' Seven Treatises. Noticiably this work came to exist as a Puritan response to the challenge of Parsons' Christian Directorie, that is to say, this was a counter-work to Parsons' book.[13]

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[13] This judgment may be supported mostly be the internal evidence of Rogers' work. Stephen Egerton's preface of recommendation makes it clear that this was a "counterpoyson" seriously needed "against Popish Directory." In his Puritan-preacher- (cont.)

The character of Rogers' work may become clear at once by its illuminating subtitle: "Containing svch direction as is gathered ovt of the holie scriptvres, leading and guiding to true happiness, both in this life, and in the life to come:

(cont.)
wise eloquency he writes: "The children of this world are in their generation wiser then the children of light. The truth hereof may appeare in the Papists; who discerning that their bookes of Controuersies, stuffed with manifold vntruths, fallacians, and corruptions, were not able to gaine sufficiently (though small gaine be too great for such merchants) to their Babylonish kingdome, haue set themselues and others on worke (being all set on worke of Hell) to penne certaine treatises, tending to insnare and intangle the minds of ignorant and simple Christians, in the corrupt and filthie puddle of Popish deuotion. In this respect perswade my selfe, it is come to passe (not without the gracious prouidence of God) that the author hereof hath been incouraged in himselfe, and by others, to write these Christian directions, as a counterpoyson to all such inchauntments of Papists, who would by these meanes beare men in hand, that al true deuotion dwelt amongst them, and were inclosed and tyed to their Cels and Cloysters: In which vncleane cages it is vnpossible for any true spirituall and holy meditations to haue their abiding: for as much as euen the very mindes and consciences of such vncleane birds, are defiled with damnable errors, and Idolatries." He mentions, then, Parsons' name in this relation, "thou shalt finde then in all the Resolutions of the Iesuiticall Father Parsons (though neuer so refined, as a bricke newly washed) . . ."

Rogers himself mentioned the name of Parsons as that whose work caused him take up this enterprise. "And partly also I was moued hereunto by this reason, that the Papists cast in our teeth, that we haue nothing set out for the certaine and daily direction of a Christian, when yet they haue published (they say) many treatises of that argument. . . . I graunt there are two which I haue seene, set forth by them in our English tongue, the one called a Christian Directorie, the other the Exercise of Christian life. . . (the one bearing the name of Robert Parsons the King of Spaines confessor: the other by an Italian a Iesuite Doctor in Diuinitie, . . .) the first is nothing lesse then a direction for a Christian though it be called a Directorie, tending rather to perswade men to resolue with themselues to leaue some grosse euils, then to shew them soundly how to attaine pardon, or teaching how to liue christianly. . . ." (The Preface, or Entrance to the Booke.) In other places, too, the name and work of Parsons are mentioned in this Seven Treatises.

and may be called the practise of Christianitie. Profitable for all svch as heartily desire the same: in the which, more particularly true Christians may learne how to leade a godly and comfortable life euery day." Despite a different theological basis, this is, like Parsons' work, a "Directory" of Christian life. Parsons' theological basis was Thomism, whereas Rogers' Calvinism. According to the Calvinistic doctrine of the Scriptures, his "Directory" was "gathered ovt of the holie scriptures." Parsons who viewed Protestantism from the angle of Lutheranism, may have thought that the battle on the ethical level with Protestantism would be advantageous to Roman Catholicism, but Puritanism was quite different from Lutheranism in this particular respect. Responding to this challenge, Puritanism could rather have an occasion to develop an element implicit in itself, which was to render concreteness to the ethical tendency rooted in contractual interpretation of covenant theology. That is to say, Puritan casuistry was, it may be said, a product of both an intrinsic logic of "contractual" covenant theology and the response to the Jesuit challenge on the casuistic level. Now the ethical tendency of Puritanism was established not only principally but also concretely.

Therefore, let us analyse Rogers' work. This book is, as the title shows, divided into seven treatises: in the first treatise he describes "who be the true children of God" as a presupposition of Christian directory to "godly life." In the second, he shows, "what course of life such persons must walke in, throughout their dayes, and how they are to carie themselues both towards God and men, which I thinke expedient to lay forth as cleerely as I can, and in some ample manner for the more full satisfying of the ignorant sort." In the third, the means to help to increase "godliness" are presented: such as public help of minister as well as private help of prayer, and etc., the meanes "whereby this life may be maintained," and thus, "how the beleeuer shall vse the same, to the end that this whole and great worke of worshipping & seruing God, may not be taken for a bare matter of knowledge, as the most doe make it." In the fourth, "a daily direction" is given, by following to which the practise of the godly life is performed. In the fifth, the author shows Christians how to arm by evangelical arms against the threat of Devil. In the sixth, he describes "sundrie priuiledges and blessings, which God doth peculiarly bequeath vnto, and bestow vpon his beloued ones, besides such benefits as they haue in common with the men of the world." This is aimed at encouraging Christians in their daily practice to be confirmed in their privilege and happiness. In the last, the seventh treatise, he defends his Christian directory to godly life against such objections as he expected to be brought up by "weake christians or carnall cauillers."

The principle of Puritan direction to godly life is "the applying of Christ and his promise" to Christian daily life. Rogers writes:

> . . . by the doctrine of ỹ promises, which he heareth, or hath heard published and preached vnto him, he draweth his owne, euen as if they had bin properly made to him: he perswadeth him by that which he heareth, no longer to fear God as a terrible Iudge, and so slauishly to abide

> in his heart, and maketh it as effectually his, as any bargaine is made sure to vs, when he, who sold it, hath sealed it vnto vs, or giuen earnest thereof. And therefore it is that the Scripture doth so often vse this phrase of speech, We are sealed vp by the spirit of promise, and by the spirit of our God: to giue vs to vnderstand, that as nothing is with greater securitie assured vnto vs then a writing sealed: so there ca be no surer way for a man to hold this redemption and saluation, then by hauing it sealed vnto him by the spirit of God.[14]

By the term "applying" he holds together the dynamic relation between the word of promise preached and the concrete life of man. In other words, he captures the dynamic aspect in relation between preaching and teaching. He attempts to cause what he preaches to be incarnated in the Christian directory. The difference may be discovered mostly in the content and theological basis from Parsons' casuistic application. Protestantism grounded itself on the conviction that the Answer was revealed in Christ. The battle between God and devil was already over in the victory of Christ. But this victory, this Answer, was won, so to speak, "principally," yet not "concretely." The preaching gives the Gospel of this victory, won principally, but it must be extended to the concrete victory, which may be achieved in establishing a godly life in Christian man. Rogers applied, thus, the term "application" to this aspect of the situation. The preaching carries the message of victory, but the teaching (viz. Christian directory) must clean up the remnants of enemy yet unsurrendered. What man has received in faith must be applied to the reality of life.

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[14] Rogers, Seven Treatises, p. 20

Here is made clear the difference between Rogers and Parsons in the basic theological position, as Rogers criticizes Parsons:

> And what reckoning he maketh of faith (which the word of God preferreth before all other things, and saith, that it ouercommeth all difficulties in the world) we may see by his owne words, in his preface fol. 6. I exhort the discreet reader (saith he) of whatsoeuer religion and faith he be, to enter into the carefull studie and exercise of good deedes, assuring him, that this is the right way, to obtaine at Gods hands the light of true beliefe. And a little after he saith, It is more easie to beleeue as we ought, then to liue, as we should. Here we see, he preferres good deedes before faith: as if the fruite should be said to be more precious, then the tree that beares it. And yet as not marking what he said, he vttereth these words a little before, which cannot stand with the other: Our fathers receiued one vniforme faith from their mother the holy Catholike Church, and did attend only to builde vpon that foundation good workes and vertuous life, as holy Scripture commaundeth vs to doe. Here he affirmeth, that good life commeth from faith. Thus while he speaketh such contraries, sometime, that good workes must be built on the foundation of faith; and with an other breath, that good life is the right way to bring faith, (and yet all may see he speaketh of one and the selfe same faith in both places) must he not needes by so teaching, deceiue the simple reader while he not being able to vnderstand what is taught, cannot possibly practise that which he ought?[15]

This discussion of Rogers against Parsons may not seem to have captured the point, yet he could make clear his position, which is well stated in this text. Rogers may have not understood well Thomistic conception of Justification, and of faith and works. But he held the Protestant position of faith firmly, and he elicited sanctification out of the presupposition of faith:

> a godly life must of necessitie goe with the faith before spoken of: and that it is the foundation and ground thereof, whereby we receive and giue credit, not only to the promise of our saluation; but also to all other promises of temporarie benefits appertaining to this life, and also to the whole word of God, with a mind to relie vpon it, and to be guided by it.[16]

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[15] op. cit., The Preface, or Entrance to the Booke

[16] op. cit., p. 73

The Thomistic idea, on the other hand, is to attain justification through sanctification. By making clear his own position, Rogers expressed that what man received principally in the event of justification, should be unfolded in the life-process towards sanctification. By that application God's mercy objectively given is realized to man's side subjectively.

This casuistic tendency arose in the same historical condition where the Puritan preaching had been emphasizing the contractual aspect of covenant. There was some combination between evangelical preaching and mysticism, but the most remarkable development was achieved in the combination between evangelical preaching and casuistic ethics. The Puritan covenant theology had assimilated casuistry in itself. The combination was beautifully expressed from the ethical angle:

> such as haue obtained mercy of God, are taught and guided by him: ought not men to settle themselues to another course, then in times past they walked in, being now deliuered from so great bondage? For to that end, as they haue heard, they were deliuered. Wherefore, if any be assured of saluation, let them either willingly be subiect to the Lords yoke, I meane his commandements, and commit their whole life to him to be gouerned, and be diligent to doe good workes: or else let them hold their peace: for they are nothing lesse, as in time it shall appeare, and hath done already in many such as they are, to their cost: and be they well assured, that God will not be slacke to reuenge such boldnes.[17]

Despite this ethical tendency, it must be noted, Protestant "Evangelical" position has consistently been maintained:

> I will shut vp this matter in one sentence. Saint Paul to the Ephesians most liuely describeth this life, which is to be led of them which are sure of Gods fauour: saying, Put off, or lay aside, as concerning your conuersation past, that old man, that is, that corrupt nature; and so the powers of your mind and bodie, which were infected with deceiueable lusts: and be renued in the spirit of your mindes, (euen where the force of reason should be greatest) that so you

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[17] *op. cit.*, p. 78

> may put on the new man which is to be sanctified, that the powers of your bodies and mindes may be renued, and changed also: so shall ye be framed, to bring forth rightousnesse, and true holinesse, wherein ye shall carrie some resemblance of God.[18]

Rogers' Seven Treatises laid the foundation for the coming Puritan effort in the field of Christian directory to a godly life. Puritan casuistry, which was treated more systematically by Perkins and Ames, was nothing else but a more careful and systematic expression in line with the great trend of "Christian Directory." Both terms "Christian Directory" and "casuistry" were almost interchangeably used thereafter. For example, the famous Baxter's casuistic work was entitled "A Christian Directory: Or, A Summ of Practical Theologie, And Cases of Conscience. Directing Christians, how to Vse their Knowledge and Faith; How to improve all Helps and Means, and to Perform all Duties; How to overcome Temptations, and escape and mortifie every Sin."

"Directory" is a term which denotes an objective side of casuistic teaching, viz. an act of teacher, but what about its subjective side, that is to say, an act of man who is guided? This aspect of casuistry we may see in John Downame's casuistic works, which may be duly called the second greates attempt in Christian directory in line with Rogers' work. Downame wrote two huge works: one being the famous Christian Warfare, the other Gvide to Godlynesse, Or a Treatise of a Christian Life. The Christian Warfare was one of the most influential book during the first half of the 17th Century. It went through many editions. The subjective side of casuistic teaching was, in this book, fully characterized. The idea of Christian warfare may remind us of Parsons' Jesuit dictum "Memento belli." This idea is of long tradition in the history of Christian religion,[19] and the Reformers employed the idea to explain the life of Christian man. But we should think that this idea was emphatically used by the Puritan both because of the character of soteriology that was unique to Puritanism, about which we have discussed in the first chapter, and because of the challenge felt from the Jesuit.

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[18] op. cit., p. 78

The Puritan soteriology, as we have explained, had a twofold aspect, either ethically emphasized or developmentally conceived. The difference between Rogers and Downame in the method of Christian directory may be found, though it should not be emphasized too much, in this, that Downame introduced the developmental element of Christian life with greater emphasis into Christian directory. This element is what we may see later time in Bunyan's The Pilgrim's Progress which still more emphasis. This same element of process in Christian life was taken as the framework of Christian directory. The whole life of Christian is a pilgrimage and the spiritual warfare. Here are the illustrative verses of poetic style which is found on the title page, the reproduction of which may serve to clarify the content of this book:

> The Christian Souldier in IEHOVAH's might,
> Watching in Prayer, manly keepes his station,
> and in his compeat Armes Diuinely bright,
> Prepares to make resistance in tentation.
>
> Sathan (chiefe Captaine in this hellish field)
> His poysoned fiery Darts against him flingeth;

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[19] Cf. Adorf von Harnack, Militia Christi, Die Christliche Religion und der Soldatenstand in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten, (Tübingen, 1905)

Which catch't and quench't with Faith's vnpierced Schield;
Hits, falls, and only tryes; no damage bringeth.

The World (Leiuetenant Generall in this fight)
In Harlots habit, fawningly allures him
To sinfull, shamefull swaruing from all right,
This done, Wealth, Honours, Pleasures, she assures him.

Which he contemning; full of Spleene and Hate,
Shee turnes her Smiles to Frownes, nought else now breathing
But (Tyrant-like) Fire, Faggot, Sword, and Bate,
Gibbets and Gayles, no crueltie out-leauing.

The Flesh, the last, the worst of hellish traine,
When outward Foes assault him with tentation,
Traytrously yeelds, allur'd with Worldly gaine;
Him also moues to yeeld, and quit his station.

Fayling in this; Treason he turnes to Rage;
And like a Captaine old and subtile places
Legions of lawlesse Lusts, which he doth wage,
To fight against Him and his sauing Graces.

'gainst all these powers of Hell Christs Champion stands,
And though sometimes his strength fainteth and faileth,
Through fierce encounters of these horrid bands;
In his Grand Leader's might he still preuayleth:

Vntill at last full Victory he gaines,
Treads, tramples on their Crests with feet victorious,
In triumph leads them captiue, and obtaines
And heauenly Crowne, Royall, Immortall, Glorious.

The Christians are, in his image, no quiet pietists but fighting saints: Let us "march forward, and shew a courageous heart and earnest desire to overcome," and "surely Christ our grand Captaine will acknowledge us for his souldiers, and will give us our pay, even a crown of victorie."[20] So, it is right to see here a powerful source of the self-consciousness of the saint-soldiers of the Cromwellian Army.[21]

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[20] Downame, Christian Warfare, pp. 129-130

[21] Dr. Haller wrote: "The loyalty which Downeme sought thus to instill in spiritual soldiers would presently be accorded to Captain Cromwell as well as to Captain Christ, and King Charles like Satan would discover that he had a fight on his hands." Rise of Puritanism, p. 158

This book is divided into two parts; the first part is wholly devoted to description of the new man in Christ over against the old man in captivity of devil, and it is interesting that he does not deal with the doctrinal discussion first, but reserves it for the second part. The doctrinal part follows th the establishment of Christian life. Doctrines are grounded on the ethical basis.

The practical concern is more powerfully expressed in his other book, of about a thousand pages folio, published in 1622, Gvide to Godlynesse, Or a Treatise of a Christian Life. It is in this book that he expressed his conviction in the importance of practical divinity, "no one part of Diuinity more profitable, . . . then that which consisteth more in experience and practice, then in theory and speculation; . . ." In this emphasis we are reminded again of Parsons' similar emphasis, emphasis on practical theology over speculative theology. His casuistic concern is expressed as follows:

> there is no meanes more effectuall to stay them from apostacie and backsliding, then that first, by catechizing they should be soundly grounded in the knowledge of the Truth which we professe. . . . And secondly, that being by this meanes inlightned in the knowledge of the Truth, they haue it by powerfull perswasions wrought into their hearts and affections, that they may also practise it in their liues and conuersations, without which, all other meanes will be vneffectuall, either for the inlightning of the minde with sauing knowledge, or the inclining of the wil to imbrace it, and to continue firme and resolute against errors and heresies.[22]

Against Catholic casuistry he builds a Christian directory upon the Protestant Evangelical position, and in this point he agrees with Rogers. He writes:

For whereas sound and sauing knowledge of the truth, and

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[22] Downame, A Gvide to Godlynesse, . . ., The Epistle of Dedicatory.

> the constant acknowledgement and profession of it, are the gifts of God, which none can attaine vnto, but those vpon whom he pleaseth to bestow them; he vouchsafeth these graces vnto those alone who loue his Truth, and bring forth the fruits of it in their holy practise.[23]

In reference to Jesus' parable, he combines the gift of God and the task of man thus: "To these only this right talent of truth is intrusted; to these it is doubled and redoubled, who make best vse of it for the glory of him that gaue it, by causing it to shine in their liues and conuersations."[24] For Downame, too, the guiding principle is "If any man well do his will, he shall know the doctrine, whether it be of God, &c. John 7. 17."[25]

Doctrinal truth in the preaching must be applied to practical life. The whole theological situation, in this period, was being developed in this shape. The Puritan preachers dealt with human life and soul deeply and thoroughly; they were not only the effective preachers but also the good "physicians of the soul."[26] By the beginning of the Civil War this tendency permiated so deeply in the society that such a lay-intellectual as Milton could speak as follows:

> Albeit in purity of Doctrine we agree with our Brethren; yet in the execution and applying of Doctrine home, and laying the salve to the very Orifice of the wound; yea tenting and searching to the Core, without which Pulpit preaching is but shooting at Rovers.[27]

By this close combination between the preaching and the casuistic teaching, theological thinking in England, and in America, was to be affected deeply, which is no less insignificant for the formation of a general ethical tendency of Anglo-American world.

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[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Cf. Haller, op. cit., p. 1ff

[27] Milton, Of Reformation Touching Chvrch-Discipline in England, (1641), p.7

II. Method of Puritan Casuistry

Puritan casuistry was a product of the ethical tendency Puritanism was to persue after the failure in political reformation. Christian directory, which we have seen in the previous section, was essentially casuistic. The term "casuistry" is generally defined as the art or science of bringing general moral principles to bear upon particular cases. We may say, casuistry is a more systematic and reflected treatment of the same subject area as that with which Christian directory dealt.

There are generally known two great Puritan casuists, teacher and disciple, that is, William Perkins and William Ames.[28] Casuistry is more precise than general Christian directory insofar as there is methodological clarification of the meaning of "application." In casuistry the application is viewed to occur through conscience, so that it is more structually clarified. This point will be treated specially in this section.

But let us begin with deliniating the circumstance of Puritan casuistry in the context of history. Thomas Pickering's illuminating introduction (actually a letter to Edward, Lord Dennie, Baron of Waltam) to Perking' casuistic work The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience serves best to this purpose.

At the outset, he writes:

> There is no one Doctrine, revealed in the Word of God, or dispensed by the Prophets and Apostles, of greater use and consequence in the Life of Man, than is that, which

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[28] Ames in his casuistic work "Conscience with the Power and Cases thereof mentioned: "I gladly call to mind the time, when being young, I heard worthy Master Perkins, so preach in a great Assembry of Students, that he instructes them soundly in the truth, stirred them up effectually to seeke after godlinesse, made them fit for the kingdome of God. . ." (To the Reader). This will show the close relationship in casuistic thinking between Perkins and Ames.

> prescribeth a Forme of relieving and rectifying the Conscience.[29]

In tendency this is in agreement with Downame's emphasis on practical theology. But casuistry grasps a problematic condition through conscience, so that treatment becomes more precise and systematic. Casuistry serves three ways: 1. as counceler, "it serveth to discover the Cure of the dangerousest Sore that can be, the Wound of the Spirit." It is a task of the physician of the soul. 2. As teacher, "it giveth for all particular Cases, speciall and sound direction;" and 3. as comforter, casuistry is "the most comfortable" of all other doctrines, because it is founded on the "most sufficient and certaine Grounds, collected and drawne out of the very Word of God."

As it is clear in Pickering's characterization of casuistry, casuistry places more emphasis on the "priestly" or "pastoral" concern. The "priestly" concern, different from the "prophetic" attitude, is more interested in guidance, assistance and consolation, rather than in being critical, or judging.

The original Puritan movement was, generally speaking, of more prophetic type, while, turning to casuistry, Puritanism appropriated the "priestly" tendency into itself. This was to enrigh the movement. In view of the fact that the original Puritanism had no casuistic tendency, but was more concerned with the matter of principle, does this not mean an important change in character of Puritanism? This change was, however, never unfortunate, rather by this change Puritanism was to move towards "indigenization," that is to say, relating itself deeply with the English life. We must not overlook, on the other, the fact that it breeded a tendency towards political indifference.

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[29] Succeeding quotations are taken from Pickering's Letter, in which pages were not given.

Casuistry, as Pickering pointed out in the second place, is to give "special and sound direction" for all particular cases." In contrast to the original Puritans whose interest was not in such particular cases, but in principle of polity, this change is remarkable. The contention between Puritanism and Anglicanism at the Admonition Controversy was revolved around the principla difference. But now being frustrated with their hope of reformation in the "principal" level, the Puritans turned to treat with the specific cases. Puritan zeal for reformation was not lost, but rather turned to a different direction. They had to submit to the Anglican Establishment, although not in absolute conformity. Within the Establishment they had to seek the place to pour out their zeal. This they found in the internal sphere of man, man's soul and conscience. To be sure, the Puritan preachers advocated Christian warfare, but, as Downame himself was quite conservative in politics, it did not attempted to mean a political or military battle, but a spiritual and religious one. Along with the emphasis on Christian warfare, they moved to spiritual assistance and care for the "wounded soul."

The uniqueness of Puritan casuistry in contrast with Catholic casuistry is this, that Puritan casuistry takes seriously the Word of God as its basis. The Puritan conviction is that the problems of conscience may not be solved absolutely unless the Word of God is heared there. Mere opinions which are only probable and conjectual cannot be the answer to the questions of conscience. In this point Puritan casuistry is different from and more strict than Jesuit casuistry, which tended towards Probabilism. A serious and consistent "application" of the Word of God, which is "mightie in operation, pearcing the heart, and discerning the thoughts and intents thereof," makes the guiding principle of Puritan casuistic thinking. Puritan casuistry is, therefore, nothing else but a direction of man in action by the Word of God; thus he says:

> The want of which direction, of what force it is to turne the actions of men, which are good in themselves, to sinnes, in regard of the agents, S. Paul affirmeth in that generall Conclusion, Whatsoever is not of Faith, is sin. Wherein he would teach us, that whatsoever is done or undertaken by men in this life, whether it concerne the knowledge and worship of God, or any particular dutie to bee performed by vertue of their Callings, for the Common good, whereof they have not sufficient warrant and assurance in Conscience, grounded upon the Word, that it is to be done, or not to be done; to them it is a sinne.

This made, to be sure, the Puritan casuistry both confidential and severe at once. The character of the Puritan as a "Precisian" rose right here from the Puritan casuistry.[30] Although that is a problematic aspect of Puritan casuistry, yet an interpretation that overlook more positive elements in this casuistry cannot be justified as well.

As in the case which we have seen in the preceeding section, Puritan casuistry differes from Romish casuistry in this presupposition of the Word of God. Let us see how Pickering criticized Romish casuistry: first, in this casuistry the duty of "releeving

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[30] Good illustrations may be found concerning the Puritan attitude towards a criticism on precisian, in Nuttal's Visible Saints, p. 133. Nuttal mentioned there Rogers and Baxter:

> "'Mr. Rogers,' said someone. . ., 'I like you and your company very well, but you are so precise.' 'O Sir,' replied Rogers, 'I serve a precise God.'" (cont.)

Conscience" is commended to the "sacrificing Priest", and their Canons determines that he should be a man of knowledge, and free from imputation of wickedness; yet, he asks, oftentimes it falls out that he is either unlearned, or else wicked and lewd of conversation, and consequently unfit to such a purpose; secondly, it is wrong to teach that the Priests appointed to be comforters and relievers of the distressed, are made by Christ himself, "Iudges of the Cases of Conscience, having in their owne hands a judiciary power and authority, truely and properly to bind or to loose, to remit or to retaine sinnes, to open or to shut the kingdom of heaven." Whereas Puritan casuistry should be directed in the Christocentric way, and in contrast to Romish casuistry the way is made clear as follows:

> Whereas the Scripture uttereth a contrary voice, that Christ only hath the keyes of David, which properly and truely openeth, and no man can shutte, and properly and truely shutteth, and no man can open. And the Ministers of God are not called to be absolute iudges of the Conscience, but onely Messengers and Embassadours of reconciliation; whereupon it followeth that they cannot bee the authors and givers of remission of sinnes, but only the Ministers and Dispensers of the same.

Anticipating what we shall discuss later, in this relation, we think that Barth's rejection of casuistry by reason of that casuistry sets casuist on the place of God, is misjudgment by confounding Puritan casuistry and Catholic casuistry. The Puritans sharply distinguished their position from Jesuit casuis-

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(cont.)
Nattal reproduced Baxter's dialogue between a Lawyer and a Minister, in which the Minister stands for himself:

"L. You talk as if you would have a Church of Saints, and seem to make Religion too serious a business: . . .
"M. I am sure St. Paul wrote to no Church but such as he called Saints; and I am sure Christ will save none but Saints: An unsanctified Christian, and a Church not holy, are contradictions in adjecto. . . .
"L. You are very severe in you Censure.
"M. I doubt some will find Christ more severe, and be less able to endure his Censure than mine.

try in this very point.

Pickering proceeds to point out "sundry false and erronious Grounds of Doctrine, much prejudiciall to the direction or resolution of the Conscience in time of neede" which are attached to Romish casuistry. They are: 1. "That a man in the course of this life, may build himselfe upon the faith of his Teachers; and for his salvation, rest contended with an implicite and vnexpressed faith." 2. "That every man ought to stand in feare and doubt of the remission and pardon of his sins, either of the present favour of God, or of his owne salvation." 3. "That every man is bound in conscience upon paine of damnation, to make speciall confession of his mortall sins, with all the particular circumstances thereof, once every yeere to his Priest." 4. "That some sinnes are veniall, because they are only besides the Law of God, not against it, and because they binde over the sinner onely to temporall, and not to eternall punishment." 5. "That a man may satisfie the justice of God, for the temporal punishment of his sins committed." All these erroneous assertions are grounded upon the wrong theology of Roman Catholicism. But, criticizing thus, he did not deny the importance of casuistry. On the contrary, because of such an erroneous casuistry in his view, it becomes more important to introduce a better casuistry: "Now," says he, "by the benefit and abuse of this Doctrine, we see how necessary it is that in Churches which professe Christian Religion, it should be more taught, and further inlarged then it is."

Whereupon, he recommended Perkins' work on casuistry for two reasons: on the one hand, "because his Grounds and Principles are drawne either directly, or by just consequence, out of the written Word, and so are of greater force to convince the Conscience, and to give satisfaction to the Minde, either doubting, or distressed." On the other hand, "for that it is delivered with such perspicuitie, and disposed in such order and Method, as fiteth best for the understanding and memory of any, whosoever shall peruse it."

Pickering's Introduction made a great deal of clarification of the principle as well as character of Puritan casuistry in contrast to Romish casuistry. Taking that for granted, we may now proceed to study a method of casuistry. As has been said elsewhere, the uniqueness of casuistry is to grasp the problematic situation in which man lives ~~in~~ and through conscience. In such a theoretical convergence upon conscience, casuistry systematizes ethical teachings. A "casuist" is not a "moralist"; the difference being that a "moralist" despite his good teachings stands upon an arbitrary basis, while a "casuist" even though lacking in experience grounds his teaching upon methodological reflections. Puritan casuistry shares the same concern with Puritan Christian directory, but in taking a methodological reflection, casuistry proceeds a step further. The method of casuistry is a theory or art of handling of "cases" of conscience. In view of these "cases" the way of "application" must be more scientifically treated.

Here we meet the hardest core of the problem of ethics in dealing with the problem of casuistic method. For the problematic stratum here revealed is the deepest and most dynamic in which history and ethics meet. As its name shows, casuistry is concerned with specific "cases" in historical reality of life. In such cases conscience meets history. Why it is called "case"? Ames explained thus: "It is called a case, because it is wont to fall out, or to happen in the course of mans life, and a case of Conscience, because when it falls out, the Conscience ought, with all possible care, to give judgement about it."[31] The most concrete aspects of life lived in history must appear as "cases." How should these cases be ethically grasped? These cases are, by character, "contingent." Ethics is, by nature, never contingent but ought to be perpetual, if not eternal. These cases are rooted in the possibility of the emergence of the new in history. How does ethics render a certain moral direction to such an ever-emerging life-process? Here is a very difficult philosophical problem deeply involved, with which we cannot deal here,[32] but casuistic method is one which concerns this problematic dimension.

It is meaningful that the Puritans headed into this problematic dimension, whereas Deism rather shunned an engagement into the problem of contingency. Puritanism deeply engaged itself with history, and this fact may be duly referred in relation with the question of the spiritual origin of English Empiricism. Deism made for the 18th Century Rationalism.

The Puritans dealt with so difficult a problem not in terms of logic but of ethics, so that it could, by virtue of ethical means, avoid an unreconcilable repulsion between the norms and the facts as we note in the case of Troeltsch. For, the cases, which are individual and contingent, do allow, nevertheless, a sort of semi-generalization, which may be evident in the fact that man in a particular case may be taught from an experience of another man in a similar case. So, it may be rather un-realistic to doubt a possiblity of reconciling ethics and history. If a case is "purely" contingent and unique, no ethical treatment is possible. Casuistry, to be sure, must deal with "human affairs" rather than with "human nature," and both must be distinguished. Yet it is wrong if human nature and human affairs are separated from one another.

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[31] Ames, Of Conscience, the Second Book, p. 2

[32] This problem was dealt in philosophical way typically by Ernst Troeltsch. Cf. especially his article, "Die Bedeutung (cont.)

With the above reflections, we must now study a method of Puritan casuistry. There is seen a development in methodological reflection of casuistry from Perkins to Ames. In the case of Perkins, the method of casuistry was not fully cleared of rude treatment. He attempted to hold the casuistic dimension from four different angles, which seem not fully systematically reflected:

> The Grounds or Preambles are specially foure. The first, touching Confession. The second touching the degree of Goodnesse in things and actions. The third, touching the degrees of Sinne. The fourth and last, concerning the subjection and power of conscience.[33]

This is a description of casuistic procedure and no more than

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(cont.)
des Begriffes der Kontingenz" Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. II, S. 769-778, may be consulted. It is no exaggeration to say that Troeltsch's philosophical thinking converged upon this problematic dimension. His philosophy of history struggled with the problem of combination between history and ethics. Troeltsch, however, did not think in terms of casuistry, but returned to Schleiermacherian "cultural ethics." Cf. his last lecture Christian Thought: Its History and Application.

[33] Perkins, The Whøle Treatisis, p. 3

that. First, casuistic questions must be disclosed and discerned, unlesse it be manifested by the confession of the party who feels troubled in conscience; it is just as a patient first explains his diseased condition. "For in all reason the Physician must first know the disease, before hee can apply the remedy and the griefe of the heart will not be discerned, unlesse it be manifested by the confession of the party diseased, and for this cause also in the griefe of conscience, the scruple, that is, the thing that troubleth the conscience, must be known."[34] For the second, he describes various degrees of goodness. It is important to the casuistic point of view, that good is conceived in variety, since variety of good can come more easily to terms with variety of case. In the same way, thirdly, sin is also termed in variety, although it does not mean to allow the degree in quality of sin. Casuistry is not concerned with "essence" but with "commitment" of sin. Committed sins are many and various. The category of "variety," it is important for a better understanding of the casuistry here discussed, plays great role in combining ethical norm and historical reality.

Then, he comes to discuss the "subjection and power" of conscience. Since conscience occupies the central position in casuistic method, the definition of conscience is important. Perkins defines:

> The name of Conscience. . . signifieth a knowledge joyned with a knowledge; and it is so tearmed in two respects: First, because when a man knowes or thinkes any thing, by meanes of Conscience he knowes what he knowes and thinkes: Secondly, because by it, man knowes that thing of himselfe with God also knowes of him. Man hath two witnesses of

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[34] *op. cit.*, p. 4

> his thoughts: God and his owne Conscience: God is the first and chiefest, and Conscience is the second, subordinate unto God, bearing witnesse unto God either with the man, or against him. Therefore it is nothing else but a part of the understanding, whereby a man knowes what he thinkes, what he willes and desires, as also in what manner he knoweth, thinketh, or willeth either good or evill. Whereunto this must be added, that as Conscience knowes our thoughts, wills, and actions, so it testifies thereof unto God, either with us, or against us.[35]

This definition is correct, but he did not proceed any further from this point to make clear "How" conscience works "casuistically" between God and man. Perkins' thought was rather descriptive, but not discursive. A methodological reflection must clarify this "How" of casuistry. This clarification had to wait for Ames' ability.

Ames' De Conscientia, eius iure et casibus was an uncomparable monumental work of Christian ethics in the 17th Century. Barth comments on this book that this was used earnestly until the middle of 18th Century, and for example S. Werenfels in Basel had used this book many years as the text for his ethical seminar.[36] Ames dealt fully with the problem left out by his teacher Perkins concerning the problem of method of casuistry. How may the Puritan idea of "application" be explained in terms of conscience? For Ames, conscience is more specifically "Iudgment," rather than "Understanding." What kind of judgment does it make? He writes:

> Conscience being referred to judgement, it is distinguished from the bare apprehension of truth. For Conscience doth alwaies suppose and assent that is firme and setled.

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[35] Perkins, op. cit., p. 26

[36] Cf. Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik, Bd. III/4, S. 7

> By the definition of Conscience, it appeareth that Conscience is not a contemplative judgement, whereby truth is simply discerned from falsehood: but a practicall judgement, by which that which a man knoweth is particularly applyed to that which is either good or evill to him, to the end that it may be a rule within him to direct his will.[37]

Conscience as "Judgment" means that it is an "act" but not one of "natural faculties." In this point, Ames distinguished himself from Perkins, for Perkins regarding conscience as "naturalem potentiam seu facultatem"[38] did not take a functional view of conscience.

In this difinition Ames revived the position taken by Thomas Aquinas during the Middle Ages.[39] It overcame habitual as well as organic conceptions of conscience, and in so doing, rendered to conscience freedom and independency from every human condition, either biological or sociological. For, if conscience be "habitus," the validity of it may not be able to stand at the destruction of a certain social basis which grounds, or at least, is related with, habitus. Conscience as act must depend absolutely on the mover of conscience. Now, it can develop its work in a "discursive" way, in terms of syllogism. Ames gives these examples:

"He that lives in sinne, shall dye:"
"I live in sinne:"
"therefore, I shall dye."

Or else:

"Whosoever believes in Christ, shall not dye but live."
"I believe in Christ:"
"therefore, I shall not dye but live."[40]

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[37] Ames, Works, Of Conscience, p.2

[38] op. cit. p. 3: Ames contends with this respect: "He gives (cont.)

By means of syllogism Ames brought about a clarification of the "How" of casuistic method by conscience. Conscience is an act of judgment according to syllogism. "In that syllogism alone is contained the whole nature of Conscience."[41] This syllogism is to explain the process of "application" of the Word of God to the concrete life of man. The further explanation will make clear the internal structure of syllogism in detail: "which doth dictate or give the proposition," he explains, "is called Synteresis, by the Schoolemen Synderesis." Then, as to the miner, "The assumption especially and peculiarly is called Syneidesis;" and lastly concerning the conclusion: "the conclusion is the Crisis, or Iudgment." Or else he writes,

> The proposition treateth of the Law; the Assumption of the fact or state, and the Conclusion of the relation arising from the fact or state, in regard of that law; the conclusion either pronounceth one guilty, or giveth spirituall peace and security.[42]

To observe this syllogism closely, the major is taken from the Scriptures, the minor describes a knowledge of man's condition, and the conclusion is drawn out of discursive reasoning on those presuppositions. Conscience as judgment is, therefore, not analytical but synthetic by nature, for it holds both the Word

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(cont.) this reason of his opinion, namely, because the act of accusing, comforting, terrifying, &c. cannot be ascribed to the Conscience, if it selfe were an act. But this reason is weak: because in the Scriptures such kindes of effects are attributed to the thoughts themselves, which undoubtedly are acts. Rom. 2. 15. . . The reason whereof is, because things done, are the effects not onely of the Mover, but also of the motion itselfe."

[39] As for Thomistic idea of conscience, see Oskar Renz, Die Synteresis nach den hl. Thomas von Aquin, (Münster i. W., 1911).

[40] Ames, op. cit., p. 3

[41] op. cit., p. 4

[42] op. cit., pp. 3-4

of God and the human situation at once in combination. In this sense, this syllogism differs from ordinary syllogism which deduces the minor out of the major. The Word of God, in this manner, is applied to a paticular concrete situation.

We should discuss, by the way, about his employment of the Scholastic terminology. The use of the term "Synteresis" gives no room for doubt that Ames is deeply indebted to Scholasticism. But the question is, then, whether Ames was totally in the same position as the Scholastics? If it cannot be so, What is a difference between Ames and Thomas Aquinas? Ames writes as follows:

> Synteresis is properly an intellectuall habit, whereby we give our consonant to the principles of morall actions. It differeth not therefore from the Law of nature which is naturally written in the hearts of all men: but in respect onely.[43]

Insofar as he follows this definition, Ames does not differ from Thomas Aquinas. The term "habitus" is an important concept for Thomas. It is one of the commingling form of will and nature, that is to say, it is a naturalized will, an inclination. According to Thomas, human intellect has a twofold way of participation to the highest norm, viz. the highest Intellect: one is "Passio," i.e. to be moved from above; the other, "Habitus," i. e. moving by its own nature in harmony with the highest norm. The complete rule of human intellect must be as "Habitus." This self-ruling "Habitus," which is at the same time the participation to the highest norm, named Thomas "Synteresis."[44] In the intellect there exists a natural "Habitus," by virtue of our reason can participate to the rectitude of the highest norm. This "Habitus" is regarded as "Synteresis." Ames seems to have accepted this idea of Synteresis as habitus, and also in the understanding of the idea of Natural Law he appears to share the same conception. But the following passage will bring us some possible discrimination on this point:

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[43] Ames, op. cit., p. 4

[44] Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, 3, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1: "Intellectus possibilis, qui de se est indeterminatus sicut (cont.)

> To Synteresis being taken *after a large sense*, ought to be referred, not only generall conclusions touching right or law, which are deduced by good consequence out of natural principles, but likewise all practicall truth, whereunto wee give *a firme assent*, *through the revelation* wee have by faith.[45]

First, he says that the term Synteresis is taken according to "a large sense." That is to say, his attitude in the use of this term is rather free, and he even attempted to modify its scholastic meaning. For, in the case of Thomas the participation of Synteresis to the highest Intellect was by "Inclination." But in this case by Ames such a term as "a firme assent" is applied. The former is more natural, while the latter more volitional. In the Thomistic terminology the Puritan theology is smuggled. And then the term is to be modified almost fundamentally in the meaning. For, by allowing the volitional interpretation of Synteresis, the concept of Revelation is to occupy the more important position in it. He proceeds to say thus:

(cont.)
materia prima, habitu indiget, quo partipet rectitudinem·suae regulaw regulae: et naturali quantum ad es quae ex naturali lumine intellectus agentis, qui est eius regula, statim determinantur, sicut sunt principia prima." I owe this quotation to Renz. Cf. *op. cit.*, S. 9

[45] Ames, *op. cit*. p. 4 (Underline is mine.)

> To this part of Conscience Synteresis being largely taken, belong all Practicall truthes whereof we are perswaded: whether they be drawn out of naturall principles, by consequence, or communicated by Divine relation.[46]

This leads to clarify the distinction between "a natural conscience" and "an inlightened conscience."

It may be said that Thomistic Synteresis is coupled with Puritan concept of faith. Through Synteresis, law, whether natural or revealed, is made known to man. Puritan Synteresis is, finally, nothing else but a firm affirmation of the revealed will of God. Synteresis in this enlarged sense can prescribe human action in affirming the law of Nature and of God. The latter law is more fundamental and clear to the Puritan mind, and he writes:

> Hence the adequate or full rule of conscience is the revealed will of God, which both declares and prescribes mans duty.[47]

It is noteworthy that in Ames' mind the Thomistic concept was transmuted into personal-voluntalistic concept. Synteresis thus defined, posits propositions by which all actions are directed and judged.

Conscience carries out the judgment in the light of proposition, and it is an act itself. But in narrower sense, as plainly stated in the former quotation, it is a knowledge of man's condition in ethical terms, which constitutes the minor. Therefore, conscience does, on the one hand, clarify an ethical condition of man, and on the other, apply the norm which it discovers in faith. This double function of conscience makes synthetic ethical judgment possible. On the other hand it clarifies and analyzes a particular situation, and on the other, it applies a certain norm to it. Therefore a norm is selected in accordance with the analyzed situation. It is a dynamic circle, but never such a static and rigid judgment as often with the Puritans. For example, to the situation analyzed as "I live in sinne," Synteresis cannot give as norm a text such as "do not be children in your thinking." Thus, conscience not only interprets man's situation, but also the Scriptures as such. This is the most important point to demand our special attention. Conscience reads the Scriptures through analyzing human situation. Such a reading is an "ethical" or "casuistical" exegesis of the Bible. By this twofold interpretation, viz. of situation as well as of the Scriptures, conscience achieves the "application" of the Word of God to human particular situation.

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[46] Ames, op. cit. p. 5

[47] Ibid.

So far we have described the method of Puritan casuistry. Let us conclude this part by comparing Barth's method of "Speziele Ethik," which should be more legitimately called casuistry. Barth intended to use "Speziele Ethik" instead of casuistry. There are threefold reason for that: 1. for casuistry naturally makes casuist to sit on the place of God; 2. the Divine imperative is turned to general norms; 3. man's free obedience becomes legal observation.[48] These reasons were made, however, without discrimination of the difference between Romish casuistry and Puritan casuistry. As we have seen in Pickering's description of the Puritan casuistry, those reasons were avoided consciously by the Puritan casuists. The contention, therefore, should not be taken from this angle. The real question is the different interpretation of law and norm for casuistry. Barth's casuistry took the norm in Christocentric interpretation, whereas the Puritan casuistry was more Bible-centered. We must not confound the Puritans as represented by Perkins and Ames with the Fundamentalists of today. We must, therefore, make an impartial comparison between Barth's Christocentric casuistry and the Puritan Bible-centered casuistry. For Barth the question comes to focus finally in, so-called, "Geformte Hinweise," viz. a concrete direction. What matters here is a concrete "form" of ethical direction. How can Barth give a concrete "form" to God's command? He answers thus: when an encounter between God and man occurs, it happens as a particular even here and now, that is, an event with a concrete form, and casuistry is nothing else but a "commentary" to this event. A concrete "form" of ethical direction is taken there.[49] That is to say, a concrete form of casuistic teaching is given by interpreting what God has done here and now. Barth wrote:

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[48] Barth, op. cit., S. 9-14

> Wir brauchen uns hier aber weder mit Hilfe des Schöpfungsgedankens noch ohne ihn nach einer Wirklichkeit unzusehen, die von der des ethischen Ereignisses verschieden wäre. Wir brauchen bloss zuzusehen und festzustellen, wie dieses sich selbst darstellt und characterisiert. Wir brauchen bloss der Geschichte nachzugehen, in der jedes ethisbhe Ereignis seinen Ort hat, in der jedes seinen Moment bildet: der Geschichte, in der Gott Schöpfer, Versöhner und Erlöser und in der der Mensch das diesem Tun Gottes Entsprechende ist: sein Geschöpf, sein in Gnaden Angenommener, der seiner Verheissung Teilhaftige. Diese Geschichte ist die Wirklichkeit, in der das ethische Ereignis sich abspielt, auf die wir also von diesem her hinblicken, von der her wir auf dieses zurückblicken müssen, um es in seiner Konkretheit zu erkennen. Auf diese Geschichte dürfen wir uns darum zuversichtlich beziehen, weil wir es in ihr ganz schlicht mit der Selbstentfaltung dieses Ereignisses zu tun haben. Es geht in diesem Ereignis, wie wir sahen, immer und überall um Gott in seinem gegliederten und differenzierten Tun und immer und überall um den Menschen in seinem entsprechend gegliederten und differenzierten Dransein diesem Gott gegenüber. . . . Auf ihre Gliederung und Differenzierung zu achten und dieses Ereignis im Blick auf sie und von ihr her zu

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[49] *op. cit.*, S. 27-28

verstehen, ist die Aufgabe der speziellen Ethik.[50] After all, however, Barth seems not quite successful to deliniate the possibility of "Geformte Hinweise," beyond such a dogmatic assertion.

In sofar as the Puritan casuistry thought in terms of the Scriptures, the relation between God and historical reality of life was grasped through the interpretation of the Bible. It is difficult for Barth to render concrete form to casuistic direction, but the Puritans were less troubed with such a question. For God's imperative was always interpreted according to the written form of the Scriptures. We cannot overlook some danger in Puritan biblicist casuistry as well as in Barth's Christocentric casuistry. Barth could avoid the danger of making the written word of the Scriptures a god, but there creeped another danger into his thought: Barth's teaching given in such a massive volume may become the substitute for the biblical texts. Casuistry is necessary for Christian ethics, but we must endeavor to avoid those dangers.

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[50] Barth, op. cit., p. 30

III. System of Casuistry: Perkins and Ames

A system should not be prohibited to casuistry. A casuistic system, however, should have its own characteristic system, which is different from dogmatic system especially in mode of treatment. On this point both Perkins and Ames were not unsuccessful, though in the case of Ames there is something to be desired. For his methodological sharpening, which we have appreciated, does not seem to be related theoretically to the system of casuistry. Here we are going to observe the casuistic systems of both Perkins and Ames. The eyes of the casuists are looking downwards at man. So man is the subject-matter of casuistry.

It is interesting and legitimate that Perkins systematized his casuistry according to his treatment of this man. He writes:

> Now as man is considered divers waies, that is to say, either apart by himselfe, or as he stands in relation to another, and is a member of Societie: so the Questions of Conscience are to bee distinguished, some concerning man simply considered by himselfe: some againe, as he stands in relation to another.[51]

He distinguishes relationship in which man stands in a two-fold way: in relation to God, and in relation to man. In man's relation to God, man as a Christian is "a member of Christ," and so he is "a son of God." Man's duty in this relation, he defines, is "to know and to worship God according to his will revealed in his word."[52] In man's relation to other men, he is "a part of a body" and "a member of some societie." There are, according to him, three sorts of society: Family, Church and Common Wealth. Therefore, in his relation to other men, man must be considered as "a member of a Family," as "a member of the Church," then, as "a member of the Common-wealth." According to such a conception, he divides his book into three parts: the first book is "concerning Man, simply considered in himselfe, without relation to another." In the second he deals with "Man, as he stands in relation to God," and in the third and last book, "Man, as he stands in relation to Man."

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[51] Perkins, op. cit., p. 29

[52] Ibid.

In the first book he deals with three questions: the first, "What a man must doe, that he may come into the favour of God, and be saved?"; the second, "How he may be assure in conscience of his owne salvation?"; the third, "How he may recover himselfe when he is distressed or falled?" In this book, soteriology is discussed from the point of view of casuistic concern, in other words, not as an objective structure of salvation but as experiencing process of man with his salvation. The first question concerning the course of salvation is dealt with in this way: First, God gives man "the outward means" of salvation, such as the ministry of the word by means of which our heart is awakened to the will of God; man is now to consider the Law of God and know sin which is against the Law. Knowing sin, man is to aspire to God's salvation. The will to believe, "seeds or sparkes of faith," deepens this aspiration though which at once deepens "evangelical sorrow," too. Then, repentance and faith are to come. Man is made able to abide by His commandment in "New Obedience."[53] This, however, is ultimately by the grace of God. The grace of God moves man towards the duty to attain salvation, so man can do: first in humiliation, next in believing in Christ; thirdly, in repentance; fourthly, in new obedience. In this way he discusses and answeres the cases according to this process of doing man's duty.

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[53] op. cit., pp. 30-32

The second question concerns the certainty of salvation. This is, needless to say, one of the most serious questions for Calvinist Puritans who accepted the doctrine of Predestination. Their conscience was most seriously concerned with the question whether they were elect or not. Perkins answers to this question according to his tendency towards ethical interpretation of the covenant. His position, as has been mentioned, was one which appears closer to a Johannine interpretation of election. This position is not only undergirded by such texts as John chapter 3, verse36 and chapter 5, verse 24, but also by Romans chapter 8, verse 16, and Psalm 15, and the First Epistle of John chapter 5, or finally Timothy chapter 2, verse 19 and the Second Epistle of Peter chapter 1, verse 10. Throughout his dealing with this question, one remarkable note is that election is assured by man's practise of new obedience according to law. Ethics is the means of assurance of salvation. "If ye exercise your selves in these things, you may hereby be well assured and perswaded of your election and salvation."[54]

The third question is concerned with pastoral guidance and assistance of man who fails in following the course of salvation. Grace is again emphasized, which helps man in his weakness. Christ and his promise, the covenant of grace, are the foundations of comfort. But, it is important to note, Perkins did not interpret grace in terms of universalism. He interpreted grace and its acceptance as grace by clarifying the responsibilities of man's part: grace must be accepted first upon the ground of "a desire to repent and beleeve." He explains, "A desire to repent and beleeve, in a touched heart and conscience, is faith and repentance itselfe: though not in nature, yet in Gods acceptation." In other words, the condition to accept grace is "a feeling of the want."[55] Grace is, secondly, accepted upon the ground of "a godly sorrow." He writes, "A godly sorrow whereby a man is grieved for his sinnes, because they are sinnes, is the beginning of repentance, and indeed for substance is repentance it selfe."[56] The third ground is this, that "A setled purpose, and willing mind to forsake all sinne, and to turne unto God, (though yet no outward conversion appeare,) is a good beginning of true conversion, and repentance."[57] The fourth ground says that "To love and man because he is a Christian and a child of God, is a sensible and certaine note of a man that is partaker of the true love of God in Christ."[58] Perkins took grace upon the condition of human ethical responsibility.

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[54] *op. cit.*, p. 51

In the second book, which is "concerning Man, as he stands in relation to God," Perkins deals with four distinct questions:

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[55] *op. cit.*, p.57

[56] *op. cit.*, p. 58

[57] *Ibid.*

[58] *op. cit.*, p. 59

first, concerning the Godhead; secondly, concerning the Scriptures; thiedly, concerning Religion, or the worship that is due unto God; and fourthly, concerning the time of the worship of God, namely the Sabbath. For the first section, he discussed the doctrine of God, especially proof of existence of God as it is a quest on which troubles man's conscience. Secondly, the doctrine of the Scriptures, in which he asserts the divine authorship (the method of proof is interesting: that if the human writers were guided by human reason, they may not write evils of themselves), and the supernatural character of content and antiquity of origin of the Scriptures.[59] The third section is concerning religion, the relationship between God and man. Two questions are subordinated to this: first, knowledge of God, and secondly, worship of God. As for the outward forms of worship of God, for example, prayer, the hearing of the word preached, the use of the Sacraments, adoration and confession, an oath, vows and fasting are dealt with. This second book deals with many important subjects which are usually treated in doctrinal theology, only from a somewhat different point of view, that is, casuistic. Thus, those important doctrines are considered in connection with their application to the daily life of man.

The third book dealing with "Man, as he stands in relation to Man," has a discussion on virtues. He discusses five main virtues: Prudence, Clemency, Temperance, Liberalities, and Justice. (Concerning fortitude, he does not come to discuss it, although he had planned to do.)

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[59] op. cit., p. 131

Turning to Ames' casuistry, we find that he follows his teacher Perkins freely in the way of systematizing his casuistry. There are many points at which we may distinguish Ames from Perkins in casuistic thinking. The first remarkable note may be found in the first book dealing method of casuistry, as we have seen above. He gives here a detailed discussion on the definition of conscience, which we have described in detail. In the second book, adding some consideration on the meaning of "case" of conscience, he develops Puritan views of soteriology, which Perkins dealt with in his first book. The order of discussion is somewhat different from Perkins to Ames, although the structure of soteriology has little change. Ames also traces the course of salvation from conversion, to effectual calling, then to faith, repentance, adoption, sanctification, finally to eternal hope. These doctrinal articles are also, as in the case of Perkins, viewed from a casuistic concern with man. For example, in the same way as Perkins, he raises question, "how he can be sure of his effectual vocation?" He answers: man can know it, first, by the signe of "a purpose and readinesse of mind to heaken unto God in every thing," thirdly, by a signe of "a vehement longing after the Word of God," and lastly by "a singular love towards them which are borne of the same seed, and bloud." This is a unique manner of dealing.

In the Book Three, the various aspects of man's obedience to the will of God are reviewed. The subject is of "Mans Dyty in generall." In this book Ames departs rather greatly from his teacher's systematization. The ideal of casuistry is to bring man to the perfect obedience to the will of God. The casuistic questions arise out of uncertainty in the way of obedience to the will of God. Obedience is "to apply our will to the will of God,"[60] "conformity to the will of God."[61] In the light of this ideal of casuistry, he discusses, first, knowledge, because "to the performing of Christian obedience there is necessarily required some knowledge."[63] Secondly, he deals with the feare of God, then, humility towards God, because "the nature of obedience stands in subjection to God."[64] Fourthly, he treats of sincerity which is "a proper quality of obedience."[65] He turns then to zeal, because "the highest degree of our obedience towards God, consisteth in zeale."[66] His sixth consideration is of peace and tranquillity of conscience, because "the concomitant object of obedience is a quiet conscience."[67] Various virtues and various sins follow, which are all discussion about obedience from various angles of action. Ames puts most of the discussion which Perkins had in his last book, dealing with man in relation with man, in this book. It is interesting, in this relation, to see that neither Perkins nor Ames accepted the Scholastic definition of virtue. For Ames virtue is only an aspect of obedience to God's will.[67]

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[60] Ames, op. cit., p. 55

[61] op. cit., p. 92

[62] op. cit., p. 59

[63] op. cit., p. 63

[64] op. cit., p. 64

[65] op. cit., p. 65

[66] op. cit., p. 70

In the fourth book, Ames deals with what Perkins did in his second book, the subject of which is the duty of man towards God, in other words, concerning religion. The guiding guiding principle of this book is to give "religious honour to God only." The range of treatment is more expanded than in Perkins. By the way, Ames gives an interesting account of heresy. He deals with these questions: "Whether are Papists Heretiques?" "Whether are Anabaptists to be accounted as Heretikes?" "Whether be the Arminians Heretikes?" and finally "Whether are Lutherans Heretikes?" As to Papist he judges, "Papistry as it was confirmed by the Councell of Trent is a pernicious heresie." As to Anabaptist, it is interesting to see that he gives a rather mild judgment, "They are not properly heretikes as they simply doe deny the baptisme of children, althou that be an error not to be suffered in the Church, because by this error they overthrow not the foundation of Faith." As to Arminians, he judges that they are not properly a heresy, but a dangerous error which tends to a "Pelagian heresie." Notworthily he criticized Lutheran doctrine of "Ubiquitas" of Christ's human nature as a doctrine which cannot be relieved of the charge of heresy. The reason is, he says, because "that opinion doth directly overthrow the humanitie of Christ." Seeing that Lutherans adhere to this doctrine with sincerety, Ames says rather ironically, "they are to be accused rather of stupidity and fury, or of Schisme, then of Heresie."[68] Concerning magistrates' duty on the question of heresy, Ames holds traditional idea: "The place and office of a Magistrate requires, that he represse wicked men that trouble the Church, even with the sword, or with publike and externall power if there be need." It is also evident that he shared the same position with Bradshaw in this regard. There is a certain distance from this position to the modern idea of Toleration, here. It is admitted generally that there were some elements to give rise to pluralism and then to toleration in the position of Independency, insofar as it asserted the autonomy of a local church. This is true, to some degree. This position of freedom coupled with congregational way of church, had an important element in itself which would undermine the confessional unity of Church, if not openly allow the possibility of heresy.

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[67] Perkins defined virtue in this way: "Virtue is a gift of the Spirit of God and a part of regeneration, whereby a man is made apt to liue well." By this definition he rejected Aristoterian definition of virtue, saying "this I put in the first place, to confute the receiued errour of the wisest Heathen Philosophers which call vertue an habit of the minde, obtained and confirmed by custome, vse, and practice." But for the (cont.)

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Christians "virtue is a part of regeneration." Cf. Perkins, op. cit., p. 275

Ames' dfinition runs thus: "We ought to give all diligence to adde to our faith, Vertue, 2 Pet. 1, 5. Because the Word of God, whereby we are in speciall manner called upon for the performance of our duty, ought to be ingrafted within us, Iam. 1, 25. We ought to deliver up our selves unto the same Doctrine, as to a pattern, or mould, the likenesse of which is to be expressed in our hearts, Rom. 6, 17. Now this inward image and likenesse, is vertue." According to this definition, virtue is an acquired quality in man according to the pattern. The pattern is Christ. Therefore "we ought to be framed and fashoned after the Image of Christ. Col. 3. 10. In whom did dwell all the fullnesse of vertues." Cf. Ames op. cit., p. 63. It is plain that here is lost the Scholastic meaning of virtue. Virtue is not a completion of natural quality, but the quality of the new man to be clothed from above:"So we ought to put on the new man with his members, which properly are vertues."

To be sure, in spite of such an emphasis on "Liberty of Conscience" Independency still held firmly the position of truth, which by excluding untruth from truth, could hardly tend towards Toleration in modern sense. To quote from Cotton, "Liberty of Conscience is to be granted to men that fear God indeed, as knowing they will not persist in heresie, or turbulent schisme, when they are convinced in conscience of the sinfulnesse thereof."[69] Freedom of Conscience is for only godly men, or ultimately for the elect only. This is interesting in contrast to the Jesuit position, viz. freedom for the true church only. The position of truth was outwardly expressed in terms of "excommunication." Independency took this means for granted. Where is, then, the synthesis of the position of liberty and the position of truth? Independency found it in ethics, the godliness of "visible saints," that is to say, true freedom to be in godliness.

It is in this relation that the conception of church within the casuistic thought-realm should be made clear. Ames discusses the church in chapter XXVI of the fourth book, in which five questions are considered. The first question is, "Whether is a Beleever bound to joyne himselfe to some certaine particular Church?" He answers both from the side of God and from the side of man. Viewed from the side of God, man must joyn the church, for it is God's institution, where "God is in a singular manner present,"[70] so that there we would approach to God: the glory of God should be promoted through the church,

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[68] Ames, op. cit., Fourth Book, p. 12

[69] John Cotten, The Controversie concerning Liberty of Conscience in Matters of Religion. . . .(1649), p. 14

and also there we receive blessings. Viewed from the side of man, Christins joining the church by profession of faith are, there, distinguished from the unbelievers, and also there, fellowship is built in mutual edification. The more interesting and characteristic question is the second: "To what a kind of Church ought we to joyne our selves?" "To none but a true one," he answers, "that is, Professing the true Faith. Of true ones, we ought to chuse the purest as farre as we are able."[71] Here should be remembered what we have said about the position of truth, and then, proceeding to add as follows:

> Although we may joyne our selves to one, in which many defects are necessarily to be tollerated, yet not to one in which we must of necessity partake in any sinne, neither is ti lawfull to adjoyne our selves to any Church, with a minde, by our silence, to cherish any of its defects, but that (as farr as we may with edification) we may doe our endeavour to take them away.[72]

The position of truth, as we have said, is connected to the ethical tendency. This combination of the position of truth and the ethical tendency becomes clearer when we come to the third question: "Whether wee may communicate with such a Church, as doth tollerate the wicked, and oppose the good?" Let us reproduce at length his answer to this question which will clarify the point here concerned:

> The tollerations of any notorious crime, is a grievous sinne in a Church, and of it owne nature tends to the corruption of the Church. It doth pollute the Communion in it selfe, to these wicked ones who are tollerated, and to those also which are the causes of that tolleration. . . . That mixture which doth arise from this tolleration, doth diminish the consolation and edification of godly.[73]

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[70] Ames, op. cit., p. 61

[71] op. cit., p. 62

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

Nevertheless, it is because of this, that his position is called as "non-separatist Independency" or "the mediating position";[74] he distinguishes his position from a sharp separatist position of Browne:

> Yet from such a Church, in which some wicked men are tollerated, we must not presently separate, . . . First, because it may be the error or infirmity of the Church. Secondly, because patience and long-suffering is to be exercised toward a private brother offending, much more towards a whole society of Brethren, or a Church. Thirdly, because by the rash departure of the godly the correction of the evill ones is not promoted, but hindered. Fourthly, Because oft-times there cannot be a departure made from sucha Church, to one more pure, without grievous discommodities; which must be avoided as much as wee can, without sinne. . .[75]

Although later he made a concession as far as to say "If any one either wearied out with unjust vexations, or providing for his owne edification, or for a testimony against wickednesse, shall depart from such a Society to one more pure, without a condemnation of that Church which he leaves, he is not therefore to be accused of Schisme or of any sinne."[76] His was a more moderate and intercessory attitude compared with the Brownist position, which made it possible for the non-conformists to live within the Establishment. The power to conserve truth in the church is derived from the fact of church covenant. This point was treated in relation to the fourth question: "Whether it bee lawfull to continue in that church, where the power of removing Scandall, and purging out the wicked, is wanting?" He answered that such an authority and power is "contained in that covenant whereby Beleevers are ioyned into a Church."[77] Having this power, the church is at liberty to maintain truth and purity of herself, which is at once to maintain "Liberties which are granted to her by Christ," too. If the church herself cannot deal with the wickedness, then he allows recourse to the civil power, as we have already mentioned, and here it is made clear in relation to the first question. He writes:

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[74] Cf. Perry Miller, Orthodoxy in Massachusetts, pp. 73ff. and G. Nuttal, The Visible Saints, p. 10

> Humane institutions if they be extrinsecall to the Church and Worship, and make to the promotion of the Ordinances of Christ, and edification of the Church, then they ought to be admitted and approved, as Civill meanes used and applyed to spirituall ends.[78]

It is important to note the expression "if they be extrinsecall to the Church and Worship. . .," for this difference was what Independency held strictly, in line with Calvinist tradition as well as Lutheran tradition, and based on this presupposition he allowed a intervention of civil power as service to the Church. The modern idea of Toleration had to wait for the rise of the position of "love" over against the position of "truth," which later such a layman as Walwyn was to represent characteristically.

Dealing with the question of the calling of the minister, he gives one of the original expressions of congregational polity. To the question "Who are they which have the right and power of calling Ministers?" he gives such an answer as this:

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[75] Ames, op. cit., pp. 62-63

[76] Op. cit., p. 63

[77] Ibid.

[78] Op. cit., p. 64

> The chiefe right of calling is in Christ alone, who is the Head of the Church, the Author of the Ministrie, and the Lord of the Minsters. The delegated right cannot properly be in Diocesan, Bishops, or Patrons, or Magistrates; as such, because Christ who ordained the Ministery, hath prescribed nothing singular concerning those Orders, hath communicated no new right unto them, and hath left his Church well ordered without them. The deligated right belongs to that whole Church, which the Minister that is to be called must serve.[79]

Next, concerning the Sacraments, it is logical from the casuistic concern to put emphasis on the "preparation" for taking the Sacraments, especially the Lords Supper. No doubt, it is important for the partakers fully to discern the meaning of the Sacrament, but his emphasis goes to the human side in the preparation:

> The examination of our selves consists in a serious triall, whether we be so disposed that we may with fruit use this Sacrament, which now we discerne to be divine. The rule of this examination is the word of God, as it respects the institution of this Sacrament. . .
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> Now it is required, First, that we renew our repentance, both generally for all our sinnes, and specially, for sinnes lately committed, and still cleaving to us, or to which wee are most subject. Secondly, that wee stirre up in our selves an hunger and thirst after the grace of God in Christ, both for the pardoning and mortifying of those sinnes, and for the amendment and reforming of our life. Thirdly, that we doe like wise stirre up our faith to lay hold upon the promises of the Gospell. Fourthly, that with all humility, reverence, and devotion, we receive this Sacrament, as the seale of grace, and of Gods promises.[80]

After dealing with several questions, finally as the last one of the fourth book he treated with the question of the Lord's Day. In his mind there is noted a vital tendency of Puritan

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[79] Ames, ~~op. cit.~~, p. 68; in this relation Bradshaw's idea may be recalled: "They hould that it is as great an iniurie to force a congregation or Church to maintaine as their pastor, with tithes and such like donations, that person that either is not able to instruct them, or that refuseth in his owne person ordinarilie to doe it, as to force a man to maintaine one for his wiffe, that either is not a woman, or that refuseth in her (cont.)

Sabbatarianism. He writes:

> All those imployments which doe notably hinder a man from attending upon God and his worship, either publicke, or private, are regularly, and ordinarily unlawfull, from the end of this institution.[81]

He does not allow any difference between physical and mental (in his term, leberall) in the work, which as a whole was probibited for the sanctifying of the seventh day. "Those which belong to pleasure and recreation," he says, "if they be such as hinder from attending on God, are no lesse forbidden then ordinary labours."[82] "To make journeis" which conflicts with the observation of worship, "Faires, Markets, and labourious acts of traffique," are "repugnant to the sanctification of this day."[83] To avoid falling into Pharisaism, however, he admitted some cases to be excused from this principle, for example, physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries, and also magistrates and soldiers, who would serve incidentally either the sick, or the Commonwealth on the day of Sabbath. But he gave rules by which those cases should be decided, that is, first, "Present, or imminent necessitie, which is neither fained, nor sought of purpose, but is put upon us by the providence of God." Secondly, it should not be for "respecting gaine, or pleasure, as the end," that is to say, not by selfish cause but in respect of God and neighbours, without withdrawing the mind from God's worship. Ames was not a cold precisian, and even he admitted to have "the ordinary and modest delight of

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[80] Ames, op. cit., pp. 84-85

[81] Op. cit., pp. 95-96

[82] Op. cit., p. 96

[83] Ibid.

of life" on the Sabbath. "Because," he says, "the Ordinances of God which tend to the furthering of spirituall life doe not oppose the temporall."[84]

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[84] Cf. op. cit., pp. 96-97. Here Barth's criticism on Ames with respect to this point should be mentioned. In his Dogmatik III/4, S. 71, he criticized Ames that in his effort to give definite rules for the observance of the Sabbath, he fell in arbitrariness and inconsequency in between the principles and the exceptions. Moreover, pointing out Ames' teaching that servants cannot decide on the necessity of the work urgent, therefore they should obey the judgment given by their master, Barth levelled a serious criticism: "Man wird die gute Absicht dieser altreformierten Sabbatethik gewiss nicht verkennen, aber schon ihr so ausgesprochen auf die Bedürfnisse und Ansprüche der herrschenden Klassen zugeschnittender Charakter verrät doch deutlich: hier war man im Begriff, ein System von Menschengeboten an die Stelle des Gebotes Gottes zu setzen, und hier scheiterte man an diesem Unternehmen. Dass dieser Sonntag sich gegenüber dem dann bald genug anstürmenden modernen Säkularismus weder in den höheren noch in den niederen Kreisen der europäischen Menschheit halten konnte, ist nicht zu verwundern." (S. 71-72). But I think this criticism may not be accepted as it stands. Of course it is true, casuistic ethics by its priestly attitude comes down to the reality, so that it appears conservative. This priestly attitude should not be simply attacked in such a term, which is a commonplace of Barth when he criticizes his opponents, as "ein System von Menschengeboten an die Stelle des Gebotes Gottes zu setzen." Then, how much better can Barth's "Spezielle Ethik" speak than Ames' casuistry? In order to be faithful to his own dogmatic principle, did he not avoid to engage himself in what a paster should treat? In order to keep himself unsoild and clean, did he not escape from the responsibility as pastor to the questions brought from the church members? Which is difficult to decide, which is more pharisaistic, Ames or Barth? He wrote: "Was kann die Ethik in dieser Sache leisten? Eine für Christen und solche, die es werden oder wieder werden wollen, verbindliche Sonntagssitte order gar eine allgemein verbindliche Sonntags gesetzgebung in Vorschlag bringen? Solche Unternehmungen werden von der Kirche von Fall zu Fall zu prüfen, vielleicht anzuregen, vielleicht so oder so zu fördern und zu unterstützen sein. Ihr eigentlicher Beitrag zu Sonntagsfrage kann doch nurdie Verkündigung des Evangeliums, der Heilsgeschichte und Endgeschichte sein, die dann als solche auch zur Verkündigung des Feiertagsgebotes, zum Aufruf zu entsagendem Glauben an Gott in der konkreten Form der Feier dieses Tages werden wird." But he did attempt to give some concrete guidance,

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The fifth and last book concerns "the Dvties of Man towards his Neighbour." Compared with Perkins' third book, here a remarkable development in treating the question about human relationships is displayed. First of all, the starting-point is different: Perkins starts with the concept of virtue, while Ames with concept of right. For Perkins the perspective is more personal, while for Ames it is more social. Ames, it is important to note, viewed human relations from the presupposition of right, so that the discussion could meet the juristic aspect of life.

The definition of right, ius in latin, is not always new, but he seems to be indebted to Scholasticism. The ambiguity in definition of ius and lex is not cleared up yet. The triple concept, ius naturale, lex naturalis, and lex aeterna, appears to be conceived basically identically.[85] In the mediaeval theology, especially in Thomas, these concepts were conceived against the hierarchical background of society. It may be due to the loss of this background that Ames could not clarify the the difference between these concepts.

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and says: "Sie kann und soll aber dem rechten menschlichen Hören auf Gottes Gebot und so auch dem rechten menschlichen Gehorsam ihm gegenüber in Form einer Reihe von Fragen zu Hilfe kommen, die sich aus der Natur der Sache ergeben, deren Beantwortung sie freilich niemandem abnehmen kann, in deren eigener Beantwrotung sich aber jedermann darüber klar werden kann, auf was es beim rechten Hören gerade dieses Gebotes und bei einem rechten Gehorsam ihm gegenüber auf alle Fälle ankommen wird." (S. 72) To be sure, his guidance is interesting but doesn't it seem that he avoided the danger of casuistry only by less committing himself to the concrete problems. Should theology preserve its clean hand in the service of God in this way? Casuistry is one of the most dangerous enterprise of theology, but isn't it true the truth may be captured by risking this danger?

After giving the definition to the idea of ius, he proceeds to the discussion of justice in the second chapter. The concept of justice becomes a guiding principle for his casuistic thinking of human relations. Ames gave an enlarged definition to justice: "Justice is a Vertue whereby we are inclined to performe all due Offices to our neighbour."[86] A traditional (originally Aristoterian) definition said that Justice is "to give every man his due." By this principle he treated with various aspects of human relations, such as revenge, restitution, respect of persons, injury, charity, prayer for others, brotherly reproof, scandal, fame, or pride and envy, the relationship between parents and children, betweeen man and wife, etc. Man is viewed, in this book, from a different view-point, that is to say, as man in social relation under the principle of justice. This may be evident in such a saying as "acception or respect of persons, doth not consist in love of the Persons, ... /but in/ the externall or accidentall Person, . . ."[87]

We may describe some points selected according to our contemporary interest.

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[85] To avoid the terminological confusion, let us quote from Latin text: "Ius naturale, vel lex naturalis est eadem quae dici solet lex aeterna. Set aeterna dicitur, qutenus est in ipso Deo ab aeterno: naturalis autem quatenus indita est, & impressa naturae hominum ab authore anturae." De Conscientia, et eivs ivre, vel casibvs, (1654 edition) p. 267

[86] Op. cit., p. 110

[87] Op. cit., p. 123

First, about war, we read that the Puritans maintained the idea of just war, though there was an expressed hatred of war, "Warre by it selfe, nakedly and entirely considered is a kind of evill." There can be, however, a lawful war, if there is a just cause. What is, then, the just cause? Ames only negatively answered: "Now every light and small injury is not a just cause of Warre, . . . Nor doth a great and heynous injury warrant a Warre, unlesse after the triall of all meanes of peace."[88] Secondly he requires a just authority to wage war. In the case of defence, the authority is grounded upon natural law: "all men have authority by the Law of nature to defend themselves and to repell force by force."[89] But this ground does not immediately support the public war, in case of which a dutiful government must have right authority. Thirdly he requires "a right intention." This right intention is determined by the aiming at the glory of God, "not out of passion, or hatred, but out of zeale for Iustice."[90] Lastly, a just manner of wagingwar is required. This is determined insofar as Law of Nations, ius gentium, is not offended. In case a war is unjustly waged not only examination of cases is required of the prince and souldiers of the higher ranke, but also, he allowed, "soldiers of the lawer ranke, which are subjects to the Prince, making Warre, although in a cause manifestly unjust, they ought not to assist him."[91] And thus, "If they undertake such a Warre (which is appearently unjust), they offer violence to their owne consciences, and expose themselves to a great hazzard of doing the greates wrong that may bee unto other men."[92]

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[88] Op. cit.,p. 184

[89] Op. cit., p. 186

[90] Ibid.

[91] Op. cit., p. 187

Next, concerning marriage, it is interesting that Ames interpreted marriage in terms of contract. "Such a consent, is the immediate efficient cause of Matrimoniall conjunction, in so much, that it is not in the authority of any humane power to joyne and in marriage without both their consents."[93] The element of freedom is emphasized in this connection: "This consent must bee voluntary and free, else it is not esteemed a human consent."[94] This contractual conception of marriage was progressive, if not revolutionary, if it is viewed in the context of history. The remarkable points in the marriage custom of this day, according to Trevelyan's picture,[95] were, first, the younger age for marriage, and secondly, the family treaty rather than the personal contract. The progressive character of Ames' teaching shouldbbe interpreted against this background. In so doing, these words speak vividly: "A mutuall consent of the parties, is necessarily required to the essence of a conjugall state."[96] Romantic feeling was thus to be introduced into the marriage relation, although in tension with the Puritan sense of modesty and sobriety. This is significant in contrast with romantic feeling in chivalry during the Middle Ages which was a feeling in extra-marital relations. But Puritan contractual interpretation, it may be safely judged, opened up a channel to introdue it into marital relations.[97] "Such a consent is the immediate efficient cause of Matrimoniall conjunction, insomuch, that it is not in the authority of any humane power to joyne any in marriage without both their consents." "This consent ought to bee so declared by externall signes, that inward and harty consent doe manifestly appeare by them. . ." "Because in Wedlock, there is a mutuall surrender of bodies, and of power, and right over their mutuall bodies." "The first duty" of man and wife, "is a speciall love, . . ." and the second is "a speciall or conjugall honour," and the third "living together" which "containeth under it the ordinary use of the same house, table, and bed," and then "communication" of bodies, estates, outword goods, but finally the Puritan concluded his teaching on the duty of man and wife with this word, that "a Communion in the ordinary worship of God."[98]

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[92] Ames, op. cit., p. 188

[93] Op. cit., p. 187

[94] Op. cit., p. 188

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[97] Troeltsch has given an interesting account on the change in family ethic. Cf. Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus. . ., S. 30-31
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[98] Barth says regarding Ames' idea of marriage that "Gerade die Liebe aber spielt hier keine Rolle." (op. cit., S. 208) It is,however, not quite right. For, Ames used even such an expression "socialis & maxime intima dilectio" which ought to be between husband and wife. (De Conscientia, lib. V, p. 332) It is a great mistake to imagine that the Puritans had no tenderness in understanding marriage relation between man and woman. On the contrary, see for example, Thomas Gataker's A Good Wife Gods Gift published in 1623, or William Gouge's Of Domestical Duties published in 1622, or William Whately's A Bride Bvsh, Or, A Direction for Married Persons, published in 1623. There are more than positive affirmation of marriage; for example, Gataker
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When one interprets marriage in this way, the problem of divorce is to be viewed differently from Roman Catholicism. Ames did not take marriage as a sacramental unity. He thought of divorce as terminating a contract. This attitude is made

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(cont.) says according to Proverbs 19, 14: "A good Wife is Gods gift. . . . Gods prouidence is more speciall in a Wife than in wealth." "The woman was Gods owne gift to Adam. And shee was Gods gift bestowed on him, to consummate and make vp his happinesse." (p. 9) Capturing the truth of free contract, he says, "they cannot lincke hearts as they list. A father may finde out a fit wife, and thinke such a one a meet match for his Sonne: and her Parents may be also of the same minde with him, as willing to entertaine the motion as hee is to make it; and yet it may be, when they have done all they can, they cannot fasten their affections. As Faith, so Loue cannot bee constrained." (p. 11, underline is mine.)

Gouge admitted freely the importance of "mutual liking" as the beginning towards marriage: "Mutuall loue and good liking of each other is as glue." "If they be ioyned together without glue, or shaken while the glue is moist, they cannot remaine firme." (p. 197) But he attempted to guide man not run into unlawful love affair, and says "Too eager and hasty pursuing after marriage, a brutish thing." (ibid.) Marriage should be begun with the mutual liking, but it should be consummated in the marriage-covenant, covenant which is ultimately "Gods Covenant". Based on this idea of God's covenant, the marriage is founded on the more objective ground than to be simply humane contract, although this objective ground is different from Romish sacramental interpretation. Thus grounded the marital relationship makes for a symbol of the mystery between Christ and Church: "Hereby man and wife who intirely, as they ought, loue one another, haue an euident demonstration of Christs loue to them. For as parents by that affection which they beare to their children, may better discerne the minde, and meaning of God towards them, then such as neuer had childe, so may maried persons better know the disposition of Iesus Christ, who is the spouse of euery faithfull soule, then single persons." (p. 211) Thus, married life is more privileged than celibacy. Whately's guidance is more intimate and frank: in his teaching matrimonial love is in no conflict with spiritual love as had been in the mediaeval ethos. "Where loue is abundant it makes a supply of all other wants." (p. 31) For the Christian couple, matrimonial love is bound with spiritual love, yet both should be distinguished: "Are we bound to marry in the Lord, and shall not our marriage be seasoned with loue in the Lord?" (p. 36) But "Spiritualnesse of loue, is a common property to that loue that is due to all men; . . . But the loue of husband and wife

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clear in his discussion on adultery. To the question, "Whether or no Adultery committed, doe onely nullifie the use, or the bond too of Matrimony?" he answered, "It is cleare, that the bond it selfe is nullified. First, Because the very essence of the contract, is directly violated, Now the contract ceasing, the bond grounded upon the contract doth necessarily cease."[99]

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to each other, should differ from all the other loues. . . a man must loue his wife aboue all the creatures in the world besides: so must the woman her husband: next to the louing God, and our Lord Iesus Christ. . . The loue of the married must be a singular loue, causing a man to account his wife the only woman in the world. . . (pp. 37-40) He treats even such a case as this: "A man may lawfully thinke another woman, a better woman, and more vertuous than his owne wife: but not loue the person of another more vertuous woman, aboue the person of his owne lesse vertuous; and so likewise may I say of the wife towards the husband." (p. 41) Under such a title as "Shewing the means of attaining loue," his main point is the emphasis on "the cohabitation": "let them haue one house, one table, one chamber, one bed, so shall they with most ease haue also one heart and one soule." (p. 42)

These illustrations may give us a totally different picture than that ordinary imagined. Puritans were more liberal and understanding to the human conditions. Generally speaking the feeling of love thus allowed and emphasized made marriage happier and healthier. This element may be interestingly compared the feeling in Shakespeare's dramas, or generally in the English Renaissance.

[99] Such a contractual conception, to be sure, prepared the way for Milton's thought on divorce. Milton's tract The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce,(1643). Milton rejected the Cannon Law conception, or otherwise, the sacramental conception of marriage. Of course these interpretations were firmly based upon the words of Jesus Christ, so he had to meet this point. "What thing more instituted to the solace and delight of man then marriage and yet the mis-interpreting of some scripture directed mainly against the abusers of the Law for divorce giv'n them by Moses, hath changed the blessing of matrimony not seldome into a familiar and co-inhabiting mischiefe; at least into a drooping and disconsolate houshold captivitie, without refuge or redemption. So ungovern'd and so wild a race doth super-
(cont.)

Two things may be suggested in this relation, first the problem of divorce became serious because of the contractual interpretation of marriage, and secondly because Romantic-idealistic feeling was imported into the contractually conceived marriage.

After all it is rather one-sided, however, if we observe in Ames' idea of marriage a progressive tendency only. There are some conservative elements commingled with this progressive element. The emphasized position of free contract was reconciled with the idea of paternal system of the family, and also with the idea of the superiority of man over woman. Woman is finally placed under the authority of parents, especially of the father, in the matter of marriage.[100] Despite a rejection of a compelled consent by fear, he admitted such a fear, "which is not violent, but reverentiall, such a feare as proceeds from a reverence towards Parents," does not nullify the consent.[101]

(cont.)
stition run us from one extreme of abused libertie into the other of unmercifull restraint." (p. 2) And he attempted to reinterpret Jesus' words, "our Saviours words touching divorce, are as it were congeal'd into a stony rigor, inconsistent both with his doctrine and his office, and that which he preacht onely to the conscience, is by cannonicall tyranny snatcht into the compulsive censure of a judiciall court. . .(p. 3) He gave his doctrine of divorce as follows: "That indisposition, unfitnes, or contrariety of mind, arising from a cause in nature unchangable, hindring and ever likely to hinder the main benefits of conjugall society, which are solace and peace, is a greater reason of divorce then naturall frigidity, especially if there be no children, and that there be mutuall consent." (p. 5) This doctrine, it should be noted, was based upon the theory of covenant. "Mariage is a covenant the very beeing whereof consists, not in a forc'd cohabitation, and counterfeit performance of duties, but in unfained love and peace." (p. 11) The idea of revocability of covenantal relation was the basis of his doctrine of divorce. This has a peculier implication to the theory of revolution of the Puritans in 1640s. The revolutionary theory was established upon the social contract, and Milton's divorce theory was upon the contractual interpretation of marriage.

As to the superiority of husband, he elsewhere explained:

> Hee ought in all things to beare himselfe, as the head of his wife; and hence first, Hee ought to excell in knowledge and prudence, that so hee may rightly give example, governe, and direct the Wife depending upon him . . .[102]

The relationship between husband and wife retained the element of government. This was commonly shared by the Puritans. Especially to wife an ethic of obedience was still appropriate, but not an ethic of fellowship which is more acceptable to modern family ethic. In the later democratic society there disappeared a vertical element.

Dealing with every aspect of human life, Puritanism by means of casuistry could get in touch with life itself. Thus, Puritanism was gaining English life. In this way Puritanism permiated into the deep strata of English society.

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[100] Ames wrote, "Nay after the consent of the parties, it is left in the choyce of the Father, whether hee will give his Daughter or no to him that hath laine with her." op. cit., p. 202.

[101] Op. cit., p. 201

[102] Op. cit., p. 156

IV. Problem of Casuistry Left Unsolved

Casuistry was, as has been said, the type of ethics which was most characteristic to the Puritan movement under politically difficult condition during the time from the failure in the concealed revolutionary ethics in Tudor Puritanism to the explicit revolutionary ethics in the Puritanism of the Civil Wars. The Puritanism of the Admonistion Controversy had an aim, though concealed, to reform the church and state by political means according to what the Puritans had been impressed with the Reformed Church, especially in Geneva. But the casuistic Puritanism, it is remarkable to note, turned their zeal to a different object, viz. the reformation of "life." The former reformation was of the ecclesio-political level, whereas the latter of more personal-ethical level. This change would mean the internalization, or individualization, of the Puritan movement.

We must observe, however, that this change was of decisive importance in view of future development of English life and thought. Through this self-transformation, English Puritanism established itself uniquely within English society, and assumed a defintie character which distinguished itself from the orthodox international Calvinism. Cartwright's Puritanism was not greatly different from the Genevan Calvinism, nor from Scotch Presbyterianism. But the casuistic Puritanism made itself deeply "indigenous" in English soil, and thus made itself different from the other Reformed bodies. Individualism, the category of majority, empiricism, etc., which are most characteristic of the English Ethos, were given more definite forms in this movement of the casuistic Puritanism. The Puritanism certainly won the battle with Jesuitism and Anglicanism in this casuistic field.

The English Puritans had to creat new life out of the preached Word by means of casuistry. The Scotch Presbyterians succeeded in reforming the institution according to the Word. This caused a difference in many points between both parties. But when the Puritans turned to preaching and casuistry, they did so without any firm doctrinal statement, such as creed and authorized cathechism. To be sure, they had the Bible, but the Bible itself was no longer interpreted simply as Luther and other Reformers thought to be able to elicit one single meaning out of loci of the Scriptures.[103] A pragmatic and casuistic reading of the Bible was to lead to a subjectivistic acceptance of the texts, and to a neglect of the need for an objective summing up of the doctrines according to the Bible. When the Puritans found themselves successfully indigenous in the society, when they caught the life of Englishmen, they had lost a doctrinal unity of themselves.

The result was to be revealed in the confusion of the idea of "reformation" among the Puritans, or in the difficulty of formulating doctrinal unity at the Westminster Assembly. The Englishmen under the influence of casuistic Puritanism had been learning a reformation of life, rather than a reformation of institutional church. When the idea of reformation was introduced to England from Scotland in terms of the Solemn League and Covenant, this confusion emerged on the surface. The Scots idea of reformation was a theologically well delineated idea which meant a reformation in terms of total national engagement under the guidance of the divines and the Christian magistrates. Such a reformation may have been understood in England only by a certain group of theological ministers of orthodox Reformed type. To be sure, an Independent such as Philip Nye was a chief mediator of this Covenant, but it is questional whether he interpreted it as meant theologically by the Scots.[104]

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[103] For example, an English reformer Tyndale did not anticipate the problem which was to arise later, but only insisted on its reformational significance: "some, /say/ that it is not lawful for the lay-people to have it in their mother-tongue; some, that it would make them all heretics; as it would, no doubt, from many things which they of long time have falsely
(cont.)

Concerning political attitude of the casuistic Puritans, it is obvious that there appeared a conservative tendency in this change in Puritan movement. But here we must ask whether is it true that Puritanism had ceased to be revolutionary? Did it not hope for a reformation of the whole nation which should begin with a reformation of individual life and which should be grounded on a reformed life? Did the Puritans not, otherwise, cast their hope of reformation into an eschatolo-

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(cont.) taught; and that is the whole cause wherefore they forbid it, though they other cloaks pretend: . . ." Cf."The Preface of Master William Tyndale, That he made before the Five Books of Moses, called Genesis" The Doctrinal Treatises and Introductions to Different Portions of the Holy Scriptures, (The Parker Society, Cambridge, 1848) pp. 392-397

[104] See p.308ff of this thesis.

future? It is quite thinkable that although they turned toward an ethical reformation, yet their original hope of national total reformation survived, even though in modified form. In the mind of a party such as the Independents and the Baptists, it is quite likely that the national total reformation was combined with an eschatological hope. This eschatological element was one of the most important elements in Puritanism during the Civil Wars.[105] Here appeared a tendency, which we can find above all among the Independents and the Baptists, a tension between ethical realism (casuistry) and eschatological idealism (millenarianism), tension which was never easily explained theologically. This characteristics was deeply rooted in the age of Puritan "underground" movement.

We must turn our attention to the fact that despite the change towards political conservativism the revolutionary element of Puritanism was not extinguished nor concealed completely. (Therefore James I's suspicion of Puritanism as dangerous as Jesuitism may be justified.) To be sure, the most Puritans were, since the failure of political reformation, keeping themselves from open collision with the Establishment. Such an effective leader as John Downame was certainly "conservative" politically. His "Christian Warfare" was no more than a "spiritual" battle with Devil and flesh. Preston, in his Fast Day Sermon, one of the few published in 1620s, preached: "Mourn, weep for our sin, in this day of fasting, and seek reconciliation with God renewing Covenant with God! The sin of England is idolatory from which the nation is not yet fully turned. So, God is very angry with this nation. How this nation can escape from God's wrath? What is the remedy?" Preston's answer is noteworthy: "the way to turne away the Lords anger is zeal, for his sake."[106] He did not say, unlike the Tudor Puritans, that it was the further reformation of Church of England; he did not use a political term, but a psychological term, remarkably. "Zeal" was not a political action for reformation, but a psychologically high quality in the sight of God! This is only one of the examples to show the change from outward political concern to inward spiritual concern. The word "reformation" was used, yet its meaning was no longer the same as what the Puritans of the Admonition Controversy meant. The term "zeal" became rather a substitute for "reformation."

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[105] Mr. John F. Wilson's forth-coming study (as a Th.D. thesis at the Union Theological Seminary in New York) will clarify this important aspect of Puritanism. An eschatological tendency was evident everywhere during the Civil War. As to an eschatological interpretation of reformation, it may be interesting to quote
(cont.)

Therefore, this change might have meant a compromise, a withdrawal (to the internal realm of life), or even "holy pretense."[107] But such a conservative side should not be emphasized

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(cont.)
from Milton than from theologians or ministers, for it may show how deeply this tendency was existing and prevailing even among the lay Christians: "Now once again by all concurrence of signs, and by the generall instinct of holy and devout men, as they daily and solemnly expresse their thoughts, God is decreeing to begin some new and great period in his Church, ev'n to the reforming of Reformation it self: what does he then but reveal Himself to his servants, and as his manner is, first to his English-men; I say as his manner is, first to us, though we mark not the method of his counsels, and are unworthy. Behold now this vast City; a City of refuge, the mansion house of liberty, encompast and surrounded with his protection; the shop of warre hath not there more anvils and hammers waking, to fashion out the plates and instruments of armed Justice in defence of beleaguer's Truth, then there be pens and heads there, sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and idea's wherewith to present, as with their homage and their fealty the approaching Reformation: . . ." Areopagitica, (1644) p. 31

onesidedly, for throughout the casuistic tendency of Puritanism there was a continuing element, pointing towards the future revolution. In all the causistic conservative tendency, the most revolutionary element was the idea of freedom of conscience. For example, we read such a revolutionary idea of freedom of conscience being inserted in the conservative and traditional account of the relation between magistrates and subjects in Ames's De Conscientia. The power of magistrates, Ames explains in conservative tendency, is "the greatest of humane powers," "the institution of God," etc. The chiefe care of the magistrate ought ~~to be~~ "that hee promote true Religion, and represse impiety. . .", and they ought to "further and promote the externall care of happinesse of his subjects, . . ." and so forth. the subjects ought to pray for them, to give them honour, and obedience.[108] Nevertheless, even though he did not give open account for the doctrine of resistance, he wrote:

> Nothing but the law of God doth properly, directly, immediately, and by it selfe bind the conscience: First, Because the Conscience or Soule of man, is not properly subject to any, but God alone. Secondly, Because the onely rule of our conscience, is the Law of God written in our hearts. Thirdly, Because man cannot indeed judge of the conscience. Fourthly, Because they cannot inflict any spirituall punishment upon the conscience.[109]

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[106] Preston, The Saints Qvalification, A Sermon Preached at a Generall Fast before the Commons House of Parliament, July 2, 1625, p. 235

[107] Cf. George L. Mosse, "Puritan Political Thought and the 'Cases of Conscience'" Church History XXIII (1954) 109, also his The Holy Pretence, a study in Christianity and reason of state from William Perkins to John Winthrop, (Oxford, 1957)

[108] Ames, op. cit. Book V, pp. 164-166

[109] Op. Cit., pp. 106-107

This is the point to which we must pay our attention. Making clear this point we are to answer one of the questions which we have raised in the Introduction, that is, concerning the transition from Luther's "evangelical liberty" to civil liberty. Our answer is this, that Puritan casuistry had contributed to this transition. To be exact, it is the casuistic method, the method of conscience, that contributed to this change, but on the other hand casuistic system, or casuistic practices, had contributed to the "indigenization." Thus, in the midst of the indigenization, a revolutionary element had grown. Casuistic Puritanism, therefore, should not be one-sidedly interpreted either as conservative or as revolutionary. In order to clarify this point, we must return to Perkins, who made clear the locus of conscience as follows:

> The naturall condition or propertie of every mans conscience, is this: that in regard of authoritie and power, it is placed in the middle betweene man and God, so as it is under God, and yet above men. And this natural condition hath two parts: the first is, the subjection of conscience to God and his Word. Concerning which subjection we have this rule: That God alone by his Word doth onely bind the conscience, by causing it in every action either to excuse for well doing, or accuse for sin. And this God doth properly. For first he is the onely Lord of the Conscience which created it, and governes it. 2. Againe, hee is the onely Law-giver, that hath power to save or destroy the soule, for the keeping and breaking of his Lawes, Iames 4. 12. 3. And further, mans conscience is knowne to none, besides himselfe, but God: (1 Cor. 2. 11) And it is God onely that gives libertie to the conscience, in regard of his owne lawes. . .[110]

The locus of conscience was thus made clear, but the importance will be discovered rather in how this conscience is related to the positive laws. The shift from Luther's evangelical freedom to civil liberty may be clearly seen in that point. Perkins continues writing:

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[110] Perkins, The Whole Treatise, p. 27

> Vpon this it followeth, that no mans commandement or law can of it selfe, and by it owne sovereigne power bind conscience, but doth it only by the authoritie & virtue of the written Word of God, or some part therof.[111]

Being combined immediately with God and His Word, conscience begins to gain a political significance. The freedom of conscience comes to imply a political freedom. When conscience is elevated so high, that every facet of human life and society is subjected to the Word of God through conscience, casuistry by its method of conscience becomes able to rule the life of nation. In the practise of casuistry the Puritans could be conservative and self-adjusting, yet the method of casuistry itself was by implication revolutionary. For the position of conscience could conflict with monarchical Absolutism.

Perkins' position was taken over by Ames; Ames wrote:

> From hence it appeareth that the perfect andonly rule of Conscience is the revealed will of God, whereby a mans duty is both shewne and commanded. . . Hence it is that the Law of God onely doth bind the Conscience of man. By the Law of God we understand that revealed wil of God, whereof we have made mention: viz. as it doth also containe those things which are commanded in the Gospell.[112]

Ames, as has been seen, employed the term "Synteresis" for understanding of conscience. The immediate subjection of conscience to the will of God and natural law becomes apparent in Synteresis. The freedom of conscience is a freedom of judgment according to synteresis. But this in no more than an articulation of his teacher's position. "The Conscience," said Ames, "is immediately subject to God, and his will, and therefore it cannot submit it selfe unto any creature without Idolatry."[113]

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[111] Perkins, op. cit., p. 27

[112] Ames, op. cit., Book One, p. 5

This immediate connection of conscience with God Himself leads to this conclusion with regard to the relation to human positive laws: Ames admitted that human laws are to be observed "out of conscience towards God." Because God has constituted this power and order, and has enjoined us to yield obedience and subjection to the human laws, a rebellious disobedience towards the human laws is sin against God. Nevertheless, Ames met the possibility that there can be unjust laws in the world. He wrote:

> Other humane Lawes, because they may bee either just, or unjust, or partly just, and partly unjust, and that by reason of the efficient matter, former or end, or in respect of this or that subject, or adjunct, therefore they doe not so absolutely bind, as that every violation of any of them should inferre a mortall sinne.[114]

The problem which is really serious, lies right here. Is unjust law a law? Must man obey such an unjust law at the cost of conscience? He continues to write:

> The violation then of such or such a Law, which is purely humane, is not any speciall kind of sinne, in respect of the matter of Law, but is onely so farre forth a sinne, as it breakes the Law of generall obedience; . . .[115]

He did not openly seek to free man from general obdience to the human laws, nor did he wish to subject man to unjust laws.

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[113] Ames, op. cit., p. 5

[114] Op. cit., p. 167

[115] Ibid.

He suggested that man look to the intention of the Lawgiver, and of the law itself, which "is always just, right and the common good." 116 And, it is important to see, he finally comes to this point:

> In all doubtfull cases, wee must presume upon the justice and equity of the Law, and the moderate intention thereof, or else upon the obliging force it beareth.[117]

Through this way he returned to assert freedom of conscience.

This is naturally to be related with the question of resistance. The position did not seem primarily revolutionary as expressed by Perkins:

> subjection is indeed to bee performed to civill authoritie ordained by God, and obedience also to the Lawes of the Magistrate for feare of wrath, and for avoiding of punishment, but not for conscience of the said authoritie or lawes properly or directly, but for conscience of Gods commandement, which appointeth both Magistracy, and the authority thereof.[118]

Observing carefully this text, we find a unique interpretation of Rom. 13, 5. viz. "for conscience sake." He grasped the meaning of it from the point of view that he put conscience to immediate subjection to God. This is a reservation which would leave a grave influence for the future. He said, "This is it that bindes the conscience immediately: the vertue of a Superiour law, whereby it standeth in force, namely the Law of God."[119] Insofar as human laws partake the Law of God, they can bind conscience: "those humane Laws," said Ames following to his teacher, "which doe either urge or declare the Divine,

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[116] Ames, op. cit., p. 168,

[117] Op. cit., p. 169

[118] Perkins, op. cit., p. 27

[119] Ibid.

or doe directly further the conservation thereof, doe even the conscience, and the reason is because such Lawes, in that respect doe partake the nature, and force of the Divine Law."[120] It is important to note the possibility of conflict between Divine Law and human laws, here. It is in case of this conflict to occur that this teaching becomes revolutionary.

Therefore, the matter is how can this conflict be discerned? It is by conscience, by any means. Conscience is able to do it, this was a belief of the Puritan casuists. If conscience confuse tyrant and lawful king, such a conscience, Ames called, is "conscientia errans." "If one do verily believe he is his Prince, that is in truth a Tyrant; or that he is a lawfull Magistrate, who indeed usurpes the title; he is bound to yeeld due obedience unto him."[121] But if conscience is rightly held, we do not confound the lawful with the unlawful. Thus, he allowed to take a "passive resistance": "Hence, there may bee subjection, where there is not obedience, as in the humble denying of obedience, when that which is commanded by the Superiour, is manifestly unlawfull." This is, so far, yet a position of "passive resistance," but it may be observed here, that what already stated in Calvin was being brought to more articulate position, handing it over to the revolutionary Puritans of the Civil Wars. The "active resistance" was easily to be turned out from this position. The revolutionary Puritans placed themselves on this position of conscience.

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[120] Ames, op. cit., p. 166

[121] Op. cit., p. 9

Winding up what we have discussed so far, let us repeat that the clarification of the locus of conscience in Puritan casuistry rendered an important influence upon Puritan self-consciousness in terms of freedom of conscience. Freedom of conscience was not merely religious but political. This clarification of the locus of conscience contributed to the shift from Luther's evangelical freedom to Puritan civil liberty. Dr. Niebuhr analysed this point in his usual sharpness:

> Even the Protestant Reformation, which rebelled against the authoritarian church, did little to vindicate the right of the individual against the state. Luther's ideal of "evangelical" liberty was religiously potent but politically irrelevant because it did not challenge the authority of the state over conscience of the individual. It wasn't until Milton interpreted the well-known words of Scripture "Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's" to mean "My conscience I have from God and I can therefore not give it to Caesar" that the religious ideal became relevant to political and civil liberty.[123]

We may be able to endorce this judgment with what we have made clear. In order to **bring** Protestant religious idea of liberty to its political relevance, it must be connected with the idea of liberty of conscience. Then, casuistic method making the locus of conscience clear, that is to say, being subject only to God and Natural Law, it gains a political meaning. We must assert the significance of Puritan casuistry to the development from Luther's evangelical freedom to Milton's liberty of conscience. In other words, between Luther and Milton, there stand Perkins and Ames.

Yet we should not stop at this point, for the shift from evangelical to civil liberty did involve a more complex problem.

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[123] Reinhold Niebuhr, Pious and Secular America, pp. 68-69

Let us turn our eyes to the fact that it was more or less by accidence than by necessity that Puritan casuistry was to contribute to the shift from evangelical freedom to civil liberty. There is a fact that a casuistry could act otherwise. Take Jeremy Taylor's casuistry for example, it gave, obviously, a contrary interpretation to the freedom of conscience. His casuistic work Dvctor Dvbitantivm, or the Rule of Conscience, which was a casuistry for the Restoration, first published in 1660, was to eliminate all political implication from Christian liberty. He wrote, "For our liberty is not a Carnal liberty, but it is a spiritual. If a slave be called to Christianity, he is the Lords freed-man, but not Mans, he is still a servant and commanded to abide in it, if in that he be called."[124] The idea of liberty was brought back again to the internal, spiritual realm of life. Thus, ~~as~~ he explained further, "truly and plainly the liberty that the Apostles speak of is but a freedom from the dominion of sin, and a freedome from the terrors and obligation of the Law."[125] Finally, a sense of "duty" is connected with "freedom," so that, "a freedom of duty." It is to be an "obedient subject." "Christ hath set us free," is immediately followed by, "but yet be servants of Christ."[126] And he strongly asserted, "Christian Liberty does not warrant disobedience to human Laws, or liberty from their obligation."[127]

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[124] Jeremy Taylor, Dvctor Dvbitantivm, p. 17

[125] Op. cit., p. 18

[126] Op. cit., p. 18

[127] Op. cit., p. 19

That is to say, we cannot say that the shift from evangelical liberty to civil liberty was wrought "theoretically" by logic of casuistic method in general. It is rather "historical" than "theoretical" that Puritan casuistry contributed to this change. This shift was so deeply bound with historical character of Puritan casuistry. We must recall the fact that the Puritans entered into casuistic field without general acceptance by the church and people of the Puritan religious principle. It was, therefore, the Puritan casuistry developed as an application of Puritan religious principles that moved spiritual evangelical liberty towards civil and political relevance.

In view of Taylor's casuistry which gave direction otherwise, we envisage the problem underlying casuistry, problem of principle. Setting aside the problem of principle, the Puritans entered into casuistry, but this problem had to emerge again. It was the case during the Civil Wars. A question of principle, in other words, a question of "Weltanschauung," is one which casuistry as in the technical level of application cannot solve. For the establishment of the idea of civil liberty, therefore, the problem of "Weltanschauung" had to be envolved, ultimately. So that the shift did not occur as a smooth development, but rather through a serious decision in the level of Weltanschauung. At the beginning of the Civil War, there emerged a case of conscience with which mere casuistry could hardly deal. For it envolved the question of principle. Fern, a most articulate leader, stated this case as follows:

> Whether upon such a supposition or Case, as is now usually made (The King will not discharge his trust but is bent or seduced to subvert Religion, Laws, and Liberties) Subjects may take Arms and resist?

The early years of the Civil War revolved around this case. The Puritans were again to deal with the question of principle, which they could not do openly for decades of their movement since the failure in political reformation. Though Ames could say that it is erroneous conscience to confound the lawful with the unlawful magistrate, yet who, by what standard, can judge which is true, which is erroneous conscience? Fern wrote "To all Misse-led People in this Land" as follows:

> . . . yet is this a time for every man to inform and speak his Conscience; and as many of you as shall read me in this Book, will, I hope, conceive, I had no other purpose in the publishing of it, then to give testimony to the Truth for the directing of your Conscience & the discharge of mind owne. . . . I must speak for Truth and Conscience sake, from which neither King nor Parliament should make us swerve.[128]

And thus he stood for the King for conscience' sake. The situation was not one which could be dealt with simply in terms of "conscience." As Henry Parker said, "'Tis a bitter controversy that our poore sinfull Nation is fallen upon, wherein not onely Armes are ingaged against Armes, but Bookes written against Bookes, and Conscience pretended against Conscience."[129] Puritan casuistry created a new life for Englishmen, and Puritanism could live on this basis. But, it could not establish itself as a universal religion for the English nation as a whole, only gaining a certain number of adherents. To be sure, by means of preaching and casuistic preaching Puritanism grew powerful among the people of Puritan ethos. The Puritan political and even military movement was now able to rely on the power which arose from deep strata of men's way of life, and on this point Puritanism of the 1640s was quite different from Puritanism of Elizabethan age which could hardly expect this sort of power from the people.

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[128] Fern, The Resolving of Conscience, (1642), To the Reader.

This case of conscience, as stated by Fern, was to break through the surface of casuistic ethics. Not only did it divided politics, but it reached to the depth of religious life, of Weltanschauung, even dividing conscience. This question, "which is truth?" was to involve the question of Weltanschauung, and so the English Civil Wars were "total" wars as Goodwine described it:

> Let not our Lives, our Liberties, our Estates, be at all precious or deare unto us in this behalfe, to expose them, be it unto the greatest danger, to prevent the certaine and most unquestionable ruine of them otherwise: Let us resolve to put all into the hands of God, to prevent the falling of all, or any thing, into the hands of these men. There is neither man nor woman of us, neither young nor old, but hath somewhat or other, more or lesse, a Mite or two at least to cast into the Treasury of the Publike safety. Men that have strength of body for the War, and fingers that know how to fight, let them to the Battell, and not feare to look the enemy in the face. Men and women that have only Purses and Estates, let them turne them into men and swords for the Battell. Men that have heads, but want armes and hands for outward execution, let these study and contrive methods and wayes of proceedings: Head-worke is every whit as necessary in such a time and exigent, as hand-work is. They that have neither hands, nor heads, nor estates, let them finde hearts to keep the Mountain of God, to pray the enemies downe, and

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[129] I owe this quotation to Dr. Haller's Rise of Puritanism p. 364

> the Armies of the Lord up: Let them finde tongue-service wherein women also may quit themselves like men, whose prayers commonly are as masculine, and doe as great and severe execution, as the prayers of men.[130]

He counted even children as able to cooperate for this cause. The truth had to be decided through such a total engagement of men who shared the same interest. "Redeeme your lives with your lives, your estates with your estates, your Religion with your Religion, out of the hands of those men, set them all to work for their own maintenance and preservation!"[131] Thus breaking through the level of casuistic solution, and the truth being not a stable presupposition, the matter appeared to go beyond good and evil, the concept of good being replaced by the conept of value.

Therefore, the shift from Luther's evangelical liberty to Puritan civil liberty, it must not be neglected, was one which was ultimately supported by historic decision, rather than logical necessity. Such was an ethical situation in which the idea of civil liberty emerged on the surface of history of civilization.

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[130] John Goodwine, Anti-Cavalierisme, (1642) p. 4

[131] Ibid.

Chapter III

Revolutionary Puritan Ethics during the Civil War

- History and Ethics -

Revolutionary ethics was a form of Puritan ethical thought during the Civil Wars. Here it began to disclose a different and deeper dimension of ethical problem than casuistry. Casuistry by its nature presupposes a set of principles, on the basis of which it attempts to deal with a particular case. Usually the Scriptures and natural law were taken as the constituitive principles of casuistry. Casuistry should not simply be judged a static and legalistic ethics; for a good casuistry takes a more dynamic form of counteraction between the principles and the reality, insofar as it makes a selection of principles in view of particular cases. Yet it is true that casuistry is impossible without the presupposition of a set of principles, and if the principles as such be questioned, casuistry is immediately threatened. Fern stated such a case at the beginning of the Civil War. It was one which pointed to a deeper dimension of the ethical problem than casuistry, and which was a question of principle, not one of application. Faced with this deeper question, casuistic ethic was bankrupt. The principles as such had to be contended. Whether a principle which gives guidance to a case is right or not, first had to be decided. This decision is not a sort of casuistic selection of a principle, but a more systematic one which has to do with the basis of the principle. The problem of ethics at the beginning of the Civil War had reached this depth.

What does it mean, that the principle must be established by a "decision"? Is it not true that the principle must exhibit its appropriateness by its own intrinsic necessity? Isn't the principle true because of its universal validity, regardless of man's acceptance? Isn't the principle archetype according to which man's conduct should be moulded? To be sure, such a conception was accepted from the age of Greek city-state to the Middle Ages of Christendom. It was conceived according to cosmo-ontological *Weltanschauung*. The truth of morals was regarded as being rooted in the structure of being itself, viz. natural law, and so there was no need of decision; inclination for the acceptance of moral truth was sufficient. But we must observe the fact that even ontology is subject to "history." When the medieval morld was passing away, the ontological basis of morals was being undermined, although this did not become immediately apparent. Here was a shift in the foundation for conscientious living; now the principles as such had to be chosen! There was emerging "another" basis for morals, and this basis was conceived by a different *Weltanschauung* from the medieval ontological *Weltanschauung*. It was a "historical"

Weltanschauung which orginated in the Reformed theology, and above all in Calvin. This view of history was expressed in terms of "Providence," and the covenant was viewed as that event by virtue of which the world was grasped as purposive. The Calvinist interpreted "Providence" not, as is usually done, as"foreseeing" but as "providing." Calvin himself gave an activistic meaning to Providence. He wrote: "providence consists in action; for it is ignorant trifling to talk of mere prescience."[1] And thus, the Thomistic ontological Weltanschauung was characteristically contrasted from the Calvinistic "historical" Weltanschauung. This difference existed already behind that case of conscience. It became increasingly apparent that Calvinism offered a possibility of the reinterpretation of morals from a different orientation. A problem which was disclosed by that case of conscience was illumined by this difference in Weltanschauung.

The "providential" view of history, based on the belief in God's government of history, is able to render meaning to something new which happens in history. It can give meaning to contingency, which for the ontological scheme is embarrassing if not meaningless. An ontological Weltanschauung, therefore, is more compatible with a peaceful, settled society, but a historical Weltschauung can deal with change in history. For it is God who "provided" a new thing to men. When Ethics is accomodated to this historical Weltanschauung, it can respond to God's providence in history: viz. ethics can realize what God provides. Thus ethics is able to function in history as a formative power. Behind that case of conscience, this Reformed Weltanschauung differed from the Anglicans' which revived and modified some elements of the Thomistic tradition.

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[1] Calvin, Institutes, I, xvi, 5; cf. ibid, "Let the readers know that what is called providence describes God, not asidly beholding from heaven the transactions whichhappen in the world, but as holding helm of the universe, and regulating all events. Thus it belongs no less to his hands than to his eyes."

Therefore, in this connection we are going to deal with the last and most important question which we raised in the Introduction: viz. the shift from Natural Law to Natural Right. For this shift is fundamentally based on the difference in Weltanschauung. The medieval concept of Natural Law is supported, as Thomas typically represented it, by cosmic ontology. Our question, therefore, is how this medieval Natural Law was transmuted to modern Natural Right. The difference in Weltanschauung may be easily noted if we compare the view of the world of Dante's Divine Comedy and that of Milton's Paradise Lost. The ontological division of threefold strata of the world, heaven, earth, and hell in the former will be contrasted to the historical scheme from creation in the latter to the end of the world. But this basic contrast may not fully clarify the situation. For this shift from Natural Law to Natural Right is conditioned by an interrelated factor.

It is a historical conscienceness which arose within Anglicanism. The original historical consciousness of Puritanism came from the Reformedtradition. But, on closer examination, it is undeniable that this historical consciousness did not contribute immediately to the rise of the modern idea of Natural Right. Consequently, it would be improper to give no attention to the Anglican historical sense in dealing with this problem.

Throughout the Revolution, this shift was in progress, and it is important that in the process of making this change Puritan ethics was not only revolutionary, but also formative, leading to the formation of modern democratic civilization. Here we cam observe a more dynamic combination of history and ethics, and by virtue of this combination ethics of a different type than casuistry developed. The casuistic approach to history is from the principle above to the reality below. But now in this case ethics acts in history as a formative power. This ethics becomes teleological _par exellence_, in contrast to an ethics of duty.

I. Puritan View of History

A. The Original Puritan View of History and the Anglican View of History

The Puritan view of history, as we have mentioned, originated from the tradition of Reformed theology. This view of history is grounded in the belief of God's Providential government of the world-history. Moreover, this history is given *heilsgeschichtliche* meaning by virtue of the history of the covenant. Zwingli, Bullinger, and Calvin shared the same position concerning this view of history despite some differences. This historical view, insofar as it was founded on the history of covenant, was combined with their unique ecclesiology, assisted by their "collective" mode of thought.[2] The church is the direct object of God's *heilsgeschichtliche* plan. In the time of Old Covenant the church was latent as the people of Israel, and in the time of New Covenant, the church is that in which we as a nation arecalled to live. The covenant is one and the same *insubstantia et re*, but within the admin-

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[2] As to the "collective" mode of thought of the Reformed theology, especially of Calvin, Karlfried Fröhlich made clear in his *Die Reichgottesidee Calvins* (München, 1922). He made a comparison of Luther and Calvin: "Wenn Luther stark individuell zu denken and zu empfinden geneigt ist, wenn bei ihm "der Christenmensch" immer wieder im Mittelphukt religiöser Betrachtung steht, so weiss sich Calvin immer und stets in der Gemeinschaft der Vielen, in der groseen Schar der Frommen aller Zeiten. Immer sind es die grossen, kollektiven Bilder religiöser Gemeinschaft, die sein geistiges Auge Schaut, "die Erwahlten", "die Kirche", "die Gemeinde Christi"; stets geisselt er "*unsere* Sunder", preist "*unsere* Erlogsin", spricht niemals von "mir" oder "dir", so wie

istratio foederis it developed from the old-latent to the new-explicit. The subject (in the sense of ethical agent) is a nation, a "collective" body. Therefore, the relation between God and man is differently termed, different from that famous Augustinian scheme "Deus et anima", viz. God and the soul, and thus in opposition to any Mystical tendency. Just as the nation of Israel responded to God's covenant as a nation, so the responsive relation between God and the church of the New Covenant is expressed as a "national" covenant. Supported by this view of history, the plan for the reformation of the church is to be accomplished as a national engagement by the leadership of the church-representatives and by the assistance of the secular representatives. Therefore, despite its essential religious outlook, this plan of reformation was fundamentally of a political character.

It was this idea of reformation that was in the mind of the Puritans who were active during the Elizabeth's reign. The Puritan view of history which undergirded this idea of reformation was a universalistic position insofar as it took this political view from the standpoint of the conviction of God's providence. This universalistic view

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(cont.) uns das in der Diktion Luthers auf Schritt und Tritt begegnet." S. 12. Of course, in Luthers' thought there is a principle of community in tension with this principle of the individual, and so this difference should not be absolutely stated, but Frohlich surely contributed to a clarification of the important difference.

of history, however, conflicted with and was temporarily defeated by another view of history, This other view of history was an Anglican view. It was a "nationalistic" view in contrast with the "universalistic" view of the Reformed tradition. When the Puritan plan of reformation failed, the universalistic view of history was supplanted by the nationalistic Anglican view of history. What were the consequences of this event? First, the Reformed universalistic view of history, having failed to establish its concrete ground which was to have been realized by a national-covenantal engagement in reformation, became more spiritual, if not abstract. It became more and more a matter of eschatological hope, a matter of God's objective dispensation. On the other hand, the ethics dependent upon this disintegrating view of history, became more casuistic, attempting to reform life individually without an adequate historical awareness. Incidentally,the individualistic inclination superseded the original "collective" element in Reformed thought. This development was aparent in the fact that the subject of the partner in covenant was more and more limited from collective to individual.

Thus, at the beginning of the Civil War, when the Puritans were granted the opportunity for reformation, they found it difficult to restore unamimously the original type of combination of history and ethics. Presbyterians attempted, in an orthodox way, to respond to this occasion which God provided by His Providence, in terms of a national covenant in cooperation with the Scots Presbyterians. The Independents, however, thought differently, for the dispensational interpretation of history which was of more sublimated form was not adequately related to their casuistic interest in godliness. The more a sectarian tendency was intensified, the deeper the discrepancy between history and ethics, between theology and politics appeared to grow. The general form of covenant relation between God and man was maintained by the Puritans, yet the problem of who was the responding subject to God'S Providence, viz. the content of covenant relation, was answered with no consensus. In other words, for example, the idea of "instrument" was accepted, which explained the attitude of the subject responding to God's Providence, yet who His instrument might be was not always made clear. It was not clear whether this subject was the Parliament (for the Presbyterians) or the Army (for the Independents). Nevertheless, it is not fair to say that there was sheer confusion. The Puritan view of history after the failure in political reformation did not always tend towards sublimated speculation in eschatological hope.

Two things may be made clear: first, casuistry had created the life-basis for the Puritan interpretation of history. Any view of history, in order to be meaningful and powerful, needs to have a basis in life, a particular ethos which in turn reinforces the view of history. For example, the Christian view of history is meaningful and powerful insofar as it is based upon the Christian ethos. Casuistry had been creating this ethos which was to give significance to the interpretation of history. The failure of Tudor Puritanism as a reformation may have been due, at least partly, to the fact that there was lacking such an ethos. Of course, casuistry by creating this ethos, had lost a doctrinal unity which continually had some influence on the interpretation of history. But once backed by an ethos common to the Puritan adherent, the Puritan view of history was able to exercise a powerful influence in conjunction with Puritan ethics. A truth of the Puritan ethical principle (which is taken through "decision") may gain a certain universal validity (though not absolute but relative) based upon the common ethos, and a view of history which would clarify a certain meaningfulness of that common ethos. Secondly, during the course of the Puritan movement, there took place a combination between the Puritan interpretation of history and some elements of the Anglican view of history. This permitted the Puritan interpretation of history to be indigenous to English society. By this combination, Puritanism overcame the alien element contained in its universalistic view of history and its internationalism in politics. Let us take this point as a clue for our further discussion.

We must first understand the Anglican view of history in order to make its contrast to the Puritan view clear. It has been noted that nationalism and Protestantism was combined in Anglicanism. For example, Karl Holl wrote:

> Since the dissolution of the tie with Rome and the establishment of the Church of England one encounters in England a peculiar, religiously colored self-awareness, which is related to the English people as such. It is derived from the state church and not, as is commonly believed, from Puritanism - for how could a minority, especially a minority in the position of conflict, have influenced the general national conscieousness?[3]

This statement contains some truth despite the apparent patriotism of the Puritans during the age of Elizabeth. For example, at the time of the Spanish Armada, the Puritan patriotism, though their hatred of Spain had a theological basis, was not as ideologically well-established a religious nationalism as was Anglicanism. The Puritan ideological position was, it may be said, international Protestantism. This was a synthesis of Protestantism and Universalism. But Anglicanism was different from Puritanism in that it grounded itself upon the synthesis of Protestantism and nationalism. But this raises the question of how this combination was possible in Anglicanism. To answer this question, the theological nature of Anglicanism must be clarified. It is by means of a particular view of history that this synthesis was possible in Anglicanism. What view of history did Anglicanism hold?

The Anglican view of history, as the means of the combination of Protestantism and nationalism, may be discovered, for example, in that famous act of Henry VIII.'s reformation, the Restraint of Appeal:

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[3] K. Holl, The Cultural Significance of the Reformation, (1959), p. 74.

> Whereas by divers sundry old authentic histories and chronicles, it is manifestly declared and expressed, that this realm of England is an empire, and so hath been accepted in the world, governed by one supreme head and king, having the dignity and royal estate of the imperial crown of the same, unto whom a body politic, compact of all sorts and degrees of people divided in termes of spirituality and temporalty, be bound and ought to bear, next to God, a natural and humble obedience. . .
>
> And whereas the king, his most noble progenitors, and the Nobility and Commons of this said realm, at divers and sundry Parliaments, as well in the time of King Edward III, Richard II, Henry IV, and other noble Kings of this realm, made sundry ordinances, laws, statutes, and provisions for the entire and sure conservation of the prerogatives, liberties, and preeminences of the said imperial crown of this realm, and of the jurisdiction spiritual and temporal of the same, to keep it from the annoyance as well of the see of Rome, as from the authority of other foreign potentates, attempting the diminution or violation thereof, as often, and from time to time, as any such annoyance or attempt might be knownor espies. . .[4]

From a careful reading it is clear that a combination of the intention of reformation, nationalistic sentiment, and historical justification underlies this act. A certain view of history was utilized for the justification of Anglican Reformation. The historical consciousness, as expressed in such official documents, may mean either a reflection of the mind of the contemporary leadership, or an impetus towards historical study in this direction. Henry VIII is reported to have given a special royal commission to John Leland, the first and most prominent antiquary and topographer of his day, "to peruse and dylygentlye to searche all the lybraryes of monasteryes and collegies . . . that the monuments of auncyent wryters, as wel of other nacyones as of your own prouynce myght be grought out of deadly darkenesse to lyvely lyght. . . Yea, and furthermore. . . all manner of superstycyon and crafty coloured doctryne of a rowte of Romayne Byshoppes (be) totally expelled oute of thys your most catholyque realme."[5] From Leland to that famous antiquary, William Camden, the idol of the sons of Gentlemen, a series of numerous historians and geographers appeared one after the other. These men "rediscovered" England, as Rowse interpreted it. And this rediscovery was coupled with the Protestant cause.

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[4] Quoted from Documents of the Christian Church, selected and edited by Henry Battenson, (1956), pp. 309-310.

> It is not so surprising, then, that the prime discoverers of the English past and present, the chroniclers and topographers, the antiquarians, surveyors and map-makers, were a strongly Protestant lot. It is indeed striking. One might have expected them, students and lovers of the past, to have been Catholics. But they were not. . . . they were looking back into the past for support on the new uncharted course; the course itself appealed to the spirit of national independence and elicited hidden resources of national pride.[6]

The Protestant cause being thus combined with nationalism in Anglicanism by the medium of the "Anglo-Saxon studies", it is apparent that it differs from the Puritan idea of reformation which maintained the universalistic view of history, to speak concretely, biblical history. For the Puritans, too, there was a strong sense of "repristination", which means to return to the original form of church; yet in Anglicanism this theory of repristination differed in that it sought not only a restoration of an ancient form of church, but also a justification of the present Anglican establishment in the light of the ancient pattern of church-state relation allegedly existing before the Papal pretension of authority corrupted the fine old custom of England. The antiquarian contribution to the formation of Anglicanism should not be overlooked.

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[5] I owe this quotation to Richard T. Vann's article, "The Free Anglo-Saxons: A Historical Myth" *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XIX, (1958, April).

[6] A. L. Rowse, *The England of Elizabeth*, 1951^2, p. 31.

After the interval following the Marian counter-Reformation, Elizabeth revived all the basic doctrines of Anglican Reformation which were stated in those Henrican Acts. Elizabeth made a slight modification in wording, viz. from "the Supreme Head" to "the Supreme Governor," which did not mean any important change in the content and was rather a politically effective disguise. The Elizabethan Settlement, it is noteworthy, had a recourse to the same method of apology, that is the appeal to history, as had the Henrican Reformation. The achievement of the Anglo-Saxon studies had been carried on through the political vicissitudes, and again the antiquaries were mobilized for this national cause. Archbishop Parker's enthusiasm in promoting Anglo-Saxon studies is especially notable. His service is remembered in the creation of the great libraries, collecting old materials there. The objective of the Anglo-Saxon studies was for him plainly "the Vindication of our Reformation in opposition to popery."[7] The combination of Protestantism and nationalism was thus wrought by the mediation of this view of English history.

In this connection, the famous work of John Foxe, Acts and Monuments, popularly called as the Book of Martyrs, invites our attention. Although this was written in very close contact with the Anglo-Saxon studies, Foxe had a different disposition than the Tudor Antiquaries, and consequently appeared much closer to the Puritans. The Antiquaries were more inclined to be humanistic, leaning more towards the spirit of Renaissance, although this judgment should not obscure their Protestant tendency. Despite the fact that he shared much with the Antiquaries, Foxe was more inclined towards the spirit of Reformation. To speak more concretely, there was a new element which was lacking in the Antiquaries, that is, the dispensational method of the interpretation of history. For the Antiquaries, the antiquarian interest was combined with the Protestant spirit, but to this combination the dispensational method on interpretation was added, a factor which appears closer to the Reformed interpretation of history.

Yet, his main purpose was to be of service to the

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[7] Strype, The Life and Acts of Matthew Parker, (London, 1711), IV, p. 525.

Anglican Reformation, especially to the Elizabethan Settlement. This book in its final folio form was dedicated to Elizabeth, whose accession, as Haller put it, "seemed to him an act of providence, her survival and success essential to the maintenance of the true religion."[8] He expressed his aim of writing this book in his "Protestation, or Petition, to the whole Church of England" which was attached to the entrance of the book:

> considering the multitude of Chronicles and storie-writers, both in England, and out of England, of whom the most part have been either Monks or Clients to the See of Rome, it grieved me to behold how partially they handled their stories.

Provoked by the discovery of the Romish distortion of history in which "were all things drawn to the honour specially of the Church of Rome, or else to the favour of their own sect of Religion," he wanted to give a counter-description of history in a new light which would justify the Reformation in the English Church:

> This partiall dealing and corrupt handling of Histories when I considered, I thought with my self nothing more lacking in the Church then a full and compleat story, which, being faithfully collected out of all our Monarchical Writers, and written Monuments, should contain neither every vain written fable. . . nor yet leave out anything necessary, . . .but. . . should both ease the labour of the Reader from turning over such a number of writers, and also should open the plain truth of times lying long hid in obscure darkness of antiquity.[9]

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[8] Haller, "John Foxe and the Puritan Revolution", The Seventeenth Century, dedicated to Richard Foster Jones. (1951) p. 216.

[9] Foxe, Acts and Monuments, "Protestation, or Petition, to the whole Church of England".

This is a text in which we may find some affinity with the Antiquaries with respect to the combining of the Reformation motif and the antiquarian interest. He had a belief in the peculiar power of history, for history is "the Witnesse of Times, the Light of Verity, the Life of Memory, Teacher of Life, and Shewer of Antiquity, &c."[10] And he had, in hope of Reformation, "spent not onely my pains, but also almost my health therein."[11] If the power of history is justly drawn out, it is the most effective means to justify the Reformation of the English Church:

> Without the knowledge whereof mans life is blinde, and soon fall into any kinde of errour, as by manifest experience we have to see in these desolate later times of the Church, when-as the Bishops of Rome under colour of antiquity have turned truth into Heresie, and brought such new found devices of strange doctrine and religion, as in the former age of the Church were never heard of before, and all thorow ignorance of times, and for lacke of true history.[12]

But the unique element of Foxe was, as suggested above, the dispensational method of periodization. This uniqueness may become clear if one compares Foxe's book with a famous antiquary, John Speed's The History of Great Britaine under the Conquests of the Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans ...(1614), which divided the periods of history of England by the events of conquest.[13] Foxe viewed history in the light of biblical history, especially, in the application of symbols from the Book of Daniel and the mystic numerology of Revelation.

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[10] Ibid.

[11] op. cit., "Dedication to Queen"

[12] Ibid.

The history of the church falls into five periods. The first period, of three hundred years, was the time of the purity of the church and of its persecution by heathen emperors. Foxe like the contemporary Antiquaries looked to the old age of Britain as the pure example of the Reformation. During the second three hundred years, the Britons were Christianized by Joseph of Arimathea and missionaries sent by the Apostle Philip. This was the time during which the church flourished in peace thanks to Constantine, who was alleged to be of British origin. The Saxon conquest took place, and the Saxons were converted by the Monk Augustine. The third three hundred years, from Egbert to the Norman Conquest, saw the church in a state of decline; and although Alfred endeavored to promote piety and learning, the Roman influence began to corrupt the good religion of Britain. The fourth period of another three hundred years was from the Norman Conquest to Wyclif. In this period Foxe describes vividly the struggle between Papacy and Emperors, with special attention to the English battles, such as those between Henry and Becket, and John and Langton. He disclosed his monarchial point of view openly. Finally with the last three-hundred-years-period the battle reached its apex. The Anti-Christ's way was to promote ignorance and superstition among the people, to userp the power over the kings, and persecute the true believers. Hildebrand and Innocentius III were the objects of his severe attack, and the popes generally were considered Antichrist. After about one hundred years of the rages of the Anitchrists, God finally began his mighty work of emancipation of the faithful from the rule of His enemies. Wyclif was thus raised. The heretic in the eyes of the Papal church was now completely differently interpreted; he who had been thrust out the church was now viewed as the champion of the recovery of the true church. The series of the Reformers, the Lollards in England, Huss and Jerome of Prague on the Continent, then Luther, Zwingli, Bucer, and so on, followed him. The movement of reformation began in England, and so it should be accomplished in England. The motif of reformation was in this way combined with national sentiment. And also, the dispensational interpretation was reconciled with monarchical reformation.

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[13] We should, however, admit that there was some sense of God's providence in this writer, too. He wrote: "These foure Nations fulfilling their times by Heauens assignement, in gaining, keeping, and again loosing, the rich Garland of Great Britaines gouernment: a fift, inferiour to none, made thereunto a double claime, . . . (A Summary conclusion, suffixed to the book.)

A true Church-history was, it is remarkable, viewed as a history of "the poore oppressed and persecuted Church of Christ," which "hath been of long season troden under foot by Enemies, neglected in the world, not regarded in histories, and almost scarce visible or known to worldly eyes, yet hath it been the true church onely of God, Wherein he hath mightily wrought hitherto, in preserving the same in all extreme distresses, continually stirring up from time to time faithfull Ministeres, by whom alwayes have been kept some sparkes of his true Doctrine and Religion."[14] But this poor persecuted church was finally, by virtue of God's dispensation, brought to a glorious Reformation in the Elizabethan Settlement. God aimed thus at this Reformation through history. Foxe concluded his huge book by likening the English nation to a ship, in his conviction and expectation of the mission of the nation:

> because God hath so placed us Englishmen here in one Commonwealth, also in one Church, as in one Ship together; let us not mangle or divide the Ship, which being divided perisheth; but ever man serve with diligence and discretion in his order, wherein he is called. They that sit at the Helm keep well the point of the Needle, to know how the Ship goeth, and wither it should. What soever weather betideth, the Needle well touched with the Sone of Gods Words, will never fail. Suchas labour at the Oars start for no tempest, but do what they can to keep from the Rocks. Likewise they which be in inferiour rooms take heed they move no sedition nor disturbance against the Rowers Mariners. No storm so dangerous to a Ship on the Sea, as is discord and disorder in Weal publique. What Countries and Nations, what Kingdomes and Empires, what Cities, Towns and Houses discord hath dissolved, in Stories is manifest; The God of peace, who hath power both of Land and Sea, reach for this merciful hand to help them up that sink, to keep up them that stand, to still these windes and surging Seas of discord and contention among us; that we professing one

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[14] Foxe, *op. cit.*, "Protestation..."

> Christ, may in one unity of doctrine gather our selves into one Ark of the true Church together, where we continuing stedfast in faith may at the last luchily be conducted to the joyfull port of our desired landing place, by his heavenly grace.[15]

Despite his spiritual affinity to the Puritnns, Foxe was Anglican in viewing the fortunate (providential) realization of the reformation in the history of England at the Elizabethan Settlement, which was also regarded as the restoration of Antiquity with its truth and purity. The Puritans did not see here such an accomplishment, but felt that a further reformation was needed.

Anglicanism was supported by such a characteristic view of history which interpreted the past of English life anew in accordance with the ideal of the Anglican Reformation. The history of Reformation thus came to an end, and it was there at the end of history that Hooker could open his ontological perspective.

B. Disintegration of Anglican View of History: James I versus Common Lawyers; Towards the Alliance between the Puritans and Common Lawyers

Sir William Dugdale looking back to the past troubles wrote in 1681 as follows:

> there were some, who did unhappily infuse into sundry well meaning people, a bad opinion of our Reformation. These were men of proud and peevish Spirits, who had not light enough in themselves to discern the truth, because they wanted learning to search into Antiquities; nor knowledge to trace those of that

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[15] *loc. cit.*

> Church in the paths by which they had derived from the Doctrine of Christ and his holy Apostles; and so (by reason thereof) ran from one extremity to another.[16]

The "men of proud and peevish Spirits" mean the Puritans in general. This comment is interesting in clarifying the fact that "a bad opinion of our Anglican Reformation" was the result of a lack of "learning to search into Antiquities." To be sure, the Puritans did not interpret the meaning of reformation in terms of the guidance of studies of Antiquities. But this judgment may not be wholly justified. For the Puritans began, at a certain time, to appropriate for themselves some elements in the antiquarian interpretation of English history. This fateful accomodation of some elements of Anglican view of history into the Puritan interpretation of history was occasioned by the disintegration of the Anglican view of history itself, and was achieved by the alliance between the Puritans and the Common Lawyers. The Puritans by assimilating some nationalist elements were enabled to render themselves indigenous to English society.

On the level of historical interpretation, the most serious conflict between Anglicanism and Puritanism was that the Puritans did not understand nor accept the Anglican view of history which saw the accomplishment of reformation as the restoration of the Antiquity at the Elizabethan Settlement. For the Puritans the history of reformation did not end there. Therefore, they had to stir the people's zeal for "further" reformation. This inevitably contradicted the Anglican view. The Puritans were more concerned with the Scriptures than the Antiquity. Bancroft had, therefore, to warn people against Puritan Biblicism, "to reade the Scriptures, but with sobriety."[17] And even he had to persuade people for their peaceful enjoyment in the Anglican Church as the accomplishment of Reformation:

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[16] Sir William Dugdale, A Short View of the Late Trouble, 1681, pp. 1-2.

> When you have attained the true grounds of Christian Religion, and are constantly built by a lively faith upon that notable foundation whereof the Apostle speaketh, which is Iusus Christ, being incorporated into his mysticall Body in your baptisme by the holy Ghost: and afterwords nourished with the heavenly food exhibited unto you in the Lords Supper: you then content your selves, and seeke no farther; . . . We neede not to be curious after we have apprehended Christ Iusvs; nor inquistitive after we have received the Gospell.[18]

The difference between Anglicanism and Puritanism was a profound one, far beyond a popular interpretation that the Puritans were Biblicist, while the Anglicans attempted to ground their church polity upon the theory of "things different." Behind the Puritan Biblicism there lay a universal view of history; while behind the Anglican theory, a national view of history. But this conflict was curiously to be transformed when King James came to the throne. It was a fateful event for both Anglicanism and Puritanism.

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[17] Bancroft, _A Sermon Preached at Pauls Crosse_, Feb. 9, 1588, p. 36.

[18] _Ibid_.

King James wrote an essay entitled The Trew Law of Free Monarchies: or the Reciprock and Mytvall Dyetie Betwixt a Free King, and His Natural Subjects, published in 1598, five years before his succession to the English Crown. The importance of this essay is today generally accepted by scholarship in political science, and McIlwain regarded it as "not only the first but the most comprehensive of all his political writings."[19] It is important, in relation to our study, in that it was to transform, if not destroy, the Anglican view of history when it exercised influence on England. The purpose of this essay, as James expressed it, was to give "the trew ground" of the mutual relation between the King and his subjects, and in so doing to settle the recent confusion of ethics and politics.[20] In order to justify his political theory, he invented a new interpretation of history,[21] which

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[19] McIlwain, The Political Works of James I, Introduction, xxxvii.

[20] op. cit., p. 54.

[21] Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that a Dr. Blackwook in his Apologia pro Regibus (1581) developed a similar view of history in England, which was written against George Buchanan's De Jure Regni Apud Scotos (1579). He argued that William the Bastard's power by virtue of the conquest was absolute, and that any right which his conquered subjects retained in their property thereafter was by his grace. Df. Christopher Hill's article "The Norman Yoke" in Democracy and the Labour Movement, (1954).

(cont.)

appeared quite different from the Elizabethan Antiquaries' sense of history. His intention in this article was to ground kingship upon an objective transcendental basis, cutting off every contractual element which might limit the power of kings. His mode of thought is characterized by its thorough-going objective tendency. Objectivistic "natural law" was to justify the relation between king and the subjects as a natural order. "By the Law of Nature the King becomes a naturall Father to all his Leages at his Coronation."[22] In the same objectivism, he

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(cont.)
It is also noteworthy, in this connection, that James gave up his tutor Buchanan's teaching in the above mentioned book, the matter of the limitation of monarchy and carried further some elements in that book towards absolutism. Buchanan according to an old dictum accepted that "A King should be a speaking Law, and the Law a dumb King", p. 25. He even granted that "a King is at liberty and solved from the lawes." (p. 39) Such elements were gladly taken up by James. While Buchanan, avoiding to allow a king a tyrant, thought in this way:

> I impose no lord over him, but I would have it in the peoples power, who gave him the authority over themselves, to prescribe tohim a modell of his government, and that the King may make use of that justice, which the people gave him over themselves. This I crave. I would not have these lawes tobe by force imposed, but I think that by a common council with the King, that should be generally established, which may generally tend to the good to all. (p. 39)

But this did not lead to a modern democracy, rather to a type of aristocratic control of monarchy.

> I did never imagine that that matter ought to be granted to the judgment of the whole people in general, but that near to our custome a select number out of all estates may conveen with the King in council. (p. 40)

James did not accept, however, any "contractual" elements to the power of kingship.

[22] *op. cit.* p. 56.

employed history to explain the relation:

> Although it be trew. . . that in the first beginning of Kings rising among the Gentiles, in the time of the first age, diuers commonwealths and societies of men choose out one among themselves, who for his vertues and valour, being more eminent then the rest, was chosen out by them, and set vp in that roome, to maintaine the weakest in their right, to throw downe oppressours, and to foster and continue the societie among men; which could not otherwose, but by vertue of the vnitie be weldone: yet these examples are nothing pertinent to vs; because our Kingdome and diuers other Monarchies are not in that case, but had their beginning in a farre contrary fashion.[23]

He means that the origin of his kingship had nothing to do with the contract, his kingship was not based on popular consent. He proved this interpretation by history:

> For as our Chronicles beare witnesse, this Ile, and especially our part of it, being scantly inhabited, but by very few, and they as barbarous and scant of ciuilitie, as number, there comes our first King Gergus, with a great number with him our of Ireland, which was long inhabited before vs, and making himself master of the countrey, by his owne frendship, and force, as well of the Irelandmen that came with him, as of the countreymen that willingly fell to him, hee made himselfe King and Lord, as well of the whole landes, as of the whole inhabitants within the same. Thereafter he and his successours, a long while after their being Kinges, amde and established their lawes from time to time, andas the occasion required.[24]

Even laws were given by the king the conquerer; so to speak, Rex wasthe source of Lex, and he wrote as follows:

> So the trewth is directly contrarie in our state to the false affirmation of such seditious writers, as would perswade vs, that the Lawes and state of our countrey were established before the admitting of a king: where by the countrarie ye see it plainprooued, that a wise king coming in among barbares, first established the estate and forme of gouernement, and thereafter made lawes by himselfe, and thereafter made lawes by himselfe, and his successours according thereto.[25]

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[23] op. cit. p. 61.

[24] op. cit., pp. 61-62.

[25] op. cit., p. 62.

His objectivistic mode of thought, as expressed with respect to the king-subject relationship and was likened father-son relationship, the father being naturally and ontologically "above", and was now apparent again in a different form, that is to say, the king was historically "first." "The kings therefore in Scotland were before any Parliaments were holden, or lawes made."[26] And all the estate and ranks were created by and deduced their property andprivilege from the kings: "by them was the land distributed (which at the first was whole theirs) states erected and decerned, and formes of gouernement deuised and estalished."[27] Therefore, in conclusion he says, "And so it followes of necessitie, that the kings were the authors and makers of the Lawes, and not the Lawes of the kings."[28]

James applied this interpretation of history to England, too, where the Common Law tradition was being formulated freshly, keeping pace with the general trend of the studies of Antiquity. What did it mean to the Englishmen, when James said, "the king makes daily statutes and ordinances, . . . without any aduice of Parliament or estates; yet it lies in the power of no parliament, to make any kinde of Lawe or Statute, without his Scepter be to it, for giuing it the force of a Law"?[29] With such a view he turned to interpret English history:

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[26] _op. cit._, p. 62.

[27] _ibid_.

[28] _ibid_.

> And although diuers changes haue beene in other countries of the blood Royall, and kingly house, the kingdome being reft by conquest one to another, as in our neighbour countrey in England, (which was neuer in ours) yet the same ground of the kings right ouerall the land, and subiects thereof remaineth alike in all other free Monarchies, as well as in this: For when the Bastard of Normandie came into England, and made himselfe king, wasit not by force, and with a mighty army? Where he gaue the Law, and tooke none, changed the Lawes, inuerted the order of gouernement, set downe the strangers his followers in many of the old possessours roomes, as at this day well appeareth a great part of the Gentlemen in England, beeing come of the Norman blood, and their old Lawes, which to this day they are ruled by, are written in his language, and not in theirs: And yet his successours haue with great happinesse enioyed the Crowne to this day; Whereof the like was also done by all them that conquested them before.[30]

In the Antiquarian interpretation of English history during the Elizabethan reign, despite the possibility of an underlying discord, the anti-papal sentiment (the motif of Reformation) did not appear to contradict the event of Norman Conquest. It was plain to the Elizabethan historians like John Foxe and Matthew Parker that the Romish "innovation" was brought about through the Norman Conquest. The event of Norman Conquest, therefore, was the most crucial point in interpreting the history of England. For if this event be too negatively interpreted, it may lead to a serious conflict with the "legitimism" in the conception of monarchy. Furthermore, it may fail to combine the motif of reformation with nationalism conceived as the royalty of king against pope. The concept of "conquest" itself was taken mildly, as we see in Speed.[31] Therefore, it is rather questionable to relate the Antiquaries immediately with the later revolutionary tide which began to arm itself with the theory of "Norman Yoke."[32] The Tudor recourse to the Antiquities was curiously ambiguous and never clearcut in theory, yet this was not a disadvantage but rather a strength. If the event of the Norman Conquest be brought to a sharp historical judgment, although the theoretical ambiguity may be cleared up, yet it is not without the sacrifice of the spiritual unity which was conserved in such an ambiguous atmosphere. James, the "wisest fool of the Christendom", dared to do it, and caused an alienation of the kings' position from the history of England.

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[29] _op_. _cit_., p. 62.

[30] _op_. _cit_., p. 63.

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[31] It is noteworthy that Speed did not have a negative attitude toward the concept of "conquest," but on the contrary he viewed the series of events of the conquest as if it were a play magnificently acted by several peoples in "this large Edifice of GREAT BRITAINS THEATRE."

[32] Christopher Hill in his interesting article on the theory of the Norman Yoke, unfortunately does not seem to distinguish this point clearly. He writes:

"These antiquarians (Camden, Verstegan, Speed, Daniel, Selden), together with Nowell, Lambarde, Harrison, Holinshed and Hayward, were also sponsors of the free Anglo-Saxons. Most of them belonged to the Society of Antiquaries, founded about 1580, which had close associations with the Parliamentary opposition. Papers read before the Society early in James I's reign argued that the Anglo-Saxons had held popularly-elected Parliaments; . . . It is hardly surprising that it fell under the royal disapproval and ceased to meet. The discrediting of the royal Arthurian legend, and its replacement by that of free Anglo-Saxon institutions, was thusof direct importance in the battle of ideas which preceded the civil war." ("The Norman Yoke" in *Democracy and the Labour Movement*, *Essays in hour of Dona* Torr, edited by John Saville, 1954, p. 19) Seeing the fact that most of the Tudor Antiquaries had served the monarchical Reformation, isn't it too hasty a judgment to draw out the revolutionary line which was basically anti-monarchical as expressed in the theory of the Norman Yoke from the work of those Antiquaries? It may be true that there was an occasion of conflict between the Stuart Monarch and some of the Antiquaries as Hill wrote, but this conflict should not be immediately retrograded tothe age of Tudor Monarchy in general terms. He wrote in a definite way that the Society of the Antiquaries was established about 1580, but (cont.)

By the introduction of the Jacobian interpretation of the Norman Conquest, there was created an opposition which became of persisting importance for the future between the absolute Monarch and the Common Lawyers. What does this opposition mean? It means nothing else than a disintegration of the ambiguous unity and harmony of the Tudor cultural and political idea. Yet James was not solely to be blamed; for the ambiguous position of Tudor polity was necessarily disclosing its problematic nature. For example, the idea of Antiquity was too vague to support the Anglican Church over against the Jesuit religious invasion as well as the Puritan criticism.

(cont.) thismay be questionable. Cf. Rowse, The England of Elizabeth, pp. 40-41.

Richard T. Vann is right in writing that the Elizabethan historians were "singularly reticent about the changes in political institutions which William brought." And also right in this judgment, that "Their bias against the Conqueror seems untimed by indignation at the introduction of a foreign scheme of government... and if that Conquest resulted in indignities to the English name, the indignities nevertheless were far from constituting a Norman Yoke." (pp. 263-264) But Vann also did not, then, make clear how the Norman Yoke theory was coupled with the Antiquarian tradition.

If not forsaken, the Anglicans still had to buttress the theory of Antiquity by more political combinations of kingship and episcopacy, "No Bishop, No King", or later by the theory of "Divine Right of Episcopacy", regardless of monarchy.

With respect to the introduction of the Jacobian absolutistic interpretation, it is significant that a novel idea attempted to justify the national church. We find this in Richard Field's "Of the Church," first published in 1606, and in a folio form in 1635.[33] There is inserted a unique interpretation of national church rather without contextual consistency. He sought in the manner of a national church in the very origin of mankind. In the first part of the Fifth Book, he declared that the order of "National Church" was rooted in the original structure of creation,tthat is, in Adam himself. In the first chapter under the title "Of the Primitive and first Church of God in the house of Adam the Father of all the living, and the government of the same" he asserted:

> Hereupon Adam the father of all the living, was appointed by that God that made him, to instruct, guide, and direct those that should come of him, even in the state of natures integrity, though without any forcing with terrours, or recalling with punishments while there was yet no pronenesse to

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[33] This book was, no doubt, an example of new apology in the manner of Foxe or Hooker: "It hath beene of late, the vaunt of the aduersaries of the religion established amongst vs, that they haue written many bookes against vs and none haue been found to oppose any thing against them; and that desire nothing more, that by wring, or disputing, ro trie the goodnes of their cause. But, I doubt not, but this Nationall Church and gouernment whereof vnder our most (cont.)

evill, nor difficulty to doe good.[34]

The church was interpreted here as analogous to paternal government. Then, in the second part under the title "Of the dignity of the first-borne amongst the sonnes of Adam, and their Kingly and Priestly direction of the rest" he viewed the beginning of the history of the national church whose line of continuation was maintained by the succession of the right and privilege of Adam:

> And seeing nothing is more naturall, than that as the Father is to instruct, direct, and set forward the children that God hath given him in the way of vertue of well-doing, so amongst the children the eldest should help the younger. . .; none could be fitter to assist him in the Kingly and Priestly office while he live, and to succeed him in the same when he died, than the first-borne. . . This preeminence of the first borne continued, the eldest ever succeeding in the Kingly and Priestly office, unlesse for impiety, or cause best knowne to God hee were rejected by him, till the time that Israel came out of Egypt, and the Church of God became nationall.[35]

But the national church in the history was first revealed at the occasion of the exodus from the bondage of Egypt. In the third chapter under the title "Of the division of the preeminence of the first borne amongst the sonnes of Iacob when they came out of Egypt, andthe Church of God became National" he described the original form of national

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(cont.)gracious souereigne, is principally committed to your fatherly care, shall yeeld men more than matchable, with the proudest of the aduerse faction..." The Epistle of Dedicatory. Here is noted his special concern with "National Church".

[34] Field, Of the Church, p. 410.

[35] op. cit., p. 411.

church as follows:

> But when it pleased Almighty God, who chose unto himselfe the posterity of Israel and sonnes of Iacob as his peculiar portion and inheritance, above all the nations of the world, to bring them with a mighty hand, and outstretched arme out of the land of Egypt, and the house of bondage, to the land which was promised to their Fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Iacob, and to make of them a mighty people; then the former kinde of government, which was domesticall, not so well fitting a people as a houshold, he settled another; and in steed of the first borne which formerly in each family and kindred was both a King and Preest, hee chose the tribe of Judah to sway the Scepter, and to be a Law-giver to the rest of his people: and the tribe of Levi to attend his Tabernacle and service: and out of all the Families of the tribe, tooke Aaron and his sonnes to serve in the Priests office, appointing the rest to meaner services about the Sancturary, or to bee Assistants to the Priests, and Rulers in the government of the People.[36]

The lack of systemtic ability prevented him from organizing his whole discussion in the light of this idea. But we should note the fact that this sort of interpretation ignited his mind like a spark. This interpretation of the national church is, it should be noted, different from the Reformed concept of the national church which was conceived by way of a national covenant. It is not contractual but natural and organic. There is an affinity with objectivism of James. Jacobian objectivism was here projected further back to the beginning of history of humanity. The mode of thought was curiously similar for both.

What we find in Ferne and Filmer later is a sense of history which was constituted in combination between James and Field. Filmer's Patriarcha stands typically in this line of thought. As the time went on, and the Tudor Antiquarian nationalism was destroyed, it gained a strange universal perspective on history, and such a view of history was coupled with the objectivistic idea of natural law. These ideas undergirded the later Royalist position. The basic theory was formed by the combination of the patriarchal, or paternal, interpretation of biblical history of the beginning of humanity, the objectivistic natural law, and Jacobian interpretation of the Norman Conquest, all of which characteristically stood in contrast to the contractual interpretation on the Puritan side. The self-interpretation of Anglicanism began thus to be transmuted, summing up in that way both history and nature, both religion and politics.

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[36] *op. cit.*, pp. 411-412.

At the occasion of the introduction of the Jacobian interpretation of English history, the tradition of the Anglo-Saxon studies of the Tudor Antiquaries were turned critically against it by a group of the Common Lawyers. They, accepting the best heritage of the Antiquarian studies stood in sharp conflict with Jacobian Absolutism. The Antiquarian studies which had been a servant of monarchism was now used by the opponents of the King and his party. The Common Lawyers of the time of the reign of James I were a group characterized by common opinion. They were Sir Edward Coke (1552-1643) the leader, William Hakewell (1574-1655), Sir James Whitelocke (1570-1632), and John

Selden (1584-1654), besides the less known Nicholas Fuller (1543-1620) and Randolph Crewe (1558-1646).

Against the newly introduced Absolutism, the basic position of the Common Lawyers was the defense of the supremacy of law. There was a vital characteristic tradition of the supremacy of law in medieval England. Fortescue was the best witness to this tradition, his basic position being a belief in the supremacy of law framed by the sharp distinction between politics and law and an evaluation of the king's power of government as being merely "political." Politics is different, in turn, from "dominium" that the prince can do anything he wants as if his pleasure were a law. By law, Fortescue meant at once natural law, custom, and constitution, "omnia jura humana, aut sunt lex naturae, consuetudines, vel statuta, quae & constitutiones appelantur."[37] The political power of king cannot change this law without the consent of the people.[38] For the political power of king is dependent on the people.

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[37] Fortescue, *De Laudibus Legum Angliae*, cap. 15

[38] Secundum vero, Princeps, quod tu formidas, consimili nec majori opera elidetur. Dubitas menpe, an Anglorum legum, vel civilium studio te conferas, dum civiles supra humanas cunctas leges alias, fama per orbem extollat gloriasa. Non te conturbet, fili Regis, haec mentis evagatio: Nam non potest rex Angliae, ad libitum suum, leges mutare regni sui. Principatu namque nedum regali, sed & politico, ipse suo populo dominatur. Si regali tantum ipse praeesste eis, Leges regni sui mutare ille posset, Tallagia quoque & caetera onera eis imponere ipsis inconsultis, quale dominium denotat leges civiles, cum dicant quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem. Sed longe aliter potest Rex, politice imperas genti suae, quia nec leges ipse sine subditorum assensu mutare poterit, nec subjectum populum retinente (cont.)

This tradition was vigorously advocated by Coke,

(cont.) onerare populus ejus libere fruetur bonis suis, legivus, quas cupit regulatus, nec per Regem suum, aut quemvis alium depilatur, consimiliter tamen plaudit poplus, sub Rege regaliter tantum principante, dummodo ipse in tyrannidem non labatur. De quali rege dicit philosophus iii. politicorum, quod melius est Civitatem regi viro optimo, quam lege optima. Set quia non semper contingit praesidente populo, hujusmodi esse virum, sanctus Thomas in libro, quem Regi Cypri scripsit, de regimine principum, optare censetur, regnum sic institui, ut rex non libere valeat populum tyrannide gubernare, quod solum fit dum potestas Regia lege politica cohibetur: *De Laudibus Legum Angliae*, published by John Selden, 1672, pp. 25-27. (The English translation runs: The second point, most worthie Prince, whereof stand in fear, shall in like manner as easily as the other, be confuted. For you stand in doubt, whether it be better for you, togive your mind to the study of the Laws of England, or of the Civile Laws, because they thorowout the whole world are advanced in glory and renowne above all other mans laws. Let not this scruple of minde trouble you, O most noble Prince: for the King of England cannot alter nor change the laws of his Realme at his pleasure. For why he governeth his people by power, not only royal, but also politique. If his power over them were royal only, then he might change the Laws of his realm in charge his subjects with Tallage in other burdones without their consent, and such is the dominion that the civil Laws purporte, when they say, The prince hispleasure hath the force of a law. But from this, much differeth the power of a King, whose government over his people is politique, For he can neither change change laws without the consent of his subjects, nor yet charge them with strange impositions against their wills. Wherefore his people do frankly and freely enjoy and occupy their own goods, being ruled by such laws as they themselves desire. Neither are they pilled either of their own king or of any other. Like pleasure also in freedome have the subjects of a king ruling only by power royal, so long as he falleth not into tyranny. Of such a king speaketh Aristotle in the third Book of his *Civil Philosophy*, saying, that it is better for a Citie to be governed by a good King, then a good law. But foras much as a king is not ever such aman, therefore Saint Thomas in the Book, which he wrote to the King of Cyprus, of the governance of Princes, wisheth the state of a Realme to be such, that itmay not be in the kings power to oppress his people with tyranny, Which thing is performed onely, while the power Royal is restrained by power politique.) *Ibid*.

whose "object of worship" was Common Law. He wrote:

> For any fundamental point of the ancient common laws and customs for the realm it is a maxim in policy, and a trial by experience, that the alteration ofthem is most dangerous; for that which has been refined and perfected by all the wisest men in former succession of ages, and proved and approved by continual experience tobe good and profitable for the commonwealth, cannot but with great hazard and danger be altered or changed.[39]

The Common Lawyers looked to the heritage of English laws as an unbroken chain of the preservation of people's right. The heroes of the "Imposition" issue, Hakewell and Whitelocke, shared the same conviction with Coke cited above.[40] The battle line was clearly drawn between James, who rested his case on the assumption that if the king owed his title to conquest, and consequently owned all the property in the realm, then he also had a right to arbitrary taxation, and the Common Lawyers, who defended the people's right to property based on the common law tradition, above all, "Magna Carta."

As James' assertion was justified by his unique interpretation of conquest, so the position of the common Lawyers was undergirded by a counter-interpretation of the same event. We may illustrate it by an interesting book entitled "Argumentum Anti-Normannicum" which is attributed to Coke, although this authorship cannot be accepted.[41] This represents concisely the main point which the Common Lawyers must have maintained since the early decades of the 17th Century.

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[39] I owe this quotation to J. W. Allen, English Political thought, 1603-1660, (London; 1938) p. 35.

[40] Hakewell wrote a book on this issue entitled The Liberty of the Subject: against the pretended power of Imposition. Maintained by an Argument in Parliament An. 7. Jacobi Regis. The question at issue wasthis: "The Question now in debate amongst us, is, Whether his Majestie may, by his will and pleasure, lay a new Charge or Imposition upon Merchandizes, to be brought into, or out of this Kingdome of England; and enforce Merchants to pay the same." p. 1. His conclusion was this: "Impositions, neither in the time of warre, or other the greatest necessitie or occasion that may be (much lesse in the time of peace) neither upon Foraine, nor inland Commodities of whatsoever nature, be they never as superfluous or unnecessary, neither upon Merchangs, Strangers nor Denizens, may be laid by the Kings absolute power, without assent of Parliament, be it for (cont.)

The theme of this book is this, that William the First, the anonymous author disliked using the surname "the Conqueror", entered into "Compact" with the English people to make himself King; and the English people gave him the scepter; the King took an oath to keep "St. Edward's Laws"; therefore there is an unbroken continuity of the old laws of England over the Norman Conquest. He then turned his investigation positively to how William the Bastard made himself a King of England. He focussed upon the coronation oath. He made a comparison between the coronation oath of the Saxon Kings and the oath of William the First,

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(cont.) never so short a time, much lesse to endure for ever, as ours." pp. 141-142.

[41] The Wing Catalogue, and the McAlpin Catalogue attributed this work to Edward Coke. But the late publication, 1682, makes it doubtful, and moreover, the internal testimony does not allow this attribution. For example, in the page xxiii, the name Edward Coke was mentioned as follows: "for as my Lord Coke saith, the Grounds of our Common Laws ... etc." But this may be utilized for our purpose to illuminate the historical thought of the Common Lawyers, since the anonymous author is believed in a close contact with the Common Lawyers, perhaps a disciple of Coke.

and discovered that there was no substantial difference between them, and this he regarded as proof that William the First, like the Saxon kings, "is Debitor Justitiae to all his People, to rule and govern them by law."[42] By the law here is meant as follows: "This law of the Realm, or Land, was looked upon, in the judgment of these Parliaments, as the Law of Ancient Time, of old Time used, and the Old Law; whose Age made it the more venerable, and gave an addition of honour to it."[43] This law was not changed, nor canceled by the Conquest, but rather under the auspicies of this law, he was elected to be king over the nation. So the author concluded:

> Our first William, when he came in, gained not such an absolute Victory as is pretended, over this Nation, . . . but came to the Crown b y the election and Consent of the Clergy and People. And feodus pepigit, he made a Solemn Covenant with the English, to observe and keep those Laws, which were bonae and approbatae, & antiquae Leges Regni.[44]

The undeniable testimony of the continuity of the common laws was for the author, the Magna Carta, the first of which was published by William the First himself! William attempted to introduce the foreign laws, which "the English thought a more killing blow than that of his Victory;" therefore, the English "beseeched him that they might still retain Leges proprias, their own Laws; and enjoy Consuetudines Antiquas, their Ancient Customs, in which their Fathers lived. . . and themselves were born and bred up in, because it would be very hard to receive Laws unknown, and to judge of those things they understood not."[45] The King finally yielded to them, and confirmed their ancient laws by his Magna Carta.[46] The author interpreted this fact:

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[42] Argumentum Anti-Normannicum, p. xvi.

[43] op. cit., p. xviii.

[44] op. cit., p. xxii.

> Thus we see the Mighty Conqueror is himself conquered, and solemnly renouncing all Arbitrary Will and Power, submits his Will to be regulated and governed by Justice, and the ancient Rights of the English Men.[47]

This victorious law was "the old Saxon Laws" and William subjected himself to "those Laws of Saint Edward, which the English were so fond of."[48]

The point in conflict was made clear: James viewed the Conquest as absolute and unconditional, simply establishing the dominion over the people and the land, promulgating a new law in the place of the old law, while the Common Lawyers defended the continuity of common law by which security of property was guaranteed: "the ancient and excellent laws of England are the birthright and the most ancient and best inheritance that the subjects of this realm have; for by them he enjoyeth not only his inheritance and goods in peace and quietness, but his liberty and his most dear country in safety." "The Common law of England had been time out of mind before the Conquest, and was not altered or changed by the Conqueror."[49] As we have seen, Anglican apologetical thinking already broke through the Tudor theory of "Antiquity" and appealed as far back as the history of Genesis. Not only in the Jacobin unconditional interpretation of the Conquest, but also in such an objective and natural interpretation of the history of Genesis was Anglican politico-religious ideology reinterpreted. At this transformation of Anglican-self-interpretation, the Tudor synthesis disintegrated. The former servant of the monarchy turned into the enemy of monarchy. The Antiquarian tradition, as carried on by the Common Lawyers, was not combined with Puritanism. This fact appeared as the alliance between the Puritan divines and the Common Lawyers.[50] In reaction to the Anglican return to the biblical history of the origin of humanity, Puritansim, which originally had in mind a unique interpretation of universal history, now began to accomodate a "national" element through this alliance. Remarkably in the Levellers, especially, in Lilburne, Coke's Institutes was telescoped into the Scriptures. This was a transformation for Puritanism, too. But through this transformation Puritanism gained a tremendous power, as we see during the Civil Wars. James, the "wisest fool" dug a grave for his son. The Tudor Antiquaries were anti-Papalist but not anti-Monarchist, but James gave an occasion for the Antiquarian Common Lawyers to turn themselves into his enemy. The Stuart Antiquaries became thus anti-Monarchist. The Antiquarian interest was combined with "Anti-Monarchism." The Tudor Kings were more or less "in" the Parliament, but the Stuart Kings were "against" the Parliament. The King's position was separated from the concrete past of English history, though it sought a substitutive ground in a remote past of biblical history. The Monarchists thus exposed themselves tothe criticism of those who took consciously their ground in the English Antiquities. While this radical change was taking place in the royal history, Puritanism was successfully interpreting the English life by way of casuistry, on the one hand, and was assimilating itself intothe English view of history by its alliance with the Common Lawyers, on the other.

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[45] op. cit., p. xxvii.

[46] op. cit., p. xxviii.

[47] op. cit., p. xxx.

[48] ibid.

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[49] So Coke said. Cf. Reports, Part V, p. iii; Third Part of the Institutes, Proeme; also cf. Prefact to Reports, Part VIII. I owe these quotations to Christopher Hill's above cited article.

[50] Cf. John D. Eusden, Puritans, Lawyers, and Politics in the Early Seventeenth Century England (New Haven, 1958).

C. The Puritan View of History During the Civil Wars

The Puritan view of history may be characterized better if it is viewed against the background which we have clarified above. It is a complex whole holding in itself several elements together, viz. the Reformed view of history, Foxe's interpretation of Church History, and the Common Lawyers' view of English history, etc. To take a wider view, the Puritans were developing one view of history, even though its elements were not brought into full synthesis. This view was characteristically different from one which was growing within the Anglican Royalist mind. If the Anglican Royalist view of history was to crystalize through the Civil Wars in thought such as Filmer's Patriarcha, the development of the Puritan view of history was developing towards the principles underlying Locke's theory of society. Take for example Locke's First Treatise of Government. This, written as a criticism of Filmer's Patriarcha, has a peculiar "historical" framework of thought as Filmer's had. To us this historical framework of thought appears an unscientific mixture of myth and history, but for the 17th Century men it was not so. Unless we understand this background rightly, we may not be able to appreciate its thought duly.[51] Just as there is in Filmer a fusion of biblical history and national history, though with the Anglican Royalist connotation, so there is the same sort of fusion of histories in Locke's view, with a different connotation. Locke's interpretation of biblical history and English history was as such a counter-interpretation to Filmer's interpretation. This interpretation, however, was not his invention but only a last flower blooming on the stock of Puritan Parliamentarianism. Actually, Locke had studied his friend, Tyrrel's, work Patriarcha non Monarch, which shows the same kind of historical consciousness and also took rootage in the tradition of Puritanism. Needless to say, Tyrrell and Locke were no longer revolutionaries of the 1640 type. But in their confrontation with the Anglican Royalist ideaology revived at the occasion of the Restoration, they utilized the tradition which was rooted in Puritanism of the Civil Wars for the sake of the Whig Revolution.

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[51] Until recently, Locke's First Treatise was almost neglected because of his old-fashioned "historical" framework, whose meaning almost being unintelligible to the modern man. But only recently our attantion has been called to the importance of the First Treatise. Cf. Herbert H. Rowen, "A Second Thought on Locke's First Treatise", Journal of History of Ideas, (XVII, 1956), pp. 130-132.

We may be able to open our historical perspective along the line from the Puritans of the Civil Wars to Tyrrell and Locke. A development of the Puritan view of history which pointed towards in such a direction was of extraordinary importance in view of the formation of the modern world. For, the most important ideas which may be duly regarded as the pillors of the modern world, were established by and in such a unique view of history. The idea of Natural Right, the theory of social contract, etc. were all conceived in this peculiar view of history. The modern world, insofar as English scene is concerned, did not arise as a reaction or repulsion against the theological medieval world, but rather came out of such a quasi-theological intermediate period as the 17th Century. Such a scheme "from Theology to Anthropology"[52] may be appropriate only in a broader sense, or to the situation on the continent of Europe, but in England this quasi-theological age was a mother of the modern world. This fact we must take most seriously. Tyrrell and Locke thought of the problems of law, government and society within this scheme of thought, that is, a fusion of biblican history and national history. It was Puritanism that give a particular interpretation to this fusion, to which Tyrrell and Locke were indebted, and that made for the rise of the modern democratic society. By the beginning of the Civil Wars, the Puritan mind could assume a combination of the biblical view of history which they took as their own theological source, the Reformed theo-ological source, the Reformed theology, and national history which they assimilated in their thought, borrowing from the Antiquaries and the Common Lawyers. For this systhesis, Foxe's Book of Martyrs gave them a fresh influence especially with repect to their understanding of English nation's special mission for God's cause. Foxe himself combined in his historical work, Antiquarian interest, Reformation motive, and dispensational method, and this whole inclusive tendency was taken generally by the Puritans beyond Foxe's own apologetic intention to defend the Anglican Reformation.[53] Taken as a whole it may be judged that the Puritan view of history followed that line of development towards Tyrell and Locke, yet a closer view shows that there were differences and divergences among the Puritans regarding their conception of history, so that the judgment we have given above may appear too over-simplified. It is even difficult to establish the direct connection between Foxe and the Puritans. We must, therefore, describe some differences within Puritansim regarding their conception of history. Nevertheless, it is still true to say that the historical scheme of thought which we find in Tyrell and Locke was of a Puritan origin. It is noteworthy that the fusion of biblical history and national history was effectively utilized by the Levellers and the Diggers, although this sort of fusion may be found in a much wider range among the Puritans. Envisaging the Levellers and the Diggers as mere laymen, we may be able to imagine how deeply and widely that fusion was accepted by the common people, and how vitally it had persisted through the 17th Century. It spread not only among the intellectuals but also in the society of the common people.

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[52] Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften II, (1923) The scheme from theo-centric to anthropo-centric world view was a common place for 19th Century historians' interpretation of thechange from the Middle Ages tothe Modern Age. Cf. also, Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. (1958 paper-back ed.) He viewed the change taking place ever Renaissance in the self-consciousness of individual.

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[53] Cf. Haller, "John Foxe and the Puritan Revolution", *The Seventeenth Century, Studies in the History of English Thought and Literature from Bacon to Pope*, (1951). He wrote, "By the time the Long Parliament met in November 1640, the conception of history and of England's historic relation to the church, set forth in seven editions of the Actes and Monuments, was still very much alive in men's minds, and the new crisis gave it new force and meaning." (p. 219)

To be sure, the intellectuals who belonged to certain parties had more conscious and more articulate conceptions of history, and differed among themselves. The Presbyterians surely had a different view of history from that of the Independents. But neither the particular Presbyterian view of history nor the Independents' view survived as an influential factor for the formation of the modern world. In Locke there are elements which seem to have been taken from Calvinistic sources, and we cannot deny it. Or we may be able to trace a relation between Lockian theory of social contract and the Scotch Presbyterian, Rutherford's, theory of social contract. But he did not seem to accept the Presbyterian theological conception of history as we shall describe below. The Independents' particular view of history also died out, and it does not seem to have contributed anything positively to the formation of the modern world. It was too theological to live in the modern society. Curiously such a quasi-theological view of history as we find in the Levellers and the Diggers, then in Tyrrell and Locke survived.

Having given thus far an introductory description of the Puritan view of history, we shall now turn to the Presbyterian view of history. We presuppose that the Presbyterians shared more or less the same idea of fusion of of biblical and national history, and on this assumption we shall try to view some particular elements which may distinguish their position from that of other parties. It is noteworthy that the differences in the conception of history were related to the differences in ethics and politics, and also in ecclesiology.

(I) The Presbyterian View of History: Once the Presbyterians had to confront the question of the Reformation, they were not dependent on the theory of Antiquity, According to Foxe, such preachers as Cornelius Burges and Stephen Marshall conceived the history of the English nation as bearing a particular historical mission. But the role which the principle of English Antiquity had played such an important part in the Anglican Reformation was not appreciated here. The orthodox Presbyterian mind, it is remarkable to note, was rather disinterested in the theory of Antiquity. It was in the Scriptures alone that they sought for the pattern of Reformation. They never accepted the principle of Antiquity along with the principle of the Scriptures. This meant that there was no point in the history of England which could be regarded as the pattern of the Reformation to come, so that there was no possibility of returning to the English past. Their idea was not rooted in the past of English history. An example of this kind of stern Presbyterian was Anthony Burges. In his sermon "The Difficulty of, and the Encouragements to a Reformation", preached at the Public Fast, September 27, 1643, he presented clearly before the House of Commons the basic doctrine b y means of which the Reformation had to be carried on: "That Gods Word is the onely rule and principle in matters of Religion and Reformation."[54] His purpose in introducing this sharply disinguished principle was to overcome the disunity among the Puritans and the Parliamentarians. To allow anything "besides" the Scriptures was, to him, the source of error and separation. The Word of God is "the onely rule."[55] He wrote:

> In Popery they share with God in every thing; to grace they joyne free will, to Christs merits their owne, to God, Angels and Saints, to the Scriptures their traditions, and Church authority; . . . If we would be content with this, that the Scripture were an halfe ule all would be well, but asGod is a perfect God, so is his Word a perfect Word, we must have no other Gods besides him, so also no other Scripture or Word beside this.[56]

From this principle he comes to reject the principles such as "Antiquity", "Custome", "Fathers", "Reason", "Universality", and "Enthusiasm." As to the principle of Antiquity he wrote:

> This is the Gorgons head that all supersitious men hold up, thinking to silence all men immediately, whereas indeed they deale as the Gibeonites did, who came with their mouldy bread andold shooes which they had newly got, as if they had enjoyed them a long while: so it is with most of their old traditions, andtheir mouldy inventions, which they obtrude upon us. . . .[57]

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[54] Anthony Burgess, *Difficulties.*, p. 3.

[55] *op*. *cit*., p. 7.

[56] *Ibid*.

[57] *op*. *cit*., p. 11.

Concerning custom:

> This a rule more then all Scriptures to many; this we and our fathers have been used to doe; Now how vaine is this? for by the same reason Heathens and Pagans might plead for their Idolatry. . .[58]

Against the principle of reason, he said:

> . . . reason is the instrument applying, not the rule it selfe, . . . Especially all reason severed from Gods Word is corrupt and carnall, a very ill Iudge in the worship of God and our conversation.[59]

His criticism of the principle of universality is no less important and noteworthy, for although the Puritans gained in number, yet they were far from claiming universality in a concrete sense. Burgess set the truth of revelation, viz. the Scriptures, over against universality:

> To doe as the most doe; this is a great rule; they never consider what the Scriptures direct to, but they will beleeve, and worship, and live as the most doe; now God hath expresly forbidden this, Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evill; They are but few to whom Christ revealeth himselfe: . . .[60]

Rejecting all these secondary principles, he attempted to pursuade his hearers to take the Scriptures as their only rule. This was a return to the original position of Cartwrightian Puritanism during the Elizabethan age. Antiquity was willfully rejected. Burgess used the term "Magna

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[58] op. cit., p. 12

[59] op. cit., p. 13

[60] ibid.

Charta" in this sermon, but it was in this way: "Let the Word of God dwell in you. . . this is your spiritual Magna Charta."[61] The genuine Presbyterian position, as is clear here, was again incompatible with the tradition of Antiquarian interest as one of the principles of reformation. The genuine Protestant theory of Reformation was in the last resort grounded on the purity of "Doctrine." No national precedent had played an important and systematic role in Protestantism outside of England, although there were some combinations with "national" feeling. Moreover, Presbyterianism could hardly return to a certain point in English history, for its reformation causes. Presbyterians had nothing to do with the English past, but were concerned with the attempt to grasp the present in the Will of God which was revealed in the Scriptures.

The Presbyterian breach from the English past was expressed, theologically by Edmund Calamy, whose theological position seems very close to Anthong Burges. In order to interpret the present opportunity for reformation, he refused to refer it to England's excellency as was popular among English Christians. It was, to him, only because of God's goodness, that England now had the opportunity for reformation. The English past was rather negatively veiwed, from this point of view.

> If Englands mercies come from free grace, let not England presume upon Gods mercies, as if intailed upon them and their posterity; for it is as free

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[61] *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

> for God to take away his mercies, as it was free to give them; . . . If free grace hath preserved England, not free will, Let England maintaine free grace above free will.[62]

This was nothing else but an application of the Protestant doctrine of Justification without meritorious works. From this point of view he was severely critical of the Arminian tendency in recent English thought. England, who was the mother of Pelagius, was urged to repent of her forgetfulness of God's free mercy. This emphasis on repentance implied to view that the English past was sinful: "the least sinne of us in England" is "greater than the greatest sin of the Heathens; of the Christians in Germany, and Ireland; yea than the sin of the devils themselves."[63] If there is such a breach from the English past, then how will the present be grasped? It is important to note that the emphasis on the free grace in the Presbyterian sense was undergirded by the belief in God's sovereignty, God's providential rule of the world, and dispensational engagement with the people by way of covenant. The present opportunity of reformation was, thus, grasped from God's free grace in the providential government of the world. It was first of all grasped from above, as God's free engagement to the English people. But next this opportunity had to be grasped in response from below, as the people's commitment to God's mercy through their repentance and thankfulness. One of the impressive notes of Calamy's sermon above mentioned is that the subject, the ethical agent, responding to God is always a collective subject, "England", or "the House of England" regarded as antitype to the type "the House of Israel," or a "Nation." Here we note a revival of characteristic Reformed thinking. Thus, Calamy's view of history, history as God's history of covenant, finds a way to relate itself to the political engagement of a whole nation. God engages Himself in the cause of reformation our of His free mercy, and the House of England should respond to His mercy with national commitment to this reformation.

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[62] Edmund Calamy, Gods free Mercy to England, A Sermon preached before the Honourable House of Commons, Feb. 23, 1641, pp. 18ff

[63] op. cit., p. 25.

The "free" grace must be accepted at man's responsibility. This logic was expressed in this way: "Let us not make these mercies our God, but bridges to lead us over unto God." A typical logic of Covenent theology! But the subject which is committed to God is not anindividual but "a Nation."

> If God should heale us, help us, and lengthen out our tranquillity, and make a reformation among us, yet it would be but a lame cure, if we be not confounded and ashamed for our evill wayes. . . But a perfect cure can never be expected from God, till there be a National humiliation, and reformation.[64]

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[64] *op. cit.*, p. 45.

God's activity in history of covenant is combined with this national engagement to reformation. The typex in the Old Covenant were, for them, such stories as the Exocus, the building of the Temple by Ezra and Nehemiah. In their mind the pictures in the Old Covenant were easily interfused with their interpretation of the present situation.

> We are a nation on Covenantwith God, we have the books of the Covenant, the Old and New Testament; we have the seales of the Covenant, Baptisme, and the Lords Supper. We have the Messengers of the Covenant, the Ministers ofthe Gospell. We have the Angell of the Covenant, the Lord Jesus Christ fully and clearely set out before us in the Ministry of the Word.[65]

Practically, the reformation will be guided by the Parliament; as a result some Parliamentary preachers were often excessively flattering to the Parliament.[66] This principle came from Calvin, though Calvin was never so flattering. At any rate, the Presbyterians in this way identified themselves with the Parliament, which was the only way to put their idea of reformation into practise.

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[65] Calamy, Great Danger of Covenant Breaking (1646), p. 23.

[66] Eduard Reynoldes in his sermon "Israels Petion in time of Trouble" preached July 27, 1642, he wrote: "Right Honourable, This Nation hath put into your hands all that is outwardly deare unto them, their persons, posterities liberties, estates; In these sad and wofull distractions, they looke upon you as binders, andhealers, and standers in the gap, and rapyers of the wast-places, God hath called you unto an high and great trust; and the sad distempers of the Church and State, the distresses and desolations of Ireland, the doubts and feares, the shiverings and convulsions of England, and in these two the interest of All the Protestant Churches call upon you, like the man of Macedonis in Saint Pauls vision, Come and help us."

Thomas Hill in his sermon "The Treade ofTruth advanced," preached July 27, 1642: "I beseech you (noble Worthies) by the many Petions you have made to God, by his wonder-working Providence about you, and by the dependance the Protestant cause abroad hath upon you, stirre up you Resolution in the behalfe of Truth. Would you have the name of this Parliament

(cont.)

Presbyterian leaders such as Calamy and Burgess, whom we have taken as examples, had prepared the theological ground for the acceptance of the Solemn League and Covenant. They attempted to re-establish the biblical principle for the present reformation in England. But this principle had been ~~in~~ a process of disintegration for so long it was actually impossible to deduce one single pattern from it. Concretely the Solemn League and Covenant was to be a "material" principle of the present Reformation.[67]

(cont.) embalmed with everlasting perfume? Improve youe power for the true Religion. Justifie our Magna Charta, the grand Charter of Scripture truthes, that doth entitle us to Salvation. Confirme unto us our Petition of Right, establish upon Pastors and Churches. . ."

[67] This Solemn League and Covenant as the "material" principle of reformation was detected by the most serious and consciencious opponent of the Presbyterian program, John Gauden, Bishop of Worcester, in his "Certaine Scrvples and Doubtes of Conscience about taking the Solemn League and Covenant." (1644) He criticized, "onely the Covenant sayes it must be according to the Word of God, and the example of best Reformed Churches; but which are the best Reformed Churches, is the greates Controversial this Kingdome has now in question, and so far, or rather, impossible to be determined into a uniformity, . . . and being by this Covenant to reforme England and Ireland according to the Word of God, . . . I doe by undeniable consequence and conclude, and grant the present Doctrine, Worship, Discipline and Government of the Church of Scotland to be according tothe Word of God, [so by virtue of this Covenant we are obliged] to endeavour the Preservation of the Doctrine, Worship, Discipline and Government of the Church of Scotland in the state it is at present, without condition how far it may appear agreeable tothe Word of God. . ."

Even though the preachers believed their reformation to be based on the Bible solely, the reality was being turned more and more into political direction. They had to catechize the people by various means, "The Covenanters Catechisme: or A brief and familiar Analysis and Exposition of the Covenant"[68] being one example.

To sum up, the Presbyterian view of history was in line with the orthodox Reformed theology. It was a revival of an interpretation of history viewed as being under God's providence, the mystery of which was revealed in the Bible, and the knowledge of which should lead to a response in terms of the "national covenant", so that history would be combined with politics.

(2) The Eschatological Tendency among the Independents

On many points, such as the idea of God's providential government of history, the analogy of the events in the Old Covenant and those in the NewCovenant, etc., the Independents shared the same position with the Presbyterians.

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[68] It is interesting that in order to make the national engagement practical andactive, one anonymous preacher published "The Covenanters Catechisme", 1644. The most interesting point in this catechism is how this author dealt with the "political" and "national" character of covenant: to this question: "When a Covenant is taken by a whole Body of a Nation or Congregation, whether every one is bound to it that belongeth to this Nation or Congregation, though he hath not sworne Personally, or by a kind of reall or verball elusion and equivocation laboured to put it off?" he answered "Yes, that every one is bound to it, because it is an Oath of the Body, which freeth no particular member from it, unlesse he cease tobe a member, 2 Chron. 34, 32. Ney, it doth bind those that are absent; . . . It doth bidn our very posterity." p. 6. This is a typical expression of a collective thinking of covenant.

They were no less Biblicist than the Presbyterians, although John Goodwin argued that Scripture provided "no Command" to exact a church covenant nor "any Instance or Example of such an exaction."[69] Then, what was the difference between the Presbyerians andthe Independents? We cannot attempt to exhaust all the differences, but it is important to point out one of the differences with respect to the conception of history. In the Presbyterian mind there was a combination between history and politics such that God'sprovidence was to be realized through a national engagement. Being thus reformed, the national church realized herself as antitype of the type, the nation of Israel. But for the Independents this point of contact did not occur in that way. For the Independent mind the tendency to distinguish politics and ecclesiology was more and more intensified, and this was to destroy the Presbyerian harmony of the national covenant and the church covenant. For the Presbyterians the national covenant was at one with the ecclesiastical covenant, so that the covenant partner which was a nation as a whole could realize God's providential will through a politico-ecclesiastical engagement. To be sure, Philip Nye, one of the Independent leaders of the day, was a chief mediator who introduced the Scotch National Church Covenant into England, (viz. the Solemn League and Covenant.) But the split between politics and ecclesiology the Indpendent interpret it which was seriously religio-political to the Scotsch Presbyterians, as more or less political expediency, despite all the religious outlook. It is doubtful whether the Independents interpreted and accepted it in the way that Scotsch Presbyterians meant.

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[69] Cf. Nuttal, Visible Saints, The Congregational Way, 1640-1660, (1957), p. 78.

The idea of a "church covenant" was different from the Presbyterian idea of a "national covenant" because it was strictly an ecclesiological principle. As such it distinguished the ecclesiological community from the other secular communities, that is to say, separated church and state. This idea of "church covenant" made the idea of the church narrower, and interestingly made the conception of history more andmore speculative. The more purified and restricted the church is, the more the view of history becomes speculative and transcendental. The church was, for the Independents, a community of the "visible saints," and this eccelsiastical self-consciousness was to point towards an individualistic existential tendency. But as we have stated in the Chapter I, the way of Independency, which stands upon that inclination which goes from Presbyterianism to Quakerism, could do no better than to hold existentialism and historical speculation in tension. We shall recall Ames in this connection, who as we have described before, is a good example of the Independent mind.

This split had a twofold effect: on the one hand it was to purify the church, and on the other it was to lead a sort of political opportunism. And then, history was no longer seen as a "church covenant." The Presbyterians interpreted the sign of the time when God provides the occasion of Reformation to be realized through national engagement. In this sense history was grasped by their "national covenant." The church must be reformed in this response to God's providence; whereas the Independents were able to establish a locally reformed church despite the course of history. Thomas Goodwin preached before the Parliament at the beginning of the Civil War:

> This Parliament seemes to have been called by God, for such a time as this; and if you will not doe it, God will doe it without you: As he said that Deliverance, so (sayI) Reformation will arise some other way; God hath a Spirit here in the Text that will worke it out in men hearts, if power and might shoudl not; . . .[70]

Although he urged the Parliament to be honoured for its good service to God's work, yet, compared with the Presbyterian view, there was no systematic identification of the cause of God with the task of the Parliament. On the contrary, even he showed the tendency to separate God's providence from man's (viz. the Parliament's) task, and also a tendency to turn the idea of reformation toward the spiritual sphere internal to man. The distinction between God and man was stressed thus:

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[70] Thoman Goodwin, *Zerubbabels Encouvragement to Finish the Temple, A Sermon preached before the House of Commons*, April 27, 1642, p. 52.

> the multiplication and growth of the Church depend not upon man. . . the growth and maintaining of them he compares unto the sprouting up of herbs and grasse in wildernesses where man comes not, & so their springing tarrieth not for man, nor waiteth for the sons of men, for them to come with watering pots to nourish them, (as herbs in gardens do) but these have showers from heaven that give the increase: I the Lord (speaking of this Vineyard) doe keep it, I will water it every moment.[71]

For the Presbyterians, the reformation of the church had to be a "historical" change as well as a "national" change, but for the Independents this unified change was not fully understood nor accepted. Against the Presbyterian dependency upon the Parliament, the Independent could say, "The building of Gods Church is his owne businesse."[72]

The difference in the conception of history can, therefore, be seen most clearly from the difference in the idea of covenant, especially the difference in the covenant-partnership. The most serious and articulate criticism on the Independent idea of "church covenant" came from the group of Presbyterians who were influenced by John Ball, Anthony Burgess, Edmund Calamy, and Daniel Cawdrey for example. Ball rejected the covenant as a constitutive principle of the church,[73] and this position was taken directly against the Independents by those friends of Ball who were Presbyterian. Calamy wrote:

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[71] op. cit., p. 53.

[72] Goodwine, op. cit., p. 48.

> There is indeed a Covenant that some fo much contend for, and make the very form of a particular church, without which a Church cannot be a true Church, which is called a Church-covenant. For my part, I conceive that whosoever shall say, that a Church-covenant is an Ordinance of Christ, and necessary to the very being of a visible Church; doth not only unchurch most of the Churches of Jesus Christ, but doth also set up his own invention for an Ordinance of Christ.[74]

Or Daniel Cawdrey wrote pointing to the same problematic element, after describing other points at issue:

> That none but confederates by the explicit Church-covenant have right to Ordinances: which is to keep out many precious should from communion with their fellow-members, and their children from Baptism, and to make them no better then Infidels.[75]

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[73] It is noteworthy that John Ball rejected the idea of making the covenant the constitutive principle of the church: "The work of grace and heavenly calling is that which giveth being to the Church, and make it a different society from all other companies of men whatsoever. . . every one that is thus called is of the Church; and every one of the Church is thus called. He that is not thus called is not of the Church, and he that is not of the Church is not thus called. He cannot be out of the Church, who is in Covenant with God: nor can he be a member of the Church, who is not in the Covenant. . . Yet when I speake thus of this covenant, its far from me to thinke that it doth give being to the Church: Its one thing to give being to a thing, perse, or by it selfe, and its another thing to concurre to the being of a thing; . . ." Treatise of Faith, p. 345.

[74] Calamy, The Great Danger of Covenant-refusing. . . The Epistle Dedicatory.

[75] Daniel Cawdrey, The Inconsistencie of the Independency, The Epistle to the Dissenting Brethren.

Both questioned the narrowness of the concept of the church which was established by the church covenant. If the idea of church covenant be taken, the Presbyterian theological politics must be groundless. If the church, being so narrowly conceived, is a corporation within, or outside the state, it is no longer a subject to recapitulate world history in responsiblity. To be exact, and Independent "visible" church is a corporation within the state, and the "invisible" church in the Independent conception is a "spiritual" community beyond the world history. To the Presbyterian idea of "national covenant," the church and the state are co-extensively identified, but the Independents distinguished the church the realm of Christ and the world the realm of God.

This distinction was theologically clarified by the distinction between "providential dispensations" and "Covenant of Grace." God deals with the world history in terms of "providential dispensations" and God deals with the church through Christ in terms of "Covenant of Grace."[76] But those two ways were not quite well reconciled to one another in the Independents' mind. The

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[76] This distinction may be learned, for example, characteristically in John Owen's sermon "God's Presence with a People, the Spring of their Prosperity; with their special Interest in abiding with Him, A Sermon preached to the Parliament of the Commonwealth, Octob. 30. 1656." Owen emphasized on the difference between providential dispensational way of God's dealing with the world, and the way of Covenant of Grace. The former is more conditional, and the latter absolute as much as God binds Himself to the believers in Christ.

Presbyterian idea of the national covenant was certainly able to synthesize both ways. The Independents seem to be unsystematic in the respect of the connection between "dispensation" and "covenant." For example, John Goodwine could utilize the idea of "providential dispensation" for criticizing the Presbyterian policy at the Westminster Assembly in interpreting an occasion of the Parliamentary Army's defeat at Newwark as God's disfavour to the Presbyterians.[77]

Thus distinguished, God's dispensations become harder to grasp by human knowledge and ethics. But how did the Independents solve this problem more positively. Thomas Goodwin gave a noteworthy suggestion which may clarify their thought on the relation between God's dispensation and man's task.

> That God carryes on the work of finishing his Temple, not by power nor might, but by his Spirit. By Spirit he meaneth the holy Ghost, by a more immediate hand stirring up mens spirits unto this work; turning and convincing them of the truth, and of their duty towards it; and likewise by coincident acts of Providence, so apparently wheeling about to the effecting of it, that though might and power be brought to concur in it, yet so as his hand alone shall be seene and acknowledged in it.[78]

This text reveals an important aspect of the Independent mind, that in contrast to the Presbyterian theologico-political way of national covenant, they looked to the which comes from above, transcendentally and miraculously stirring men in their spirits towards the work of reformation. This is only God's act, all human "might and power" being in service to His work. "The building of the temple is thus more immediately carryed on by the working of the holy Ghost." If the Presbyterians were inclined more towards the "political" way, then the Independents more towards "miraculous" way of the interpretation of God's will.

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[77] John Goodwine, "θεομαχια" (1644). He interpreted the event in the light of Joshua chapter 7 which described the Israel's defeat in the city of Ai, because of Achan's sin.

[78] Thomas Goodwin, op. cit., p. 44.

Both the Presbyterians and the Independents shared the idea of the "Instrument" of God's Providence, but the difference was that for the Presbyterians this instrumetn was the Parliament; whereas for the Independents it was the Army. Thus, it became possible for the Independents to interpret the Army's victories as God's Providence. By virtue of this thought the Independent leaders could identify themselves the victorious Army regime.

> God hath founded Sion, he hath taken care of the generation of the righteous, the children of Sion, however different among themselves; hath broken the yoke of their Oppressors, given them peace, ordered the Affaires of this Nation, so that they doe, or may, all of them enjoy quietnesse, one not envying the other, nor they vexing them, but serving God according to the light, which he is graciously pleased to afford them, they waite for farther manifestations of the glorious Gospell; and that God hath broken, and will break, every designe, that either openly and professedly, or upon spacious pretences, of crying loe here is Christ, or loe there, hath sought, or shall seek and endeavour to subvert this his work, to the preservation whereof, he will certainly mouldthe Government, and interest of this Nation, ordering its affaires in a peculiar manner on that account only: and no that he delighteth in one way or form, whereinto it hath beencast, more then another.[79]

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[79] John Owen, God's Work in Founding Zion, and His Peoples Duty thereupon, September 17, 1656.

This statement was made before Cromwell and the Parliament in the year 1656. The preacher, John Owen, had seen the accomplishment of the work of God in the victory of Cromwellian Army. Yet, it is noteworthy that though "God hath founded Sion," the idea of reformation turned towards the internalsshpere of man. The object of concern for the Independents was still not a political, but a spiritual Reformation. The providential-dispensational view of history was no longer synthesized with the motive of reformation in the Independents. History and ethics were losing their mutual interaction.

> Take heede, lest that evill be still abiding upon any of our Spirits, that we should be crying out and calling for Reformation, withought a due consideration of what it is, and how it is to be brought about. I which one of many of them: who have prayed for it, and complained for want of it, had endeavour'd to carry it on as they might; would you have a Reformation; be you more humble, more holy, more zealous, delight more in the waies, worship, Ordinances of God: reforme your persons in your lives, Relations, families, parishes, as to Gospell obedience, and you will see a glorious Reformation indeed: what mean you by a Reformation, is it the hurting of others, or doing good to our selves? is it a power over other mens, persons or our owne lusts? God hath now for sundry yeares tryed us, whether indeed we love Reformation or no; have any provoked us, or compelled us to defile the worship of God, with ceremonies or superstitions, and our owne consciences there withall? have we been imposed on in the wayes of God, by men ignorant of them? hath not God said to us! you have prayed under persecution for Reformation, you that have fought in the high places of the field for Reformation, goe now, reforme your selves; you Minister, preach as often as you will, as freely as you please, no man shall controll you, live as holily as you can, pray as often, fast as often as you will; be full of of bounty and good wrokes, giving examples to your flock, none shall trouble you; be instant in season, out of season, preach to the whole counsell of God without controll; you people by holy, serve God in holinesse, keepe in them, bring forth such fruits as

> men may glorifie God on your account, condemne the world, justifie the cause of God, by a Gospel Conversation; . . .[80]

This "personal Reformation" had lost its relation to political matters, and the latter was to be decided by God's miraculous dispensation which occurs beyond human ethical responsibility. There was emphasized the distinction between God's design in history and man's ethical responsibility; as a result a combination of these became very difficult and unsystematic. It is right to sever God's dispensation from man's politics, and in this sense the Independent was more dutiful to God's truth. On this basis the Independents could envisage God in his freedom outwitting the Presbyterians: "He hath judged otherwise as to the condition wherein his people should glorify him."[81] "Otherwise," here means different from the Presbyterian prospect. Owen restated that Goodwin's theory in this way:

> Providentiall dispensations are discoveries of the wisdome of God in disposing of the condition of his people, so as they may best glorify him. To dispute against the condition wherein at any time we are cast by his providence, is to rise up against this wisdome in disposing of things to his own Glory.[82]

Thus, according to the Independent view, compared with the Presbyterians, the phase of relationship between politics and ethics, history and ethics, the matter of the state and the matter of the church, were more ambiguous and unsystematic. The distance and relationship between God's and ~~and~~ man's ways seemed not to be treated consistently. Both the Massachusetts theocracy and Roger Williams' toleration, for example, came out of the Independent position. Religiously speaking, both enthusiasm and seekerism (viz. confidence and doubt) arose from the Independent religion. The reformation in eschatological hope and the ethical-personal reformation were not fully reconciled. A curious combination of political opportunism and religious spiritualism occured here. The position of God's providential dispensation was curiously combined, or identified, with the principle of "Might," the example of which is given in the thought of Hugh Peter.[83]

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[80] op. cit., p. 42-45.

[81] op. cit., p. 25.

[82] ibid.

(3) The Fifth-Monarchists and the Levellers

It is no wonder that Fifth-Monarchism was deeply connected with the Independent interpretation of history, though the dispensational tendenay was more strongly emphasized. Interestingly enough, Thomas Goodwin was one of the original advocators of the idea of Fifth Monarchy. He is reported to have been preaching millenarian sermons full of complicated calculations as early as 1639.[84] His explicit "Fifthmonarchism" was displayed in a sermon which was publishedlater by a Fifthmonarchist for the defence of their cause under the title "A Sermon of the Fifth Monarchy" in 1654. John Owen also was of the same opinion in his "The Advantage of the Kingdom of Christ in the Shaking of the Kingdoms of the World" published in 1651. In the close contact with them, there was a famous millenarian preacher, John Archer, the author of the famous pamphlet "The Personall raigne of Christ upon Earth " published in 1641, in which he calculated the second coming of Christ as King about 1666.

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[83] Cf. Lilburne, Discourse Betwixt Lieutenant Colonel Iohn Lilburne, . . . and Mr. Hugh Peter (1649).

[84] Cf. G. F. Nuttall, Visible Saints (1957), p. 148.

Fostered in the spiritual field of Independency, Fifthmonarchism went beyond the Independents themselves. At the political level, the difference between the Independents and the Fifthmonarchists was drawn clearly by their attitude towards the Cromwellian regime. The Independents accepted as God's providenct that Cromwell had acted as his "Instrument." The Fifthmonarchists, however, could hardly accept this regime, not because it was a government set up by the Army, of which the Levellers and Parliamentarians were critical, but because it was a government by a single person; for according to their belief, it should be a government by saint with Christ.[85] This difference came out of the more profound reason of the different conceptions of God's dispensational history: the Independents could accept it, because they refrained from speaking definitely about the way and manner of God's dispensation, only depending on the "testimony of the events." Owen, for example, said, "I know not what may be accomplished before the End of the world, from the beginning of it hitherto for the most part, the thought of God, have not bin as these thoughts of ours."[86] But the Fifth-monarchists, like the Communists of today, did know that the course of events in God's dispensation should be explained by way of the interpretation of Daniel's prophecy and John's Revelation.[87]

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[85] Cf. Brown, *The Political Activities of the Baptists and Fifth Monarchy Men in England During the Interregnum* (1912) p. 44.

Fifthmonarchists interpreted history by the application of the images in Daniel's prophecy, and were seriously concerned with the end of the old age, the fourth monarchy of Rome, that is, the age of Papal rule, and looked for the beginning of the new age, the fifthmonarchy, that is, the age of Christ's rule. The picture of the coming age was drawn and theduty of the saints was described, for example, as follows:

> Saints who shall exercise and mannage this supreamacy of power, in the first rise of this fifth Monarchy are such as have been actors withChrist in warring against the whore, who are called, chose, and faithful, Rev. 17, 14. I mean the Lambs Military Officers, with whom he betrusteth the Militia, or supram power of his Kingdome, Rev. 19, 14. who for many reasons may seem most meet to mannage the supream power, as the Judges of old, and after thm David a man of war did, untill the Churches be settled in Peace. . . This I conceive to be the office and duty of the supream Authority, or Councel of the State,

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[86] Owen, op. cit. p. 25.

[87] As to the breach between Fifthmonarchists and the Independents cf. Brown, p. 46, and Nuttall, Visible Saints, p. 148.

> and the Supream power is to incourage them, and strengthen their hands in this work, until Melchizedeck became King of Salem, I mean till Christ have settled his people in peace. . . Then will they beat their swords into plough-shears, and their spears into pruning hooks: Nation shall not lift up sword against Nation, neither shall they learn war any more, Isa. 2. 4. Mic. 4. 3. And in that peaceable state will the Churches continue for a thousand years, and the Saints shall reign with Christ, or for him. Rev. 20.[88]

In relation to the history of England, Fifthmonarchism is charaterized by its totally negative attitude towards the past. We must mention in this connection that there was a curious combination of dispensational interpretation and some elements which came from the Common Lawyers' historical concern. There is drawn a sharp dividing line between Fourth Monarchy and Fifth Monarchy, as if the age of Capitalism should be extinguished before the coming of the new age of Communism. The story of the Fourth Monarchy which was interpreted by dispensational periodization, had only negative meaning. Aspinwall viewed this difference not only formally but also materially. There would be a difference in the constitutive principle between the Fourth and Fifth Monarchy: "Dragons way" for the former and "Christs way" for the latter. Interestingly enough, the "Christs way" was explained as the combination of a democratic election and Christ's qualification and sanction, while the "Dragons way" involved the assumption of power "by Tyranny, Oppression, and Usurpation."[89] He judged the Fourth Monarchy to be exemplified by the Norman Conquest, which showed the "Dragons way" of government. Thus, the Fifthmonarchists viewed the whole history of English monarchy begun with the Norman Conquest in a totally negative judgment. God's dispensation to the fifth Monarchy, therefore, began with the extinction of the Norman Blood, which meant the beheading of Charles the First. By their negative view the Norman Conquest showed the Fifthmonarchists their involvement in the popular trend of the Norman Yoke theory, but by grasping it from the dispensational point of view, their understanding of history became sharper and more negative with respect to the past, and consequently the utopian tendency was intensified.

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[88] William Aspinwall, A Brief Description of the Fifth Monarchy, or Kingdome, that shortly is to come into the World. (1653), pp. 6-7.

In contrast to the Fifthmonarchists, the Levellers had accomodated into their thought the tradition of the Common Lawyers' view of history in the course of their

(Fifthmonarchists' dispensational view of English history)



(Figure I)

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[89] Aspinwall, The Legislative Povver is Christs peculiar Prerogative, (1656), pp. 22-23.

movement. As to the difference between them, Brown rightly wrote;

> While the ideal of the Levellers was government by the people, that of the Fifth Monarchists was government by the elect, and while the Levellers longed for a full and free Parliament, the Fifth Monarchy men yearned for a dispensation from Heaven.[90]

We must recognize, however, that this superficial difference was rooted in the more profound difference of conception of history. This must be made clear. The Levellers, Lilburne typically, learned much from the writings of the Common Lawyers, especially from Coke. Coke was virtually the only source, apart from the other Antiquarian works with which the Levellers were familiar. Lilburne, during legal battle with the House of Lords, was deeply influenced by Coke's view that the Magna Carta had embodied the Anglo-Saxon liberties. The term "Magna Carta" was one which occupied one of the most important parts in his political thinking. It was upon this basis that he defended his own and people's liberty.[91]

This view of the history of England was in line with the Common Lawyers, although there is something which must be dealt with later in this relation. The views of both the Common Lawyers and the Levellers in contrast to the Fifthmonarchists are represented by diagramme 2. The crucial point is how to interpret the heritage from the Anglo-Saxon past, which was shown in Diagramme 2. by the dotted line. The Levellers' interpretation of this heritage was curiously different from either the Common Lawyers or the Fifthmonarchists. To be sure, the Levellers did not simply negate this heritage and thus differed from the Fifthmonarchist who saw nothing positive in the Fourth Monarchy. The Levellers, accepting the Common Lawyers' view of history, allowed themselves to be steeped more deeply in English history, and accomodated positively into their thought some elements which came from the Common Lawyers. They accomodated more from the Common Lawyers' view of history than any other Puritan group, than the Presbyterians, the Independents and this Fifthmonarchists.

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[90] Brown, *op. cit.*, p.38

[91] A portrait, which is frontispiece to the *Triall of Liut. Collnel John Lilburne*. . .(1649) shows that Lilburne stands defending his case at the trial holding Coke's *Institutes* in his right hand. So much Coke was important in his political thinking. D. B. Robertson's tabulation of the references in the works of John Lilburne shows more citations of Coke than of all other secular authors. *Religious Foundations of Leveller Democracy* (N. Y., 1951) appendix.

On the other hand, the influence of the Common Lawyers was by no means accepted either directly or in a pure form. Lilburne read Coke extensively, but he did not seem to accept his as he was. Lilburne was also influenced by a revolutionary Common Lawyer, Henry Parker, whose inter-

(Levellers' view of English history)



(Figure II)

pretation significantly deviated from the orthodox Common Lawyers' position. Parker's thought of 1642, emphasized the discontinuity of the ancient law and liberty.[92] Therefore we must admit that there was a tension in Lilburne's mind, whether to view the Anglo-Saxon heritage of law positively or negatively. The orthodox Common Lawyers' position was essentially conservative, despite their engagement in the Revolution which was rather motivated by a conservative purpose against the Stuart Kings' deviation from the English tradition of the Common Law. The lawyers rested their case on the precedents in English legal tradition, and never departed from the ground of the Common Law. But Lilburne was one who could write like this in 1646:

> The greatest mischief of all and the oppressing bondage of England ever since the Norman Yoke, is this: I must be tried before you by a law (called the common law) that I know not, nor I think no man else, neither do I know where to find it or read it. . . The tedious, unknown, and impossible-to-be-understood common law practises in Westminster Hall came in by the will of a tyrant, namely William the Conqueror.[93]

In reality, the Common Law as such was not pure but corrupt. In recognizing this Lilburne departed from the position of Common Lawyers.

Lilburne seems to have stood in tension between the

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[92] Cf. Christopher Hill's above mentioned article, "The Norman Yoke", pp. 26-27.

[93] Lilburne, The Just Mans Justification, (1645), p. 15.

Fifthmonarchists and the Common Lawyers. His view of the Anglo-Saxon heritage may be, therefore, characterized as a modification from the positive toward the negative interpretation. English legal heritage was viewed in a tension which was at once both positive and negative. This "dialectics" of history took a form which we generally call "The Norman Yoke theory."[94] This theory interpreted the historical reality in dialectical terms, in contrast to the good old days of the Anglo-Saxon. This tension was the "pull" which drove men to revolutionary action. In order to appreciate this theory of history, however, we must note that thiswas endorsed by a theological interpretation of history; in other words, this theory was nothing else than an application of the biblical scheme of history to English history. Such a historical "dislectics" was a biblical property which viewed the world history in terms of "Paradise Lost" and "Paradise Regained" to use Miltonic terminology. English history was telescoped into the biblical scheme of history. This view was generally accepted by the contemporary Englishmen, but it had a peculiar role to the Levellers' thought.

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[94] The best study of this theory was made by Christopher Hill, which we have mentioned above. "The Norman Yoke", Democracy and the Labour Movement, edited by John Saville, (London, 1954). He described this theory as follows: "The theory took many forms, but in its main outlines it ran as follows: Before 1066 the Anglo-Saxon inhabitants of this country lived as free and equal citizens, governing themselves through representative institutions. The Norman Conquest deprived them of this liberty, established the tyranny of an alien king and landlords. But the people did not forget the rights they had lost. They fought continuously to recover them, with varying success. Concessions (Magna Carta, for instance) were from time to time extroted from their rulers, and always the tradition of lost Anglo-Saxon freedom was a stimulus to more insistant demands upon the successors of the Norman usurpers." (p. 11)

The Levellers' unique use of this theory of the Norman Yoke may be found in their method of applying this theory to the revolutionary cause. The "negative" emphasis on the view of English history was more and more intensified when they had to confront the Parliament later. That is to say, while the Levellers, especially Lilburne, stood with the Parliament fighting against the King, or at least until the conflict with the House of Lords, the element which was taken from the Common Lawyers' source played rather a positive role. But in the conflict which finally occurred with the House of Commons, the Levellers had almost deserted the position of Magna Carta, and thus the revolutionary tendency was more and more intensified. It is interesting to note that Lilburne who was deeply imbued with the thought of Coke, could not easily depart from the position which he had based in the English legal heritage, despite the criticism from his comrades: Walwyn criticized Lilburne's heavy dependency on Magna Carta saying, "Magna Charta hath been more precious in your esteem than it deserveth," and it is "but a part of the peoples rights and liberties" which "by the blood of our Ancestors wrestled out of the pawes of those Kings, who by force had conquered the Nation, changed the lawes and by hand held them in bondage."[95] Overton also wrote in agreement to Walwyn:

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[95] Walwyn, "Englands Lamentable Slaverie" Haller's ed. III, 313-315.

> You know, the Lawes of this Nation are unworthy a Free-People, and deserve from first to last, to be considered, and seriously debated, and reduced to an agreement with common equity, and right reason, which ought to be the Forme and Life of every Government. Magna Charta it self being but a beggerly thing, containing many markes of intollerable bondage, and the Lawes that have been made since by Parliaments, have in very many particulars made our Government much more oppressive and intollerable.[96]

Although a recent study suggested that Lilburne himself turned his back on the Magna Carta in 1647 in his "Regall Tyrannie Discovered"[97], yet Lilburne did not desert wholly what he had accepted from the Common Law tradition. We admit that there was a shift from the positive attitude towards the English legal heritage to a more negative attitude, but this shift was an important process in bringing the national Civil Right up to the level of universal Natural Right, aprocess which we shall discuss later. Through this process, and by virtue of an acceptance of the Common Law tradition, however distorted it may have been the inclination towards Natural Law and Divine Law avoided becoming abstract. English history was grasped in tension from affirmation to negation, whereas the Fifth-monarchists grasped **it** in a simple negation.

The Diggers shared the same view of history as the Levellers, though they applied the Norman Yoke theory to their concern with the "land", while the Levellers applied it to "man." Winstanley wrote thus:

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[96] Overton, "A Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens, . . ." Haller's ed. III, p. 365.

[97] Vann, "The Free Anglo-Saxons", *Journals of History of Ideas*, (XIX, 1958), p. 271.

> The Reformation that England now is to endeavour, is not to remove the Norman Yoke only, and to bring us back to be governed by those Laws that were before William the Conqueror came in, as if that were the rule or mark we aime at: No, that is not it; but the Reformation is according to the Word of God, and that is the pure Law of righteousnesse before the fall, which made all things, unto which all things are to be restored; and he that endeavours not that, is a Covenant-breakers.[98]

Winstanley's theological background was the combination of Quaker mysticism and a theology of history which held that the English national history was fused with the universal biblical history.[99]

We must take this fusion of both histories seriously in order to face the problem of Natural Law in this age, a problem with which we shall deal next.

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[98] Winstanley, A Letter to the Lord Fairfax, Generall of the English Forces, and his Councell of War, (1649), p. 13, Sabine's edition of Winstanley's Works, p. 292.

[99] This point was admirably clarified by Paul Elmen in his article "The Theological Basis of Digger Communism", Church History XXIII, (1954), pp. 207-218.

II. The Puritan Idea of Natural Law

A. The Historical Scheme of Thought as the Place where the Shift from Natural Law to Natural Right Occured

The shift from natural law to natural right can only be made clear correctly against the background of the historical scheme of thought which we have described above. The arena of the 17th Century ideological struggle between Anglicanism and Puritanism was history: the difference will be clear in comparing the time of the Tudors to that of the Stuarts, in view of the fact that a Tudor apologist for Anglicanism such as Hooker was successful in recapitulating its interest and dependence in history through cosmo-ontology. The contradiction between Anglicanism and Puritanism in the time of Elizabeth was, with respect to the thought-pattern, one between ontological Weltanschauung and history. But after King James made a fatal shift in apologetic method, the battle line was changed to the Puritan advantage, although its effect was not fully realized by the time of the Civil War. The idea of natural law can not be properly treated apart from this background. Natural law was, during this time, deeply involved with history, and changed according to the changed meanings of history. We must, therefore, start by making clear the deep involvement of natural law with history during the Civil War period.

We must recall that both Anglicanism and Puritanism by the beginning of the Civil War had made a curious combination between biblical history and national history, and there was a loose interpenetration of these concepts of history. These two concepts of history were not fully brought into synthesis, yet a kind of conceptional amalgamation had been achieved. It is in relation to this commingled idea of history that the idea of natural law was conceived by the contemporary mind.

Here is one example taken from the Parliamentary side. Henry Parker, one of the most articulate theorists of the Revolution, who is extraordinarily interesting in showing this historical scheme because he was not a preacher but a layman and lawyer. In 1642 he wrote the following in a famous revolutionary pamphlet:

> Man being depraved by the fall of Adam grew so untame and uncivill a creature, that the Law of God written in his brest was not sufficient to restrayne him from mischiefe, or to make him sociable, and therefore without some magistracy to provide new orders, and to judge of old, and to execute according to Justice, no society could be upheld. Without society men could not live, and without lawes men could not be sociable, and without authority somewhere invested, to judge according to Law, and execute according to judgement, Law was a vaine and void thing. It was soon therefore provided that lawes agreeable to the dictates of reason should be ratified by common consent, and that the execution and interpretation of those Lawes should be intrusted to some magistrate, for the preventing of common injuries betwixt Subject and Subject, but when it after appeared that man was yet subject to unnaturall destruction, by the Tyranny of intrusted magistrates, a mischiefe almost as fatall as to be without all magistrates, how to provide a wholsome remedy therefore, was not so easie to be invented. 'Twas not difficult to invent Lawes, for the limiting of supreme governors, but to invent how those lawes should be executed or by whom interpreted, was almost impossible, nam quis custodiat ipsos custodes; . . .[100]

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[100] Parker, Observations. . . p.13.

Here we can discern the most important theories of the Revolution, though in embryonic form, theories such as that of social contract, the ideas of natural law and positive laws, the theory of resistance, and the idea of sovereignty. By reading the text carefully, however, we discover as a framework of this text a scheme of biblical history. Those revolutionary ideas and theories were conceived in a historical scheme of thought. The presupposed primordial state of nature, the Fall and the establishment of political society and positive laws were located in the course of history as read in the Scriptures. Then, if we read his next important pamphlet "Ius Populi" published in 1644, this historical scheme was more clearly made apparent. There we can observe how profoundly his thinking was framed by the scheme combining biblical and English history. It begins with the history of Creation, then comes the history of Patriarchs, then the history of Israelite nations and their kings, and this line of history connects finally to English history. Every important political discussion was given in this framework. The idea of natural law and the theory of social contract were fundamentally combined with the interpretation of such a history. Nobody may do justice to the idea of natural law in this age without knowing this background. To speak about natural law, Parker thought that it was a law of the primordial state of man, but not immediately a law of the fallen state, to which positive laws and the executioners of which laws are concerned. To use Kantian terminology, natural law is not a "constitutive" principle of the political society, but a "regulative" principle, which does not identify itself immediately with positive laws of society. It can judge whether a law be good or bad, and thus it allows for adjustment. Without going further, let us see how the Anglican Royalists had the same scheme of thought as the background of political thought.

Henry Ferne was, no doubt, the chief theorist of the Royalist cause, but in order to exemplify the persistance of the same thought-pattern let us cite Robert Filmer, whom we have already mentioned as the author of "Patriarcha," which was not original but was in line with Ferne's thought, but more known to posterity than Ferne himself because of Locke's criticism of it. It may be interesting to reproduce Locke's summary of Filmer's thought which was given in his First Treatise of Government:

> He /Filmer/ assures us how this Fatherhood began in Adam, continued it's course, and kept the World in order all the time of the Patriarchs till the Flood, got out of the Arch with Noah and his Sons, made and supported all the Kings of the Earth till the Captivity of the Israelites in Egypt, and then the poor Fatherhood was under hatches till God by giving the Israelites Kings, Re-established the Ancient and prime Right of the lineal Succession in paternal Government.[101]

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[101] Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690), p.8.

Then he quoted and summarized:

> And first as it was devested in Adam, he says not only Adam, but the succeeding Patriarchs, had by Right of Fatherhood, Royal Authority over their Children, p. 12. This Lordship which Adam by Command had over the whole World, and by right descending from him, the Patriarchs did enjoy; was as large and ample as the Absolute Dominion of any Monarch, which hath been since the Creation. p. 13 . . . . Adam and the Patriarchs had Absolute Power of Life and Death, p. 35. Kings in the right of Parents, succeed to the Exercise of supreme jurisdiction. p. 19. As Kingly Power is by the Law of God, so it hath no inferior Law to Limit it, Adam was Lord of all, p. 40. The Father of a Family governs by no other Law than by his own will, p. 78. The Superiority of Princes if above Laws, p. 79. The unlimited jurisdiction of Kings is so amply described by Samuel. p. 80. Kings are above the Laws. p. 93....Neither Common nor Statute Laws, are or can be any Diminution of that General Power, which Kings have over their People by right of Fatherhood, p. 115.[102]

What Locke attempted to refute in order to justify the Whig Revolution of 1688 was this sort of thought which was revived at the occasion of the Restoration. But Filmer, who died in 1653, was a leading theorist during the Civil Wars and fought against the Parliamentarian theory of resistance. Thus, this "Patriarcha" was a product of that time, even though it exercized influence after the Restoration, having been published in 1680.

We can discover here too a biblical scheme of history as the framework of thought. In the light of our preceeding study we may be able to find in Filmer's historical thought a combination of King James' interpretation of monarchy as paternity and Field's retroactive view towards the primodial history. It is a characteristic difference from Parker that in the mind of Filmer the idea of nature and natural law came in political society as a "constitutive" principle. Monarchical government is one which reflected the "Order of Creation" immediately. The Royalists judged the present Civil War as an "unnatural" war, based on this principle. It was as unnatural as sons who rebeled their father by arms. It is interesting to note that while Parker and the Puritans in general took the occasion of Fall seriously in the interpretation of history and society, Filmer and the Royalists in general did not.

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[102] Quoted from Locke's Two Treatises of Government, 1690, pp. 10-11; the pages given in this quotation are of Filmer's "Patriarcha" which was published in 1680.

The process from biblical history to national history was ambiguous. The same may be said in reference to national history. For example, the idea of the supremacy of law was to be proved in terms of the continuity of the "anient" law over the Norman Conquest; the fact of social contract was in the same way, discussed in an important relation with the Norman Conquest. The Parliamentarians thought not only that the original political society in biblical history was established by contract, but also that such a contract existed through the ages of English history. This interpretation was apparently combined with the problem of political decision, of resistance. The Royalists, in line with James' interpretation, viewed the Conquest as an "absolute" conquest. Ferne insisted on the theory of absolute conquest, which disputes the Parliamentarian emphasis on the existence of consent.

> How shall the Conscience be satisfied that this their argument, grounded upon election and the derivation of power from the people, can have place in this kingdom, when as the Crown not only descends by inheritance, but also has so often been settled by Conquest in the lines of Saxons, Danes, and Normans? In answering to this they look beyond all these, and say, the right is still good to the people by reason of their first election. I answer, So then that first election must be supposed here, & supposed good against all other titles, or else this power of resistance falls to the ground. It is probable indeed that Kings at first were by choice here as elswhere; but can Conscience rest upon such remote probabilities for resistance, or think that first election will give it power against Princes that do not claim by it. We tell them the Roman Emperors were not to be resisted, Rom. 13.2. they reply, as we had it above, that they were absolute Monarchs. But how came they of subjects to be absolute Monarchs? Was it any otherwise than by force and arms? The way that the Saxons, Danes, and Normans made themselves masters of this people, was not the right of the people as good against them for the power of resistance by virtue of the first election, as well as of the people of this Land, against their Kings after so many conquests?[103]

His intention in this emphasis was, as he explained himself, not to allow the kings of England to rule as conquerors, God forbid, but "to shew this slender plea of the first election can no more take place against the Kings of this Land, than it could against the Roman Monarchs."[104] That is to say, Paul's teaching of non-resistance should not be exempted in this case by an assumption of a contract which could not be proved with respect to the English monarchy which established itself by the right of conquest. Thus he attempted to refute by historical example the Parliamentarian assumption of existence of contract between the "English" kings and the "English" people.

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[103] Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience, p. 15.

[104] op. cit., p. 15.

> We answer, the words 'capitulation' or 'covenant' are now much used to make men believe the Kings admittance to the Crown is altogether conditionall, as in the meerly elective kingdoms of Polonia, Swedeland, &c. whereas our King is King before he comes to the Coronation, which is sooner or later at his pleasure, but alwaies to be in due time in regard of that security his people receive by his taking the oath, and he again mutually from them, in which performance there is something like a covenant, all but the forfeiture. The King there promises and binds himself by oath to performance. Could they in this covenant shew us such an agreement between the King and his people, that in case he will not discharge his trust, then it shall be lawfull for the States of the kingdome by armes to resist, and provide for the safety thereof, it were something.[105]

The Parliamentarian counterblast was given by Philip Hunton who met to this challenge squarely; he stated the case clearly for the Parliamentary cause in his "A Treatise of Monarchy" first published in 1643. Henry Parker also made a point in his clear-cut criticism on this position (Cf. Jus Populi, 1644). Here let us focus our attention to Hunton. "All Conquest," wrote Hunton, "doth not put the Conqueror into an absolute right. He may come to a right by Conquest: but not sole Conquest; but a partiall, occasioning a Right by finall Agreement;"[106] This is his basic position.

> Yea. . ., he may win a Kingdome meerly by the sword and enter on it by right of Conquest: yet considering that right of conquest hath too much of force in it to be safe and permanent; he may thinke conquest

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[105] op. cit., p.16.

[106] Hunton, A Treatise of Monarchy, p.34.

> the best meane of getting a Kingdome, but not of holding, and in wisdome for himselfe and posterity, gain the affections of the people by deserting that Title, and a new by Politique agreement, or descend from that right by fundamentall grants of liberties to the people, and limitations to his own power:[107]

The Norman Conquest, he judged, was such a case. Then he described how William the Conqueror came to the English throne:

> The very truth is, and everie intelligent reader of the Historie of those times will attest it, that Duke William pretended the grant and gift of King Edward who died without children and he came with forces into this Kingdome, not to Conquer, but make good his Title against his enemies: his end of entring the Land was not to gaine a new absolute Title but to vindicate the old limited one, whereby the English Saxon Kings his Predecessors held this Kingdome.[108]

He developed this interpretation according to his reading of Camden's Britania, and discovered that there was a movement of the people of this sort: "before Harold usurped the Crown, most men thought it the wisest Policie to set the Crown on William's head" in order to prevent the war; and it was after Harold was slain in the first battle that William came in London and was "received by the Londoners, and solemnly inaugurated King. . ."[109] Thus follows his unique judgment:

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[107] _ibid._

[108] _op. cit._, p.35.

[109] _op. cit._, p.36.

> But suppose he did come in a Conqueror, yet he did not establish the Kingdome on those termes, but on the old Lawes, which he reteyned and authorized for himselfe and his Successors to governe by. Indeed after his settlement in the Kingdome, some Norman Customes he brought in, and to gratify his souldiers dispossessed many English of their estates, dealing in it too much like a Conqueror: but the triall by twelve men, and other fundamentalls untouched, which have remained till this day.[110]

The matters concerning law and society were treated in relation to this particular interest in history. The Puritan Parliamentarians were in line with the thought produced by the alliance between the Puritan theological view of history and the Common Lawyers' interpretation of the Norman Conquest, whereas the Anglican Royalist thought according to the combination of biblical history and Jacobian interpretation of English history. The idea of natural law was conceived on the basis of those historical references.

The above examples clarify the background of the contemporary conception of law. It was a unique historical scheme of thought which constituted a combination of biblical history and national history. When any of these interpreters thought of natural law, there was an image as a background, the image of a primodial history of Creation, Fall, and the people of Israel, which descended directly to English history. Both biblical history and national history loosely intermingled, and upon this same scheme of history two different types of historical interpretation confronted each other.

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[110] ibid.

Moreover, the idea of natural law was committed in this confrontation, too. It is amazing that natural law was conceived in this historical scheme, but especially insofar as opinion was divided by two mutually opposing interpretations of history. The problem of natural law was, thus, a problem to be decided along with the problem of history. Natural law no longer meant the one single ideal law, but was bound with history, even with a divided history! For natural law to assume history into itself may mean either the suicide of natural law or else some other extraordinary effect. Yes, here was an occasion of the "metamorphosis" of natural law. Despite the remnants of older conceptional forms, here was an ending of traditional "ontological" conceptions of natural law. An age-long tradition of the Stoic conception of natural law, which assumed a world-historical meaning by being assimilated into Christianity by the Apologists, who regarded it identical with Christian moral laws, had been terminated.

In order to clarify this juncture, let us venture to compare this historical conception of the natural law idea with the traditional ontological conception.

The Stoic idea of natural law was regarded as having issue from " λόγος τοῦ κόσμου " or " νοῦς Διός ", that is to say, a law in accordance with God "εἱμαρμένη", or "πρόνοια", which is at once the work and essence of God and the structure of human being (φύσις). In conformity to this law, freedom is necessity, and at the same time necessity is freedom. The idea of natural law was, therefore, conceived as a Pan-theistic unity of God and nature, for it is a law of "φύσις" as well as of God. The cosmo-ontological scheme of thought was a legitimate mode of thinking of natural law. The historical scheme of thought which we have described above appears consistent with this cosmo-ontological conception.

The cosmo-ontological conception of natural law was brought to its finest expression by Thomas Aquinas. His genius combined successfully the Stoic idea of natural law and the Augustinian idea of *lex aeterna* (though *lex aeterna* itself was discovered in its Stoic lineage[111]) with Aristoterian ontology. The Augustinian idea of *lex aeterna* was not orinigally divorced from natural law. But in Thomas both were to be located according to his dualistic scheme of Nature and the Supernature. Natural law is the law for the realm of Nature, and *lex aeterna* for the realm of the Supernature. Natural law was subordinated to *lex aeterna*, and therefore, to some degree, secularized and rationalized. Needless to say, he did not separate these realms, but combined them by his famous logic "Dona gratiarum hoc modo naturae adduntur, quod eam non tollunt, ad magis perficiunt." Therefore, the realm of Nature, which was conceived under natural law, was never reduced to a mechanism, but on the contrary, by virtue of Aristoterian metaphysics, it was conceived more dynamically as culminating "teleologically" towards the realm of the Supernature in which Nature was to be fulfilled. Natural law insofar as "participates" in lex aeterna can direct the movement towards the right direction, given by the natural law's determination of "virtues." The whole of the cosmos, either macro or micro, was a vital and teleologically moving substance, natural law being the law of both human and physical nature. There was no split between outward physical nature and inward human nature. We must not simply judge that the Thomistic Weltanschuung was a-historical, for it was never a Gnostic one, yet it is true that history was either transformed by the Supernatural with its revelatory character, or reduced to the biological growth with its developmental character. At any rate, history was here absorbed into ontology.

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[111] Cf. A.,Schubert, *Augustinus Lex-aeterna Lehre nach Inhalt und Quellen*. (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, xxiv, 2) Münster, 1924

What we witness in the 17th Century is a remarkable decline of this ontological conception of natural law which continued from the Stoics to the Scholastics. This century was like a melting pot in which the old ideas were dissolved into new patterns. The idea of natural law was to be recast in a different pattern, and it was divested from the ontological framework. The historical scheme of thought was substituted. But this was not universally the status of natural law in the 17th Century. Rather was this incorporation of natural law within a historical scheme a particular phenomenon in England, where it functioned in an ideological struggle between Anglicanism and Puritanism. For we cannot overlook the fact that there was emerging another mode of transition from the mediaeval ontological natural law towards the modern rationalistic natural law. Even in England there was a process of transmutation of natural law beyond that with which we are now concerned, the line of thought moving from Bacon to Newton, that is, towards mechanical natural law. That shift was assisted by the historical scheme of thought in Puritanism and was a third factor pointing towards the personalization of natural law, that is, natural right.

All three directions, it may be said, came out of the dissolution of Thomistic cultural synthesis, first begun by Nominalism. When man was conceived to have the power of volition, the unity of human nature and physical nature lost its philosophical unity. But the dissolution on the politicoethical level was initiated by Marsilio of Padua, who in his "Defensor Pacis" attacked the prevailing form of Papal rule of the world, which was the sociological basis of the metaphysical theology of Thomas Aquinas. Despite a conciliatory attempt of Nicholas of Cusa in the 15th Century, the dissolution could not be checked before the Reformation. We must take into consideration the progress of natural science, too. While Nominalism dissolved the Thomistic synthesis and moved toward the distinguishing of subjectivity in human nature, the rising natural science dissolved it towards an objective mechanical conception of the world. The main subject-matter of the modern epistemological philosophy was thus formulated: How to bring back to synthesis the Subject and the Object, freedom and necessity, morals and natural science. There Kant sought a synthesis of Rousseau and Newton.

The transition from the mediaeval ontological natural law to the modern rationalistic natural law was, it is commonly agreed, achieved by Hugo Grotius. A tendency towards the rationalization of natural law was already apparent in Richard Hooker, who first distinguished the law of reason from the law of nature intentionally.[112] Grotius' rationalization of the natural law was in line with the contemporary tendency of anti-Calvinistic rationalism, and his Arminianism is duly supposed to have accelerated this tendency. The shift from the Thomistic natural law to the Enlightenment's law of reason was prepared previously by rationalists such as Hooker and Grotius, although their rationalism must be distinguished from Enlightenment rationalism. This shift, with regard to the thought-background, was the change from "Realism" in the mediaeval sense to "Idealism" in the modern sense. "Idea", "ἐιδος " in Greek, was an objective reality in the Middle Ages as well as ancient Greece, whereas since the 18th Century it was identified with the subjective realm. Nevertheless, this shift was nothing else but a translation of the mediaeval objective-realistic natural law into the noetic-subjective realm, and was not without significance in view of the destruction of the mediaeval universal community. Now universality was to be established upon the basis of reason. In so doing, however, the modern natural law had lost meaningful contact with history, so that since then, natural law was regarded generally as an "a-historical" idea. Rationalism based on this modern natural law of Enlightenment was to be opposed to a Historism based on the Romantic reaction to Enlightenment. Such was not true in the mediaeval concept of natural law, because there history was reconciled with nature, Christianity with Greek-Stoic metaphysics.

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[112] Cf. Hooker, *Laws. . .* Book I, viii, 9

On the other hand, a mechanical conception of natural law had been developing along with such a rationalization. Since Natural science was being divorced from theology, as Bacon advocated, an attempt was made to couch in the term natural law a scientific-mechanical meaning. Grievous sighs on the "mechanization" of the world were heard among intellectuals by the end of the 17th Century.[113] Kant, in the 18th Century, found that both internal natural law, viz.

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[113] We shall cite two examples: one from a philosopher, and the other from a clergy man. Fontenelle wrote, " 'I perceive,' said the Countess, 'Philosophy is now become very mechanical.' 'So mechanical', said I, 'that I fear we shall quickly be asham'd of it; they will have the World to be in great, what a watch is in little; which is very regular, & depends only upon the just disposing of the several parts of the movement. But pray tell me, Madam, had you not formerly a more sublime Idea of the Universe?" Plurality of Worlds, 1686, I owe this quotation to Willey's *The Seventeenth Century Background*, p.l. The other comes from Samuel Parker, D.D. Arch-deacon of Canterbury, later Bishop of Oxford, who wrote a book entitled *A Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature, and of the Christian Religion* (1681). He complained in view of Hobbes' influence: "that humane Nature is a meer Machine, and that all the contrivances of the minds of Men are nothing but the mechanical Results of Matter and Motion. etc." (Preface iii).

moral laws and outer natural law, scientific laws of nature stood without immediate connection.[114] How he could deal with this problem is a question which requires another opportunity for investigation.

In contrast to these two ways, endorsement by reason and by physical nature, the shift in the case of Puritanism appears different and unique by virtue of its curious involvement in history. This shift pointed towards personalization, but not towards rationalization nor mechanization. We must especially note the difference between this shift and that achieved by Hugo Grotius, for this difference reveals an important characteristic of modern civilization.

We have seen that the national history of England was concerned with the continuity of the Common Law, but what does this mean? Hugo Grotius took the problem of natural law seriously, and attempted to ground it not on experience but on definition, not on facts in history but on logical deduction in reason.[115]

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[114] Cf. Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, where he concluded saying: "Zwi Dinge erfüllen das Gemüth mit immer neuer und zunehmemder Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschäftigt: der bestirnte Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir." (Beschluss).

[115] This was first pointed out by Cassirer, and accepted by d'Entreves. Cf. d'Entreves, *Natural Law*.

But this was in accordance with the need which arose at the decline of the idea of _ius gentium_. _Ius gentium_ was a concept which rendered concreteness to the idea of natural law in the mediaeval juristic system, and when it was lost, the mediaeval idea of natural law became abstract. In view of this fact, rationalization was nothing else but an attempt to rescue the declining idea of natural law. _Ius gentium_ was a Roman legal concept analogous to English Common Law. In England the Common Law still had vital power, and natural law, therefore, in England did not cease to be vital together with the Common Law. Hugo Grotius tried to distinguish logic from life-experience in the matter of law and its validity, whereas in England the point of contact where life and logic met was not lost. This makes a great difference. The fact that history was related positively to law, either natural or positive, was of tremendous significance. But it was Puritanism that accepted effectively the Common Law tradition and English history;originally it was Anglican property and it was the strength of Anglicanism that it based its understanding on English history politically recapitulated in the new ideology. For example, Hooker speculated upon this political recapitulation and thus, his theology could silence, even for a short while, the Puritans who had not yet grounded themselves in English history. Hooker placed himself firmly upon the traditional conception of English law which was conceived, rather ambiguously in Fortescue's definition as natural law, constitution, statute laws, all at the same time. Hooker grasped this tradition in his rather "modalistic" conception of law, which could assert, in practical reference, that the laws concerning the Anglican ecclesiastical polity promulgated were identical in essence with the "eternal law" of God. Thus, his theology could serve as an apology of the Elizabethan Settlement. His cosmo-ontological Weltanschuung was effective and powerful for grasping the ecclesiastical situation by viewing it as a restoration of the ancient model. Ontology is strong if it stands at the end of history, and Hooker's ontology found its place in the Elizabethan Settlement which was assumed to be the end of a long history of reformation. But now the Puritans carried the unity of natural law and the Common Law tradition towards a different conception, a historical conception. On the other hand, the Stuart Anglicans had alienated themselves from a "right" relation to English history.

Thus, we are now coming back to examine the meaning of this historically conceived natural law in Puritanism. Anglican Royalists also, we must not forget, conceived law in their own historical conception. These two factions met each other in the same arena of history. This is not the kind of confrontation seen between them during the reign of Elizabeth. This is not a confrontation between the ontological Anglicanism of Hooker and historical Puritanism. The idea of natural law itself was disputed on the basis of two antagonistic conceptions of history. When its historical basis was thus disputed, ontology came to an end. Apart from the presupposition of the oneness and unity of history, ontology is non-sense. But in order to overcome this awkward situation, the Anglican Royalists, such as Ferne and Filmer, attempted to recapitulate history again by the principle of nature, and they characteristically tried to subsume history into genealogy. But the historical dispute could be resolved in these terms.

When the idea of natural law was subsumed into history, even into such a divided history, the validity of which was no longer provable by ontology, one concept of natural law came into conflict with the other. Which was true: that of the Anglicans or that of the Puritans? It is interesting to see that after this battle of ideas, Locke finally gave up the age-long tradition that natural law was *idea innata*.[116] English Empiricism was moving to the fore between the struggling ideas. A movement towards the formation of the Modern Age appears in this direction which must be distinguished from that on the Continent: one moved from ontology to empiricism, and the other from ontology to rationalism. The one has contact with history, and the other gets rid of history and falls back to reason.

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[116] Cf. John Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, edited by W. von Leyden, (Oxford, 1954). Locke did not reject a presupposed existence of natural law, but did reject a definition of natural law as self-evidently and clearly in man's mind like the Cartesian "idea innata." An interesting remark was given, which testifies the contemporary situation of confusion with regard to natural law: "respondemus quod licet ipsa sanior pars hominum non prorsus inter se consetiunt quid sit lex naturae, quae illius certa et cognita decreta, non inde sequi nullam omnino dari naturae legem; imo vero magis efficitur esse hujusmodi legem, cum omnes de lege ipsa tam acriter contendunt;" (p. 114). As is expressed here, even among the highly intellectual minds there was no agreement on the idea of natural law; but Locke took it reversely as an evidence of existence although one and the same definition could not be given immediately. So to speak, natural law is given to men but concealed, so that man must find it by the right use of reason.

Insofar as natural law is conceived in an ontological scheme, its validity may be proved by ontological demonstration, or by an analysis of the structure of being. But it was conceived in terms of a historical scheme which had received two different interpretations, the validity of which must be proved by the overcoming of one by the other. It was not only dependent on a historical conception, but also on the real course of history. In the Interregnum under Cromwell's regime, the one may be right; and at the Restoration the other may appear true. We cannot neglect elements that may be produced by the historical conception of natural law. But it is also wrong, at the same time, to neglect some characteristics which were created and added to the idea of natural law. Historical ideas have a definite character, and a kind of universality must be sought, first of all, in that definite historical character. The Royalist idea of natural law is, therefore, different from the Puritan natural law. The former was the principle of "order", which was typically found in the relation between father and son; whereas the latter developed in such a way as to become a principle of the modern contractual society. Which concept is true is the kind of question which can be solved only by an anacronistic dogmatician.

The Puritans sought to overcome the Anglican view of natural law, and so they attributed some importance to this idea. First of all they had to assert its truth in terms of the Right of Resistance, which would give it validity. The idea of natural law also had to be grounded in personality, from which was its universality. It was in the struggle against the Anglican view of natural law that the shift from the mediaeval feudalistic natural law to the modern democrative natural right occured in Puritanism.

B. The Right of Resistance and the Puritan Idea of Natural Law

In view of the fact that the idea of natural law was conceived by different conceptions of history, the validity of the Puritan idea of natural law had to be asserted against the Anglican idea of natural law. Insofar as the Anglican idea emphasized "order" through the "paternal" genealogical conception of history, its ethical significance was conservative and it justified the theory of "passive obedience." Over against this theory of Anglican Royalism, the validity of the Puritan idea had to be asserted in establishing the theory of the "right of resistance." The Puritan idea of natural law was thus profoundly associated with this theory of the right of resistance during the Civil War. This combination was to determine the direction of the shift from natural law to natural right. For natural law was taken as the right of resistance.

The theory of "passive obedience" was of fundamental importance for the formation and existence of Anglicanism. The theory of "passive obedience" which had influence on the formation of Anglicanism was of Lutheran origin. No doubt, this doctrine had a biblical source and was known throughout the Middle Ages, but what Anglicanism accepted was a more particular meaning given by Luther, namely, that of obedience to a secular magistrate against the pope. In the year 1552 at the convocation held at London, this principle was clearly asserted:

> The Civil Magistrate is ordained and allowed of God. . . and therefore is to be obeyed not only for wrath, but also for Conscience sake. . .That the Bishop of Rome hath no Jurisdiction in this Realm of England.[117]

Anglicanism was determined from both sides, from above, by the theory of "Royal Supremacy" and from below by the doctrine of "passive obedience." The Lutheran doctrine of "passive obedience" was introduced to Henry VIII through Tyndale's book "The Obedience of Christen Man", an interpretation of the Lutheran doctrine in the prospect of an English reformation under the Royal leadership. Lutheran doctrine had power to free such a Leviathan as the state from the fetter, and despite Luther's own good intention, it gave rise to Absolutism during the 17th and 18th Centuries. Luther derived the state exclusively from above, from God's plan of salvation, and consequently no right of resistance was allowed to the subjects.[118] Anglicanism had profoundly utilized this Lutheran theory, and achieved a Lutheran "Obrigkeitsstaat" on a national scale. The doctrine of "passive obedience" was from the beginning one of the integral parts of of Anglicanism. As in the case of Luther, the theory of "Obrigkeit" was, from an ethical point of view, conceived according to the Fifth Commandment. The Anglicans, consequently, especially during the Stuart period, attempted to apply "paternal" authority to the kingship and "filial" obedience to the duty of the subjects. Such a relation was deemed either "Schöpfungsordnung" or natural law.

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[117] I quoted this from Seller's The History of Passive Obedience, published in 1689, p.3.

[118] Cf. Holl, op. cit. (engl. tr.) p.51, pp.51, 53, 60.

The Puritans had to overcome this natural law idea, which rationalized the doctrine of passive obedience. The validity of the Puritan natural law, thus, had to concur with the right of resistance. It was, however, to the Puritan advantage that Anglicanism had deserted the ontological method which had risen in close relation with politics. Both began to look to the Scriptures and English history for their own sake. The Scriptures as well as English history could be read in several ways. History, either biblical or national, meant something different to the Puritans than to their oponents. From the same sources the Puritans elicited something to justify the right of resistance.

There are two important pamphlets written for the revolutionary cause in the year of 1642; Henry Parker's *Observations* upon some of his Majesties late Answers and Expresses,[119] and

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[119] Parker's pamphlet was first published anonymously and went two editions within 1642. This is reprinted in Haller's *Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution, 1638-1647*, (1934) Vol. II. pp.167-213. The first edition was entitled *Some Few Observations upon his Majesties late Answer* and published on May 21; the second enlarged edition was dated by Thomason, July 2.

and John Goodwin's *Anti-Cavalierisme, or Truth Pleading as well the Necessity, as the Lawfulness of this present VVar, for the suppressing of that Butcherly Brood of Cavaliering Incendiaries, who are now hammering England, to make an Ireland of it: wherein All the materiall objections against the lawfulness of this undertaking, are fully cleered and answered, and All men that either love God, Themselves, or Goodmen, Exhorted to Contribute all manner of assistance hereunto.*[120] Goodwin, an influential Independent preacher, dealt with the problem in the manner of a preacher, whereas Parker, a Common Lawyer, treated it according to his own profession.

Let us begin by considering Goodwin's pamphlet. He posed the problem concerned from a right angle:

> Yea, but say the Rabbies and great Disputers that stand by your enemies and strengthen their hand. . .: It is not lawfull (say these men) for you to oppose them, nor to contend any wayes by force against them, because by opposing them, you resist the King the Lords anointed, whom God commands should be obeyed and submitted unto. If you conceive him to be your adversary, yet you ought to oppose him, (or rather that adverse disposition of his against you) onely with prayers and teares, and supplications unto God for him, and with petitorie and humble addresments unto himselfe, but to make no outward resistance at all.[121]

Here it appears that the Royalists had made use of the doctrine of "passive obedience" for their own cause, and the Puritans consequently had to confront this doctrine squarely. Goodwin attacked the Royalist position from two sides: one is by way of relativizing the three forms of government on the same level, and the other by elevating the position of the inferior magistrate as equal to the supreme magistrate with respect to divine ordination. The way of relativizing was a powerful attack on Absolutism which related the king exclusively and immediately with God. The same method was also taken by Parker, as we shall see later. Goodwin's incomparable contribution in overcoming Absolutism was, however, this, that he discovered the New Testament ground which would check an exclusive application of the Pauline text of Rom. 13. It was a discovery of the First Peter Chapter 2. 13. "Submit yourselves to every Ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, whether it be unto the King, as supreme, or unto Governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, etc." The discoveror's attention was focused in the expression "ordinance of man, ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις "[122]

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[120] Thomason entered the date, October 21. It was first published without date. This is reprinted in Haller's book (just mentioned) , pp.217-269.

[121] Goodwin, *Anti-Cavalierisme*, p.6.

> Only two things I desire may be taken notice of from this Scripture where submission to Kings is commanded: First, that a King or Kingly Government is ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις an ordinance of man, or an humane creation (as the Originall properly signifieth). . .'Submit to every Ordinance of man (saith Peter) for the Lords sake, whether it be unto the King, &c.' Therefore he supposeth the

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[122] Goodwin, Anti-Cavalierisme, p.7.

> King or Kingly Government to be the Ordinance, or creation of man.[123]

The text of Rom. 13.2. which says "the ordinance of God" was applied by the Royalist exclusively to the kingship. Based on this text, Goodwin's relativizing method served not only to divorce such an immediate connection of God and king but also to disclose a different perspective in biblical history and also in extra-biblical world history. For example, in referring to Gen. 14. 12. he wrote: "for there were Kings over the Heathen Nations, with the forme of whose government God did not wayes intermeddle by way of any command or appointment concerning it, long before there was any King over Israel.[124] The same point is illustrated in his discussion of how the kings of Israel were created by men in various examples. But Goodwin in so doing did not always abandon the doctrine of divine sanction, although the divine sanction should not be given exclusively to monarchy. Here we recognize the second effect of his relativizing method:

> For it is the will and appointment of God, that there should be some government or other in every society of men, yet not any government neither, not any that is unjust, unreasonable, or tyrannicall: And in this sense all formes of government that are lawfull and just, whether they be simple, as the three commonly known by the names of Monarchy, Aristocracy, Demo-

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[123] ibid.

[124] op. cit., p.7.

> cracy; or whether they be mixt, having somewhat of two, or all of these simples in them, are equally and indifferently from God: not any one of them determinately, or with exclusion of the rest.[125]

He levelled all the three forms of government as equally from both man and God. No single form of government is priviledged to be an immediate ordinance of God: "Becauxe it is no ordinance or appointment of God that any partrular nation or society of men, should have either this or that special forme of government amongst them, but only that they should have some kinde of government which is just and lawfull."[126] This will naturally end in the assertion: "Therefore Kingly Government is no Ordinance in this sense, viz. as imposed upon any Nation or People by way of duty or of God."[127] This position lay in juxtaposition to the Royalist's which was convinced in this way: "The Government which God made choice of to set up among his people was Monarchicall still, first in Moses, then in the Judges, then in the Kings: yea generally all Authors yield, and experience has taught it, that Monarchy is a better government than Aristocracy,.... "[128]

This way of relativizing was deeply rooted in his theology, which was a Calvinistic theology with some Independent modifications. The distinction between God and man was made sharper in keeping with the general tendency of the Independents. He applied such a distinction to the political realm. Separating God's way from man's way, he restated the relation between God's providential work in establishing political society and man's engagement in Providence, which was quite dynamic in contrast to the conception of Anglican Absolutism. Here is a remarkable text which shows one application of his theology to the political level:

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[125] ibid.

[126] op. cit., p.8.

[127] ibid.

[128] Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience, (1642) p.17.

> God by speciall instinct and work of providence inclines the hearts of severall Nations, some to imbrace and fall upon one, and some upon another, some upon that which is Monarchicall, or Kingly, others upon that which is Aristocraticall, some upon that which is Democraticall, &c. and withall commands, that that which every Nation or People chooseth for itselfe, should be obeyed and submitted unto by those that have chosen it, and live under it, so long as it continueth: For the time is comming, when Christ will put downe all rule, and all authority, and power. And this is another sense wherein Kings or Kingly Government may be said to be from God, or to be the Ordinance of God, viz. because where it is established and set up, he had a speciall hand in ordering and guiding the hearts of the People to choose it, before others, and withall commands it to be obeyed, as Government that is lawfull and authorized by him, not as commanded and enjoyned by him.[129]

Emphasis on the Providence of God was intensified in the Independents' mind more than in original Calvinism, and with such a tendency this theology undergirded political theory. History in which various forms of political organization rose, exist, and will fall was grasped from the view-point of "Providence". But more notable is that his way of relativizing the governmental forms was supported by a characteristic "eschatological" sense, as he said in the above quotation: "For the time is comming, when Christ will put downe all rule, and all authority, and power." This "eschatological" prospect decisively broke through the position of Anglican Royalism which was defended by way of a divine sanction of the status quo as well as of kingship expressed in terms of the "Lord's Annointed." The Anglicans attempted to subsume history again in the principle of nature, whereas the Puritan here grasped history, in the light of Providence, as having an eschatological end. The basis of theology itself was in dispute. By virtue of Providence, an opportunity of change in political orders comes to be grasped meaningfully. We shall come back to a consideration of this point later.

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[129] op. cit., p.8.

The second effect of this relativizing was to elevate inferior magistrates equally as high as supreme authority. He wrote:

> The second thing I desire you would take notice of from the same Scripture, is this, that subordinate Authority, and inferiour Magistracy and power is as much the Ordinance of God, as Soveraignty and supreame Authority itselfe is: and that God by one and the same command, requires us to submit ourselves to inferiour Magistrates or Governors, as well as hee doth to Kings themselves.[130]

There is couched a plain political intention here. The inferior ~~mag~~ magistrate meant in England the Parliament, which was then in conflict with the supreme authority, viz. the authority of King. We shall see here that Calvinistic theory of

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[130] *op. cit.*, p.9.

"inferior magistracy" was being taken over with more theological clarification. In his rejection of immediate identification between kingly government and God's order, Goodwin said:

> Though the King be to be obeyed and submitted unto, yet this obedience was never intended by God to be universall, but with limitation, viz. In such commands wherein a man's obedience to the King should not be found disobedience against God: . . .[131]

In such a context of thought he quoted a well-known text of the Bible: "Whether it be right in the sight of God to obey you, rather than God, Judge yee." So, "The debt of obedience to God must alwayes be paid, . . ." Out of this presupposition, his political thinking arrived logically to this consequence:

> If a King should command me not to pray for the generall good, or peace of the Church or State where I live, or to forbeare the doing of any thing, which I conceive I am bound in conscience unto God to doe for the publique good, I am not in this case any whit more bound to obey the King's command, than the Apostle Peter and John were to obey the command of the Rulers and Elders who charged them to give over preaching the Gospell, or than Shadrack, Meshach, and Abednego were, to worship the Golden Image, because Nebuchadnezzar commanded it.[132]

The battle line was thus drawn against the Royalist theory of "Divine Right" of the king. Goodwin's monumental contribution to the formation of revolutionary ethics was above all this relativization of the forms of government, first by separating God's Will from man's definition, that is to say, by refusing to identify and combine immediately man's political reason with God's plan; and secondly, by grasping history under the rule of God's Providence, and limiting it by eschatology; and thirdly, by distinguishing the divine sanction of political power from the hierarchy of the political order, so that the "inferiors" were regarded as divinely ordained as well as the supreme powers. His criticism of Anglican Royalism clearly aimed at its "religious" foundation, and in this attempt he succeeded in establishing the Parliamentary position on a sure religious ground delineated by his Puritan theology.

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[131] *op. cit.*, p.9.

[132] *ibid.*

He buttressed his discussion by the biblical examples taken mostly from the history of Israel as witnessed in the books of Kings, Samuel, and Chronicles. His method is interesting insofar as it avoided the confounding of historical examples with the essential matter, viz. to confound _quid facti_ with _quid juris_, and it viewed God's dispensations in individual cases. This method was advantageous in his intention of relativizing the Royalist "absolutistic" position, but disadvantageous at the same time in this respect, that the cause he wanted to defend also may not be definitely justified. To be sure, Goodwin's Independency was characteristic of his relativistic position; even he had given up an attempt to deduce a definite church order from the Bible in the matter of ecclesiology. By virtue of his effort, however, it was made clear that the Bible does not speak for the Parliamentary cause either. The Scriptures as such were of a nature as to support both positions, either by theory of passive obedience or the right of resistance. In a time such as the 17th Century, the establishment of the right of resistance had to be supported by the Scriptures, but it could hardly be decided by the principle of the Scriptures alone.

The principle of natural law should be introduced into discussion in this connection. We know that a natural law divided in meaning cannot be the absolute determiner of the case, but the introduction of the idea of natural law was related to the rise of the right of resistance. By virtue of the idea of natural law, the present problem, whether to obey the Parliament which is no less of divine sanction than the King and which was to some extent clarified in the light of the biblical interpretation, could be more concretely treated:

> Now then put the case that the inferiour Governour requires that which is only honest, agreeable to the laws of God and of Nature, as, viz. that we should doe our best to defend ourselves against those that contrary to all Law and conscience assault us; the superiour, that which is contrary to both, viz. to sit still whilst our Lawes, Liberties, Estates, Lives, friends, godly Magistrates, and Religion itselfe, are indangered, and ready to be taken from us; the question in this case, whether we are to obey the inferiour or superiour Authority; (the command of God indifferently extending it for obedience unto either, in things that are lawfull) is easily resolved, except men will complaine and say it is darke at noone day.[133]

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[133] op. cit., p.27.

For Goodwin as for his contemporaries generally, the Law of God was always taken together with natural law. He did not elaborate what the natural law was, but the connotation of it was never ambiguous. He wrote:

> Men that have no lawfull authority or power to take away the lives or goods of men, may very lawfully be resisted in any attempt they shall make. . . This I suppose is a pregnant and knowne principle both in reason and religion.[134]

His idea of natural law seemed to be the principle of self-preservation, rather than the principle of order. Upon this principle he established the right of resistance. This point was clarified by the more juristic mind of Henry Parker, whom we shall next consider, than his theological mind.

But before we turn to Henry Parker, let us see one more point of great importance, namely how to come to terms with the ethic of martyrdom when the right of resistance was established. The ethic of martyrdom was a pinnacle of the position of non-resistance. This ethic was verified by the history of early Christianity, by the teaching of Tertullian, and also by a religious satisfaction in self-sacrifice in obedience to the truth and example of Christ. To be sure, in the change from natural law as the principle of order to natural right as the principle of welfare, which is important when we think of building a Christian social ethics, the overcoming of the ethic of martyrdom is an important problem.[135]

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[134] *op. cit.*, p. 16

[135] There is a revival of the ethic of martyrdom curiously modified in Lilburne, the chief Leveller. But his martyrdom was of a very different nature.

It was by virtue of natural law as the principle of welfare that the element in this ethic which leads to suicide was checked. And, vice versa, the ethic of martyrdom being checked in this way, the right of resistance was justified by the natural law. What we must note in Goodwin is, however, his unique way of grappling with the ethic of martyrdom of the primitive Christians. He dealt with the question concerning the non-resistance of the primitive Christians, why they did not take a resistance but went into martyrdom. His answer, offered in terms of the scheme of a providential view of history, involves some remarkable points. He found the leaders of that time guilty of their "ignorance" because of which many Christians had to go to death, ignorance of "such a point of liberty as this we now speake of."[136] But, of course, their ignorance could possibly be considered this way only from the point of view of God's Providence. He remarks:

> . . . that Spirit of courage, patience and constancy, which God poured out abundantly upon his Church & servants in those times, whereby they were so strengthned and incouraged to suffere, that martyrdome seemed a desirable then unto them, might be a speciall reason and meanes to take them off from inquiring into, or so much as thinking what their lawfull liberty might be in the case we speake of. . . . Whilst Christians were furnished with an extraordinary strength from heaven, to offer themselves up in martyrdome, their edge must needs be taken off hereby, as from seeking meanes to escape it, so from studying cases and questions about the lawfulness of escaping.[137]

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[136] op. cit., p. 29

[137] Ibid.

At any rate, this ignorance caused the continuation of apparent or hidden disaster for hundreds of years. And this ignorance hindered the development of evangelical freedom to civil liberty. God had hidden this privilege from their eyes because they were unable to use it. He continued as follows:

> Whether God was pleased to make use of one or both of their particulars last mentioned, or any other like unto them, as a meanes to hide that liberty of resistance we speake of from the eyes of the primitive Christians, or no; certaine it is, that the frame and tenour of his after dispensations, did require, that such a libertie should be hid from them; or at least that they should not make use of it; as on the contrary, the nature and pouport of those dispensations which God hath now in hand, requires that this libertie should be manifested and made knowne unto Christians.[138]

Here comes finally the clarification of his point:

> Whereas, now on the contrary, that time of Gods preordination and purpose, for the downefall of Antichrist, drawing neere, there is kinde of necessitie, that those truths, which have slept for many yeares, should now be awakened: and particularly that God should reveale and discover unto his faithfull ministers, and other his servants the just bounds and limits of Authoritie, and power, and consequently the just and full extent of the lawfull liberties of those that live in subjection.[139]

It is to his credit that he grasped the necessity and meaning of the shift from evangelical freedom to civil liberty, from the ethic of passive obedience to the right of resistance, in the light of Providential view of history. Being ignorant of the signs of the times, from the time of the early Church until his day meant that the connotation of the freedom of the Gospel had not been explicated fully. It was the cause of mischief: "If all truths had been clearly taught in the Church of Christ, and accordingly received and beleeved," he wrote, "it had beene impossible that ever such a monster should have gooten in the temple of God, that he should exalt himselfe above all that which is called God."[140] He envisaged the time of the ethic of martyrdom coming to an end: "opportunities of suffering Martyrdome will not alwayes continue in the Church for the servants of God: yea, the time draweth neare, when they shall cease and be no more."[141] Because, God was turning "the wheele of his providence and dispensations, between his own Church, and the Synagogue of Sathan",[142] and martyrdom will become the destiny for the devil's followers:

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[138] op. cit., p. 30

[139] op. cit. p. 31

> That side which hath been down hitherto, shall be upward, and that which hath been above, shall be below: Now the devils Saints, and the Children of the Whore, even all fearefull and unbeleeving ones, and abominable, and murtherers, and Whoremongers, and Sorcerers, and all lyars, they shall be called to their Martyrdome. . . [143]

The meaning of martyrdom was changed for the Christians: it no longer consists "in lying down, and suffering proud and wicked men to ride over our heads, and in sitting still whilst our estates, liberties, wives, children, friends, are ruined and destroyed before our faces, when God puts an opportunity into our hand to defend them;"[144] but rather it is turned into the ethic of fighting saints, "when a man is resolved to professe the name, and faith of Christ, what danger soever hee incurs, what losse soever he sustaines, or is like to sustaine by it."[145]

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[140] op. cit., p.31, in the same line of thought: "For had this opinion beene timeously enough, and substantially taught in the Church, it would certainly have caused an abortion in Antichrists birth, and so have disappointed the devill of his first-borne." ibid.

[141] op. cit., p.36.

[142] ibid.

[143] ibid.

It was important for the establishment of the right of resistance that the ethic of martyrdom, with its negative meaning, was overcome. The assertion of the right of resistance was a serious task of spirit. This significant overcoming of the position of non-resistance was brought about by his unique view of history which was interpreted in the light of God's Providence. In this providential interpretation of history it was possible to capture the moment of God's intervention into history, "an unexpected breaking out of his goodness and power, in a miraculous cure."[146] By virtue of the reading of the signs of the times, the overcoming of the ethic of martyrdom was vindicated, and men's responsible engagement to God's Providence was urged:

> Consider I beseech you, the great weight and importance of the opportunitie that is before you, if through your zeale, and forwardnesse, and faithfulnesse to advance it,

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[144] op. cit., p.34.

[145] op. cit., pp.34-35. Of course he did not overlook the occasions when the Christians must suffer martyrdom, and he gave the examples of such cases, for example, as God did not open a door of lawful escape, etc. But this must be discriminated at the sign of the time.

[146] op. cit., p.1.

> and the blessing of God upon it, your present service shall prosper, your light will be like the lightning which "as our Saviour saith) shineth from the East even unto the West: the heate and warmth and living influence thereof, shall pierce through many kingdomes great and large, as France, Germany, Bohemia, Hungaria, Polonia, Denmarke, Sweden, with many others, and finde out all the children of God, and all that are friends to the Kingdome of Heaven, and will bee a cheering and refreshing to them:[147]

The opportunity God had provided would be grasped according to Christ's example and His teaching:

> The opportunitie and occasion is so rich and glorious, that it calls to remembrance (as sometimes the shadow doth the substance) the great opportunitie that was before the Lord Jesus Christ, for the salvation of the world: We know that he being rich, became poore, that the world through his poverty might be made rich. You have the patterne in the mount before you: See that according to your line and measure, you make all things like to it.[148]

His theology was thus applied to the political realm. Self-commitment in self-negation, without falling into "Synergism", was the way to capture God's opportunity.

We can now turn to examine the position of Henry Parker, who had grounded the right of resistance on the principle of natural law as the principle of self-preservation. He maintained the same position as Goodwin, though more radically, in this judgment: "God is no more the author of Regall, than of Aristocraticall power, nor of supreame, than of subordinate command;"[149] The most remarkable of his pamphlets, "Observations upon some of his Majesties late Answers and Expresses", was the inversion of the locus of political authority, viz. from Royal supremacy in the divine right to popular supremacy. At the outset it was declared:

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[147] op. cit., p.50.

[148] op. cit., p.51.

[149] Parker, Observations, p.1.

> Power is originally inherent in the people, and it is nothing else but that might and vigour which such or such a societie of men containes in itselfe, and when by such or such a Law of common consent and agreement it is derived into such and such hands, God confirmes that Law: and so man is the free and voluntary author, the Law is the Instrument, and God is the establisher of both.[150]

This was a declaration of a grave significance, and actually the Levellers movement was deeply indebted to this manifesto. The meaning and effect of this inversion was momentous in disclosing the deep vein of the problem of law beyond the realm of statute laws. In view of the mediaeval tradition of law-supremacy in England, Parker's position was no less a deviation than the Stuart theory of "Divine Right of Kings" was. But in view of the prospect of the formation of the democratic society, this was rather a creative deviation. The years of the 1640's saw problems arising at the dissolution of the "Sweet harmony" of the laws natural and positive. Whether "ius quia iustum" or "ius quia iussum", i.e. whether law is law because it is just, or because it is commanded, this old question was seriously revived. What mattered was the Ultimate of all laws, rather than a mere interpretation of the positive laws. It broke through the strata of Jurisprudence towards the level of Philosophy of Law, Ethics, or Philosophy of History and Society. The grounding of the right of resistance has to be treated in this depth.

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[150] Parker, op. cit., p.l.

The source of political power is in the people, but this power should not be arbitrary nor lawless, but should bear legality within itself. What is the supreme legality? Parker developed his interpretation of natural law in this connection. The ultimate of all laws, "the Paramount Law," comes now to matter:

> This directs us then to the transcendent of all Politiques, to the Paramount Law that shall give Law to all humane Lawes whatsoever, and that is Salus Populi: . . .[151]

In other words, natural law as the "Paramount Law" which underlies all the statute laws is "Salus Populi", to be defined materially. "Salus Populi" is "suprema lex." Parker should not be confounded with Machiavelli simply because he uses the term *Salus Populi*.[152] Parker was a conscious opponent of Machiavellianism, and actually he restored the ancient unity of natural law and the principle of *Salus Populi*, which was dissolved by Machiavelli. On the other hand, Parker, though he was a Common Lawyer, cannot be classified within the pure Erastian party led by Selden in the Long Parliament. Parker's position was not an orthodox Common Lawyer's position.[153] There was in Parker a deviation from the Common Law tradition, too.

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[151] *op. cit.*, p.1.

[152] It is not justified to interprete Parker's position of "Salus Populi Suprema Lex" as this, "that 'Reason of State was something more sublime and imperial than law'; that the actions of Parliament should be guided not primarily by law, but by interest of state. . ." as recently Sir Charles Ogilvie commented in his "The King's Government and the Common Law 1471-1641" (Oxford, 1958) p. 154. The theory of "raison d' etet" should never be taken as identical with Parker's theory of Salus Populi.

Parker opposed the theory of Salus Populi against the theory of Lex Regia in absolutistic version and wrote:

> The Law of Prerogative itselfe, it is subservient to this Law, and were it not conducing thereunto, it were not necessary nor expedient. Neither can the right of conquest be pleaded to acquit Princes of that which is due to the people as the Authors, or ends of all power, for meere force cannot alter the course of nature, or frustrate the tenour of Law, and if it could, there were more reason, why the people might justifie force to regaine due libertie, than the Prince might to subvert the same.[154]

More clearly with illustration:

> My Lord of Strafford, sayes that the Law of Prerogative is like that of the first table, but the Law of Common safety and utility like that of the second, and hence concludes, that precedence is to be given to that which is more sacred, (that is) Regall Prerogative. . .;[155]

Against this position he gave an opposite statement:

> Granting Prerogative to be but mediate, and the Weale Publike to be finall, we must rank the Lawes of libertie in the first Table, and Prerogative in the second, as Nature doth require.[156]

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[153] Selden's position was depicted by Gooch in his "English Democratic Ideas in the 17th Century", pp.101-104. Jordan's "Men of Substance" interpreted the position of Parker as simply "Erastian", but giving no distinction between Selden and Parker.

[154] Parker, Observations, p.3.

[155] op. cit., p.17.

[156] op. cit., p.18.

The ethical basis of the idea of *Lex Regia* is, needless to say, the "paternalistic" conception of *Rex*. Law was conceived as if a home was governed by the will of father and the will was considered as law itself for the family. The analogy between *Pater* and *Rex* represented a characteristic type of *Weltanschuung* which took a view such as King Charles asserted: "Princes are called Gods, Fathers, Husbands, Lords, Heads, &c. and this implyes them to be of more worth and more unsubordinate in the end, than their Subjects are, who by the same relation must stand as Creatures, Children, Wives, Servants, Members, &c."[157] Therefore, the overcoming of *Lex Regia* had to involve a battle in the deeper strata of life and thought, or else the overcoming of a certain "Ethos" which endorsed the idea of *Lex Regia*. Parker bluntly rejected the analogy of *Pater* and *Rex* as unfit to "political" relationship between king and the subjects.[158] He could do so, because there was already developed in English society a new Ethos which would support such a rejection as Parker's. This was due to the Puritan effort in casuistic reformation of English life. Ethical subjectivity, the sense of equality, the self-consciousness as independent individuals, were being established among large numbers of people. Parker's juristic overcoming of the theory of Lex Regia cannot be correctly understood unless we take the wider view of changing situation.

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[157] Parker, *op. cit.*, p.18.

[158] *Ibid.* "The King is a Father to his People, taken singly, but not universally; for the father is more worthy than the son in nature, and the son is wholly debtor to the father, and can by no merit transcend his dutie, nor chalenge any thing as due from his father; for the father doth all his offices meritoriously, freely, and unexactedly. Yet this holds not in the relation betwixt King & Subject, for its more due in policie, and more strictly to be chalenged, that the king should make happy the People, than the People make glorious the King."

His definition of natural law was, also, different from the "paternalistic" conception of natural law as the principle of "order." "We had a maxime," said he, "and it was grounded upon Nature. . . that a community can have no private ends to mislead it, and make it injurious to itselfe, . . ."[159] In this way he gave a material definition of natural law; natural law for him was the principle of common welfare: Salus Populi suprema lex! This natural law was entangled with the idea of the right of resistance in his mind, the two ideas being held together by the conception of social contract:

> I conceive it is now sufficiently cleared, that all rule is but fiduciarie, and that this and that Prince is more or lesse absolute, as he is more or lesse trusted, and that all trusts differ not in nature or intent, but in degree only and extent: and therefore since it is unnaturall for any Nation to give away its owne proprietie in itselfe absolutely, and to subject itselfe to a condition of servilitie below men, because this is contrarie to the supreme of all Lawes, wee must not think that it can stand with the intent of any trust, that necessarie defence should be barred, and naturall preservation denyed to any people; no man will deny, but that the People may use meanes of defence, where Princes are conditionate, and have a sovereigntie more limited, and yet these being without an intent of preservation, it is no more intended that the People shall be remedilessly oppressed in a Monarchy, than in a Republique.[160]

When we deal with the problem of the formation of the modern society from an ethical point of view, this combination of ideas must be carefully described. The modern theory of social contract should not be simply considered at one with the mediaeval idea of "fealty" contract between feudal lords and the subjects. For the modern theory of social contract was involved with the problem of *Weltanschauung*. The idea of natural law was being changed into the principle of utility by virtue of its combination with the right of resistance. This meant that it had a particular relation to the theory of social contract. The establishment of the theory of social contract was in accordance with the transition from the cosmological idea of natural law to the idea of natural right.

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[159] op. cit., p.22.

[160] op. cit., p.20.

Natural law as the principle of welfare was the basis of the right of resistance, and the right of resistance demanded natural law as the principle of welfare. Parker declared the lawfulness of resistance based on this ground:

> It ought to be also as unquestioned, that where this ordinary course cannot be taken for the preventing of publike mischiefes, any extraordinary course that is for that purpose the most effectuall, may justly be taken and executed by the most transcendent over-ruling Primum Mobile of all humane Lawes, if the King will not joyne with the people, that People may without disloyalty save themselves, and if the people should be so unnaturall as to oppose their owne preservation, the King might use all possible means for their safetie. . . .[161]

Or else:

> Let the world judge whether this be not contrary to the clearest beames of humaine reason, and the strongest inclinations of nature, for every private man may defend himselfe by force, if assaulted, though by the force of a Magistrate or his owne father, and though he be not without all confidence by flight &c. yet here whole nations being exposed to enmity and hazard, being utterly uncapable of flight, must yeeld their throats and submit to Assassinates,

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[161] *op. cit.*, p.18.

if their King will not allow, them defence.[162] Here the natural law was diverted into the conservative idea or the revolutionary idea, the former being the law of the absolutistic hierarchical social order and the latter the "right" to demand welfare. Natural law was, thus, to be sought not in the cosmic order or ontological structure of nature but in the "people". The people were the "Bearer" of natural law. Natural law was no longer the law of the cosmos macro or micro, but the right of the people. The right of resistance had mediated the "subjectivization" of natural law into the personal realm. Law is the objective determination, but right is the subjective demand. This "demand" was to disclose a "teleological" dimension of the political society, which is a transcendental dimension. In other words, the order of society was no longer an end in itself, but it was regarded as the means to serve to the higher purpose which was to be found beyond the political society.

The mediaeval natural law could maintain a transcendental telos of political society by participating in the lex aeterna, but the absolutistic conception of society had lost this sort of teleology, for its natural law could only justify the status quo. By virtue of the shift from an absolutistic natural law to a democratic natural right, the meaning of the state was inverted; it changed from being the end itself to the means to serve the higher end. An unfortunate effect of

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[162] op. cit., p.19.

Luther's "Obligkeitsstaat" was thus overcome in this direction.

Such a historic change in ideas took place on the basis of a generally accepted theology which the Puritan preachers and theologians had been developing. Parker was never aloof from this influence of theology, and so he should not be simply judged as a "secular" thinker.[163] His juristic discussion appeared quasi-theological. As we have already seen, Parker utilized the "heilageschichtliche" scheme of the Creation and the Fall as an essential framework of his thinking. If one neglects this thought-pattern, he cannot fully appreciate Parker's political thinking. The shift in the conceptions of natural law, the rise of modern theory of social contract, and the establishment of the right of resistance, these were all conditioned by that "heilageschichtliche" scheme of thought. Political society was thus conceived, within the same scheme of thought, in dialectical tension between the Creation and the fall, therefore it was regarded not simply as a "natural" but as a "moral" institution;[164] and natural law and the right of resistance was likewise in dialectical tension in Miltonic terminology between "Paradise Lost" and "Paradise Regained."

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[163] Jordan appears to interpret him as "secular." Cf. Men of Substance (1942)

[164] Cf. Jus Populi, pp.15-16, Parker over against the Royalists who interpreted kingly government as "natural" distinguished between natural cause and moral cause in the establishing of political society. Also Rutherford more clearly stated thus: ". . . politique societie is naturall, in radice, in the root, and voluntary and free, in modo, in the manner of their union; "Lex, Rex p.93.

Founded upon this historical dialectics, the social contract theory formulated a teleological dimension in political society. Parker in 1642 was busy rejecting dogmatically the Royalist theory, a task in which he was successful. In 1644 he made a careful attempt to clarify the dialectics by establishing political society on the basis of divine ordination and popular consent, that is to say, on the basis of the position of Rom. 13. and that of 1 Peter 2. But this work was done more remarkably along the same lines by Samuel Rutherford, a Scot theologian and one of the Commissioners to England during the first Civil War, in his book "Lex, Rex" published in the same year as Parker's "Jus Populi" in 1644 (October 7.) Rutherford gave a beautifully elaborated theory of social contract which was an explication of the Scots theory of national covenant in view of the English situation.

Through the works of such revolutionary theorists as Goodwin, Parker, and Rutherford, the idea of natural law was significantly combined with the right of resistance, which, along with the theory of social contract, guided the change of the old idea of natural law towards the new basic idea of the modern democratic society.

C. The Establishment of Natural Right and the Rise of Modern Democratic Man - The Levellers

In the revolutionary idea which was formulated in the year of 1642, there was an important combination of the idea of natural law and the Common Law. The transformation of the Common Law into the revolutionary idea had been developing ever since the conflict between James I and Sir Edward Coke and the Common Lawyers, and this revolutionarily inclined Common Law was assimilated into the idea of Natural Law in the formation of revolutionary idea of 1642. The Common Law was the safeguard for men of the property, since it was primarily the law for Property.[165] This law was powerful in the hands of the Parliamentary Common Lawyers to combat the royal demands for "ship money" and other cases of the royal Prerogative. But the Common Law was more especially concerned with the interest of a particular, landed class of people, so that in order to gain universal acknowledgment of the necessity of revolution, it had to be recast and amalgamated with the Natural Law which was acknowledged to be a universal validity. Natural Law was the idealistic element, and the Common Law the realistic element in the revolutionary idea of 1642. The idealistic element could subsume into the revolutionary movement the wider interest of the common people. Such a combination of the Common Law and the Natural Law was articulated by a common lawyer such as Henry Parker. The common people could interpret the Common Law interest in property in more general terms than in the light of Natural Law. They deduced the idea of Natural Right out of this fusion of the Laws, the right of man as man, but not merely the right of man to material property.

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[165] Cf. Ogilvie, Sir Charles, The King's Government and the Common Law - 1471-1641, p. 6. ". . . The common Law, which was essentially a law ofproperty, and especially of landed property, was regarded by the politically influential class, the backbone of which were country gentry, as its shield and buckler."

But five years after the days of bloody struggle, when an occasion brought about a debate between the Army officers and the grandees of the Army at Putney, October 1647, this fusion which was meaningful and creative, was destroyed. It was a separation between Natural Right which was based on the Natural Law, though remarkably coloured by the idea of Common Law of property, and Civil Right which was strictly in line with the spirit of the Common Law. Rainborough, and Army Officer, had thus uttered at the highest moment of the Putney Debate:

> I think that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live, as the greatest he; and therefore truly, sir, I think it's clear, that every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government; and I do think that the poorest man in England is not at all bound in a strict sense to that government that he hath not had a voice to put himself under; . . .[166]

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[166] Clarke Manuscripts, reprinted in Puritanism and Liberty, edited by A. S. P. Woodhouse (1951), p. 53.

To this statemen , Ireton, son-in-law of Cromwell, responded:

> Give me leave to tell you, that if you make this the rule I think you must fly for refuge to an absolute natural right, and you must deny all civil right; and I am sure it will come to that in the consequence.[167]

The question concerned the suffrage which was demanded in "The Case of the Army Stated."[168] The democratic party in the Army attempted to expand the suffrage in view of constitutional reformation, which was based upon the theory of the "Birth Right" of English men. Ireton opposed this position and wanted "to restrain it still to men who have a local, a permanent interest in the kingdom, who have such an interest that they may live upon it as freeman, and who have such an interest as if fixed upon a place, and is not the same equally everywhere."[169] In short, he wanted to restrict the suffrage to men of landed property, for that who "hath a permanent interest" in society. He conceived that the proposal of that paper would "take away that which is the most original, the most fundamental civil constitution of this kingdom, and which is, above all, that constitution by which I have any property."[170] He also conceived the task of Government to be that of protecting property. For Government was erected by election of men of property since they have "a permanent fixed interest in the kingdom"[171] and "still the constitution of this government hath had an eye" to this local interest.[172] The Army leader had this idea in mind. Natural Law was thrust out and his eyes were fixed on the law of property and the government which protected it. Those who attacked this principle were driven back as the forces of Anarchy.

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[167] Woodhouse, op. cit., p. 53.

[168] Reprinted in Woodhouse's book, pp. 429-436.

[169] op. cit., p. 62.

[170] op. cit., p. 60.

Soldiers of the Army were not generally men of property, but they engaged themselves in the battle with the King because they could find their place in the idea of Natural Law of the revolutionary idea of 1642. They interpreted the term property more or less in quasi-theological way, and not in jurisprudential terms. Rainborough said:

> I do think that the main cause why Almighty God gave men reason it was that they should make use of that reason, and that they should improve it for that end and purpose that God gave it them. And truly, I think that half a loaf is better than none if a man be hungry: (this gift of reason without other property may seem a small thing), yet I think there is nothing that God hath given a man that any (one) else can take from him. And therefore, I say, that either it must be the Law of God or the law of man that must prohibit the meanest man in the kingdom to have this benefit as well as the greatest. I do not find anything in the Law of God, that a lord shall choose twenty burgesses, and a gentleman but too, or a poor man shall choose none: I find no such thing in the Law of Nature, nor in the Law of Nations.[173]

The soldiers had to have recourse to the Natural Law in order to elevate their positions as men as equal to that of men of property.

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[171] op. cit, p. 54.

[172] op. cit., p. 55.

[173] op. cit., p. 56.

> And therefore I do (think) and am still of the same opinion, that every man born in England cannot, ought not, neither by the Law of God nor the Law of Nature, to be exempted from the choice of those who are to make Laws for him to live under, and for him, for aught I know, to lose his life under.[174]

This sort of theory was no invention but merely an application of the idea of 1642, and if Ireton refused this theory as destructive to property and anarchical to government, they fall into doubt:

> Sir, I see that it is impossible to have liberty but all property must be taken away. If it be laid down for a rule, and if you will say it, it must be so. But I would fain know what the soldier hath fought for all this while? He hath fought to enslave himself, to give power to men of riches, men of estates, to make him a perpetual slave.[175]

Sexby, also representing his group of soldiers, envisaged what happened here: "I see that though liberty were our end, there is a degeneration from it."[176] There was a disillusion for him, since he too was not a man of property but of natural birth right:

> We have engaged in this kingdom and ventured our lives, and it was all for this: to recover our birthrights and privileges as Englishmen: and by the arguments urged there is none. There are many thousands of us soldiers that have ventured our lives; we have had little propriety in the kingdom as to our estate yet had a birthright. But it seems now, except a man hath a fixed estate in this kingdom, he hath no right in this kingdom. I wonder we were so much deceived.[177]

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[174] op. cit., p. 56.

[175] op. cit., p. 71.

[176] op. cit., p. 69.

[177] ibid.

Yes, if Ireton was right, they would be greatly deceived. "I shall tell you in a word my resolution," Sexby said. "I am resolved to give my birthright to none!"[178] But Ireton's position was curiously supported by the legal sense of the Common Law. Ultimately, therefore, they had to part from the positive Common Law in order to demand their right. Wildman rightly caught this point:

> Our case is to be considered thus, that we have been under slavery. That's acknowledged by all. Our very laws were made by our conquerors; and where as it's spoken much of chronicales, I conceive there is no credit to be given to any of them; and the reason is because those that were our lords, and made us their vassals, would suffer nothing else to be chronicled. We are now engaged for our freedom. That's the end of Parliaments; not to constitute what is already (established, but to act) according to the just rules of government. Every person in England hath as clear a right to elect his representative as the greatest person in England.[179]

The position of Natural Right had to be distinguished from the Civil Right founded on the statute law, or the legal sense of the Common Law. The theory of the Norman Yoke was to be applied to this purpose more radically.[180]

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[178] *ibid*.

[179] *op*. *cit*., p. 65-66.

[180] An"equalitarian" democracy based on the Norman Yoke theory was expressed by Winstanley, the leader of the Diggers movement. A fascinating application of the Norman Yoke theory may be found especially in his pamphlets and letters 1649-1680. For example, in an articulate pamphlet such as "An appeal to the House of Commons" (1649), he sharply realized the need of further revolution than Ireton contemplated; for the Magna Carta did not free the common people and restore their property:

> England, you know, hath been conquered and enslaved divers times, and the best Laws that England hath,

(cont.)

The revolutionary idea cannot rest on the basis of the positive laws.

Ireton's treacherous attitude was finally revealed when he ventured to amend the theory which was formulated by Henry Parker in 1642. Ireton reinterpreted Parker's theory in the light of his theory of property as follows:

> I do acknowledge that which you take to be so general of power of making laws, of determining what shall be law in the land, does lie in the people - (but by the people is meant those) - that are possessed of the permanent interest in the land.

The "people" meant men of property! Then, many of the Englishmen who had no property were not the "people."[181]

(cont.)

> (viz. Magna Charta) were got by our Forefathers importunate petitioning unto the Kings, that stil were their Task-masters; and yet these best laws are yoaks and manicles, tying one sort of people to be slaves to another; Clergy and Gantry have got their freedom, but the common people stil are, and have been left servants to wrok for them, like the Israelites under the Egyptian Task-masters. (Sabine's edition, p. 303)

His idea was to carry the emancipation from the Norman Yoke to its consequence, emancipation conceived in terms of the "land." "When William the Conqueror triumphed, he took the land from the English both the Enclosures from the Gentry, and the Commons and waste lands from the common people, and gave our land to his Norman souldiers." (p. 304) But this lost land must be finally regained to the hands of people, not only the Gentry and the Clergy, but also the common people. "O let the first thing you do, be this, to set the land free." This was the cry of the Diggers. (p. 305)

[181] In the same pamphlet Winstanley wrote, against the position of Ireton:

> And seeing in particular you swore to endeavor the freedom, peace and safety of this people of England, shutting out no sort from freedom; therefore you cannot say that the Gentry and Clergy were only comprehended, but without exception, all sorts of people in the land are to have freedom, seeing all sorts

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Government was, then merely an instrument of the privileged people. According to Ireton, the present Revolution was engaged for restoring legal order against one man's arbitrary will; the King attempted to damage the property of the "people" levying tax and "Ship Money" by illegal power of Prerogative.

Such was the history from 1642 to 1647, and the idea of 1642 was stripped of its idealism and creativity. The Leveller Movement must be viewed against this background of the degeneration of the revolutionary idea of 1642. Actually it was the Levellers who influenced the representative of the soldiers cited above. But the fact that Henry Parker, the most articulate author of the revolutionary idea of 1642, had changed his mind by this time, will disclose the depth of the problem. It is, therefore, not only amatter of theory but a matter of the ethical character of man. Man may be able to articulate high ideas, but his ethic betrays his ideas. It was not logical inconsistency but ethical inconsistency that underlaid this degeneration of the idea of 1642. The idea of 1642 contained some important elements which would bring forth modern Democracy if it were materialized at the level of ethics as well as of politics. For it contained a pattern of a new Ethos upon which new Democratic society might be

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(cont.) have assisted you in person and purse, and the common people more especially, seeing their estates were weakest, and their misery in the wars the greatest. op. cit., p. 305.

established. But out of the revolutionary movement based, really or alledgedly, on the idea of 1642, modern Democracy did not arise. Such a man as Ireton can never be a "democratic man". We observe the first "democratic" man in a modern sense among the Levellers, for they not only accepted the idea of 1642 but also carried it to its "ethical" consequence. This point should be made clear, and for this purpose we will now consider Henry Parker's change of viewpoint.

An ethical inconsistency was revealed in the person of Henry Parker himself. Needless to say, he was the revolutionary par excellence in the year of 1642. When he uttered boldly, "Power is originally inherent in the people, and it is nothing else but that might and vigour which such or such a societie of men containes in it selfe, etc.", which we have quoted before, it had a serious effect upon the common people. How deeply his theory affected Lilburne, may be seen in Lilburne's own words:

> . . . which principle, is notably discussed by the Author of the printed observations upon some of his Majesties late answers and expresses (who is commonly reputed to be one in a speciall manner to be imployed by the Parliament) who saith page 2. speaking of the King whose Regall power the Parliament now executes, (and therefore the people have just ground to be very watchfull that no inrodes by them be made upon their liberties, that nature, reason, and the freedomes of the fundamentall lawes of England, invest them with) we see that power is but secondary and derivative in Princes, (and I say in counsells likewise) the fountaine and efficient cause is the people, and etc. . .[182]

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[182] Lilburne, Innocency and Truth Justified, (1646), p. 57.

As Lilburne here witnesses, because of his brilliant pen-service, he was employed to the Parliament "in a speciall manner." When he said, "the name of a King is great I confesse, and worthy of great honour, but is not the name of people greater?"[183], did this "people" mean the "people" in Ireton's sense? The common people did not read it in that way. He himself, to be sure, grounded his revolution idea upon the people as the source of political authority. It may be admitted that there was a tendency towards the theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty in his pamphlet of 1642, yet it was well counterbalanced by the theory of social contract and Law-Supremacy. For the existence of the Parliament was dependent upon the people's consent, and it was able to become a "real body of people" by virtue of representation through "public consent." There was a sense of service as he wrote, "by vertue of election and representation, a few shall act for many, the wise shall consent for the simple, the vertue of all shall redound to some, and prudence of some shall redound to all."[184] We can find there only a modest understanding of the representation.

But how greatly was this man changed by 1650, when he wrote a vitriolic letter to Lilburne, like "A Letter of Due Censure, and Redargvtion to Lieut. Coll: John Lilburne:

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[183] Parker, Observation, p. 17.

[184] *op. cit.*, p. 15.

touching his Triall at Guild-Hall-London in Octob. last 1649"? Here appears an Ireton of the Parliament! His mind had obliterated the democratic tendency in 1642, and there stood instead of the ideas of Parliamentary Sovereignty, the Principle of "Might", the collective personality of the Parliament in opposition to the common individual "people". He gave up the idea of Law-Supremacy and returned to the Parliamentary version of Lex Regia. The Parliament was Rex as a collective personality, instead of an individual man, viz. the king. Then, wasn't this collective Rex more than a usurper, not differing from an individual Rex? Parker wrote to Lilburne:

> You [Lilburne] will answer, that the men in present authority now at Westminster, which granted this Commission are Usurpers, and we are not to look upon Usurpers, or imagine that they so represent God, and do Gods businesse, as other legall Magistrates that are rightly invested by God himself. Hereunto I shall reply, that judgement in this case (whether the present Parliament be rightly the Supreme Authority of England, or not) belongs not to you being a private person, more than it does to me, or any other man in England.[185]

The authority of the Parliament now towers too high to be a matter for the common people to discuss. Or else he said:

> You will say, all men in justice ought to be enemies to Usurpers, and Friends to such as are unduly depressed. I reply on the contrary, that private men, let the case be what it will, of their own heads, or upon their own conducts, are not to rise against a settled Usurper, or enterprize any thing that may disturbe the common peace: nay even publick persons are to prefer the safetie of the people, before any lower interest, or fight, or Law whatsoever.[186]

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[185] Parker, A Letter, p. 28.

[186] op. cit., p. 31.

What happened to this man? How can we connect our memory of him in 1642 with this man? For him, the Parliament now appears as a large iron ball laid upon the surface of the common people. It is a whole of power and authority. Thus, he confessed:

> 'Tis very hard for me to contest with the present Power, whose Agents have free liberty to say any thing against me, whilest I am denyed all the priviledges of an Englishman.[187]

So Lilburne must also be silent.

The principle of "Might" had overcome the revolutionary theory of 1642. Because the Parliament won the battle with the Roylist, it could hold the authority by means of which the positive laws were executed. "The doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty is not necessarily a doctrine of liberty or of democracy."[188] Woodhouse was right in this judgment over against the position of McIlwain's superficial emphasis on the "High Court of Parliament."[189] Parker was never democratic in his theory of the Parliamentary Sovereignty. "In order that the sovereignty of Parliament may become a doctrine of liberty and democracy, and their most effective safeguard, parliament must be domocratized andits general conformity to the will of the nation must be ensured." This judgment fits into our line of discussion. But what does it mean to "democratize" the Parliament? Isn't it that man himself grows "democratic"? Isn't it true that the real Democracy must be built upon "democratic" men? The Parliament, to be sure, is the form of Democracy, but the "democratic" men must be the content of Democracy. The form of Democracy had been known for a long time; and to take our view close to the preceeding age of this time, the form of Democracy, the system of election and representation or the Parliament itself, came from either Calvinism, Presbyterianism or the Independency in its political expressions, or the medieval English heritage. But the "democratic" man was not born from either. The "modern" man had already appeared; for example, Luther was a modern man in one sense. But Parker was not a "democratic" man either. Therefore the problem must be envisaged more deeply than simply exposing his "undemocratic" theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty. There was a certain Ethos which produced such an "undemocratic" Parliamentary Sovereignty.

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[187] op. cit., p. 27.

[188] Woodhouse, op. cit., Introduction, p. 63.

[189] Cf. C. H. McIlwain, The High Court of Parliament, (1910).

Parker was born as a younger son of a Gentleman. He received little material inheritance but was given the highest education at Oxford that the sons of Gentlemen could have. In him also the blood of the new rising Gentry was flowing, with strength seeking opportunities to rise and with weakness causing him to crave an authority for his security. He was elevated to a position of reward to his satisfaction; but once he arrived, he had craved the established authority, thus setting aside his pen of criticism. He changed into a man subservient to the authority now established in the Parliament. How much difference was there in the ethical quality between such a man and Hooker, who once said, "By the goodness of Almightie God and his seruant Elizabeth we are." To be sure, on the level of theory there was a great difference but on the level of this ethic there is no great difference. The object of royality was changed from the King to the Parliament. But his subservient nature was never overcome. Such a subservient nature was the ethical basis which supported his theory of the Parliamentary Sovereignty. He once elevated the doctrine of _Salus_ _Populi_ highly, but he did not establish the meaning of "Populus" as a responsible subject of high ethical quality. This was because he could not establish himself as such an ethical subject. When he moved from the position of _Salus_ _Populi_ to the position of the Parliamentary Sovereignty, his theoretical countenance looked like Machiavelli, whom he first rejected in 1642.

As one of the new Gentry he was powerful by means of his learning. But his self-interest and will to power, common characteristics of the newly rising class, made him ethically weak in the sight of the holder of authority upon which his security depended. When facing those above he was subservient, but when looking at those below, he was arrogant. As an Oxonian and well-educated Lawyer, he wrote to Lilburne:

> We perceive hereby plainly the substance of your Levelling philosophy to be briefly this: The Judges because they understand Law, are to be degraded, and made servants to the Jurors: but the Jurors, because they understand no Law, are to be mounted aloft, where they are to administer justice to the whole Kingdom. The Judges because they are commonly Gentlemen by birth, and have had honourable education, are to be exposed to scorn: but the Jurors, because they be commonly Mechanicks, bred up illiterately to handy crafts, are to be placed at the helme.; and consequently Learning and gentle extraction, because they have been in esteem with all Nations from the beginning of the world till now, must be debased; but ignorance, and sordid birth must ascend the chair, and be lifted up to the eminentest office, and places of power. Coblers must now practice Physick instead of Docters; Tradesmen must get into Pulpits instead of Divines, and plowmen must ride to the Sessions instead of Justices of the Peace. The pretence of levelling is to put all men upon an equall floore, by adding to the inferior so much as may match him with his superior, and taking from the superior so much as may match him with his inferior: andthisis sfficiently heretical in policie.[190]

When he occupied in a satisfactory chair in the Parliament, he busied himself by oppressing the dynamic power of seeking fulfillment of culmination from the more subordinate classes. He was, thus, a defender of a new order in which he could enjoy hisown success. In the year of 1642, he had written that "Man is by nature of restlesse ambition" in the light of his opponent, especially the King, but he could never discover this same nature and itsugly effects within himself. In the above cited text we are able to observe his self-interest, arrogance, and class-consciousness in its superiority complex. His "person" was never renewed as a "democratic" man.

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[190] Parker, A Letter, pp. 21-22.

We have said that the democratization of the Parliament led to the development of a democratic man. This democratic man finds himself above the Parliament. This should not be taken in an anarchial sense but in an ethical sense. With respect to man's ethical responsibility, man is superior than any political institutions. This position destroys the idea of the Parliamentary Sovereignty. In the following text, the contrast with Parker should be noted:

> Wee are your [viz. the members of the Parliament] Principalls, and you our Agents; it is a Truth which you cannot but acknowledge: For if you or any other shall assume, or exercise any Power, that is not derived from our Trust and choice thereunto, that Power is no lesse than usurpation and Oppression, from which wee expect to be freed, in whomsoever we finde it; . . .[191]

This shows the opposite position to that of Parker of 1650, but this is, it should be noted, nothing else than an application of Parker's theory of 1642. "Wee are your Principalls!" this "we" was the self-consciousness of "democratic" man, though exaggerated. Why, then, did such a difference between Parker and the Levellers take place? What made this difference? Our attention must be paid to the change in the ethical quality of man. Parker in 1642 had a logically consistent theory of Revolution which made for the formation of Democracy, he was inconsistent on the level of Ethos, that it to say, his was an ethical inconsistency. Democracy had risen not simply from the Puritan Revolution in general, but from the point where the idea of 1642 was ethically consequential, from where a "democratic" man was born who was to endow the form of Democracy with a new significance.

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[191] Overton, *A Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens, and other Free-Born People of England, to their owne House of Commons*, (1646), p. 3.

We find the best example in Lilburne. Of course, the Levellers in general were deeply inbued by what Lilburne exemplified, and so they were also duly counted the first democratic men. But how could they, the Levellers, of rather mean birth and education, make themselves compatible to the men of property now in the high positions of the government? The answer must be first sought in religion. The message of the Puritan preachers contained in itself two major doctrines: Predestination and the Covenant. The former was to destroy the privilege and status which man created in a society and the latter to establish ethical subjectivity of individuals. The Levellers interpreted this powerful message according to their own experience and knowledge. Lilburne's religion was a religion of martyrdom founded on his mystical experience; Walwyn's was one of a unique sort to be characterized by his theological position of love, which should be estimated in a contrast to the position of truth (which is primarily concerned with separating truth from untruth.) Overton's religion may be characterized as a radicalism which interprets religion in terms of the "whole man" thus overcoming Platonic dualism. Their strong personality was established upon their unique modes of religious conviction.

Lilburne started his public life as a sufferer under the prelatical jurisdiction, and his religious foundation was formed through this experience. He wrote in the year 1638:

> With the consideration of these and other gratious promises, made to his people, I being one of his chosen ones did claime my share & interest in them, and the Lord of his infinite goodness enabled me to cast by selfe upon and rest in them, knowing and stedfastly beleeving that he is a God of faithfullnes and power, whoe is able and willing to make good these his promises to the vtmost, and (to his praise be it spoken I desire to speake it) my soule was that morning exceedingly lifted up with spiritual consolation: and I felt within me such a divine supportation, that the basenesse of my punishment I was to undergoe did seem as a matter of nothing to me.[192]

This is one of the most compact texts revealing his religion. We note the idea of Election, "I being one of his chosen ones", the idea of Covenant, "gratious promises", then mysticism, union with God through the Holy Spirit's support, and active engagement in suffering with God's encouragement. These elements were very familiar ones, especially among the left-wing Puritans, and it is most plausible that he accepted this kind of religion from the Baptist church, which he joined in 1636. Predestination and Covenant, and also mysticism joined man's soul immediately to God and gave an independent self-consciousness of strong personality. Moreover, the establishment of this religious self was made decisive in his self-commitment to God through his conversion.

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[192] Lilburne, A Worke of the Beast; Or, A Relation of a most unchristian Censure, (1638), p. 4.

> It is true, I am a young man and noe Scoller, according to that which the world counts scollership, yet I have obtayned mercie of the Lord to be faithfull, & hee by a divine prouidence hath brought me hither this day, & I speak to you in the name of the Lord, being assisted with the spirit & power of the God of heaven and earth, & I speake not the words of rashness or inconsideratenesse, but the words of soberness, and mature deliberation, for I did consult with my God before I came hither and desired him that he would direct and enable me to speake that which might be for his glory and the good of his people, and as I am a Souldier fighting under the banner of the great and mightie Captaine the Lord Iesus Christ, and as I looke for that Crowne of immortality which one day I know shall bee set upon my temples, being in the condition that I am in, I dare not hold my peace, but speake unto you with boldnes in the might and strength of my God, the things which the Lord in mercy hath made knowne unto my Soule, come life come death.[193]

If the former text shows his religion, this explains his ethical attitude. Here also we note every influence from the prevailing Puritan teaching, not only in his experience of conversion, but also in the principle of "soli Deo Gloria", and above all in the ethic of Christian Warfare. His own religious personality was a unique integration of these teachings. He was a legitimate child of the Puritan preaching movement. Because of this relious ground, he viewed the world differently than the ordinary Gentlemen did; in his experience the Puritan values were inverted:

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[193] *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

> I am the Sonne of a Gentle man, and my Friends are of rancke and quality in the Countrie where they live, which is 200. miles from this place. . . and withall, I am a yong man and likelie to have lived well and in plentie, according to the fashion of the world. Yet notwithstanding, for the cause of Christ, and to doe him service, I have and doe bid adue to Father, Friends, Riches, pleasures, ease, contented life and bloud, and lay all downe at the Footstoole of Iesus Christ, being willing to part with all rather than I will dishonour him, or in the least measure part with all the peace of a good conscience, & and that sweetnesse and joy which I have found in him, for in naked Christ is the quintiscence of swetnes & I am so farr from thinking my affliction and punishment which this day I haue endured. . .[194]

It was because of this religious conviction that he could stand against oppression on the pretext of "order" established in the society. What buttressed him in his battle against authority was the religious inversion of the values. For the rise of modern "democratic" man, this religious background was necessary, for he had to rise through the contest with man of another religious self-consciousness. But the uniqueness in the rise of a modern democratic man was, as we see in Lilburne, found in the combination of religious self-consciousness and legal self-interpretation. There took place a fusion of religious personality andlegal self-consciousness. From the beginning Lilburne's religious aspiration was to be Christ's disciple through his actual suffering, but his ethic of martyrdom was related to the problem of justice. In the year of 1638, he could not fully interpret his own situation in which he was to follow Christ, but he could state in keeping with his biblical knowledge of Paul's trial that "they are vorse and more cruel, then the Lawes of the Pagansand Heathen Romans were." Thus he sublimated his innocent suffering by a religious satisfaction. But once he had learned law and history, he was able to interpret the situation more clearly, and then the meaning of martyrdom became more positive. We cannot fully answer the question of how the religion of martyrdom and social concern are related to each other. Lilburne did not give any logical answer to it. Suffice it to recall the fact that the meaning of martyrdom was changed in this age, as we have seen in John Goodwin. Martyrdom was no longer a passive ethic of suffering saints, but an active ethic of fighting saints.

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[194] op. cit., p. 20.

Lilburne had learned law and history some years after his first suffering, law mostly from the booksof Sir Edward Coke and Christopher St. Germain, and history from the works of the Antiquaries, such as John Speed. Now he was empowered to deal with the situation of his suffering, but now his persecutors had changed. Learning some laws from the book of Coke, he was able to say:

> This Gentleman [viz. Lilburne] hath been since also committed to the said Prison of New gate by the Lords, contrary to Magna Charta, and the Petition of Right, where it is said, No man shall be imprisoned, but by the judgment of his Equalls being men of like condition and quality, that is to say, Commons by Commons, as Peeres by Peeres, and no man put to answer

> before Indectiment or Presentment in Matters Cyrminall, 5. of Edw. 3. chap. 9, the 25. of Edw. chap. 4.[195]

Upon this ground he denied the right of the House of Lords which was merely "made by pregogative, and never intrusted or impowered by the Commons of England, the originall and fountaine of Power"[196] to judge him as a Commoner. In his battle with the House of Lords in 1646, the Magna Carta was to play dicisive role. As he put it, "Magna Charta the English mans legall birth-right and inheritance."[197] He could, in this way, interpret the situation of his mission, but immediately sublimating his suffering towards union with Christ, but judging to clearly as "contrary to the Law of the Land, and the Rights and Priviledges of the Subjects."[198] In 1638 he was only able to interpret his suffering with its legal aspect in terms of Paul's instance in the Scriptures, but in 1646 he was already able to combine his legal knowledge with the use of the Bible:

> . . . craving law, iustice, and right, according to Magna Charta, which as Sir Edward Cooke in the 2nd, part of his institutes fol. 56 saith, is the best birth-right the Subject hath, for thereby his goods, lands, wife, children, his body, life, honour, and estimation, are protected from iniury and wrong: but I was dealt with muchlike the proceedings of that Iudge he speaks off, fol. 55. who (he saith)

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[195] Cf. Liberty Vindicated against Slavery, (1646), pp. 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 20. etc.

[196] Free-Mans Freedoms vindicated, (1646), p. 6.

[197] Ibid.

[198] England's Birth-Right Justified, (1646), p. 4.

> first punisheth, and then he heareth: and lastly compelleth to confesse, and make and marre lawes at his pleasure, like as the Centurion in the holy History did to St. Paul, for the Test saith, Acts 22. 24. 27. that the chiefe captain commanded him to be brought into the Castle, and bade that he should be examined by scourging, that he might know wherefore they cryed so against him, and verse 27. then the chief Captain came and said unto him, tell me art thou a Roman? he said yea, but saith noble Sir Edward Cooke there, good Iudges and Iustices abhorre these courses.[199]

There are numerous examples of this sort in his pamphlet. His knowledge of the Scriptures was thus fused with his newly-learned legal knowledge. This fusion was expressed in this way:

> So doubtless (if timely provison be not made according to the will and pleasure of God and the Fundamentall Lawes of this Realme, for the preservation or rather restauration of the free practise of justice, & our native just freedomes, the dreadfull God of Justice (for the injustice of the Rulers of the people) will in his wrath and fury contend against them, . . .[200]

According to this text, the fusion should be not only that of biblical knowledge and legal knowledge, but also that of religion and law.

To be sure, there was a change in this tactic when he was confronted by the betrayal of the House of Commons. In this battle he took up the Parliamentary Declarations, rather than the Magna Carta. He, as he himself testified, read carefully the Declarations which stated the Parliamentary cause of resistance, and understood them deeply. He

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[199] Innocency and Truth justified, (1646), p. 64.

[200] Liberty Vindicated against Slavery, (1646), p. 29.

We was able to do so, because he, by virtue of a fusion in his existence, not only interpreted but lived in the idea of 1642. The Parliament and Lilburne, from whom the Leveller Movement came, started from the same position at the beginning of the Civil War. They conflicted later when the Levellers strictly retained the guidance of the idea of1642 and the Parliament deviated from that position in view of settlement. Lilburne confessed in 1649 that he had read "seriously" "all their primitive most excellent Declarations" and had himself become engaged in the high purpose of deliberation under the guidance of the Parliament, and at that time was "not in the least doubting but they would be as good as their words and Declarations, and not in the least to seek themselves" when he risked his life in the field. But their self-interest had changed and they did not think especially of the good and welfare of the common people. Lilburne's battle was, therefore, with regard to their deviation from the idea of 1642. The Putney Debate was one of the phases of this battle waged by his followers in the Army.

But the most important thing in the Leveller Movement was not merely their outward activity but underlying Ethos. From our ethical point of view this question may be dealt with exclusively. First of all, we must clarify the formation of the new Ethos as exemplified by Lilburne. Returning to the first point, we must understand rightly the fusion of the religious personality and the legal self-consciousness. This fusion was of such a kind as to ground legal self-consciousness on a religiously established strong personality. In so doing, his religious personality assumed a unique social implication. His original religious motive of a sufferer for Christ's sake came to be fused with political motice insuch a self-consciousness as "that worthy and constant sufferer for his countries liberties."[201] We can see in this fusion that we may call the Subject of Christian social ethics. This Subject was supported by Puritan religion which was able to establish an ethical Subject from the knowledge of law which Lilburne learned from the Common Lawyers, especially, Sir Edward Coke.

Upon this fusion on the existential level, a curious mixture of several laws took place. Lilburne's conception of law was not strictly jurisprudential, but semi-theological and semi-jurisprudential. He held several laws on once: "the Law of God, the law of nature, the law of Heathen Romans, and the knowne law of this land, recorded . . . in Magna Charta."[202] That is to say, he grasped law in its essence but not in its written forms. Yet he did not make his idea of law totally abstract. For example, a written law such as the Magna Carta was taken as written, although his interpretation was much coloured in his inclination towards Natural Law. His idea of law may be clearly understood by a text such as this:

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[201] Or, "a lover of his Country, and sufferer for the common Liberty" were his favourite self-address.

[202] In numerous places of his writing 1646-149.

> Besides it is to be considered, that all Statutes and lawes are Null and void which are to do any wayes tend to the infringing of the peoples rights and liberties, being repugnant, and contrary to Magna Charta, so often confirmed, though seldome or never observed or kept, the neglect whereof, and the suffering of the violators thereof to passe unpunished, have been the causes of great troubles to the Kingdome, in these and former times, and without their follow speedy amendment thereof; and punishment of the breakers and abusers of this great charter of liberty; nothing can be expected but confusion and unavoidable ruine upon this Kingdome, being by the sword already so much wasted, and by these and the like grievous oppressions, made to be a People in meere Bondage and slavery; most worthy therefore of consideration, is the observation, which Sir Edward Cooke hath touching this poynt, how that the alteration of any of those maximes of the common Law is most dangerous, . . .[203]

It is clear that he interpreted the Magna Carta in the light of Natural Law, and regarded it as the heart of the Common Law. He interpreted the nature of law not with respect to the positive laws but to the Ultimate of laws, in this case the Magna Carta dna Natural Law. It is interesting that the Parliamentary Common Lawyers, such as Parker, viewed the stability of law with regard to the civil law.[204] This was a point which separated Lilburne from Parker. But Parker, it should be remembered, in 1642 was inclined toward Natural Law.

This idea of law may be clarified if we look at the historical scheme of thought underlying it. We have studied the Leveller's unique interpretation of history by which national history was telescoped into biblical history. Being thus telescoped into the biblical scheme of history, viz. the scheme of Creation, Fall, History of Redemption, and "Paradise Regained", law in the national history was to assume such a developmental interpretation as the pure "ancient laws", and laws created by the Norman Conquest, and thus: our Parliament should "at length free this Nation from this unsupportable vassilage & bondage & restore us to our ancient (long lost) liberties and freedomes, and so longer offer us thus tyranously to be wasted and worne out, famished, and starved, and murthered, . . ."[205]

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[203] Liberty against Slavery, p. 6.

[204] Parker, A Letter, p. 13.

The relation between Natural Law and the positive laws was grasped by a dialectics of history. When Lilburne looked to the old day as saying "Our Ancestors of old lived in the highest pitch of perfect Liberty," there was a fusion of the primordial state in biblical history and the happy days in old Britain. From this knowledge of history he turned his eyes to the present situation: "and wee now in dejected servility we are not used as free men, but as adjects, yea, as meere slaves."[206] According to this knowledge of history, law itself was conceived in a dialectic manner. Yet, the Levellers did not neglect the element of national history; on this point they differed from the Fifth Monarchy men who totally denyed the meaning of national history. To the Levellers, national history was assimilated in a dialectic manner into their theological, political, and legal thinking. The fusion between biblical history and national history was signigicant in the sense, that the element of national history rendered "concreteness" to their thought whether theological or political, and the element of biblical history which by nature dealt with universal world, rendered"universality" to their thought.

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[205] Liberty vindicated against Salvery, p. 13.

[206] op. cit., p. 24.

The most important problem for a correct appreciation of the Levellers' thought seems to be to grasp this point of fusion. This point of fusion cannot be ignored without losing the real picture of their thought. In this existentially based fusion of religious personality and legal self-consciousness, the revolutionary idea of 1642 which as such was constituted by the combination of a religious element and a political element, or of Natural Law and the Common Law was materialized in the dimension of personality. Lilburne not only was able to interpret the revolutionary idea of 1642 rightly, but he also lived in that idea. The idea of 1642 contained a pattern of new Ethos, which was potentially a basis of Democracy, but Lilburne lifed in this Ethos. He realized the democratic idea couched in the Declarations of the Parliament and in the theory of Henry Parker in his person. This ethical

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quality in the person of Lilburne was a factor which distinguished him and his followers from those treacherous Parliamentarians. The Parliamentarians established the sovereignty of the Parliament without Democracy, whereas the Levellers made themselves "democratic" though failed to realize their ideal on the political level. Such was the ethical background of the conflict between the Levellers and the Parliamentarians or the Army grandees.

We must finally deal with the questions: how the ontological Natural Law was shifted to the personal Natural Right and how the status society was changed to the contract society? Envisaging how the idea of Natural Law was developing in Lilburne's mind towards Natural Right, we must make several things clear. First, historical "dialectics" was able to conceive the idea of Natural Law in particular relation to man'sself-understanding, that is, an understanding of man in his historical reality by a heilsgeschichtliche tension of the memory of the happy primodial state governed by Natural Law and the prospect of the recovery of the same state. This is characteristically different from the Thomistic conception of Natural Law, which is subordinate to lex aeterna, viz. divine law. Natural Law prescribes virtues and thus directs natural powers to a supernatural consummation. But in the Levellers' mind there is no such a hierarchical subordination of Natural Law to the lex aeterna but, so to speak, lex aeterna and Natural Law were the fundamental law of og the primodial state and the positive laws have entered into the fallen state, that is into history. But just as throughout this history God's plan of salvation is working, Natural Law is working as the "remedy" for the failure of the positive laws and the political society. So far Lilburne and Parker share the same position. Thomas conceived Natural Law within a hierarchically ordered dualistic world; whereas Parker and Lilburne viewed it in the movement of history, that is from the past to the future, not from below to above. Second, Thomistic Natural Law gave "order" to the realm of Nature, whereas Parker and Lilburne regarded Natural Law as the Principle of establishing the final cause of political society in history, that is, salus populi. Thomas' Natural Law as the principle of ordo prescribes good and evil, but the latter Natural Law describes the "falue" of political society. It is the principle of "Welfare." The English tradition of Utilitarism was, it may be safely said, rooted in this distinction taken against the medieval conception of Natural Law during the 17th Century. This sort of Natural Law is no longer a prescription according to a transcendental standard of Godd and Evil, but it is understood through an immanent sense of pleasure and displeasure. Hedonism becomes the ground of knowledge of Natural Law. If so, the validity of Natural Law must be established differently. In fact the category of "Universality" which was appropriate to the ontological conception of Natural Law was to be replaced by the new category of "Majority." An embrionic tendency towards Utilitarianism had been conceived already in the Puritanic revolutionaries of the 17th Century.

Third, in that way the ontological Natural Law was transferred into the subjective realm of man: first, from the cosmic structure of being to the realm of history; secondly, from the objective order to the realm of sense-experience. But a difference must be noticed between Parker and Lilburne: the former conceived the subject of Natural Law thus made immanent in terms of collective personality and limited by some privileged people who could identify their interest with the representatives in the Parliament; whereas Lilburne regarded the subject of Natural Law as individual common people. The category of the "majority" which sums up the common interest must be defined in terms of the common people. This was demanded by the Leveller program of reformation of the Parliament and of the new system of franchise.

Fourth, as each individual man is the subject of Natural Law, he thus becomes self-concsious in terms of Natural Right. The idea of Natural Law which is at work in history in a heilsgeschichtliche sense appears transmuted as Right in an individual personality. This personal Natural Right is nothing else than a knowledge of Natural Law in thepresent reality of history conceived by a heilsgeschichtliche tension. For in history, which is the fallen state of man, the idea of Natural Law assumes a dialectic tension to itself. Natural Law no longer prescribes human conduct directly as in the primodial state, but undergirds human personality in terms of Natural Right, that is to say, by virtue of that historical "dialectics" Natural *Law* is transmuted Natural *Right*; from prescription to demand. The prospect of "Paradise Regained" must be based upon this Natural Right. Thus, this idea became the principle of the Leveller Utopianism.

Fifth, the locus of Natural Law thus changed from the cosmic structure of being to "personality". Natural Law which was the principle of status society was turned into the principle of contract society. The modern contract society must be grounded on and constituted by individual persons who are conscious of their authority as the responsible agents of social contract. This social contract must be distinguished from the feudalistic "fealty" contract between the lords and thesubjects, from the Presbyterian "national covenant" which conceives the human partnership in collective terms and other quasi-contracts which do not take the moral responsibility of the contract partners seriously. This contract by nature appears similar to the Anabaptist type of covenant which requires ethical responsibility. We can say that this social contract is the best political application of the religious covenant of the Anabaptist type. As we have see, Lilburne's religion, which appeared much closer to the Anabaptist type, adopted a legal character through his study of the common law. The establishment of this sort of personality which becomes conscious of himself in terms of Natural Right was to turn the history of society from status society to contract society.

Finally we must add one more consideration, that the transition from Natural Law to Natural Right was mediated by the Levellers' assimilation of the English legal heritage. The Leveller concept of Natural Right was not an abstract but a concrete one, and it is because the Levellers identified Natural Law with the ancient good laws which were presupposed to have existed before the Norman Conquest took place. They also identified Natural Right with the Englishmen's "Birth Right." This natural Right is, therefore, more concrete than the same idea in the American or French Revolutions. It was deeply rooted in English history which was interpreted in fusion with biblical history. But as we have seen in the Putney Debate, the Levellers were, generally speaking, inclined to the side of Natural Law. This inclination, however, served to render "universality" to Englishmen's "Birth Right", so it was possible to overcome the national boundary which circumscribed the idea of "Birth Right." This possibility is ever meaningful from our point of view; for the possibility of overcoming a national boundary of the idea of "Birth Right" is a chance to combine "concreteness" with "universality." This possibility appeared when the conflict took place between Natural Birth Right and Civil Right, the latter of which Ireton characteristically defended in terms of "local interest." The meaning of the Leveller Movement, therefore, may be discovered rather in its unsuccessful battle with the privileged class which aimed at a new status society. In this battle of ideas, theirs had to turn from the national to the universal level. There was danger in the identification of Civil Right with Natural Right; for in so doing the English national interest may be confused with universal right. The mistakes of the English colonialism and imperialism may be based on this wrong identification. But in the failure of the Leveller Movement their universal tendency was to stand in tension with the Civil Right of men of property who had a "local interest." The idea of Natural Right was taken upon the individual basis. Upon this individual personal basis, Natural Human Right becomes a right of everybody despite national, racial, economical differences.

The Levellers were superior in that they thought in terms of man, rather than in terms of land, as the Diggers did. Both, however, adpoted the same scheme of thought as we have described, that is, a fusion of national history and biblical history. The Diggers thought that the "land" had to be restored in the original purity, that is, as common property. The Levellers, on the other, thought that "man" had to be established as Natural Right demanded. The Levellers' socio-economical programs were all based upon this ethical basis. This we must rightly appreciate.

To be sure, the contribution of the Levellers lay not in their creativity but in that they carried the revolutionary idea of 1642 to its ethical consequence. Lilburne, for example, was not creative either in theology or in politics. He learned his religion conscienciously and diligently from the Puritan preachers, his law from the Common Lawyers. He was a legitimate son of the marriage of Puritanism and the Common Law which took place in the early decades of the Stuart dynasty. He carried what he received to the ethical consequences realized in his person.

Conclusion

It was during the 17th Century that the traditional idea of Natural Law was dissolved into various interpretations. The struggle between Anglicanism and Puritanism was a decisive factor in this change. It was out of this struggle that cosmo-ontological Natural Law was transmuted Natural Right, which became one of the most fundamental ideas of modern democracy. In our view, the modern democratic ideas of man and society were the product of a historical friction between Anglicanism and Puritanism, in the main, that is to say, these ideas were not simply deduced by logical necessity from the essence of Calvinism, or Puritanism. In other words, the modern democratic ideas came out of the "destiny," but not out of the "essence," of Puritanism. We had to mention the Levellers with special attention, for they represented this "destiny" in a final and acute form, as the bearer of these new democratic ideas. The Levellers themselves were not so creative, but their uniqueness lies rather in their faithfulness in carrying to its consequence what the Puritan movement politically implied in conflict with Anglicanism. The Levellers were the first to articulate Natural Right in the modern democratic sense.

During the Civil War the idea of Natural Law itself was divided into two major different interpretations, viz. Anglican-Royalist, and Puritan-Parliamentarian interpretations. From the latter, that is to say, from the revolutionary interpretation of Natural Law, the idea of Natural Right emerged in more characteristic opposition to the traditional idea of Natural Law, whichwas represented by the Anglican-Royalists as the principle of social order under the absolutistic monarchy. The idea of *jus naturale* was one which belonged to a classical and mediaeval tradition, but this should not be confounded with the 17th Century idea of Natural Right. Suffice it here to turn our attention to the fact that in the early 17th Century autheologian such as Ames did not realize the distinction between *jus naturale* and *lex naturae*,[1] while in 1651 this distinction has become unmistakably clear to such an observer as Thomas Hobbes.[2] This distinction, to be sure, was not an invention of Hobbes, but he based it on the observation of the contemporary situation by his realistic eyes. This distinction was rooted deeply in the events and experiences during the first half of the 17th Century, to be exact, in the 1640s. The establishment of the idea of Natural Right was a shift from the cosmo-ontological to the historic-personal dimension in the conception of Natural Law.

On the other hand, as we have mentioned already, there was taking place another no less important shift in the conception of Natural Law, which pointed towards the Newtonian-scientific version of Natural Law, that is, laws of physical nature, viz. the principle of natural science. We can see as early as Richard Hooker that the law of nature and the law of reason were intentionally distinguished one from another. The steady development of natural science in the 17th Century justified a mechanical interpretation of Natural Law.

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[1] Cf. Ames, *De Conscientia*, lib. V, c. 1.

[2] In his *Leviathan*, Hobbes wrote: "For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because Right, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas Law, determineth, (cont.)

In such a situation the moral meaning which was pertinent to the traditional notion of Natural Law became more and more ambiguous. Hobbes, and Spinoza on the continent, attempted to re-establish moral science according to the example of "geometry," and despite their original intention the traditional moral meaning of Natural Law was conversely to be extinguished. Samuel Parker, Bishop of Oxford, had to attempt to recover the moral meaning of Natural Law from the Hobbesian mechanical view.[3] In this attempt to overcome Hobbes Parker was to recapitulate both Culverwel's more "epistemological" idea of "Light of Reason"[4] and Pufendorf's more "dogmatic" idea of Natural Law. Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature was an attempt in line with Parker.[5] In Locke's case, however, the epistemological tendency was strengthened. The idea of Natural Law was no longer one which might be "dogmatically" demonstrated, but one which should be sought out by use of

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(cont.)
and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent." (Part I, Chap. XIV, p. 64 in the first -1651- edition.)

[3] Cf. Samuel Parker, A Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature, andof the Christian Religion, 1681

[4] Cf. Nathanael Culverwel, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature with severall other Treatises. . ., 1654

[5] Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature was recently published by W. von Leyden.

Reason (viz. Light of Nature.) We can view from this point the rising tendency towards the epistemological philosophy of the future centuries.

The dissolution of the traditional idea of Natural Law led to a split between the principle of society and the principle of (physical) nature. In a sense Hobbes' theory of society was an attempt to heal this split, and he also had to deal with a split between Natural Law and Natural Right. He applied the analogy of "artificial man" to the interpretation of society. Thus, he attempted to re-establish a totality of community by overcoming a theory of contract. The idea "artificial man" was conceived by the image of "automata" (automatic machine such as a clock), and this made his theory of society "mechanical." The contemporary split between social and natural sciences is rooted in this dissolution of Natural Law in the 17th Century, and the struggle to bring both the principle of society and the principle of nature into harmony has been continuing ever since this age. The 17th Century intellectuals grappled with this problem vigorously. The question of Natural Law was one of the most serious problem to that age.

As far as we can see, the discrepancy between Natural Law as the principle of physical nature (the principle of natural science) and Natural Law as the principle of society (a principle of social theory) was never reconciled, even until today. It is impossible, and even more dangerous for today, than in the case of Hobbes, to attempt to establish morals according to the example of natural science. We think, in this relation, that not a whole inclusive ontology but a strong position of person in history and a social theory based upon this self-consciousness is needed in such a time as today. For our urgent business seems to be to establish man and the realm of morals over against the realm of natural science, rather than to attempt to synthesize them at this stage.

The person in history must be understood not only as a subjective self-commitment in an encounter with God, but also as an objective assertion of personality as "right" in society. It is for this reason that we must take seriously the establishment of the idea of Natural Right and Human Right in the Leveller movement. Natural Right grasps Natural Law on a personal basis (so that Natural Right is "Human" Right), rather than on a cosmic basis. To grasp Natural Law on a personal basis is more meaningful today in view of pluralistic-relativistic world situation after World War II, where the world is not only divided between communistic countries and free nations, but also the Asian-African countries are becoming autonomous thereby making relativism real on a world-wide scale. It is interesting to note, on the other hand, that the 17th Century idea of Human Right arose from a very relativistic situation in England. For example, Henry Parker described the situation like this:

> In England there are now some that hold the Supreme Authority to be in the last Kings Heir absolutely, and their endeavours are to bring him in upon his own terms; you /Lilburne/ and your party, hold it lawfull to joyn with him, upon your terms, but till you joyn with him, and He submit to your terms, the Supreme Authority is not in him: We, and our side, which is now prevalent, after a long dispute in Arms, hold this to be a true Parliament, and that the true Parliament is ever the Supreme Authority of England; and we have not onely the decision of the Sword (which in such like dubious cases

> after the last appeal hath been made to it, is no contemptible plea) but also the strongest reason, and majority of suffranges of all the people throughout the Land on our side, . . .[6]

In this relativistic situation, the Royalist stuck to the absolutistic version of Natural Law idea, which we have seen in Filmer; the Parliamentarians, such as Parker, rested their their cause on the idea of sovereignty supported by "decision of the Sword," viz. the principle of "Might" and the principle of Majority. This relativistic situation, in a national scale, anticipated the basic problems we confront in a world-wide scale. In such a situation the Levellers stood upon the principle of Natural Human Right. The Levellers' position was the supremacy of Natural Law which was conceived in terms of "Birth Right." This position was different both from the Royalists' position of Natural Law, and from the Parliamentarians' principle of "Might."

We live in no less relativistic situation; the "world" is no longer to be conceived by a general terminology, such as dogmatics or ontology. The "reality" after the last World War is different from the "reality" after World War I in the depth and quality of relativism, that is to say, the "reality" after the second World War may hardly be recapitulated by a revived dogmatics as after the first World War. For, while the first World War involved mainly the Western nations, the second World War effected the whole world. If the world is so divided, we can hardly establish a "universal" principle for morals as well as for theology. Natural Law which grounds itself on the cosmic basis may hardly be maintained. It is rather true, therefore, that a realistic thinker gave up the traditional idea of Natural Law in order to grapple with this reality squarely. A mere attempt to revive Natural Law in the traditional sense as a universal moral principle may not be able to give anything more than what the Anglican Royalists could do in such a relativistic situation.

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[6] Henry Parker, A Letter of Due Censure, and Redargvtion to Leut. Coll: John Lilburne. . . (1650), p. 29

Nevertheless, and because of the disintegration of cosmo-ontological basis for Natural Law, it becomes more meaningful to grasp and re-establish Natural Law on a personal basis. Like the Levellers, in view of this relativistic situation, we must return to a position of individual person undergirded by the idea of Natural Human Right. Before any attempts may be made to bring society and nature into synthesis, man must be defended and guarded first of all from any destructive powers in the world. We must restore man above a national state, above international relations, and above the divided world. The position of man for which God created him must be restored. This intention should not be mistaken as the revival of Renaissance view of man. We relate ourselves rather to such an ordinary lay-Christian movement, whose spirit was far from that of Renaissance. The idea of Human Right came out of such a lay-Christian movement, in Troeltsch's terminology, it was a step-child of Reformation.

Natural Law being located upon a personal basis, conversely personality as "Right" (viz. Human Right) makes possible a combination of individuality and universality (or else, subjectivity and objectivity). Individuality gives a location of right (in a historically concrete person) and universality renders a basis for demand of right. This is a "personal universality," and insofar as personality is of a historic person, this is a "historical universality." This universality can be regarded as a Protestant modification of the mediaeval version of historical universality, though Protestantism did not take it seriously.

The Levellers' idea of Natural Human Right had a theological, or at least, quasi-theological basis. This fact makes it possible to develop this idea of Natural Right into contemporary use for theological ethics. Let us conclude this thesis with a preliminary attempt of theological reinterpretation.

Barth attempted to endorse Democracy and Human Right materially upon the Christological inner-circle, that is, the Church.[7] But the fact that the church became a true church

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[7] Barth, Rechtfertigung und Recht, (1938), p. 44 "Gerade im Blick auf den intimsten und zentralsten Gehalt der neutestamentlichen Mahnung würde ich also sagen, dass wir uns, wenn irgendwo, dann gerade in der Verlängerung der neutestamentlichen Linie im Sinne des "demokratischen" Staatsbegriffs auf dem Boden legitimer Auslegung befinden." And p. 45, "Es heisst dann doch wohl, dass die entscheidende Leistung der Kirche für den Staat schlicht darin besteht, dass sie ihren Raum als Kirche behauptet und ausfüllt. Indem sie das tut, wird aufs Beste auch für den ganz anderen Raum des Staates gesorgt. Indem sie die göttliche Rechtfertigung verkündigt, wird aufs Beste auch der Aufrichtung und Erhaltung des menschlichen Rechtes gedient."

(Luther's Reformation for example) does not support the rise of Democracy. Rather ironically, the struggle between one "true" church (the Anglican Church for example) and another "true" church (either the Presbyterians or the Independents or the Baptists) was more influential on the rising Democracy. Barth neglected totally the history of the formation of Democracy. For us, Brunner's social ethics is more important. He attempted to ground Democracy in the principle of Natural Law and "Schöpfungsordnungen." His limitation, however, lies in the fact that he did not take historical development of the idea of Natural Law seriously. His idea of "Christian Natural Law" was asserted dogmatically and "unhistorically," so that it is more or less his "opinion." In order to formulate this idea he had recourse to both the Bible and Luther. It is rather paradoxical that the biblical truth in the personal-existential dimension transcends the limitation of history, but such an idea of Natural Law which is supposed to transcend history was curously not always so. Luther's idea of religious personality and love remains valid for all Protestants. But his interpretation of "Schöpfungsordnungen" and Natural Law can not and should not be taken as a truth which is not subject to historical change. Natural Law in New Testament sense was not a clear principle to justify Democracy, certainly not in Luther's sense. A true modern Democracy is supported by such a "historic" idea of Natural Right as emerged during the 17th Century. This fact Dr. Brunner did not realize.

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The idea of Natural Human Right is not one to be ontologico-theologically demonstrated, but it is something to be declared by a common consent. In this way the character of Natural Right as a truth is quite different from the character of Natural Law. Natural Law is simply a universal truth alleged to be objectively valid; whereas Natural Right is a universal truth incarnated in historic subjectivity of person, so that its truth must be declared by subjective engagement of men. Beginning with the Leveller manifestos, embodied in the Bill of Rights and Constitutions of democratic nations, finally it was given an expression of universal validity through the United Nations' Declaration. Insofar as its truthfulness must be declared, the character of Natural Right resembles the truth of the Scriptures, viz. the truth of Gospel for example, which should be proclaimed. The truth of Gospel is a universal truth which was "historically" revealed. This "historical" universal truth is different from a universal truth as of geometry in which the Greek mind was more interested since Socrates. The latter is a truth which can be deduced from Reason by logical necessity, whereas a truth which is incarnated in history is one which should be declared and proclaimed by witnesses.

How possible is it to deal with this idea in our contemporary theological thinking? What is the importance of re-interpretation of this idea for Christian social ethics? The contemporary Christian ethics entered into a dead-end with the question of Love and Justice. This statement of the problem was formulated most sharply by Dr. Brunner. This problem was known throughout the history of Christianity, but Dr. Brunner's statement of problem was new insofar as it was endorsed by theological reflection. His basic position may be regarded to be a theology of encounter. He grounded his "personalism" on this basis. Following Buber and Ebner he made clear the unique dimension of I-Thou relationship. Love is the principle of this personal dimension of life. But outside the realm of Love, otherwise, the realm of I-Thou encounter, Justice is the principle of social relations and institutions. As the Godess of Justice covers her eyes, Justice must not see person and not judge according to "personal" interests. Justice is in essence "impersonal." The dichotomy of Love and Justice is supported by theological presupposition of the dichotomy of "I-character" and "It-character." The character of things outsede the realm of encounter he regarded as "It-character." This theological dichotomy affected his theological construction extensively, for example, his ecclesiology was characterized by the dichotomy of "Ecclesia" (a communion by personal encounter of believers) and "Institutional churches" (the nature of which is It-character.)

We must pay our attention to this fact, that Human Right is neither simply I-character nor simply It-character. This may not be grasped rightly, therefore, by Dr. Brunner's theological scheme. So to speak, this has "He-character" between "I" and "It." Human Right is "personality as Right." Human Right demands man's personality as personality in distinction from things impersonal which are purely of It-character. Human Right as the Right of person is, so to speak, objectified subject, or else, objective person. We must admit "He" as a "person" despite his standing outside the I-Thou encounter.

It is only made possible to grasp the meaning of Natural Human Right theologically, when we overcome Dr. Brunner's theology in this direction. He seems to have made too sharp a distinction between I-character and It-character, between Love and Justice. He based his ethics upon Luther's precedent, but he did not see the important development in Protestantism which overcame the weakness of the Lutheran "Two-Realm theory" and combined the principle of personality and the principle of Natural Law. On our part we had to take seriously the shift from personality in Luther's sense to Human Right in the Levellers. By the Levellers' idea of Human Right, we judge, Luther's idea of religious personality was most successfully transmuted to be a principle of social ethics in the coming modern world. We want to build our social ethics in the line which combines Luther with the Puritan elements. Human Right, as we have seen, was originally a product of Protestant religion and became a world property through the United Nations declaration. Originally this idea was grounded upon individual persons, but now based on the individual it became of universal validity. Protestant Christianity, especially in the Puritan tradition, can endorse this idea from the religious depth of personality, but the fact that there is an objective element in this idea allows other religio-cultural elements to participate in dealing with this idea. Allowing a broader concern, however, Protestantism as a legitimate spirit in this business is to accomplish this task. We take more seriously an idea whcih has been living in history, than any ideas which are dogmatically stated and asserted.

To assume the idea of Natural Human Right into theological ethics may make us able to synthesize a dualistic scheme of Brunner's theology of Revelation and Natural Theology towards a theology of Heilsgeschichte. Let us recall that Natural Right was originally conceived in a heilsgeschichtliche scheme of thought, and in this thought we can accept the element of Natural Theology.

To be sure, Human Right by its "objective" quality can furnish a bridge between a deeply religious dimension of life and a broadly social dimension of life. Through our experience of encounter we are able to distinguish "He" from "It." Encounter is the basis of the discovery of "He." And to treat a man as "He" who is outside the encounter relationship, will save the conception of Christian human relationship from being too narrow. To establish Human Right is to give a society an "inclination" towards encounter relationship of I and Thou, towards the Christological inner-circle, viz. the church, in which personality is fully realized. Contemporary Christian social ethics may find an opning to a hopeful future if it takes the idea of Natural Right (regarded as a Protestant version of historical universality) seriously. The dichotomy of Love and Justice thus may be overcome.

This thesis being rather a historical study, we must develop our systematic treatment on another occasion, but we are sure that our Protestant social ethics must be built upon this unique heritage which is legitimately ours!

-END-

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Curriculum Vitae

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Aizu Middle School in Wakamatsu City, Fukushima-Ken, 1940-1942

Tokyo Military Boys School (Tokyo Rikugun Yônen Gakko), 1942-1945

Tokyo Higher Normal School, 1946-1948

Tokyo Union Theological Seminary, 1948-1956
-the degree of Master in Theology (Shingaku Shushi) 1956

The College of the Bible in Lexington, Ky., 1956-1957

Union Theological Seminary in New York City, 1957-1958
-Master of Sacred Theology, 1958

Career: Licensed to the ministry of the United Church of Christ in Japan, 1954

Minister of the Nakanomomozono Church in Tokyo, 1954-1956

Assistant to Dr. Emil Brunner at International Christian University in Tokyo, 1954-1955

Assistant in the department of Systematic Theology of Tokyo Union Theological Seminary, 1955-1956

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